






   
 National Security Intelligence 
and Ethics 
This volume examines the ethical issues that arise as a result of national security 
intelligence collection and analysis. 
Powerful new technologies enable the collection, communication and analysis 
of national security data on an unprecedented scale. Data collection now plays a 
central role in intelligence practice, yet this development raises a host of ethical and 
national security problems, such as privacy; autonomy; threats to national security 
and democracy by foreign states; and accountability for liberal democracies. 
This volume provides a comprehensive set of in-depth ethical analyses of these 
problems by combining contributions from both ethics scholars and intelligence 
practitioners. It provides the reader with a practical understanding of relevant 
operations, the issues that they raise and analysis of how responses to these issues 
can be informed by a commitment to liberal democratic values. This combination 
of perspectives is crucial in providing an informed appreciation of ethical 
challenges that is also grounded in the realities of the practice of intelligence. 
This book will be of great interest to all students of intelligence studies, ethics, 
security studies, foreign policy and international relations. 
Seumas Miller holds research positions at Charles Sturt University, Australia, TU 
Delft, the Netherlands and the University of Oxford, United Kingdom. 
Mitt Regan is McDevitt Professor of Jurisprudence and Co-Director of the Center 
on National Security and the Law at Georgetown University Law Center, USA. 
He also serves as a senior fellow at the Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership at 
the U.S. Naval Academy. 
Patrick F. Walsh is a former intelligence analyst and Associate Professor of 
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Seumas Miller, Mitt Regan and Patrick F. Walsh 
The national security intelligence environment is undergoing profound changes. 
Powerful new technologies enable the collection, communication and analysis 
of national security data on an unprecedented scale and now have a central role 
in intelligence practice. The Snowden leaks and other events have prompted 
considerable debate over how best to reconcile privacy with effective security 
intelligence collection in the face of such technologies, as well as how to ensure 
effective accountability of intelligence agencies. In addition, the threat of trans-
national terrorism has challenged traditional institutional arrangements based on 
the distinction between domestic and foreign intelligence. The increasing use of 
algorithms in intelligence operations also raises a wide range of issues regarding 
the human-machine relationship in these operations, the ability to exploit such 
technology to disrupt elections and other political processes, and the stability of 
traditional analyst culture in the intelligence community. Furthermore, that com-
munity itself is under increasing scrutiny with respect to its independence vis-à-
vis political decision makers. These are but a few of the urgent challenges facing 
intelligence operations by liberal democracies that call for rigorous and innova-
tive analysis rooted in appreciation of the core values of the liberal democratic 
tradition. That analysis, however, must also be rooted in an understanding of the 
dynamics of intelligence operations. 
Historically, the intelligence studies literature has been slow to identify the eth-
ical dimensions of intelligence practice for organizations and its practitioners and 
to date there have been no works that provide a relatively comprehensive set of 
analyses of the ethical issues in national security intelligence collection, analysis 
and dissemination. Moreover, the growing complexity of the security environ-
ment (e.g. CBRN – chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear – threats posed 
by non-state actors, use of intelligence and surveillance tools to combat pandem-
ics such as COVID-19, the blurring of domestic and international security, glo-
balization and rapid growth of cyber technology) make especially urgent the need 
for ethical analyses to be informed by relevant empirical work. Scholars from 
intelligence studies background, or knowledgeable practitioners with a depth of 
understanding of the actual practices and problems confronted by the intelligence 
community are the best source of such work. In this edited collection, we have 
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in national security intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination, and in 
doing so we have brought together both scholars and practitioners. 
Most of the chapters originated as contributions to two research workshops 
held at the University of Oxford and Georgetown University, respectively, in 2019 
under the auspices of a European Research Council Advanced grant on counter-
terrorism ethics and an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant on national 
security intelligence ethics. 
The collection is divided into six parts. The first part, “The just intelligence 
model”, is theoretical in character and comprises three chapters. Ross Bellaby 
argues that the currently most influential normative theory of intelligence activi-
ties, the so-called Just Intelligence Model derived from Just War Theory, offers 
a number of underlying ethical contributions that can help us better understand 
when intelligence should be licensed and when it should be limited. In Chapter 2, 
Seumas Miller offers analyses of the key principles of discrimination, necessity 
and proportionality – each of which is a constitutive principle of the Just Intel-
ligence Model. He shows in general terms how they apply, or ought to apply, to 
national security intelligence activity. He also argues that there is an additional 
normative principle governing espionage, in particular, that is not constitutive of 
the Just Intelligence Model, namely, a principle of reciprocity. In the final chapter 
in this part, David Omand and Mark Phythian shift the focus onto new technol-
ogy and consider ethical issues such as intelligence agency and law enforcement 
access to bulk data sets, and the use of AI and algorithms to search and mine them. 
They argue that these issues in “techno-ethics” can be informed by principles 
derived from Just War Theory and seek to address the question as to how far these 
principles can be used as the basis of a model that can guide thinking about the 
technoethics of contemporary intelligence practice. 
The second part, “Espionage”, comprises four chapters. In Chapter 4, David 
Perry examines a broad range of ethical issues, challenges and dilemmas in 
human intelligence (HUMINT), and assesses how best to interpret them in con-
nection with several important prima facie ethical principles. Recognizing that 
the motivations of espionage agents can be complex and varied, Perry frames his 
analysis in terms of agents’ freedom of action, distinguishing between those who 
act voluntarily, those who are deceived by false-flag tactics and those who are 
compelled by threats of blackmail and the like. In the following chapter, Michael 
Skerker focuses on the rights of foreign intelligence targets. He articulates a con-
servative cosmopolitan model for just intelligence collection directing all states 
with a certain character to adhere to the same norms when and if they engage in 
intelligence collection on foreign targets. 
Students of the history of espionage and readers of spy novels alike will be 
well aware of the phenomenon of so-called sleeper-cells. In Chapter 6 in this 
part Kevin Macnish introduces and discusses what he refers to as digital sleeper 
cells. These consist in code which can be placed on an adversary’s network and 
left dormant for a period of time, before being activated if, and when, needed. 
Such new opportunities bring with them new risks, including ethical risks. In 






coalition states provide intelligence to other coalition partners while knowing that 
there is some possibility that an operational partner state may use that intelligence 
to undertake an activity that does not correspond with the legal obligations that 
apply to the “providing” state. Reviewing some of the challenges involved in 
sharing intelligence among coalition partners can help to identify where the legal 
and ethical risk lies for coalition states so that conscious decisions regarding intel-
ligence sharing can be included in the planning of such operations. 
The third part, “Bulk data collection and analysis”, comprises two chapters. 
In Chapter 8, Tom Sorell addresses the question as to whether or not bulk data 
collection is morally legitimate on balance because of its operational utility for 
the security services, and the overriding importance of the purposes that these 
services pursue, notwithstanding the violations of privacy involved. In Chapter 
9, Jessica Davis focuses on the ethical implications of current data collection and 
analysis practices being used to combat COVID-19, such as collecting data on 
citizens from cell phones, financial transactions, and social media intelligence, 
and combining it with health data. She argues that parallels can be drawn between 
the global pandemic and the post-9/11 era, which saw significant broadening of 
state surveillance and intelligence powers around the world – powers that were 
never rolled back, and have instead became part of the fabric of the state intel-
ligence and security apparatus. 
The fourth part, “Covert operations”, comprises two chapters. In Chapter 10, 
Loch Johnson explores the legal foundations of covert action, along with the 
degree to which these methods are subjected to accountability; its successes and 
failures around the world; and, central throughout the analysis, the ethical issues 
posed by its use. He suggests that there have been positives, for example its use 
in its paramilitary forms as a supplement to overt US warfare, and negatives, for 
example the excessive use of drone assassinations by the United States. In Chapter 
11, Nicholas Melgaard and David Whetham focus on information warfare. They 
explore the ethical landscape of information warfare in the twenty-first century 
and examine the principles that should govern the way liberal democracies under-
stand both the behaviour of other actors and also their own activities in this area. 
The fifth part, “Accountability”, comprises three chapters. As past and recent 
history demonstrates, it is of great importance that national security intelligence 
agencies are subjected to accountability by way of robust institutional mecha-
nisms. This is especially crucial in light of the fact that, in contrast with many 
other political activities, there can be significant limits to public transparency 
about operations of the intelligence community. Chapter 12 by Genevieve Lester 
and Frank Leith Jones describes the historical dynamics that led to the adop-
tion of the US system of accountability in relation to intelligence activities. They 
argue that the development of intelligence oversight in the United States has been 
driven by the executive-legislative relationship. Chapter 13 by Mary B. DeRosa 
focuses on the effectiveness of congressional oversight of US intelligence activi-
ties. The United States has adopted the most detailed system of external oversight 
of the intelligence community, which has served as an impetus for increasing 
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Regan and Michele Poole examines oversight of covert action, an area in which 
it is especially challenging to ensure accountability. It provides a useful compara-
tive perspective by analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the US and the UK 
approaches to oversight of this activity. 
The sixth part, “Future directions”, comprises three chapters. In Chapter 15, 
Robert Cardillo focuses on the new and emerging GEOINT technologies and sug-
gests that its holistic collection practices will facilitate a detailed model of the 
planet and much that is happening on it. He suggests that there are many benefits 
of such a model, including natural disaster preparedness and response, enhanced 
measurements of the environment and real-time detection of nefarious actors. 
However, Cardillo also argues that such a world will demand a radical rethink-
ing of privacy, requiring us to find the optimum balance between the benefits of 
this technology, their implications for our privacy and the potential for misuse. 
Exploring that balance is the overriding purpose of his chapter. Chapter 16, Pat-
rick F. Walsh assesses CBRN threats posed by non-state actors. It explores how 
these threats have diverged from classical WMD scenarios (that shaped the Cold 
War) to ones where threat trajectories are less certain due to an increasing number 
of complex political, social and technological factors. The focus is on how non-
state actor CBRN threats may evolve in the future rather than state-based ones. In 
the final chapter, Gregory F. Treverton assesses challenges for the future of intelli-
gence, many of which have long been with us but are newly reconfigured: balanc-
ing tactical and strategic intelligence; building and adjusting stories in a shapeless 
world; dealing with transparency and big data; finding new ways to add value; 
intelligence as an argument for policy; breaking the tired intelligence cycle and 
dealing with new competitors who are also potential colleagues. Treverton says 
that would have been his list of challenges had Donald Trump not been elected 
president. However, Treverton suggests that the Trump administration scrambled 
the deck, injecting enormous uncertainty. It raised the last and most worrisome 
challenge: how to deal with a world in which truth is personal or subjective, and, 
indeed, the very idea of truth is under attack. 
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 1 Intelligence and the just war
tradition 
The need for a flexible ethical 
framework 
 Ross Bellaby 
 Introduction 
It is impossible to think of one “just war doctrine”, with a single point of lineal 
development from a single idea. Rather, “just war” is better thought of as a set of 
“recurrent issues and themes in the discussion of warfare . . . reflecting a general 
philosophical orientation towards the subject” ( Clark 1988 , 31) – a collection of 
underlying ethical arguments that have evolved over time in response to security 
challenges. As a broad body of thought the just war tradition “remains one of 
the most popular frameworks for evaluating the morality of war and warfare” 
( Fitzsimmons 2015 , 1069); 1 influencing and becoming reflected in political rheto-
ric and legal cannon.2 Indeed, many theorists have adapted the just war tradition 
to tackle emerging ethical-security problems of the day, from acts of terrorism 
and counter-terrorism policy, 3 drone warfare,4 biosecurity, 5 private military com-
panies6 and civil wars.7 
For intelligence the ethical dilemma faced includes recognizing and reconcil-
ing that it necessarily includes practices that “unavoidably entail doing some-
thing that is seriously contrary to the moral rules accepted as governing most 
human activity” ( Quinlan 2007 , 2) with the argument that without secret intelli-
gence states cannot “understand sufficiently the nature of some important threats” 
( Omand 2007 , 116). That on the one hand it can be argued that over the last cen-
tury intelligence has become one of the most vital tools a political community has 
in providing timely information designed to serve and protect its members and, 
as such, represents an ethical good. While on the other hand, it can also be argued 
that secret intelligence often necessarily involves violating people’s vital interest 
in privacy and autonomy and so there should be limits on its use. There is a need, 
therefore, for an ethical framework that can evaluate and reconcile these two ten-
sions, offering both a limitation on the harm that is caused by intelligence collec-
tion, while also outlining exactly when this harm is justified. By establishing the 
criteria of just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, last resort, proportion-
ality and discrimination, it can be argued that the harm intelligence can cause is 
limited while also outlining if and when its use is justified. 
There are, however, some key concerns levied at using the just war tradition 
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them is that intelligence is not a war. That is, a lot of what intelligence does 
focuses on domestic surveillance with activities closer to police work; it is not 
on a battlefield, weighing up the costs of killing the soldier in front of you, but 
rather involves extensive and systematic collection of data. Intelligence is not 
necessarily about examining the ethical cost of killing an individual in order to 
protect one’s own or another’s life. It is about data collection and analysis in order 
to prevent threats from actually causing significant harm to another. For some, 
therefore, it is better if intelligence was located within the political as compared to 
the security sphere, where questions on its activity should reflect existing domes-
tic oversight structures. There are concerns that equating intelligence with war 
makes its activities too permissive; the supreme emergency often associated with 
war heightens the pressure to act and lowers the ethical threshold, making it an ill 
fit for a broad set of activities which are often carried out in times of peace and 
against one’s own population. 
However, while intelligence is not war, it is also not police work. Indeed, 
although it is actually difficult to place a clear set of boundaries around what intel-
ligence is – as it ranges from data collection and analysis to more active forms of 
paramilitary operations – intelligence is quintessentially an activity that concerns 
itself with “national security”, dealing with threats greater in their impact both in 
terms of areas of national importance and number of people affected. It is tasked 
with detecting threats that can represent a significant harm to a large number of 
individuals and works within the national security infrastructure to provide secu-
rity to the community as a whole. The argument put forward here, therefore, is 
that by looking at the underlying tensions presented by intelligence activity and 
the justifications found within the just war tradition a set of specialized just intel-
ligence principles can be established. 
Indeed, on a theoretical level the just war tradition gives an important starting 
point in the need to understand the fundamental harm caused to the individual – 
that is, the impact it has on our most fundamental vital interests – and how this 
relates to the harm that the national security agenda is seeking to prevent. Just 
as the just war tradition recognizes a general presumption against killing to be 
justified within a set of given limits, the impacts of secret keeping on people’s 
autonomy and other vital interests means there is also a general presumption 
against secrecy unless a direct justification is given ( Calhoun 2001 ). The tradition 
then invites us to break down the justification into a set of ethical sub-questions 
and debates to be had that, in combination, provide an extensive understanding 
as to whether the act is just or not. These criteria are well versed in dealing with 
the types of ethical debates that are raised in the security sphere, drawing on both 
absolutist and utilitarian questions and concerns. For example, the principle of 
just cause asks us to consider the underlying reason given for why the harm is 
justified, drawing on wider ethical arguments on self-defence and the duty of 
the state to protect the political community, explored through hypotheticals and 
real-life or historical cases to understand what reasons are justifiable for differ-
ent acts. The principle of legitimate authority places the political community at 
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those external structures that are pulled into the protective shield of secrecy to 
lose much of their potency. While the principle of proportionality delineates what 
costs and benefits should be included in the calculation and ensures that the over-
all benefit is in the positive, the principle of discrimination seeks to distinguish the 
rights and obligations the state has to different groups of people, outlining who is 
a legitimate target and who is protected. Not only does the just war tradition direct 
us to ask certain ethical questions that are relevant in the security world but it also 
establishes a body of thought to guide the types of debates we should be having, 
and the variety of answers available to us. 
One important difference, however, between war and intelligence is that in the 
former there is a sharp distinction between the justice of going to war,  jus ad 
bellum, and the justice of actions within war,  jus in bello. This distinction does 
not work when we consider cyber-intelligence collection. There is not the same 
division between evaluating and sanctioning the general act of intelligence col-
lection and the carrying out of the variety of acts under this authorization that is 
seen with war. There is no “time of war/time of peace” distinction for intelligence, 
but rather operations are running continuously. So, with intelligence, the evalu-
ation must be done continuously, whereby each operation must fulfil all the just 
cyber-intelligence principles described later, with an operation being sanctioned 
according to who is being targeted, taking into account whether there is a specific 
just cause for the operation, ensuring that there is a right intention, and that the 
method chosen is proportionate the proposed gains. 
Adapting just war for just intelligence 
Reconceptualizing the idea of security 
In order to create this new ethical framework how we conceive of “security” needs 
reconceptualizing. While Zedner is correct in that security is another “promiscu-
ous concept” ( Zedner 2009 , 9) – ranging in content, referent object and means of 
provision8 – the value of security, and from there the right or expectation to have 
security, for this chapter is directly linked to the value that an individual has in 
maintaining their vital interests.9 That is, security is the condition by which one’s 
vital interests are maintained and protected. This means contemplating security 
as the processes and protections designed to maintain people’s vital interests. For 
example, at its core the vital interest in maintaining one’s physical integrity gives 
rise to the understanding of security as personal safety, thus “usually understood 
to refer to the protection against physical or other harm” and to provide secu-
rity therefore includes “the prevention of or resilience against deliberate attack” 
( Schneier 2006 , 12). 10 Or, in terms of privacy, security refers to the protections 
one has, both physically and symbolically, that prevent outsiders from intruding 
on private spaces or accessing personal information without authorization. 
Security is therefore not separate from people’s interests, but an overarching 
formula by which they are ensured, and the role of the state is to negotiate the 
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protections so that individuals can fulfil their own version of the good life. The 
provision of security means understanding the complex interrelation between an 
individual’s vital interests and offering them the necessary protections, and that 
harming someone is the way and degree to which these vital interests are violated. 
What this understanding provides is a way of detailing the impact, or harm, that 
intelligence can have on individuals, which can then be reconciled with the threat 
the intelligence community is seeking to prevent. Importantly, this means that 
security and human rights are not opposing attributes to be “balanced” against 
each other but are different aspects of the same phenomenon. Indeed, narratives 
that portray security and liberties as opposing qualities that must be traded or 
balanced, while pervasive, are dangerous ( Waldron 2003 ;  Pozen 2015 ;  McArthur 
2001 ). By framing it as a trade-off between privacy and security, where you can 
have either security or privacy but not both and, importantly, where security is 
seen as a trump card ( Thompson 2001 ;  Dragu 2011 ;  Bambauer 2013 ), 11 it is not 
surprising that “After 9/11 countries around the globe unhesitatingly adopted poli-
cies to enhance their government’s capacity to prevent terrorism . . . at the expense 
of individual civil liberties” ( Dragu 2011 ). 12 While Jeremy Waldron warns that 
even these framings are problematic in terms of unequal distribution of the trade-
off, unclear returns for any given exchange and the problem of trading liberties 
at will ( Waldron 2003 ), it is argued here that these framings fail to see how the 
matrix of vital interests should be taken as a whole, viewed holistically in order 
to provide an individual with enough of his vital interests that he can carry out his 
goals, and therefore be deemed secure. This means that “the overlapping or even 
isomorphic relationship between privacy and security is far more subtle than it 
might be imagined and cannot be glossed over by a rhetoric of ‘opposed’ rights or 
values of security and privacy” ( Raab 2017 ). 
Therefore, it is important to understand the harm that an intelligence activity 
represents through its aim of providing security to people so that this can be rec-
onciled with the harm that it seeks to prevent by forestalling a threat from being 
realized. As a process this means, first, recognizing that while some vital interests 
such as physical and mental integrity might appear to take precedence over the 
other interests such as autonomy, liberty, self-worth or privacy, they should be 
taken together as a complex matrix that all need to be maintained.13 That in main-
taining the security of the individual an excess of one vital interest will not neces-
sarily make up for the lacking of another interest: an excess of physical security 
cannot be used as a justification for undermining people’s privacy; it cannot be 
argued that people are physically very safe in exchange for having no privacy 
( Feinberg 1984 , 37;  Rescher 1972 , 5). 
Secondly, in making this calculation, it is important to understand that these 
vital interests are not binary, whole one minute and utterly destroyed the next, 
but exist to varying degrees given the context. The negotiation therefore involves 
understanding which and to what extent both the state and a perpetrator are threat-
ening vital interest(s). For example, privacy can be perceived as consisting of 
different levels where the more personal or intimate the information, the greater 
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must be a greater threat to someone’s other vital interests to justify the privacy 
intervention. Part of this negotiation is understanding whether the target has acted 
in some way so as to waive or forfeit their immediate vital interests, the potential 
threat to other people’s vital interests represented by the aggressing actor and that 
the state is itself not representing the greater threat to our vital interests. 
Proportional problems and proportional responses 
I have spoken elsewhere about a metaphorical “ladder of escalation” which can 
be used to separate out different intelligence collection activities according to the 
harm they cause, which can be set against the level of threat they seek to prevent. 
This flexibility allows for a differentiation across the large range of intelligence 
activities and situations with a flexible set of just intelligence principles, each with 
their own series of internal spectrums or proportional calculations. For example, 
in terms of just cause and self-defence the type of defence one should muster 
should be proportional to the type of threat. That is, if the threat is of lesser mag-
nitude than killing or severe suffering, while there might not be a justification to 
kill in self-defence there could be justification for a low-level physical response, 
loss of property and resources, or sanctions ( Pattison 2018 ). For intelligence, this 
means the justified intelligence activity should reflect the potential threat repre-
sented. Equally, for authority then different measures need to be in place to offer 
flexible but increasing oversight as the harm caused goes up, whereby the level of 
blame is not diminished but more securely located with those in charge. While for 
discrimination this allows those tangentially involved with a threat to be included 
for low-level intelligence activities, while being protected from more intrusive 
forms lest evidence shows they have a greater involvement. 
 Temporal quality 
One of the key differences between war and intelligence is that in the former the 
threat is relatively known, whereas intelligence activity can, and should, come 
long before the threat is known for it is the purpose of the intelligence operative to 
locate the threat in the first instance. Therefore, intelligence can involve targeting 
individuals before their threat status is known, which means decisions are being 
made on whether or not to use an intelligence activity before one is able to make 
an ethical calculation as to whether it is justified or not. In order to reconcile this 
it is necessary to think of intelligence as a form of pre-emptive or preventive 
self-defence. This is based on the argument that there is a distinction between 
“self-defence against present definite threats . . . definite future threats . . . as 
well as indefinite potential threats” ( Lee 2018 , 346; Walzer 2015 ). For example, 
pre-emptive self-defence counters threats that, while not realized, have a clear 
likelihood and close temporal quality, while preventive self-defence has a much 
broader temporal range, being years down the line or where it is unclear if the 
threat will materialize. By understanding intelligence as a flexible, proportional 
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gather initial information on a situation and target, and then use this information 
to either escalate up through more harmful intelligence activities or by abandon-
ing the target. 
Developing and applying just intelligence principles 
Following from these initial principles a set of “just intelligence principles” can 
be created. These principles reflect the underlying ethical arguments found within 
the just war tradition but are appropriately adapted for intelligence activity. These 
just intelligence principles are as follows ( Bellaby 2014 , 109): 
• Just cause: there must be a sufficient threat to justify the harm that might be 
caused by the intelligence collection activity. 
• Authority: there must be legitimate authority, representing the political com-
munity’s interests, sanctioning the activity. 
• Intention: the means should be used for the intended purpose and not for 
other (political, economic, social) objectives. 
• Proportionality: the harm that is perceived to be caused should be outweighed 
by the perceived gains. 
• Last resort: less harmful acts should be attempted before more harmful ones 
are chosen. 
• Discrimination: there should be discrimination between legitimate and ille-
gitimate targets. 
While a direct transfer of the just war tradition’s principles to just intelligence 
is both inaccurate and unhelpful, by following the underlying ethical arguments 
made they can be applied to different areas of intelligence activity. 
 Just cause 
The criteria of “just cause” is often considered to be one of the most important of 
the just war principles as it outlines the main reason for going to war and the main 
argument for its ethical justification. Over the years, acting in self-defence has 
been defined as the main, acceptable just cause for going to war. In comparison, 
the just cause equivalent for intelligence collection could be interpreted as pre-
venting the realization of a threat against the political community. This is because 
it is the role of the intelligence to firstly detect, provide information on and initiate 
some prevention of any and all threats that face the political community. In this 
way, depending on the nature of the threat, it can act as a just cause to justify the 
use of the intelligence activity and the harm it can cause. Therefore, by acting to 
detect and prevent these threats intelligence activity works as an act of a preven-
tive self-defence, averting the actualization of threats against the political com-
munity ( Bellaby 2014 , 26). 
However, protecting the political community is more than just protecting the 
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just cause is not necessarily to balance these, but to highlight what they are and 
interrogate them.14 Reconciling these different conceptions of security and deter-
mining if there is a suitable threat to the political community means understanding 
the threat from both other actors’ and the state’s own national security efforts if 
they excessively or unnecessarily violate people’s vital interests. For example, 
when the National Security Agency (NSA) programmes to collect as much infor-
mation as possible (through surveillance programs referred to as Upstream, Quan-
tuminsert, Tempora) were revealed, by doing this the intelligence services were 
seen to be significantly violating the privacy of people en masse ( Feinberg 1984 , 
35; Bellaby 2016 ). Therefore while there was not a just cause for such intelligence 
activity because there was no clear, direct threat to act as a justification, there is in 
fact a just cause for someone to reveal the information and blow the whistle given 
the harm being caused. What this means for intelligence is that there is actually 
a just cause for revealing the secret activity of the intelligence community when 
their activity itself represents a threat to the political community. When the state, 
or its representatives, is the source of an unjustified threat to the individual’s and 
society’s vital interests then there is a just cause to act. 
 Just authority 
In the just war tradition the principle of legitimate authority determines that in 
order for a war to be considered morally permissible it must be authorized by the 
right (or legitimate) authority. That is, those who have the right to command by 
virtue of their position: “since the care of the common weal is committed to those 
who are in the right authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal” 
( Aquinas 2002 , 214). This authorizing actor must have both the moral weight of 
representing and protecting the needs of the political community and ensuring 
practical considerations such as having the physical, intellectual and emotional 
ability to take into account the different factors involved while limiting personal 
costs or bias. While traditionally the legitimate authority rested with the state and 
its representatives as the most appropriate actor to fulfil these needs, this does not 
necessarily have to be the case. The state will often represent a good choice as it 
has extensive experience and a wide breadth of knowledge and in many instances 
is a manifestation of the political community’s best form of protection and ability 
to represent the wishes of the people. However, at its core the just war tradition 
seeks to place authority within those who best represent and will act in the inter-
ests of the political community and its people. What this means is that when the 
state fails in this task or begins to represent the source of the problem then there 
is a need to rest the legitimate authority elsewhere. 
Initially, therefore, this should (uncontentiously) mean bringing oversight out 
of the intelligence community’s purview as those planning, performing or manag-
ing operations have heavily invested interests. However, while this oversight has 
traditionally been placed predominantly in the hands of the executive, with addi-
tional oversight through the legislature and judiciary, historically many admin-
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repercussions for members of government and embarrassment for the administra-
tion as a whole ( Wells 2004 , 1203; Ambinder 2013 , 6). Existing institutions have 
proven unable to act without bias and act outside their political objectives, and 
are therefore ill-suited for balancing the ethical and security concerns. Indeed, 
Rahul Sagar has shown that in the United States “Given the President’s stronghold 
over the flow of national security information, there is little reason to believe that 
lawmakers will be able to take the lead in uncovering policies and actions” ( Sagar 
2016 , 128). 15 Whereas in terms of the judiciary he argues that “judges are not 
trained, and the courts not equipped, to make politically charged decisions about 
what state secrets are appropriate” coupled with a “judicial deference towards 
the executive’s claims about the harm likely to be caused by the disclosures” 
( Sagar 2016 , 74). Moreover, in those courts where the whole proceedings are kept 
secret – the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court being a notable case – the 
secrecy limits opportunity for engaged reflection and debate on the legal inter-
pretation as judicial peer review and the right to appeal is prevented.16 What this 
highlights is that these existing political structures lack the physical power to keep 
the intelligence community in check, and are insufficient in manpower, intellec-
tual mandate or drive to do so or cannot separate their own political interests from 
their role as overseer. The problem seen is that the secrecy necessarily attached to 
intelligence is extended over the political oversight mechanisms, which in turn 
insulates them from the piercing power of democratic observation and rather than 
these actors interrogating intelligence they become habitualized by a national 
security elitism that distorts their oversight role. 
Rather, there needs to be a new, proactive and imbedded set of oversight mech-
anisms to systematically examine conduct and information collected to determine 
if it should be released or not.17 In designing this new oversight actor several prin-
ciples can be highlighted. First, at its core the principle of legitimate authority dis-
tils the idea that the review should be examined before rather than after the event. 
The wars must pass the initial criteria before any attack is deemed legitimate. This 
means that the review should be penetrative. The oversight actor should have the 
power and expectation to review operations, policies, practices and trends within 
the intelligence community in real time, including whether there are tendencies 
towards too much secret keeping as well as acting to review individual cases to 
determine if they should keep the information or not. 
Secondly, since the authority should represent the political community, it does 
not have to be limited to state representatives nor do they necessarily have to be 
elected or subject to populous demands – as restricting it in this way can be more 
detrimental to the actual review. Therefore, alternative representative mecha-
nisms can be utilized such as using legal, moral and societal experts or repre-
sentatives, chosen because of their expertise rather than because of their elected 
status. In order to avoid the same popular pressures faced by elected officials 
they should not be subjected to direct democratic elections, but rather represent 
experts in the relevant fields of intelligence oversight, preferably legally trained, 
nominated and confirmed by the legislative in a public debate where their suit-
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Thirdly, to limit the distortive effect of political interference the body should be 
able to determine for itself what information should be released free from political 
censure. If it detects intelligence activity that contravenes the principles outlined 
in the other criteria it should be free to determine for itself what to reveal accord-
ing to the interests of the community and free from worries of political scandal. 
 Last resort 
In the just war tradition the need that war only be undertaken as a last resort is an 
attempt to allow those means that can cause a lower level of harm, like diplomacy 
or economic pressure, to be given a chance to resolve the issue before the higher 
harms seen in war are permitted. This way the more harmful acts are avoided 
if possible. Based on this conception of last resort, one can argue for a similar 
rationale for the just intelligence principles. In order for an intelligence collection 
means to be just it must only be used once other less harmful means have been 
exhausted or are redundant. In this way, the principle of last resort ensures that the 
intelligence collection means with the lowest level harm is used first in an attempt 
to deal with the threat, and thus give the opportunity for more harmful activities 
to be avoided. While there is no rigid methodology or steps that must be worked 
through, it does require that some of the more harmful actions are not resorted to 
out of ease or expediency. 
Proportionality 
The idea of proportionality is one of the oldest principles not only of the just war 
tradition but also of moral theory and armed strategy in general. Leaders and 
individuals alike often weigh up the costs of an action against what can be gained 
from it. The notion of proportionality seeks to ensure that the harm caused in war 
is proportionate to the threat that it is meant to overcome, placing a limit on the 
amount of harm allowed for a given action. What is important is that all the harms 
are included in the calculation and only those benefits that are directly linked 
to the just cause should count ( Hurka 2005 ;  McKenna 1960 ;  Regan 1996 ). For 
example, in terms of war while we would not consider the boost to the economy 
as a relevant good, the fact that it might hurt the economy would be counted as 
a negative. Therefore, while wider damages can be included when assessing the 
need to release the information only specific goods directly relating to the just 
cause can be included when arguing for information retention. 
Similar to the consequentialist calculation one can argue that in order for the 
intelligence collection to be just the level of harm that one perceives to be caused 
by the collection should be outweighed by the perceived gains. As David Omand 
asks, “is the likely impact of the proposed intelligence gathering operation, taking 
account of the methods to be used, in proportion to the seriousness of the business 
at hand in terms of the harm it seeks to prevent?” ( Omand 2007 , 162). On the one 
hand the costs and gains can be examined in terms of Herman’s “balance sheet” 
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can be integrated into an ethical balance sheet” ( Herman 2002 , 290). This moral 
accounting allows us to balance the overall good effect of intelligence knowledge 
against some of the less desirable methods. If it is discovered “at the bottom of 
the ledger that the benefits of intelligence knowledge is found to be in credit, then 
the means employed to gather intelligence can be morally justified by the positive 
impact of knowledge acquired” ( Erskine 2004 , 366). 
In addition to these direct costs, however, we need to include wider costs such 
as the impact on individuals’ autonomy, society, degradation to important social 
norms and practices and the cohesion of the political community. Richard Mat-
thews argues that no individual is an island, but is a part of a complex set of social 
networks that are also damaged when someone is affected by intelligence prac-
tice: “its run-on effect is well documented and involves wide-ranging pain and 
suffering across the communities and contexts” ( Matthews 2012 , 466). For exam-
ple, additional costs associated with intelligence collection activities can include 
degradation to social cohesion as minorities are over-represented and excessively 
targeted, marginalizing them from the greater social whole and reinforcing dis-
torted criminal statistics, often with individuals unaware that their information is 
being used ( Bennetto 2005 , 5). 
Discrimination 
The requirement that an attack must discriminate between combatants and non-
combatants is one of the most stridently codified just war rules and is reflected 
in the international law of war as such. Soldiers charged with the deployment of 
force and violence cannot do so indiscriminately. They have an obligation to exert 
a particular effort to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets. The 
target has to have “something about them” to justify being a legitimate target 
( Nagel 1979 , 124). That is, either the target represented a threat of some form and 
attacking him is justified as an act of self-defence, or that when the individual 
became a soldier he waived his normal protective rights in some way. 
For intelligence one can argue that, just as soldiers are legitimate targets 
because they are a threat and they give up certain protective rights, arguably any 
individual can act in a way as to make themselves a threat or to forfeit certain 
protective rights. Holding a particular job; being in possession of important infor-
mation and being a member of a state’s infrastructure are all examples of how 
an individual can make himself liable for the threat or consent to the waiving or 
forfeiting of certain rights. For example, “consent to participate in the world of 
national security on all levels of a country’s self-defence structure together with 
the quality of the information possessed” puts the individual liable to the threat 
and as such justifies them as targets ( Pfaff and Tiel 2004 , 6). 
Notes 
1 For a summary of the various different historical thematic and contemporary intellectual 
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2 For political use, see Kelsay (2013 ). For the principle of discrimination, see Article 48, 
first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions; for the principle of proportionality, 
see Article 51(4b), first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions; for the principle 
of just cause, see Article 51 UN Charter. 
3 For example, see Lowe (2003 ),  Walzer (2006 ), Crawford (2003 ), Sussmann (2013 ), 
 Valls (2000 ) and  Steinhoff (2004 ). 
4 For example, see  Williams (2015 ). 
5 For example, see van der Bruggen (2013 ). 
6 For example, see  Fitzsimmons (2015 ) and  Pattison (2008 ). 
7 For example, see  Meisels (2014 ) and  Scheid (2012 ). 
8 For work on “security studies” and the changes in referent object, the construction of 
security threats and security actors, see Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1997 ),  Browning 
and McDonald (2011 )  and Katzenstein (1996 ). 
9 For more on there being a “right” to security, see  Lazarus (2007 ), ( 2012 ). 
10 This is different from the instrumentalist arguments made by people such as Henry Shue 
whereby security is necessary for the enjoyment of other rights. See Lazarus (2012 ). 
11 For arguments against security necessarily trumping privacy, see  Moore (2011 ). For 
arguments for security trumping privacy, see  Himma (2007 ). 
12 Also see  Ackerman (2006 ) and  Hardin (2004 ). 
13 Isaiah Berlin declared that in much the same way that boots were more important than 
the words of Shakespeare, liberty and autonomy are not necessarily the total first needs 
of an individual ( Berlin 1969 , 124). 
14 For McMahan the principle of proportionality is therefore directly connected to the prin-
ciple of just cause as it enables the balancing of the just cause against the various poten-
tial harm to be caused by the act of war ( McMahan 2005 ). 
15 Also see  Born (2003 , 22). 
16 For the role of the right to appeal and the importance of multi-layered court systems, see 
Dalton (1985 ),  Lennerfors (2007 )  and Nobles and Schiff (2002 ). 
17 This builds on Rahul Sagar’s discussion on the limits of retrospection as a form of over-
sight ( Sagar 2007 , 414–17). 
 References 
Ackerman, Bruce. 2006. Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of 
Terrorism: Emergency Powers in an Age of Terrorism. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Ambinder, Marc. 2013.  Deep State: Inside the Government Secrecy Industry. Hoboken, 
New Jersey: Wiley. 
Aquinas, Thomas. 2002. “From Summa Theologiae”. In  International Relations in Politi-
cal Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, edited by Chris 
Brown, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Bambauer, Derek E. 2013. “Privacy versus Security”.  Journal of Criminal Law and Crimi-
nology 103 (3): 667–83. 
Bellaby, Ross W. 2014. The Ethics of Intelligence: A New Framework. London; New York: 
Routledge. 
———. 2016. “Justifying Cyber-Intelligence?”  Journal of Military Ethics 15 (4): 299– 
319.  https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2017.1284463 . 
Bennetto, Jason. 2005. Police and Racism: What Has Been Achieved 10 Years after the 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report? London: Equality and Human Rights Commission. 






































18 Ross Bellaby 
Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Four Essays on Liberty. London; New York etc.: Oxford Paperbacks. 
Born, Hans. 2003. Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mecha-
nisms and Practices. Edited by Philipp Fluri, Anders B. Johnsson, and Born Hans. 
Geneva: IPU-DCAF. 
Browning, Christopher S., and Matt McDonald. 2011. “The Future of Critical Security 
Studies: Ethics and the Politics of Security”. European Journal of International Rela-
tions , October.  https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066111419538 . 
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1997.  Security: A New Framework for Anal-
ysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Calhoun, Laurie. 2001. “The Metaethical Paradox of Just War Theory”.  Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice 4 (1): 41–58. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011440213213 . 
Clark, Ian. 1988. Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford; New York: Claren-
don Press. 
Crawford, Neta C. 2003. “Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War”.  Perspectives 
on Politics 1 (1): 5–25. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592703000021 . 
Dalton, Harlon. 1985. “Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously”.  Yale Law 
Journal 95 (1): 62–107. 
Dragu, Tiberiu. 2011. “Is There a Trade-off between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, 
Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention”.  American Political Science Review 105 
(1): 64–78. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000614 . 
Erskine, Toni. 2004. “‘As Rays of Light to the Human Soul’? Moral Agents and Intelli-
gence Gathering”. Intelligence and National Security 19 (2): 359–81. https://doi.org/10. 
1080/0268452042000302047. 
Feinberg, Joel. 1984.  The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others v. 1. New 
York: Oxford University Press Inc. 
Fitzsimmons, Scott. 2015. “Just War Theory and Private Security Companies”. Interna-
tional Affairs 91 (5): 1069–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12398 . 
Hardin, Russell. 2004. “Civil Liberties in the Era of Mass Terrorism”.  The Journal of Eth-
ics 8 (1): 77–95. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOET.0000012253.54321.05 . 
Herman, Michael. 2002. Intelligence Services in the Information Age: Theory and Prac-
tice. London: Frank Cass Publications. 
Himma, Kenneth E. 2007. “Privacy versus Security: Why Privacy Is Not an Absolute Value 
or Right”. San Diego Law Review 44: 857–920. 
Hurka, Thomas. 2005. “Proportionality in the Morality of War”.  Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 33 (1): 34–66. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00024.x . 
Johnson, James T. 2006. “The Just War Idea: The State of the Question”.  Social Philosophy 
and Policy 23 (1): 167–95. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052506060079 . 
Katzenstein, Peter. 1996.  The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
Kelsay, John. 2013. “Just War Thinking as a Social Practice”. Ethics & International 
Affairs 27 (1): 67–86. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679412000780 . 
Lazarus, Liora. 2007. “Mapping the Right to Security”. In Security and Human Rights, 
edited by Benjamin Goold and Liora Lazarus, 1st edition. Oxford; Portland, OR: Hart 
Publishing. 
———. 2012. “The Right to Security: Securing Rights or Securitising Rights”. In Examin-
ing Critical Perspectives on Human Rights, edited by Rob Dickinson, Elena Katselli, 






































Intelligence and the just war tradition 19 
Lee, Hsin-Wen. 2018. “A New Societal Self-Defense Theory of Punishment: The Rights-
Protection Theory”. Philosophia 46 (2): 337–53. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-
9931-z. 
Lennerfors, Thomas Taro. 2007. “The Transformation of Transparency: On the Act on 
Public Procurement and the Right to Appeal in the Context of the War on Corruption”. 
Journal of Business Ethics 73 (4): 381–90. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-006-9213-3 . 
Lowe, Scott. 2003. “Terrorism and Just War Theory”. Perspectives on Evil and Human 
Wickedness 1 (2): 46–52. 
Marx, Gary. 2004. “Some Concepts That May Be Useful in Understanding the Myriad 
Forms and Contexts of Surveillance”. Intelligence and National Security 19 (2): 226–48. 
 https://doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000302976 . 
Matthews, Richard. 2012. “An Empirical Critique of ‘Interrogational’ Torture”.  Journal of 
Social Philosophy 43 (4): 457–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12004 . 
McArthur, Robert L. 2001. “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy”.  Ethics and Information 
Technology 3 (2): 123–8. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011898010298 . 
McKenna, Joseph C. 1960. “Ethics and War: A Catholic View”.  American Political Science 
Review 54 (3): 647–58. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400122609 . 
McMahan, Jeff. 2005. “Just Cause for War”.  Ethics & International Affairs 19 (3): 1–21. 
 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2005.tb00551.x . 
Meisels, Tamar. 2014. “Fighting for Independence: What Can Just War Theory Learn from 
Civil Conflict?” Social Theory and Practice 40 (2): 304–26. https://doi.org/10.5840/ 
soctheorpract201440218 . 
Moore, Adam D. 2011. “Privacy, Security, and Government Surveillance: WikiLeaks and 
the New Accountability”.  Public Affairs Quarterly 25 (2): 141–56. 
Nagel, Thomas. 1979.  Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nobles, Richard, and David Schiff. 2002. “The Right to Appeal and Workable Systems 
of Justice”. The Modern Law Review 65 (5): 676–701. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
2230.00403. 
Omand, David. 2007. “Reflections on Secret Intelligence”. In The New Protective State: 
Government, Intelligence and Terrorism, edited by Peter Hennessy, 1st edition. London; 
New York: Continuum. 
Pattison, James. 2008. “Just War Theory and the Privatization of Military Force”.  Ethics &
International Affairs 22 (2): 143–62. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2008.00140.x .
———. 2018. The Alternatives to War: From Sanctions to Nonviolence. Oxford, UK; New 
York: OUP Oxford. 
Pfaff, Tony, and Jeffrey R. Tiel. 2004. “The Ethics of Espionage”.  Journal of Military Eth-
ics 3 (1): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570310004447 . 
Pozen, David. 2015. “Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs”.  University of Chicago Law Review 83 
(1): 221–47. 
Quinlan, Michael. 2007. “Just Intelligence: Prolegomena to an Ethical Theory”.  Intelli-
gence and National Security 22 (1): 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520701200715 . 
Raab, Charles D. 2017. “Security, Privacy and Oversight”. In  Security in a Small Nation: 
Scotland, Democracy, Politics, edited by Andrew W. Neal. Open Book Publishers. 
 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0078 . 
Regan, Richard J. 1996. Just War: Principles and Cases. Washington, DC: The Catholic 
University of America Press. 
Rescher, Nicholas. 1972.  Welfare: The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective. 1st edi-




























20 Ross Bellaby 
Sagar, Rahul. 2007. “On Combating the Abuse of State Secrecy”.  Journal of Political Phi-
losophy 15 (4): 404–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007.00283.x . 
———. 2016. Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy. Revised edition. Princ-
eton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Scheid, Anna F. 2012. “Waging a Just Revolution: Just War Criteria in the Context of 
Oppression”. Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 32 (2): 153–72. https://doi. 
org/10.1353/sce.2012.0035 . 
Schneier, Bruce. 2006.  Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain 
World. 2003. Corr. 2nd edition. New York: Springer-Verlag New York Inc. 
Steinhoff, Uwe. 2004. “How Can Terrorism Be Justified?” In  Terrorism: The Philosophi-
cal Issues, edited by Igor Primoratz, 97–109. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi. 
org/10.1057/9780230204546 . 
Sussmann, Naomi. 2013. “Can Just War Theory Delegitimate Terrorism?”  European Jour-
nal of Political Theory 12 (4): 425–46. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885112464478 . 
Thompson, Paul B. 2001. “Privacy, Secrecy and Security”.  Ethics and Information Tech-
nology 3 (1): 13–9. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011423705643 . 
Valls, Andrew. 2000. “Can Terrorism Be Justified?” In  Ethics in International Affairs, 
edited by Andrew Valls, 65–79. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
van der Bruggen, Koos. 2013. “Biosecurity and the Just-War Tradition”. In  On the Dual 
Uses of Science and Ethics: Principles, Practices, and Prospects, edited by Michael J. 
Selgelid and Brian Rappert. ANU E Press.  https://research.monash.edu/en/publications/ 
on-the-dual-uses-of-science-and-ethics-principles-practices-and-p. 
Von Hirsch, Andrew. 2000. “The Ethics of Public Television Surveillance”. In  Ethical and 
Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention, edited by Andrew Von Hirsch, 
David Garland, and Alison Wakefield, 59–76. Studies in Penal Theory and Penal Ethics. 
Oxford: Hart. 
Waldron, Jeremy. 2003. “Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance”.  Journal of Political 
Philosophy 11 (2): 191–210.  https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00174 . 
Walzer, Michael. 2006. “Terrorism and Just War”.  Philosophia 34 (1): 3–12. https://doi. 
org/10.1007/s11406-006-9004-1 . 
———. 2015. Just and Unjust Wars. 5th edition. New York: Basic Books. 
Wells, Christina E. 2004. “‘National Security’ Information and the Freedom of Information 
Act”. Administrative Law Review 56 (4): 1195–1221. 
Williams, John. 2015. “Distant Intimacy: Space, Drones, and Just War”.  Ethics & Interna-
tional Affairs 29 (1): 93–110.  https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679414000793 . 













 2 Truth-seeking and the principles 
of discrimination, necessity, 
proportionality and reciprocity 
in national security intelligence 
activity 
 Seumas Miller 
 Introduction 
National security intelligence is information or other data collected, analyzed and 
disseminated by intelligence agencies (in particular) and done so in the service 
of these agencies’ primary institutional purpose ( Miller 2010 ), at least in liberal 
democracies. Here it is understood that this institutional purpose and these actions 
are to be understood normatively, that is in terms of what  ought to be done, as 
opposed to what is in fact being done. Here, the term “normative” has a moral or 
ethical loading, for example what ought to be done is typically what morally ought 
to be done all things considered (including consideration of the empirical facts).1 
Moreover, these essentially  epistemic (from the Greek word, “episteme”, meaning 
knowledge) or evidence-based truth-seeking activities of collection, analysis and 
dissemination are the main ones performed by national security agencies. That 
said, many of these agencies also perform kinetic tasks, for example the covert 
operations conducted by the United States CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 
and on occasion tasks that might be referred to as quasi-epistemic, for example 
psychological “warfare”. 
Further, the definition of national security is highly problematic; the concept of 
national security is ill-defined, indeterminate, shifting, open-ended and contest-
able ( Williams 2003 , 511–31, 514;  McDonald 2008 , 563–87, 567;  Buzan, Wæver, 
and de Wilde 1997 , 24). For instance, the US National Intelligence Strategy has as 
one of its purposes to promote American prosperity. 2 However, let us assume that 
national security intelligence is, at the very least, intelligence pertaining to serious 
internal or external threats to the nation-state itself, or to one of its fundamen-
tal political, military or criminal justice institutions, and that these threats might 
emanate from state or non-state actors, for example terrorist groups. So national 
security intelligence includes not only military intelligence but also some criminal 
intelligence and economic intelligence, since the latter may have national security 
implications, for example intelligence on drug cartels destabilizing governments 
or on fighter aircraft being built by private companies. 
It might be claimed that unlike, for instance, much of the intellectual work 




22 Seumas Miller 
not an end in itself but rather the means to some further end; that is, the end point 
of the intelligence process is actionable intelligence, that is intelligence provided 
to relevant decision makers that is a means to kinetic action. In one sense this 
claim is true. Intelligence does need to be actionable; intelligence collection and 
analysis has a purpose beyond acquisition of the truth (so to speak). However, in 
another sense it is false. For the acquisition of the truth (or, at least, of probable 
truth) is (or ought to be) an end in itself for intelligence officers, notwithstanding 
the further requirement that the truths acquired be actionable. Let me explain. 
The activities of intelligence collection and analysis are not related to knowl-
edge merely as means to end, but also conceptually. Truth is not an external con-
tingently connected end which some intelligence activities might be directed 
towards if the intelligence officers happened to have an interest in truth, rather 
than, say, an interest in falsity or an interest in neither but rather only in “play-
fulness” (a la postmodernists) or self-interest (a la demagogues, such as former 
US President, Donald Trump, who have a tendency to say whatever they believe 
might be useful to them and do so without regard for the truth). Rather truth is 
internally connected to intelligence activity. Thus aiming at truth is aiming at 
truth as an end in itself. (This is, of course, consistent with also aiming at truth as 
a means to some other further end, such as apprehending an offender or winning 
a war.) In other words, supposed intelligence activity which  only aimed at truth 
as a means to some other end would not be genuine intelligence activity or would 
be defective qua intelligence activity, since for such a pseudo-intelligence officer 
truth would not be internal to his or her activity. Such pseudo-intelligence officers 
would abandon truth-aiming if, for example, it turns out that the best means to the 
officer’s end is not after all truth, but rather falsity. Obviously, such pseudo-intel-
ligence officers would be extremely dangerous since their intelligence would be 
very unreliable. For they are not simply officers who aim at (and more often than 
not acquire) the truth but who, nevertheless, often present false reports to their 
political masters (or other “clients”) knowing them to be false (or, more likely, to 
be somewhat misleading because unpalatable truths are omitted or downplayed). 
Rather these pseudo-intelligence officers do not aim at truth in the first place. That 
is, having little interest in the truth, they do not seek the truth and, as a result, do 
not themselves acquire knowledge; therefore, they do not have knowledge to pass 
on to their political masters. Of course, in the real world such pseudo-intelligence 
officers are unlikely to exist in a pure form. However, in an intelligence agency 
lacking in independence and in which intelligence officers’ desire to please or, 
more likely, desire not to antagonize their political masters (e.g. some Soviet 
intelligence officers who served under Stalin), the commitment to the truth might 
well weaken, especially when one considers the inherent difficulties in acquiring 
accurate, significant national security intelligence from adversaries determined to 
maintain information security. As a consequence, such intelligence officers might 
initially have the practice of reporting what they know to be false or misleading 
on some occasions when it is politically or otherwise expedient to do so, but end 
up over time largely abandoning the practice of evidence-based truth-seeking in 
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political or other non-epistemic agendas; that is, end up becoming something akin 
to pseudo-intelligence officers. 
There is an important institutional implication of the earlier discussion. As 
we have just seen, whereas the primary institutional purpose of national secu-
rity intelligence agencies is essentially epistemic, the realization of this epistemic 
purpose serves a larger national security purpose only realizable by the kinetic 
activity of other institutions, for example the military. Accordingly, there is an 
institutional division of labour; the intelligence agency provides knowledge (or 
weaker epistemic goods) to the decision makers, for example politicians and mili-
tary leaders, who in turn act (or refrain from acting) on that knowledge. In order 
for this institutional division of labour to function successfully it is critical that 
the intelligence provided is reliable and, therefore, that the epistemic activity of 
the intelligence agencies is not unduly influenced or otherwise undermined by the 
institutions which they serve, for example by their political masters. Accordingly, 
consistent with an appropriate level of responsiveness to their political masters’
national security intelligence demands, it is necessary that intelligence officers’
professional commitment to the epistemic purposes of their intelligence agencies 
overrides any personal loyalty they might have to their political masters; indeed, 
on occasion, they may need to speak unpalatable truths to power. However, it is 
also necessary that intelligence officers have an overriding professional commit-
ment to the epistemic purposes of their intelligence agencies rather than seeking 
to realize the ultimate national security outcomes that might or might not flow 
from the decisions of the politicians, military leaders and other decision mak-
ers who act on their intelligence. It is important that intelligence officers do not 
engage in institutional overreach. 
In relation to national security intelligence and the normative theory thereof, a 
threefold distinction needs to be kept in mind, namely: 
1. Institutional level – the core activities, structures, resources and institutional 
purposes of national security intelligence agencies, for example the raison 
d’etre for the establishment and continued existence of MI5 in the United 
Kingdom 
2. Macro-activity level – the mid- to long-term goals, strategies and campaigns 
of national security intelligence agencies, for example to win the Cold War,
increased reliance on electronic rather than human intelligence 
3. Micro-activity level – immediate, specific, operations of national security 
intelligence agencies, for example surveillance of a given terrorist suspect 
Note that these three levels interact, for example level 1 drives level 2 which in 
turn drives level 3 (and the reverse interactive process from level 3 to level 2 to 
level 1 is also the case).4 Moreover, the distinction between the three levels is not 
necessarily clear-cut, for example when does a short-term goal, such as collecting 
intelligence on the perpetrators of 9/11, become a mid- or even long-term goal, 
such as collecting intelligence on Al-Qaeda? For our purposes in this chapter, it 
is important to note the difference between a normative theory of an institution in 
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an avowed liberal democracy [e.g. of Israel’s Mossad or of the United States NSA 
(National Security Agency)], a normative framework for the conduct of macro-
level activity (e.g. of UK secret intelligence activity in the Cold War or of bulk 
data collection and analysis by the NSA) and a set of ethical guidelines for the 
conduct of micro-level activity (e.g. ethical guidelines in relation to intelligence 
collection on a member of a home-grown extremist right-wing subversive group 
or on “turning” a member of a foreign intelligence agency). 
Regarding the normative theory of institutions, we have serviceable normative 
theories of police organizations [e.g. as the protection by means of police use of 
coercive force – or the threat thereof – of the legally enshrined, justifiably enforce-
able, moral rights of citizens from violation by fellow citizens ( Miller and Black-
ler 2016 , chap. 1)] and of military organizations [e.g. as the protection by means 
of military use of lethal force – or the threat thereof – of the legally enshrined, 
justifiably enforceable, joint moral rights of citizens – e.g. territorial rights – 
from violation by members of the armed forces of foreign nations or of other 
political entities ( Miller 2016b , chap. 3)]. Accordingly, we can derive serviceable 
normative theories of intelligence agencies engaged in (respectively) criminal 
intelligence and military intelligence; the realization of the epistemic purposes 
definitive of these intelligence agencies ultimately serves in turn the institutional 
purposes of police and military organizations (respectively). But what of national 
security intelligence agencies? Their remit is wider in some respects than that 
of criminal intelligence agencies and that of military intelligence agencies (and 
also narrower in some respect than each of these types of intelligence agencies, 
i.e. a great deal of criminal intelligence is not national security intelligence and – 
arguably – not all military intelligence is of interest to national security agencies, 
e.g. intelligence at the micro level concerning a small-scale enemy troop move-
ment that is without much strategic significance). Evidently, we do not yet have 
a serviceable normative theory of national security intelligence agencies (or even 
an acknowledgement that one is needed). This is a significant gap in normative 
theory and, given the expanding role of national security intelligence agencies, for 
example in relation to pandemics and the impact of climate change or as a result 
of technological developments such as in respect of GEOINT, one with poten-
tially important practical implications. On the other hand, it might be argued that 
in place of a normative theory, a set of relatively concrete, historically relative, 
national security purposes could be specified, such as collecting and analyzing 
intelligence required for counter-terrorism purposes or that will assist the armed 
forces engaged in combat, and ascertaining the intentions and capabilities of hos-
tile, dangerous, authoritarian states, such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. 
However, ultimately, the selection of these national security purposes would need 
to be justified, at least in part, by recourse to a normative theory of national secu-
rity, for example self-defence (an unduly narrow account) or national interest (an 
unduly wide account). 
Importantly, this aforementioned threefold distinction does not parallel the 
twofold distinction in traditional Just War Theory between the jus ad bellum (the 
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the war once embarked upon should be conducted), and even less so the contem-
porary fivefold distinction between jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum 
(the principles applicable once hostilities have ceased) and jus ad vim (the prin-
ciples governing the use of force short of war).5 This so notwithstanding recent 
attempts to apply Just War Theory to national security intelligence activities via 
the so-called Just Intelligence theory ( Bellaby 2014 ;  Quinlan 2007 ); evidently the 
morality of national security intelligence activities does not parallel the morality 
of kinetic military activities ( Miller 2021 ). 
There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, as mentioned the constitutive 
(proximate) end of intelligence activity is knowledge, that is it is a form of truth-
seeking. By contrast, the constitutive end of military activity is non-epistemic, that 
is it is a form of kinetic activity. Secondly, as a result of intelligence activity being 
epistemic activity (“knowing things”), it is inherently less harmful than kinetic 
military action (“killing people and breaking things”). Thirdly, intelligence and 
military activities stand in (roughly speaking) the relationship of knowledge to 
action; kinetic action presupposes epistemic action since the decision to perform 
a kinetic action (or not to do so) presupposes knowledge with respect to the why, 
how, what, when, where, who etc. of the kinetic action in question (and its alterna-
tives); hence intelligence collection is the first resort and the use of military force 
the last resort (and, indeed, the principle of last resort is constitutive of Just War 
Theory but not of intelligence activity). Fourthly, national security intelligence 
activity is a continuous, ongoing (indeed, cyclical – hence the so-called intel-
ligence cycle) activity in relation to threats and enemies that come and go; unlike 
war it has no determinate end state, the cessation of hostilities, that is being aimed 
at (perhaps understood in terms of winning the war).6 
Notwithstanding that intelligence activity has knowledge as its constitutive end 
and military activity does not, there do seem to be a number of moral principles 
that govern both sets of activities, for example the principles of necessity and 
proportionality. These principles, at least, are in part constitutive of normative 
theories of intelligence agencies, normative frameworks for ongoing intelligence 
campaigns and sets of moral guidelines for intelligence operations, and they apply 
at each of the three levels mentioned earlier. Indeed,  some of these principles, or 
analogues of them, are constitutive of quite different types of security agency and 
their activities, for example military organizations versus police organizations. 
Consider, for example, Just War Theory 7 and its supposed analogue in intelligence 
work, Just Intelligence Theory. 8 However, appearances notwithstanding, these 
principles apply differently in these different institutional settings and within a 
given institutional setting (e.g. of national security intelligence settings) at each of 
these three levels. Indeed, each of these principles might actually consist of a set 
of somewhat diverse principles. For instance, the so-called principle of necessity 
might in fact denote more than one principle, for example the principle of mili-
tary necessity typically concerned with avoiding civilian casualties and the prin-
ciple of necessity in policing typically concerned with avoiding death or injury to 
offenders ( Miller and Blackler 2016 ). Moreover, the principle of necessity might 
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intelligence agency?), at the macro level (e.g. is it necessary to collect secret intel-
ligence on one’s allies?) and at the micro level (e.g. is it necessary to intercept the 
communications of a suspected terrorist with his children?). 
The focus of this chapter is with the analysis and application of four moral 
principles, namely discrimination, necessity, proportionality and reciprocity in 
national security intelligence activity. However, in doing so we need to keep 
in mind, firstly, the twofold distinction between these moral principles and the 
closely associated legal principles; secondly, the twofold distinction between the 
essentially evidence-based truth seeking epistemic activity of national security 
intelligence agencies and the kinetic activities of military and police organiza-
tions (and some national security intelligence agencies at times, notably covert 
action) and thirdly, the threefold distinction between the institutional, and the 
macro and the micro levels. We begin with the moral principle of discrimination 
( Green 1993 ). 
Principle of discrimination 
The context for the application of the principle of discrimination is typically taken 
to be a theatre of war in which (especially) the lives of non-combatants are at risk 
from the combatants waging the war in question. According to this principle it is 
prohibited for combatants to deliberately target non-combatants. This is consistent 
with the deaths of non-combatants being an unintended consequence, even a fore-
seen unintended consequence, of the actions of combatants (although, under an 
associated precautionary principle combatants are required to take steps to mini-
mize the risks to non-combatants).9 The principle of discrimination is potentially 
implicated in national security intelligence activity in so far as it is an expression 
of a more general moral principle according to which innocent persons ought 
not to be deliberately harmed or otherwise have their rights deliberately violated. 
Accordingly, it would be one thing for police to intercept and access the metadata 
and content of the phone calls and emails of a known terrorist on an ongoing basis 
for intelligence purposes and quite another for this to be done on an ongoing basis 
for intelligence purposes to a citizen known to be innocent of any crime, e.g. on 
the off-chance that some useful intelligence might be picked up. Surveillance of 
the terrorist would in this instance be morally justified infringement of the right to 
privacy, whereas surveillance of the innocent citizen would evidently be a  viola-
tion of the right to privacy. 
However, as just mentioned, the principle of discrimination as it applies in 
armed conflict assumes a distinction between combatants and non-combatants 
and prohibits combatants from deliberately targeting non-combatants. By con-
trast, the analogous (let us assume) principle of discrimination in national secu-
rity intelligence activities (referred to as the principle of discrimination*) does 
not consist of a general prohibition on targeting innocent persons and with good 
reason; innocent persons may be a useful source of national security intelligence. 
Of course, innocent persons will often willingly provide intelligence if asked 
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Indeed, it is permissible for intelligence officials to collect intelligence from inno-
cent persons even without their consent. For instance, it is permissible for an 
intelligence official to deliberately obtain information about a terrorist from the 
terrorist’s innocent relative without the latter’s consent, for example by access-
ing their private communication without their permission, or by deception, for 
example by telling a lie. By contrast, deliberately killing the terrorist’s innocent 
relative is obviously prohibited (with or without their consent). 
Intelligence activities ultimately aimed at identifying terrorists and thwarting 
acts of terrorism now involve the application of machine learning techniques to 
bulk databases that consist in the main of the communication and other data of 
innocent civilians – indeed, frequently innocent fellow citizens, that is the data 
of innocent civilians is deliberately collected and accessed (or, at least, filtered 
and accessed). It can be argued that while the data of these innocent persons is 
“read” by a machine it is not seen by human eyes or, at least, it is only the data 
that results from the application of the machine learning process that is seen by 
human eyes; however, the argument might continue, such data meets the standard 
of reasonable suspicion already applicable to intelligence gathering/investigation 
by law enforcement agencies and does so by virtue of being the result of that very 
process. Whatever the merits of this argument as a justification for the application 
of machine learning techniques to bulk databases by way of mitigating the degree 
and extent of intrusion into the privacy of innocent citizens,10 nevertheless, this 
intrusion into the privacy of innocent civilians is deliberately done, albeit as a 
means to an end. As such, it is not analogous to the principle of discrimination as 
it applies to the use of lethal force by combatants in war; combatants, to reiterate, 
are not permitted to deliberately kill innocent civilians, even as a means to some 
further legitimate end. The reason for this difference between the principle of dis-
crimination* applicable in intelligence activities and the principle of discrimina-
tion applicable to the use of lethal force by combatants reflects the much greater 
moral significance that attaches to deliberately taking an innocent person’s life 
than attaches to deliberately invading an innocent person’s privacy or deliberately 
deceiving them. This difference in moral significance in turn reflects, indeed in 
large part is derived from, the greater moral weight that attaches to life than to 
privacy or truth-telling. Hence there is an (more or less) absolute legal prohibi-
tion on deliberately killing the innocent (even in wartime), but not on deliberately 
invading their privacy or on telling lies to them (even in peacetime). 
We have seen that the principle of discrimination assumes a twofold distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants (even if, at times, there are problems 
determining whether a person is a combatant or a non-combatant and even if there 
is a third category of civilians who are engaged in hostilities at particular times 
but who are not combatants per se). By contrast, police operate with a threefold 
distinction between innocent persons, suspects and known offenders. Innocent 
persons ought not to be deliberately harmed whereas known offenders may be, 
for example police may target known offenders using coercive, incapacitating or 
even lethal force. But what of suspects? Suspects are the targets of police investi-
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contrast, combatants are not investigators, even if at times they need to determine 
whether or not a person presenting as an innocent civilian is in fact a combatant. 
This threefold distinction in policing cuts across the combatant/non-combatant 
distinction. For instance, combatants are not necessarily suspected of crimes or 
offenders and neither suspects nor offenders are necessarily combatants. What of 
national security intelligence officers? 
As we have seen, the targets of intelligence officers can be willing or unwilling
providers of intelligence (let us take a willing provider to be someone who has con-
sented to provide information). Moreover, those who are willing might be individu-
ally contacted or the information they willingly provide (in effect) might already be
publicly available. Those who unwillingly provide intelligence might do so without
knowing they have done so, for example as a result of a surveillance operation or
an undercover operative who deceives them, or they might do so knowingly, for
example as a result of a coercive interrogation. Moreover, the “providers” of intelli-
gence might have had the intelligence stolen from them by a field officer, for exam-
ple a spy. Note that some publicly available information might, nevertheless, not
have been willingly provided to intelligence officers, for example some information
regarding an adult might be posted on social media by his naïve adolescent daughter
who is unaware that it might be accessed by and of interest to intelligence officers.
An additional important point to be made here is that whereas each single 
item of an integrated body of information might have been willingly provided 
the aggregate of that information, once analyzed to create the integrated body 
of information, might not have been willingly or even knowingly provided. For 
instance, intelligence officers might construct a fairly detailed picture of the char-
acteristics, behaviour and movements of an individual on the basis of multiple, 
single, incremental items of publicly available information, including informa-
tion extracted from social media. An analogous, but more alarming, point can 
be made in relation to intelligence activity at the macro level and, indeed, at the 
institutional level. What if such detailed pictures can be constructed of most of 
the members of an entire population? Evidently, the Chinese state is aiming to do 
just this, notably in Xinjiang, and, thereby, displaying a de facto institutional pur-
pose of its intelligence agencies: social control in the name of national security. It 
should be noted that this projected surveillance society (Chinese style) is to make 
use of a wide range of integrated databases of personal and public information 
much of which is not readily available to intelligence officers (or members of 
other security agencies) in liberal democracies. 
The fundamental point to be made in the light of the earlier discussion is that 
the principle of discrimination* applicable to intelligence officers is only very 
loosely analogous to the principle of discrimination applicable to combatants and 
non-combatants, since the targets of intelligence officers could be virtually any-
one (even if not everyone) and the moral constraints on their intelligence activity 
pertain more to the nature and extent of the intelligence being sought (e.g. is it the 
confidential or private information of large cohorts of people?) and the particular 
methods used to collect it, for example coercive interrogation, deception, intru-
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A final point regarding the principle of discrimination* (i.e. discrimination as 
it applies to intelligence activities) does pertain to the targets of intelligence offi-
cers. This point arises from differences between internal and external national 
security threats and it is, therefore, relevant not only to the micro level but also 
to the macro level. In liberal democracies at least, foreigners who are the targets 
of national security intelligence activities enjoy few – if any – protections and in 
this respect they are unlike fellow citizens who are the targets of national secu-
rity intelligence activities. Yet, the innocent citizens of enemy authoritarian states 
have moral rights, including privacy rights (whatever their legal rights may be or, 
more likely, not be). On the other hand, it does seem that given the purpose of the 
intelligence activities in question is national security, it is perhaps to be expected 
that the principle of discrimination* and, for that matter, the principles of neces-
sity and proportionality, might justifiably be applied in a more permissive manner 
to foreigners than to fellow citizens.11 We return to this issue in the final section. 
Principle of necessity 
As we saw in the introduction, the principle of necessity applies to both kinetic 
military and kinetic law enforcement activity and to epistemic intelligence activ-
ity, and does so at all three levels, that is the institutional, macro and micro levels. 
Thus, in respect of epistemic national security intelligence activity, it is necessary 
to, firstly, have a national security intelligence agency (institutional level), sec-
ondly, to spy on hostile enemy powers (macro level) and, thirdly, to intercept the 
communications of, for instance, Osama bin Laden’s trusted courier in order to 
locate his leader (micro level). 
Elsewhere I have provided an analysis of the principle of necessity (or, per-
haps, principles of necessity) ( Miller 2021 ) and one that differs from the standard 
account ( Lazar 2012 ). According to my own analysis, the principle of necessity 
has at its core a means/end principle and the necessity in question refers to the 
necessary means to an end (whether it be the end of personal self-defence, or a 
military, law enforcement or national security intelligence end). Thus if the only 
available means to achieve an intelligence end is intrusive surveillance of a target 
then the necessity principle might require that this means be used, notwithstand-
ing that it infringes the target’s privacy. If, on the other hand, there was an alterna-
tive means, say, collecting the metadata from the target’s phone then neither of 
these two methods would be a necessary means (although it would be necessary to 
choose one or other of these two methods if the end was to be realized). 
However, there is a further factor in play. For it will be claimed that the means 
that ought to be relied on is metadata collection since it is not necessary to engage 
in intrusive surveillance. However, from the mere fact that one of two available 
means is not necessary to realize some end it does not follow that it ought not to 
be chosen. After all, ex hypothesi neither of the two available means is a neces-
sary means to achieve the end in question and it would be irrational not to choose 
any of the available means to one’s ends. Clearly, the idea is that the less harmful 
means morally ought to be chosen. Metadata collection ought to be preferred to 
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intrusive surveillance since it is the less harmful means. Evidently, there is another 
end in play here; an end in addition to the end of acquiring intelligence. The end 
in question is the moral end to minimize harm, from which can be derived the 
moral principle to minimize harm to others. So the necessity principle is to be ana-
lyzed in terms of a core means/end principle and an implied harm minimization 
principle. Notice that the necessity principle in play in intelligence activity (the 
principle of necessity*) is different from the principle of military necessity (and 
from the principle of necessity applicable in law enforcement) by virtue of the dif-
ferent constitutive ends of the two principles: an epistemic end and a kinetic end 
(respectively). Since both of these constitutive ends are morally significant the 
principle of necessity and the principle of necessity* are moral principles twice 
over (given they are also moral principles by virtue of their implied harm mini-
mization principle). 
While epistemic actions, including intelligence activity, have knowledge as 
their constitutive end, kinetic actions, including military activity, do not; rather 
military activity has the end of winning battles (and, ultimately, wars). However, 
as we also saw, intelligence activities and kinetic military activities (and, also 
intelligence activities and kinetic law enforcement activities, respectively) stand 
in the relationship of knowledge to action; the decision to perform a kinetic action 
presupposes knowledge with respect to the why, how, what, when, where, who 
etc. of the kinetic action in question. Hence, intelligence collection is temporally 
and logically prior to the use of military force; intelligence collection is, for these 
reasons, the first resort. Moreover, the use of military force, unlike intelligence 
collection and analysis, is inherently extremely harmful; it involves killing people 
rather than merely coming to know things. Hence, the use of military force is a 
last resort – this time for moral reasons. 
While obviously the principle of necessity* thus analyzed (as an amalgam of a 
core means/epistemic end principle and an implied harm minimization principle) 
is applicable to national security intelligence activities in some circumstances, a 
question arises as to the extent of this applicability; perhaps its applicability is 
actually quite limited, unlike the analogous principle of military necessity, for 
instance. Thus intelligence activities, including collection, might not be neces-
sary to a strategic or operational end but might, nevertheless, be justified on some 
weaker basis, such as being potentially useful. A related point is that the intel-
ligence value of some collected intelligence is not known prior to analysis of 
it; that is, at the point of collection the intelligence might only be believed to be 
potentially useful (and possibly true), but certainly not believed to be necessary. 
Again, under a policy of redundancy a number of informers might be deliberately 
cultivated in relation to some national security task only one, or at most two, of 
whom might be necessary, that is any one (or at most two) of the informers would 
be sufficient for the task. However, multiple informers might increase the likeli-
hood that the intelligence collected was reliable. By contrast, it would be hard 
to justify shooting dead all the members of a large cohort of enemy combatants 
(let alone embarking on a war against another nation-state), on the grounds that 
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military necessity to military action is wide and strict whereas the applicability of 
the corresponding principle of necessity* to national security intelligence activi-
ties is much more limited and much less strict. 
The width and strictness of the applicability of the principle of necessity to 
military action reflect the obvious fact, as mentioned earlier, that the means to 
achieve military ends, that is use of lethal force, are inherently extremely harm-
ful, whereas the means to achieve epistemic ends, including epistemic national 
security intelligence ends, typically are not, or need not be. Of course, the realiza-
tion of epistemic national security intelligence ends is the means to kinetic ends 
that can be inherently extremely harmful, for example war. However, in and of 
itself the proximate end state of successful epistemic national security intelligence 
activity is not harmful, even if the means to that end state are, for instance, viola-
tions of privacy, since this end state simply consists in intelligence officers (and 
those who receive their intelligence) being in a state of knowledge. Whether harm 
results from this knowledge depends on the decision makers who receive this 
knowledge from the intelligence officers, for example if these decision makers 
decide to go to war on the basis of the intelligence they have received. Accord-
ingly, it is the decision makers, such as military leaders and politicians, who 
are directly morally responsible for the harm resulting from their decisions. On 
the other hand, the intelligence officers who provide them with the intelligence 
which informs their decisions bear a degree of indirect moral responsibility for 
the harms (as well as benefits) that result from these decisions. Indeed, in the case 
of avoidable great harm resulting from bad intelligence the relevant intelligence 
officers may well have a high degree of moral culpability [albeit in the context of 
being morally responsible jointly with the decision makers, i.e. there is collective 
responsibility ( Miller 2016b )]. 
Notwithstanding the contrast with lethal force in theatres of war, the means used 
to achieve epistemic national security intelligence ends may well be somewhat, 
even very, harmful, for example coercive interrogation, and frequently involve 
infringement of privacy, confidentiality or informational property rights. Accord-
ingly, it is important to consider the threshold at which the use of harmful methods 
and, in particular, methods involving privacy/confidentiality infringements/viola-
tions or information theft might justifiably be used to collect national security 
intelligence. The threshold at which discrete national security intelligence opera-
tions at the micro level can justifiably be conducted if, for example, they infringe 
some individual’s privacy, confidentiality or property rights is somewhat unclear. 
It might be thought that the notion of reasonable suspicion could be invoked in 
relation to domestically focused national security intelligence operations, as it 
is invoked in relation to criminal investigations (a related essentially epistemic 
activity). However, intelligence collection cannot be expected to wait for rea-
sonable suspicion; after all, it is often intelligence collection that generates rea-
sonable suspicion. Accordingly, reasonable suspicion seems too high a threshold 
standard for intelligence collection to have to meet. Of course, intelligence collec-
tion which is restricted to information already in the public domain (or otherwise 
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of past investigations) can generate reasonable suspicion. However, this sugges-
tion runs into the problem mentioned earlier of privacy/autonomy violations aris-
ing from the creation of detailed profiles of individuals based solely on publicly 
available information (in conjunction with other information uncontroversially, 
justifiably available to security agencies). 
In the absence of a principle-based solution to this first threshold problem it is 
unclear where the line is to be drawn in relation to (at least) domestically focused 
national security intelligence collection. Moreover, it has implications for our 
question concerning the extent of the applicability of the principle of necessity* 
to national security intelligence activities. For a solution to the threshold problem 
would, in effect, place a prior constraint on national security intelligence collec-
tion such that even if the collection in question was reasonably judged to be nec-
essary it might, nevertheless, not be morally (or legally, if the relevant law tracked 
morality) permissible. In this respect, the prior constraint would interact with the 
principle of necessity* in a way analogous to the way the principle of discrimina-
tion interacts with the principle of military necessity, that is combatants cannot 
deliberately kill innocent civilians, even if it is reasonably judged to be militarily 
necessary to do so. 
There is a second related threshold problem, namely one with respect to the 
threshold at which national security-based bulk data collection and/or use at the 
macro level can justifiably be undertaken, given the potential for such collection/ 
use to increase to the point where it compromises liberal democracy. 12 Consider 
in this connection the establishment of biometric databases and their integration 
with existing criminal justice, financial, health and so on databases ( Miller and 
Smith 2021 ). Perhaps it can be justified in relation to bulk data pertaining to spe-
cific foreign powers who have by their hostile and other actions already met the 
threshold standard of reasonable suspicion. However, the creation of, or access 
to, such bulk data collections might be made difficult, if not impossible, by the 
foreign power in question. It is, presumably, far easier to create bulk data collec-
tions pertaining to one’s own citizenry. However, doing so may lead to a power 
imbalance between the state and the citizenry that compromises liberal democ-
racy. Accordingly, in the absence of a solution to this second threshold problem it 
is unclear where the line is to be drawn in relation to national security intelligence 
collection. On the other hand, a solution to this second threshold problem would, 
in effect, place a prior constraint on national security intelligence collection such 
that even if the collection in question was reasonably judged to be necessary (and 
not merely potentially useful) for national security ends, it might, nevertheless, 
not be morally (or legally, if the relevant law tracked morality) permissible. 
Principle of proportionality 
In national security intelligence activities, as in personal self-defence, law enforce-
ment and waging war, the application of the principle of necessity* implies the 
application of the principle of proportionality (in the weighing of means against 
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and the application of the principle of proportionality* presupposes the applica-
tion of the principle of discrimination*. Moreover, the implied principle of harm 
minimization is also in play. 
On the one hand, harm in terms of privacy infringements, deception and theft of 
information (as opposed to, say, coercive interrogation) is easy or, at least, easier 
to justify in the case of suspects – and certainly known offenders, for example 
known terrorists – than in the case of innocent citizens. Hence the application 
of the principle of proportionality* presupposes the principle of discrimination* 
in play; it might be disproportionate to collect intelligence by means of an intru-
sive method from a person believed to be innocent of any serious crime but not 
disproportionate if the target were a known terrorist. On the other hand, the prin-
ciple of proportionality* presupposes the provision of some moral weight to be 
accorded to national security (the ultimate end, we are assuming, of the activity) 
or, at least, to be accorded to the likely national security outcome that might result 
from the use of the intelligence to be collected, analyzed and disseminated. Hence 
the application of the principle of proportionality* presupposes the principle of 
necessity*. Here we should also note that inherent differences between epistemic 
action and kinetic action mentioned earlier infect the application of the principle 
of proportionality* as they did the application of the principle of necessity*. We
saw earlier that the intelligence value of some collected intelligence is not known 
prior to analysis of it; that is, at the point of collection the intelligence might only 
be believed to be potentially useful (and possibly true), but certainly not believed 
to be necessary. Accordingly, it will be difficult at the point of collection to deter-
mine whether or not a harmful method, for example deception of an innocent 
person, necessary to collect the intelligence is disproportionately harmful. 
As argued before, national security intelligence activity exists at both micro 
and macro levels. This has implications for the application of the principle of pro-
portionality* (as we saw it had for the application of the principle of necessity*). 
Consider in this connection national security intelligence bulk data collection. At 
the micro level, the application of the principle of proportionality* (and of the 
principle of necessity* and of discrimination*) is on specific intelligence opera-
tions directed at particular targets, for example collecting information concerning 
the associates of a suspected terrorist. Thus, a question to be addressed might 
be: is intrusive surveillance proportionate? What of the macro level? Key ethical 
issues at the macro level pertain to proportionality of the establishment and gen-
eral uses of the bulk databases themselves ( Anderson 2016 ). 
The principle of proportionality needs to take into account not only the some-
what vague character of the end of national security (definitive, as we saw ear-
lier, of the principle of necessity) and the obstacles faced by intelligence officers, 
for example high-level encryption, but also potential future harms arising from 
national security intelligence activities and, in particular, from the utilization of 
bulk data. Concerns in this area are somewhat allayed by the fact that the bulk 
data collected and analyzed is typically in an anonymized form (e.g. by means 
of machine learning techniques), and, therefore, only the privacy rights of genu-
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analysis). However, these harms, such as the aforementioned power imbalance 
between citizens and the state arising from extensive privacy infringements by 
intelligence agencies, and a diminution in public trust as a consequence of the 
secret nature of national security intelligence activities, may be incremental in 
character and difficult to quantify. 
Accordingly, an aspect of the aforementioned threshold problem comes into 
view. For it can be difficult to know exactly where to draw the line between pro-
portionate and disproportionate intelligence activities when it comes to the utili-
zation of bulk data for national security purposes. Consider in this connection the 
aforementioned potential utilization of integrated biometric and non-biometric 
databases. One prominent concern about the inadequacy of privacy protections 
is the potential for “function creep”, where the use of information taken for a 
particular purpose is used for other purposes for which consent was not obtained. 
The underlying concern in relation to “function creep” is, in effect, the power 
imbalance already mentioned. More specifically, there is a threat to individual 
autonomy posed by comprehensive, integrated biometric and non-biometric data-
bases utilized by governments and their security agencies in the service of ill-
defined notions of necessity and national security and, at least potentially, without 
appropriate regulatory constraints and democratic accountability. 
Espionage and the principle of reciprocity 
Thus far I have provided an analysis of the principles of necessity* and propor-
tionality*, and of their relationship to one another and to the principle of dis-
crimination* in their application to national security intelligence activity. I have 
done so in the context of knowledge derived from evidence-based truth-seeking 
being the constitutive (proximate) normative end of national security intelligence 
activity and the fundamental normative institutional purpose of national security 
intelligence agencies. I now want to argue that there is an additional normative 
principle governing external national security intelligence activities (call it espio-
nage), in particular; this is a principle of reciprocity. Since I have discussed this in 
detail elsewhere I will be brief.13 
Intelligence gathering, surveillance and so on of citizens by domestic law 
enforcement agencies might be thought to be reasonably well defined and regu-
lated; hence the apparent feasibility of simply extending the law enforcement 
model to national security intelligence collection within domestic jurisdictions. 
However, this domestic law enforcement model is clearly too restrictive, and 
not practicable, in relation to external national security intelligence gathering 
from, for example, hostile foreign states during peacetime, let alone wartime. So 
the question arises as to whether some different moral principle(s) needs to be 
invoked in relation to espionage, in particular. I argue that two principles of reci-
procity need to be invoked: a retrospective and a prospective principle.14 
The retrospective principle of reciprocity would justify nation-state, A, engag-
ing in espionage against nation-state (or non-state actor), B, in circumstances in 
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if A’s espionage was in the service of A’s morally justifiable political purposes, 
namely, national security. 
The prospective principle of reciprocity is a tit-for-tat principle in the service 
of bringing about a morally desirable future state of affairs. The state of affairs 
in question is an equilibrium state among nation-states; more specifically, a mor-
ally justifiable equilibrium under the rule of international law. So this principle 
does not justify harmful actions in the manner of its sister retrospective principle; 
rather it has as its purpose to eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, harmful actions 
and, in this case, espionage and, thereby, move relevant nation-states into some 
form of a social contract. 
On the one hand, the United States and its allies cannot be expected to defend 
their legitimate national interests with their hands tied behind their backs. So 
their recourse to espionage seems justified and the retrospective principle of 
reciprocity provides a specific moral justification for this. On the other hand, 
understood as a prospective tit-for-tat procedure in the service of bringing about 
a social contract, the principle of reciprocity requires the moral renovation of 
espionage, including cyber espionage, as it is currently conducted. Second, I 
make a couple of suggestions: (i) the clustering of nation-states and (ii) a demar-
cation between government and security personnel on the one hand and ordinary 
citizens on the other. 
Under existing arrangements the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand – the so-called Five Eyes – share information gath-
ered from other states. These nation-states are, so to speak, allies in espionage, 
notably cyber espionage; for example, they share intelligence. They are the mem-
bers of my first cluster. There are, of course, other liberal democratic states out-
side the Five Eyes, such as various EU countries, which have “shared core liberal 
democratic values” with one another and with the Five Eyes and, specifically, a 
commitment to privacy rights. This is a second cluster. 
The members of these two clusters ought to make good on their claims to 
respect privacy rights by developing privacy-respecting protocols governing their 
intelligence gathering activities in relation to one another. Of course, determin-
ing the precise content of such protocols is no easy matter given, for example, 
that there are often competing national interests in play, even between liberal 
democracies with shared values and many common political interests. But there 
does not appear to be any in-principle reason why such protocols could not be 
developed and the fact that this might be difficult is no objection to attempting 
to do so. Moreover, since adherence to the protocols in question would consist, 
in so far as it is practicable, in ensuring compliance with some of the standard 
moral principles protecting privacy and confidentiality rights, such as probable 
cause/reasonable suspicion and use of judicial warrants, these two clusters would 
essentially consist of an extension of the law enforcement model to espionage 
conducted within and between these countries. 
Further, such a process of clustering of liberal democratic states would be in 
accordance with the prospective principle of reciprocity; each of these nation-
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protocols in question but each might be deterred from not doing so by the tit-for-
tat procedure of the prospective principle. 
What of authoritarian states known to be supporting international terrorism 
and/or engaging in hostile covert political operations, including espionage and 
cyber-espionage, for example China and North Korea? 
In respect of authoritarian states of this kind, the retrospective principle of 
reciprocity reigns. Accordingly, there are few, if any constraints on intelligence-
gathering and analysis, including cyber-espionage, if it is done in the service of a 
legitimate political interest such as national security. 15 Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to demarcate within such an authoritarian state between the government and 
its security agencies, on the one hand, and private citizens, on the other. Not-
withstanding the applicability of the retrospective reciprocity principle, the need 
to respect the privacy rights of private citizens in authoritarian states remains; 
perhaps all the more so given these rights (and, for that matter, human rights in 
general) are routinely violated by their own governments. 
So a stringent principle of discrimination* ought to govern espionage, includ-
ing cyber-espionage, directed at authoritarian states. At the very least, the citizens 
of these states ought to be able to differentiate between morally justified infringe-
ments of the privacy and confidentiality rights of members of their government 
and its security agencies, on the one hand, and violations of their own privacy and 
confidentiality rights, on the other, and be justified in believing that whereas the 
former might be routine the latter are few and far between. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have framed intelligence activity as evidence-based truth-seek-
ing epistemic activity (by contrast with, for instance, military activity or covert 
action), offered analyses of the key principles of discrimination, necessity and 
proportionality, and shown in general terms how they apply, or ought to apply, to 
national security intelligence activity. I have also introduced and analyzed a prin-
ciple of reciprocity and argued that it needs to be introduced to govern espionage, 
in particular. 
Notes 
1 I use these terms more or less interchangeably in this chapter, although distinctions are 
sometimes made ( Alexandra and Miller 2009 ). 
2 See National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017, p. 4 “Sec-
ond, we will promote American prosperity. We will rejuvenate the American econ-
omy for the benefit of American workers and companies”, available at  www.hsdl. 
org/?view&did=806478 . 
3 Or at least I assume that many, if not most, academics believe this. More specifically, I 
assume that most academics believe that intellectual work in universities is an end-in-
itself and that it is in the service of further ends, for example. community well-being. 
4 This point relates to the so-called intelligence cycle. See, for instance, Hulnick (2006 ). 
5 See, for instance  Walzer (2015 ). 
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6 See Mark Phythian in Omand and Phythian (2018 , 85) for this kind of point and David 
Omand in same (91–2) for a response to it. 
7 See, for instance,  Walzer (2015 ). 
8 See, for instance, Bellaby (2014 ),  Quinlan (2007 )  and Omand and Phythian (2018 , 
chap. 3). 
9 There are various different versions and interpretations of the legal and moral principle 
of discrimination and, for that matter, of the legal and moral principles of precau-
tion, necessity and proportionality. My concern is with these principles understood as 
contested moral principles. Accordingly, I take myself to have a significant degree of 
licence in formulating these principles. 
10 See, for instance,  Sorell (2018 ). 
 11 See, for instance,  Miller (2009 ). 
12 See Macnish (2017 , Chap. 5) for an account of the ethical issues in this area. 
13 An earlier version of this section appeared in Miller (2016a ). 
14 Reciprocity-based principles are related to, but distinct from, consent-based principles. 
In relation to the latter applied to espionage, see Pfaff and Tiel (2004 ). 
15 There are important questions here concerning what counts as a legitimate purpose, 
particularly in the context of the blurring of the distinction between a political interest 
and an economic interest, for example China’s cyber-theft operations. For reasons of 
space I cannot pursue these here. 
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 3 The technoethics of contemporary 
intelligence practice 
A framework for analysis 
David Omand and Mark Phythian 
 Introduction 
Intelligence agencies have a history of rapid exploitation of the latest scientific 
and technological advances, from the electric telegraph to radio transmissions and 
satellite observation. As with warfare, the history of intelligence can be told in 
terms of the relative advantage bestowed by a series of technological innovations 
( McNeill 1983 ; Warner 2014 ). This historically close relationship between intel-
ligence and technology marks out intelligence as a sphere of activity where issues 
of “technoethics”1 – of the way in which technological developments impact 
on the nature of ethical frameworks and judgements and the inter-relationship 
between the two – are prevalent. The digitization of information of all kinds is 
the latest field of technological innovation to generate ethical dilemmas for intel-
ligence practice. Some of the ethical issues raised by intelligence use of digital 
information are simply modern forms of age-old dilemmas now being shaped by 
new technologies, such as judging when invasions of privacy are justified. Others 
arise because of the development of digital technology itself, such as the applica-
tion of Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms to enable facial recognition or the 
placing of malware on a target computer network. Taken together, these questions 
about the ethics of using digital technology for intelligence purposes call for a 
specific examination of “technoethics”, drawing where relevant on the ethical 
guidance available from other disciplines such as for the safe use of advanced 
medical devices and artificial intelligence algorithms. 
In this chapter our focus is on the ethical challenges posed by the still rapidly 
developing sphere of digital intelligence. Indeed, so pervasive are the challenges 
it poses that, as we emphasize in this chapter, it is increasingly misleading to 
approach it as a discrete sphere of activity. It proceeds as follows: we begin by 
recalling the fundamental origin of the ethical concerns over intelligence activity 
and set out the ethical principles that we have derived in our previous work from 
the Just War tradition ( Omand and Phythian 2018 ). We then discuss the contem-
porary landscape of intelligence technoethics, followed by a proposed framework 
for thinking about the technoethics of intelligence, using jus in intelligentia con-
cepts and focusing on the importance of norm development, and the requirements 
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An ethical framework for secret intelligence 
States invest in intelligence and data collection to provide a sound basis for 
their decisions, especially regarding the security, safety and health of their citi-
zens. Much of the information needed to protect the public can come from open 
sources. But there are threats emanating from beyond and within national borders 
from malign actors (hostile states, terrorists, cyber criminals and their ilk) who 
are determined to conceal their capabilities and intentions and to expose them 
requires secret intelligence ( Omand and Phythian 2018 , chap. 1). The means by 
which states, via investment in intrusive information gathering, seek to protect 
against such threats and protect their interests more widely, including from natural 
hazards, can create tensions in relation to liberal principles. Consequently, there is 
a strong case for accepting that intrusive data gathering and secret intelligence, if 
judged necessary, requires a code of ethics different from that we would want to 
regulate everyday conduct in a liberal democracy. 
This is because, fundamentally, espionage is about acquiring secrets held by 
another (“stealing secrets”) in conditions where the person with the secret may go 
to extreme and often violent means to prevent their secrets being compromised. 
Having to overcome the determined will of the person with the secret takes us 
into behaviours that could never satisfy the kind of ethical threshold mandated by 
Kantian ethics. Using people as means to an end, subverting them from their duty 
in order that they spy on your behalf, intruding on personal privacy and employ-
ing deceptive practices are the essence of intelligence tradecraft. Only preventing 
serious harm to others can morally justify such methods. However, there are suf-
ficient serious threats facing the democracies to provide the justification. 
Yet, the exercise of secret intelligence activity in liberal democracies cannot be 
without ethical and legal constraints. Rather like the technologist in Mario Bunge’s 
mid-1970s outline of a “technoethics”, the intelligence professional in the liberal 
state is caught between conflicting demands that cannot necessarily be pursued 
independently of each other but need to be balanced ( Bunge 1977 , 98). 2 The pro-
fessional cannot slough off ethical responsibility onto the policy maker just as the 
technologist cannot simply hide behind the user of the technology. A case can be 
made for seeing basic science as value-neutral but its technological application is 
a human-directed activity and the developers of technology need to be aware of 
how their innovations may be used for ill as well as good. But how should liberal 
democracies arrive at ethical guidelines that govern intelligence practice? How 
should they seek to arrive at this balance? One solution to this knotty problem is to 
look to draw parallels with the development over the centuries, under the Just War 
tradition, of ways to constrain the conditions under which states may go to war (jus 
ad bellum) and the conduct of their armed forces when so engaged (jus in bello). 
If the application of the extreme violence of armed conflict can be constrained by 
an ethically based code then on the legal principle of omne majus continent in se 
minus it should be possible to envisage ethical limitations on secret intelligence 
activity – a jus ad intelligentiam informed by thinking in terms of jus ad bellum
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is not to say that thinking in terms of parallels can offer neat or simple solutions to 
dilemmas concerning intelligence practice in liberal democracies – any assump-
tion that it could offer anything approaching a tick-box solution would be counter-
productive – but it does offer the best available set of concepts for thinking about 
the ethics of intelligence, one that can be universally applied as states anticipate 
and address the challenges they will inevitably face. On this basis, in our earlier 
work we derived such a set of jus in intelligentia concepts that we believe can 
be of use in reaching ethical judgements about the conduct of intelligence activ-
ity, including the use of advanced technologies, by the security and intelligence 
authorities of liberal democratic states ( Omand and Phythian 2018 , chap. 3): 
• right intention – acting with integrity and having no ulterior motive or other 
agenda behind the authorization of intelligence activity or in analysis, assess-
ment and the presentation of intelligence judgements to decision makers 
• proportionality – ensuring that the ethical risks of operations are in line with 
the harm that the operations are intended to prevent 
• right authority – establishing the level appropriate to the ethical risks that 
may be run and that will then allow for accountability for decisions and over-
sight of the process 
• reasonable prospect of success – having adequate justification for the 
expectation that conducting individual operations will be likely to deliver 
results of value, given the ethical risks associated with them, including risks 
to agents and their families 
• discrimination – having the ability to assess and manage the risk of unin-
tended (collateral) harm, such as privacy intrusion into the lives of those who 
are not the intended targets of intelligence gathering 
• necessity – there being no other reasonable way to achieve the authorized 
mission at lesser ethical risk 
Later in this chapter we illustrate the use of these principles as applied to ethical 
issues arising from the use of digital technology by intelligence agencies. 
The technoethics of intelligence: the impact of digitization 
and the internet 
Digitization is the conversion of any form of information into numerical form (usu-
ally, but not necessarily, expressed in binary code). Speech and sound, visual images
(still and moving), geolocation, text, radar and other electromagnetic radiation,
DNA, patterns and logical structures text, and much else by way of information
available in analogue form can all be accurately rendered as strings of numbers.
Having information held as digital data has great economic and practical advantages:
• Large volumes of numerical data can be moved cheaply in bulk over any 
distance and terrain (and across oceans), for example by fibre-optic cables, 
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• Public key encryption can provide strong end-to-end security for data in 
motion without effort by the user (thus enabling digital commerce and finan-
cial transactions). 
• The internet provides a (permissionless) ability to link computer networks 
together using open protocols, and thus provides global connectivity. The 
World Wide Web internet carries provide easy access to data in user-friendly 
formats, one example social media. 
• Personal smart mobile devices are now cheap and very powerful, and 5G 
networks will allow high bandwidth, low latency and connectivity even on 
the move. 
• Digital data can be stored at reasonable cost, with data science developed 
to provide powerful ways of searching and data mining very large data sets 
(without needing to structure data with fields defined in advance). 
• Machine learning systems and advanced AI algorithms can be used to carry 
out classification tasks, increasingly more accurately than even trained 
humans, for example in detecting malign tumours, operating passport facial 
recognition systems at borders or spotting anomalous behaviour in a com-
puter network. 
• The Internet of Things enables everyday household and personal devices 
(including sports and personal health technology) to be internet connected. 
Digital cities increasingly have internet-connected infrastructure for conges-
tion charging, traffic light control, water and energy metering and telecoms 
systems. 
These developments have provided exploitable characteristics of interest to 
national security and intelligence agencies. Given the nature of the international 
system these exploitable characteristics constitute both opportunities and vulner-
abilities. Alex Younger drew attention to these in a rare speech by a serving Chief 
of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, or MI6), delivered at the University of St. 
Andrews in December 2018, when he set out how we are now, “in the early stages 
of a fourth industrial revolution that will further blur the lines between the physi-
cal, the digital and biological realms” and that he had seen the 
damage new technologies can do in the hands of a skilled opponent unre-
strained by any notion of law or morality, as well as the potentially existential 
challenge the data age poses to the traditional operating methods of a secret 
intelligence agency. 
This meant, for Younger, that “We and our allies face a battle to make sure tech-
nology works to our advantage, not to that of our opponents” ( Younger 2018 ). We
can identify eight core dimensions of the fundamental problem this gives rise to: 
1 access to bulk data – defined as mining a large volume of data containing 
information almost all of which is known not to be relevant to an intelligence 
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eras the internet works on packet switched networks where the individual 
packets that make up any form of communication may be directed automati-
cally on different global paths dependent on cost at that instant. Access to 
bulk traffic nevertheless provides an opportunity to discover who was calling 
whom, when, where and how (communications data), or to try to gain access 
to specific communications of interest (communications content). 
2 network exploitation – the lengthy and complex code used in computer oper-
ating systems and applications inevitably contains mistakes and weaknesses 
that can be discovered and exploited to gain access to networks, machines 
and communications (including so-called zero-day exploits). 
3 attribution – anonymity is hard wired into the internet protocols, making it 
difficult for security services and law enforcement to definitively attribute 
harmful material on the internet, including disinformation, racial and per-
sonal abuse and criminal attacks, sabotage and foreign subversion via infor-
mation operations. 
4 data sabotage – the global nature of the internet allows remote attacks for 
intelligence gathering and for sabotage, including contaminating and denying 
stored digital data. Software and some hardware components can if accessed 
be corrupted covertly or denied to users. 
5 criminal ransomware – ransomware malware attacks demand payment to 
criminals to restore access. Constraints of space and time no longer hinder 
the scale of such hostile activity – attacks can arrive against multiple targets 
in many countries at near the speed of light from jurisdictions that will not 
cooperate with law enforcement investigations. 
6 critical infrastructure vulnerability – the digital control systems and soft-
ware that operate almost all critical national infrastructure such as power gen-
eration, water supply, manufacturing and logistics, as well as finance, are all 
vulnerable to cyberattack. 
7 the business model of the internet involves capturing the personal data and 
internet browsing history of individuals and exploiting this data for market-
ing purposes – so-called surveillance capitalism ( Zuboff 2019 ). Such “ad 
tech” involves real-time auctions of space for advertising according to the 
desired characteristics of the intended viewer, including from targeting their 
personal data and internet browsing history. Ad tech similarly allows the tar-
geting of personalized political marketing as well as of commercial products 
and services. 
8 the spread of social media and its use as the main source of information 
for younger generations creates vulnerabilities for democracies in the face 
of intimidatory posts, fake news, manipulative marketing and weaponized 
information. 
Hence, while digitization brings significant benefits to society it also facilitates 
threats from hostile intelligence agencies and sub-state criminal entities. This no 
more than reflects the contemporary reality that the same digital tools are avail-
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provide equivalent opportunities for the security and intelligence agencies of lib-
eral democracies to pose the same types of threat as they face and experience from 
other states in the international system. This is the landscape of the modern digital 
battlefield where jus in intelligentia rules are needed. 
One characteristic of this landscape is its complexity which has washed away 
notions of binary divides that traditionally acted as organizing principles in think-
ing about security challenges. As Younger explained in December 2018: 
This complexity has eroded the boundaries we have traditionally relied upon 
for our security: the boundaries between virtual and real, the domestic and the 
international, between states and non-state actors and between war and peace. 
The result is a world of far greater ambiguity. 
 ( Younger 2018 ) 
Neither are notions of security simply about state behaviour and the actions of 
non-state actors. Yet even when they are not, this complexity remains a defin-
ing characteristic, mandating, potentially, multiple roles for intelligence agencies 
which serve to emphasize the technoethical dimension of contemporary intelli-
gence work. 
The example of the COVID-19 pandemic illustrates this well. Modern digital 
surveillance, including the use of apps on mobile devices and monitoring of digi-
tal personal information, has provided health authorities in nations such as South 
Korea, Singapore and China the public health benefit of powerful tools for assist-
ing in testing and tracking programmes limiting the spread of the virus. For a virus 
in a globalized world national borders are no longer significant barriers but the 
unit of account for political decision-making is still the nation-state. 
This takes us to the health-security interface. As a number of observers have 
noted, there are parallels that can be drawn between intelligence analysis and 
medical diagnosis, giving rise to a space in which mutual learning can take place.3 
As we discuss later, we can usefully extend this thinking to cover parallels in 
intelligence and medical ethics. However, COVID-19 also illustrates three fur-
ther things around this interface. First, it illustrates well how notions of national 
security intelligence are in the process of being adapted and how the shift from 
the Secret State of the Cold War era to the Protecting State of the twenty-first 
century continues apace ( Omand 2010 , chap. 1). 4 National security is increas-
ingly recognized as having a public safety and health dimension, and the COVID-
19 pandemic has acted as a catalyst in advancing this recognition. At the same 
time, the COVID-19 crisis contains a more traditional challenge for western intel-
ligence agencies – preventing others from stealing COVID-19 vaccine secrets 
( Philp 2020 ). 
Second, the case of COVID-19 illustrates the nature of a modern “infodemic” 
with the internet and social media rapidly spreading disinformation about (worth-
less) treatments for the disease or for preventing infection, including the alleged 
healing powers of hairdryers and malaria medicines ( Jankowicz and Otis 2020 ). 







The technoethics of intelligence practice 45 
spread conspiracy stories, in this case about the origin of the outbreak with both 
Russia and China in different ways pushing the story that a US military labora-
tory was the source. This phenomenon in turn poses questions about how targeted 
states should respond and what role, if any, intelligence agencies should have 
in this. As Josep Borrell, the High Commissioner of the European Commission, 
warned in June 2020: 
Disinformation in times of the coronavirus can kill. We have a duty to pro-
tect our citizens by making them aware of false information, and expose the 
actors responsible for engaging in such practices. In today’s technology-
driven world, where warriors wield keyboards rather than swords and tar-
geted influence operations and disinformation campaigns are a recognised 
weapon of state and non-state actors, the European Union is increasing its 
activities and capacities in this fight. 
 ( European Commission 2020 ) 5 
The ease with which digital disinformation can be deliberately constructed and 
targeted at specific groups is itself a direct threat to democracy when coupled 
to the increasing susceptibility of the public to digital manipulation. We have 
evidence, not least from the 2016 US Presidential election, of a readiness uncriti-
cally to recirculate realistic fakes, hoaxes and lurid exaggerations. In future we 
can expect to see more hyper-partisan populist views and conspiracy laden argu-
ments on social media. Accompanying those trends will be a further decline in 
the intellectual standards of political argument, a coarsening of debate, a failure 
to defend scientific reasoning and an unwillingness to apply evidence properly to 
policymaking. Voter cynicism about the motives of politicians and resulting low 
election turnout are likely consequences ( Omand 2020 , chap. 11). 
Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic also illustrates well how the technoethics of 
intelligence can trigger liberal democratic concerns over privacy in a domestic 
context. The National Cyber Security Centre, a part of the Government Commu-
nications Headquarters (GCHQ), was involved in the design of the government’s 
planned contact tracing app, assisting NHSX, the technology and digital branch of 
the National Health Service. GCHQ has long had the responsibility for being the 
technical authority for the cryptographic security of sensitive national systems. 
However, while United Kingdom (UK) citizens were keen to accept governmen-
tal intervention in the form of pandemic Keynesianism in the economic sphere, 
some were less enthusiastic about the prospect of comprehensive government 
health monitoring in the form of a centralized model track and trace app.6 Hence, 
alongside the more pronounced concerns over the potential for the Chinese state 
to use the COVID-19 crisis as an opportunity to increase surveillance of its citi-
zens, some privacy and security experts in the UK warned of the risk of hackers 
accessing personal data and of domestic slippery slopes and “Orwellian over-
tones” ( Naughton 2020a ). Concerns about the possible consequences of acquiesc-
ing in the creation of the “Coronopticon” co-exist alongside recognition of the 
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Such apps to be effective require use by a significant proportion of the public and 
that level of uptake depends crucially on trust that the authorities will safeguard 
personal data from hackers and only use the information to be accessed for the 
stated purpose ( Hart et al. 2020 ). 
Meeting the challenges posed by the contemporary technoethics 
of intelligence 
Hence, the COVID-19 global emergency illustrates well the importance of state 
agencies operating in the digital sphere in order to protect intellectual property, 
prevent the unchallenged spread of misinformation and collect data on individual 
exposure to the virus that can allow for interventions intended to limit the spread 
of the disease. At the same time, it also illustrates how such interventions can 
give rise to privacy concerns. In thinking about how to balance these compet-
ing demands, principles adopted from Just War thinking can make an important 
contribution. After all, as Danielle Allen and her colleagues note, there are core 
parallels in the war and pandemic contexts for liberal democratic states: 
In both situations, the goal is to defeat the adversary with minimal loss of 
life and minimal damage to the material supports of a healthy economy and 
society, without perpetrating injustice, and while also pursuing defeat of 
the adversary in a way that both lays a foundation for a transition back to a 
peace-time setting and preserves the polity’s political institutions to a maxi-
mal extent throughout the crisis and with a view to perpetual sustainability. 
That is, the goal is not to defeat the adversary at any cost but to preserve one’s 
society, including preserving it as the kind of society it is. 
( Allen et al. 2020 ) 7 
The Just War-derived ethical concepts listed earlier can be used to help unpack the 
ethical challenges that arise ( Omand and Phythian 2018 , 79–83). 8 
Right intention and integrity of motive 
Right intention and integrity of motive on the part of those initiating, authoriz-
ing and conducting operations. The principle of right intention does not rule out 
deception in the course of an intelligence operation, such as inserting into the 
digital code of malware clues that attempt to encourage a false-flag attribution 
to a third country. But there must be no deception of government or Parliamen-
tary oversight, or hidden domestic political or personal agendas lying behind the 
authorization or the conduct of digital intelligence activity. In the only recorded 
UK instance of such conduct, a GCHQ employee who deliberately undertook 
a number of unauthorized digital searches on an individual was sacked on the 
spot ( Norton-Taylor 2015 ). In line with this approach, the analysis, assessment 
and presentation of the case for authorization to the relevant executive and judi-
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of collateral intrusion or other unintended consequences. Public confidence in 
government’s use of digital intelligence technology depends upon upholding this 
principle. 
We can see in this a key difference between intelligence ethics and medical 
ethics. A key demand of medical ethics is transparency over the risks of any medi-
cal procedure linked to the giving of specific informed consent by the patient. 
This is not possible in the world of secret intelligence – for example, for the 
individual citizen whose personal data is to be accessed in the course of intrusive 
surveillance – without vitiating the intelligence gathering operation. Consent has 
therefore to be given not individually but collectively though Parliamentary regu-
lation following as transparent a debate as possible given legitimate security con-
cerns and with the added protection of informed scrutiny via external oversight. 
Similarly, it is an accepted principle in medical research that drug and treatment 
trials require independent ethical approval and the informed consent of those tak-
ing part, and the same is true for academic research involving individual partici-
pants. The intelligence agencies also need to research and trial their innovations 
and new procedures for accessing and mining data (on which they depend to 
keep one step ahead of their targets), but they have to conduct this activity in 
secret. Proposals for major trials should nevertheless be subject to independent 
scrutiny by the senior judge acting as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to 
ensure that the proportionality and necessity tests are satisfied, thus protecting the 
interests of the individual data owners whose information is to be accessed. The 
Edward Snowden leaks exposed a 2002 case in which GCHQ conducted a major 
trial (in the end unsuccessful) of a new system for scraping still images from bulk 
data (Optic Nerve) ( Ackerman and Ball 2014 ). The subsequent controversy added 
to the case for updating legislation to take account of digital technology and for 
strengthening oversight arrangements, now in place via the UK’s 2016 Investiga-
tory Powers Act. 
Proportionality of means in relation to the ends to be secured 
Assessing proportionality has to be done by carrying out a balancing exercise in 
which the risks of intelligence operations – the potential for unintended harm to 
others – are set against the anticipated harms to the public that they are designed 
to avert; for example, the access to bulk data containing the communications of 
those not the subject of investigation set against the threat to life and property 
averted by uncovering a terrorist attack plot. Such proportionality judgements 
involve weighing up many kinds of uncertainty, for which the UK Courts have 
been willing to allow “a margin of appreciation” for the decisions taken by the 
security and intelligence agencies ( Anderson 2014 , 76). 
There is also an element of counter-factual thinking involved in such balancing 
when it comes to authorization of an operation since not conducting the operation 
also involves potential ethical risk. As John Stuart Mill pointed out in the mid-
nineteenth century: “A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions 
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injury” ( Mill 1869 , chap. 1). This principle is well established in medical eth-
ics, for example in the balancing act that a clinical team may have to make in 
intervening in medical emergencies in childbirth or following major accidents. 
Another example of proportionality judgement is in the licensing of new drugs 
and therapies where the expected benefits to a large number of sufferers from a 
disease have to be balanced against the risks of adverse side effects for a small 
number of patients and how far that can be mitigated by training of clinicians and 
warning leaflets with prescriptions. 
Right authority for intelligence activity 
“Right” in the secret intelligence context means both that the go-ahead is given by 
someone who has the authority to give it under rights-compliant law and that the 
decision is taken at a senior enough level appropriate to the ethical risks that may 
be run (an important consideration in ensuring that the activity is not “arbitrary” 
in the words of the UN Universal Human Rights Declaration). In general, the 
more sensitive the operation the more senior should be the authorizer. Under the 
UK Investigatory Powers Act 2016, for example, warrants to allow intelligence 
access by using digital bulk data must be signed by the Secretary of State and 
then judicially reviewed and counter-signed by a senior judge acting as a Com-
missioner under the terms of the Act. Authority to access communications data 
(considered less inherently sensitive than the content of communications) may 
under the Act be authorized by a designated independent senior officer working 
for the judicial Commissioner. In addition, since the 1950s there has been a stand-
ing instruction from the Foreign Secretary to the UK agencies that any operation 
that is contemplated, whether domestic or foreign, that could have an impact on 
foreign policy must be cleared by the Secretary of State or a senior official in the 
Foreign Office. Such a system ensures that there is an audit trail of who agreed 
to what. Public confidence issues quickly arise if that is not the case, as was 
exposed during inquiries into British Army covert intelligence gathering in the 
Northern Ireland conflict in the period of the 1970s and 1980s before legislation 
was introduced.9 
A different application of this key concept comes in the regulation of the use 
in intelligence and security activity of AI algorithms to categorize data. If such a 
machine learning system makes a wrong determination about an individual which 
results in an injustice, such as placing the innocent person on a no-fly list or pro-
viding targeting data for a direct intervention, who is to be held accountable – the 
coder who wrote the algorithm, the senior responsible owner of the decision sys-
tem in which it was embedded, the senior line manager or minister who authorized 
the policy for its use for that purpose? With the most advanced AI algorithms it 
may be hard to establish an audit trail of how the selection system arrived at its 
result in any particular case. An evolutionary machine learning process can result 
in the machine being able to select desired characteristics from bulk data without 
conscious programming of decision rules. There is a heavy ethical responsibility 
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can fully understand the implications of using such systems. The ethics of manag-
ing AI accountability in such circumstances (such as driverless vehicle accidents) 
is an issue going way beyond the realms of security and intelligence activity. 
However, at present there is no satisfactory ethical code for AI applications that is 
internationally accepted. 
A reasonable prospect of success in achieving the desired ends 
from the activity 
Originally, as part of the Just War tradition, this was an injunction against opera-
tions such as vainglorious cavalry charges that needlessly expose the forces 
involved to extreme danger. In the intelligence context this principle can be said 
to rule out activity where there is no justification for taking significant ethical risk, 
for example in “fishing expeditions” that involve engaging the privacy rights of 
many innocent people with no clear idea in mind as to what is being sought. When 
intelligence agencies access data in bulk, by definition the majority of individuals 
contained within the data set are not, and are unlikely to become, of interest to 
the Security and Intelligence Agencies in the exercise of their statutory functions 
( Home Office 2016 ). It is the problem of the haystack and the needle. There needs 
therefore to be a reasonable belief, on the basis of past experience or specific 
research, that there can be an expectation of sufficient effectiveness to justify the 
level of risk being run by the operation. For example, in the case of bulk access 
to communications data, the application of some filtering or other targeting or 
selection mechanism has an acceptable likelihood of pulling out for the analyst 
material that is relevant to an authorized intelligence requirement. Applying this 
principle rules out “mass surveillance”, or keeping the communications of a large 
group of citizens under observation in the blind hope that something may turn up 
to justify the operation. 
The effective application of an AI selector also depends on having the algo-
rithm correctly exposed to data that is representative of the real situation. Ethi-
cally unacceptable cultural, racial or gender bias in selection decisions can result 
if the training data is narrowly compiled and does not reflect what will be found 
in practice. Such biases can be hard to spot ( Ledford 2019 ). 
Discrimination 
Discrimination is needed to manage collateral harm, in the basic sense of the 
ability to see the difference between classes of things or people. In the laws of 
war that emerged from the Just War tradition the military commander faces, on 
the one hand, legitimate military targets and on the other hand groups of people 
that require protection such as innocent civilians not participating on the side of 
the adversary or surrendering soldiers. Before a new type of weapon is intro-
duced into the battlefield there needs to be a legal assessment that the combination 
of weapon and operator is capable of discriminating between them. By analogy, 
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confidence that there will be the human and technical ability to assess and manage 
the risk of collateral harm, including the implications of privacy intrusion into the 
lives of those not intended to be the target of intelligence gathering. 
Collateral intrusion has always been an issue with interception of fixed line 
telephones that capture the communications of all users in a home not just the 
targeted suspect. Bulk access operations have to be operated under clear ethical 
constraints to take account of the evident fact that almost all bulk data relates to 
those who are not and would never be the legitimate target of intelligence activ-
ity. Agencies must recognize that their privacy rights are engaged, right from the 
outset of planning such bulk operations, but with careful design of algorithms and 
procedures for destroying unexamined material after a set period that ethical risk 
can be managed down to an acceptable level applying the necessity and propor-
tionality tests. 
This principle also provides the basis for ethical oversight of the artificial intel-
ligence algorithms that are increasingly being used to question large data sets. In 
any practical decision system (whether conducted by humans, by humans assisted 
by machine intelligence or by AI algorithms themselves) what is a reasonable 
prospect of success has to be defined, given that the possibility of error cannot be 
excluded. AI applications that have a low rate of false positives are said to have 
high specificity. Those with a low rate of false negatives have high sensitivity. 
Where the cursor is set between these will depend upon the consequences of get-
ting it wrong either way. A no-fly security system can be expected to allow more 
false positives (preventing an innocent passenger from flying) in return for fewer 
false negatives (allowing a genuine terrorist suspect to board an aircraft). Key to 
achieving an acceptable balance of results is understanding what the true level of 
the decision factor is likely to be. For example, an antibody test for corona virus 
might have a 95% level of both specificity and sensitivity but despite these high 
levels, applied to a community of 500 people with a 5% infection rate an individ-
ual who tests positive only has a 50% chance of genuinely having the antibodies 
( Frasier 2020 ). 
Necessity 
Necessity is the final Just War-derived concept that can be used to judge the 
ethical adequacy of an operation. Is it really necessary to do this? Additional 
Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions applicable to armed conflict places 
a requirement on a military commander to be able to justify that an operation 
is a necessary part of achieving his military aim. There needs to be confidence 
that there is no reasonable alternative way to achieve the ends of the authorized 
mission at lesser ethical risk. That applies to intelligence activity, for example 
establishing that wanted information cannot be obtained more easily from open 
sources, or indeed already exists somewhere in the intelligence community. There 
are many databases of personal data relating to individuals that can be accessed 
with appropriate legal authority. Government examples include criminal records, 
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information gathered at the border. Private sector information includes airline 
bookings (and advanced passenger information shared between nations), credit 
card and financial data, on-line purchases and internet connection records and 
mobile telephone usage data. With the right legal authority under data protec-
tion legislation, however, such personal data can be accessed (under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights/Human Rights Act 1999) for the purposes 
of national security, the detection and prevention of serious crime and for the 
protection of health. 
These ethical concepts, especially necessity and proportionality, form a use-
ful framework for jus in intelligentia in today’s digital world. On the other hand, 
the jus ad intelligentiam to help judge the acceptability of digital intelligence 
capability itself is harder to pin down. We have to accept the primacy today of 
the nation-state in relation to the security of the citizen (e.g. as set out in article 
4(2) of the Treaty of European Union) and nation-states will choose to maintain 
the means to defend themselves against digital threats and to be able to exploit to 
that end the digitized personal data that unavoidably is part of modern life. To that 
end intelligence activity is the first not the last resort. But the ethical injunction 
of necessity remains. 
The ethics of being a cyber power: offensive cyber capabilities 
and deterrence in cyberspace 
There is nevertheless considerable interest in international legal and diplomatic 
circles in the development of norms for responsible conduct in cyberspace that 
might if followed by the democracies eventually become part of accepted inter-
national law. Some norms, for example, might take the Geneva Convention’s 
route and identify classes of potential targets to be protected, such as not target-
ing the core structures of the internet and not deliberately weakening the encryp-
tion on which key applications depend, including for financial systems and key 
protocols such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). International Human Rights Law 
is already considered by many states to apply in cyberspace (as per the Tallinn 
Manual drawn up by North Atlantic Treaty Organization experts) ( Schmitt 2017 ). 
Domestic legal regulation and oversight measures can help the search for norms 
as examples of confidence building measures both for the domestic population 
and for international confidence in rules-based international order. 
Espionage, including digital espionage, is however not regulated by interna-
tional law, being regarded as “fair game” between nations, with the onus being 
on a nation to defend itself. Some espionage techniques could nevertheless open 
weaknesses in the “commons” of the internet and the difference between a digital 
espionage operation and a cyberattack could be only a few lines of code. Such 
considerations, along with the impossibility of adequate verification, seem to rule 
out an arms control approach to limiting hostile activity in cyberspace or to apply-
ing the approach of the Hague conventions on weaponry (such as restrictions on 
landmines) to prohibiting techniques that carry high risk of wider harm (such as 
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Hence, developing norms for state behaviour in cyberspace is as challenging 
a prospect as it is an important task. However, there have been important recent 
interventions that represent significant early steps in what is likely to be a long, 
non-linear, endeavour. 
On the basis of these, we can say that one essential foundation on which interna-
tional norms must be built is robust and transparent national legislation regulating
intrusive intelligence practice in the digital sphere. Another is the open and regular
discussion of principles that should govern intelligence and security behaviour.
There is clear potential for the second of these to act as a confidence-building mea-
sure by building on the foundation provided by the first; intelligence managers in
liberal democratic states can act as norm entrepreneurs10 in this field but in doing so
they are not operating in a vacuum but in a context underpinned by openly debated
and clearly understood national legal frameworks. These give the interventions by
intelligence managers much of their force as confidence-building measures.11 
A very good example of this process of norm development can be seen in the 
Fullerton Lecture given by GCHQ Director Jeremy Fleming in Singapore in Feb-
ruary 2019, which was widely reported and made easily accessible in both text 
and video forms ( Fleming 2019 ). 12 This addressed core issues related to being a 
Cyber Power: “What does it mean? What does a country need to have at its dis-
posal to be a Cyber Power? How should it exercise that power? What rules, regu-
lations and ethics are needed to exercise power responsibly?” ( Fleming 2019 ). His 
answer was that a cyber power had the following three characteristics: 
One, it has to be world class in safeguarding the cyber health of its citizens, 
businesses and institutions – it must protect the digital homeland. 
Two, it has to have the legal, ethical and regulatory regimes to foster public 
trust – without which we do not have a licence to operate in cyber space. 
And three, when the security of its citizens are threatened it has to have 
the ability – in extremis and in accordance with international law – to project 
cyber power to disrupt, deny or degrade. 
 ( Fleming 2019 ) 
Ethics and legality were not treated as synonymous, but as complementary 
requirements to be met that, together, could give confidence that cyber power was 
being used responsibly: 
I’ve always liked the philosopher and scientist Aldo Leopold’s definition of 
ethics. He said it was about “doing the right thing even when no one else is 
watching”. Nowhere does that apply so much than in the world of national 
security. In spying, intelligence gathering, espionage – whatever term you’d 
like to use – I believe that there are ethical rules and boundaries, and these 
should always be followed and upheld. 
Of course, the UK is a liberal democracy. There is extensive oversight of 
the work of the intelligence and security agencies. Someone else, typically a 
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It’s perhaps easy to be ethical in such a situation – and in our democracies, 
sometimes we take that oversight for granted. Nonetheless, our analysts are 
constantly reminded that it is not enough to be able to do something . . . it is 
not even enough for it to be legal to do something . . . it must also be right to 
do something. 
 ( Fleming 2019 ) 
Here, then, the foundation of confidence lies in robust national legislation and 
oversight mechanisms onto which the emphasis on professional ethics in train-
ing and professional development added further assurance. One objection to this 
line of reasoning could be that these are simply words, that talk is cheap. But the 
words used are significant. The second characteristic of a cyber power identified 
by Fleming (earlier) was that the “legal, ethical and regulatory regimes” were in 
place that could “foster public trust”. Without these, “we do not have a licence to 
operate in cyber space”. Later in the speech, Fleming returned to this idea of “our 
licence to operate” which “enables us to retain the trust of the societies we serve”. 
Both of these terms reflected the titles of reports advocating significant reform 
of the regulatory regimes governing digital intelligence collection and interfer-
ence in the wake of legal challenges following the Snowden disclosures and part 
of an extended period in the UK of public discussion of intelligence collection 
practices. The idea of a “licence to operate” comes from the title of a report from 
the Independent Surveillance Review,  A Democratic Licence to Operate, pub-
lished in July 2015, on which one of us (David Omand) served as a panel mem-
ber ( Independent Surveillance Review 2015 ). The reference to the importance of 
retaining trust recalls the title of the June 2015 report by David Anderson, QC, the 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation,  A Question of Trust ( Anderson 
2014 ). Both of these influenced the nature of the 2016 Investigatory Powers Act, 
the post-Snowden regulatory framework passed (by a large cross-party majority) 
for digital intelligence collection and use, one feature of which was enhanced 
oversight. 
This act created a powerful Commissioner (a very senior judge), a new system 
of warrants for access to bulk data and an independent body to authorize law 
enforcement access to communications data and internet data connection records 
(the who called whom, when, where and how). It is this oversight capability that 
adds to confidence in interventions such as this by Jeremy Fleming. For example, 
the 2016 Investigatory Powers Act provided for the need for prior approval by 
Judicial Commissioners of warrants for the use of intrusive powers such as inter-
ception, equipment interference and the use of surveillance in sensitive environ-
ments. It also created the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO) 
to consist of around 70 staff comprising 15 Judicial Commissioners (current and 
recently retired High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court Judges), a Tech-
nical Advisory Panel of scientific experts and around 50 official staff, including 
lawyers and communications experts. 
In its 2017 Annual Report, IPCO set out a particular interest in Section 7 
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referring to activity that SIS and GCHQ carry out outside the British Islands where 
the authorization removes any liability under UK criminal or civil law for what is 
done. In the course of overseeing these, Sir John Goldring, the deputy IPC, 
“conducted two inspections of GCHQ and SIS, in the spring and autumn of 
2017, along with two of SIS’s overseas stations in early 2017 [and] separate 
inspections of the FCO as regards its work with SIS and GCHQ during the 
summer of 2017”, focusing on “the authorisation and review processes, and 
particularly whether the Foreign Secretary was provided with a proper under-
standing of the activity that would be sanctioned by the authorisation”. 
( Investigatory Powers Commission 2019 , para. 11.1–11.15)
Both of IPCO’s annual reports to date are detailed (131 and 141 pages-long 
respectively), publicly available, are clear about inspection methodology and set 
out errors and breaches in relation to warranting. In short, the oversight mecha-
nism provides a firm basis for intelligence managers to build in discussing ethical 
approaches to cyber power and act as norm entrepreneurs. 
Given all of this, when is it right for a cyber power to deploy its offensive
cyber capability, “taking action online that has direct real-world effect” in Jer-
emy Fleming’s words? Here again we can see the utility of drawing on and
adapting Just War precepts to guide our thinking. This is one area where we
can clearly see the relevance of thinking in terms of an intelligence equivalent
of jus ad bellum. Underpinning these considerations is the principle that there
are boundaries of acceptable state behaviour in cyberspace ( Fleming 2019 ) and
that a core characteristic of the responsible cyber power is the way in which
it uses that power in a manner that encourages other states to operate within
these boundaries and in support of the rules-based international order. This con-
tributes to the development of norms in this still rapidly developing sphere of
activity. Where states seek to act outside these boundaries, the responsible cyber
power can act to deter by attaching costs, both reputational and/or physical. In
this sense, then, applying the notion of deterrence here means influencing others
not to act in ways that harm us. There are a number of forms this approach can
take, for example:
• working with other nations to expose adversary actions and intentions to 
criticism 
• influencing via diplomacy and nudging, including with sanctions 
• offering inducements, such as of a reset in relations with the option to with-
hold if unacceptable behaviour continues 
• emphasizing mutual economic inter-dependence,  deterrence by entangle-
ment with the potential adversary, as Joseph Nye has called it ( Nye 2017 ) 13 
• making ourselves a harder target and thus making life as difficult as we can 
for the attackers, exercising deterrence by denial of benefit to the aggressor, 
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• threatening consequences, including via the use of armed force or offensive 
cyber means, which provide the essence of deterrence by punishment
We could arrange these as a scale of D: from D minor, detection and exposure to 
disapproval, to discouragement, to deflection, to dissuasion and finally to D major, 
the formal structures of defence and deterrence found in NATO strategy. Digital 
intelligence aimed at understanding the capabilities and intentions of potential 
adversaries is at the heart of decisions about how best to deter potential threats, 
including through the development of offensive cyber capabilities, at three levels. 
First, for armed forces, ours and those of potential adversaries, the digital is 
now a domain of warfare. Any future armed conflict is likely to involve the use 
of cyber weapons, just as in the recent past armed forces used electronic warfare. 
As noted earlier the use of any weapon system needs to be constrained by jus in 
bello ethical considerations, for example adherence to international humanitarian 
law and the Geneva Conventions. The development of such weapons inevitably 
involves significant prior intelligence gathering on the digital networks or capa-
bilities that are the target of the system. 
Second, many states are acquiring the capability to inflict highly damaging 
cyberattacks on national infrastructure, potentially causing death and damage that 
would be equivalent to a kinetic armed attack. For the UK and NATO allies it is 
important that potential adversaries understand that such “Article 5 level” attacks 
would engage the full weight of NATO’s defence and deterrence strategy. The 
Obama Administration warned in 2011 that it would 
respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our 
country. We reserve the right to use all necessary means – diplomatic, infor-
mational, military, and economic – as appropriate and consistent with appli-
cable international law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, 
and our interests. 
(BBC  News 2011 ) 
Aggressors must understand that the response to such attacks need not be con-
fined to cyberspace. 
But then we have the third level of everyday cyber threat, well below the 
threshold of armed attack, ranging from fraud to digital subversion of democracy, 
as seen during the 2016 US Presidential election campaign and described earlier. 
The acronym CESSPIT encapsulates this as: Crime, Espionage, Sabotage and 
Subversion perverting internet technology. 
The CESSPIT activities below the threshold of armed attack are best managed 
as a whole of nation effort to reduce the risk to the citizen, including education of 
business and citizens to operate safely in the digital world. Active cyber defences 
can seek out and block malware, bad addresses and dodgy websites. Children can 
be taught critical thinking so that they are better equipped to detect deception, 
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We need to make life as difficult as possible for the attackers by penetrating 
and disrupting their networks to create difficulty and make attacks more costly 
in terms of effort. Such persistent engagement is a contribution to deterrence by 
denial. It could be described as forward active dissuasion (FAD), like having 
police officers on the streets. That contributes to reducing the risk but, like the 
threat of arrest for criminals, it will not stop them from trying to commit crime. 
Conclusions 
Intelligence officers are in ethical terms natural consequentialists, wishing to 
have the acceptability of their methods judged by their results, for example in 
terms of terrorist plots uncovered and frustrated. This principle underlies the 
requirement in the UK’s 2016 Investigatory Powers Act for proportionality. 
There has to be a relationship between the ethical risks being run and the harms it 
is sought to prevent. The principle of necessity is also incorporated into the 2016 
Act, that digital operations that involve an ethical risk (which the Act defines) 
need adequate justification. There is a moral obligation to consider whether the 
results might be obtained by a method (such as use of open sources) that carries 
lower ethical risk. 
Some democratic societies, including the UK, have insisted on importing a 
deontological element into the consequentialist ethical approach of their agen-
cies by constraining them to act in accordance with universal human rights, as 
laid down in the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and translated 
into UK domestic law by the 1999 Human Rights Act. That includes the absolute 
prohibition on obtaining information by torture and other unlawful interrogation 
methods. In relation to digital intelligence operations it also requires that balances 
be sought within the basket of human rights, especially over respecting privacy 
rights of citizens as well as their right to life and the enjoyment of property, and 
the protection of freedom of speech. There is also an aretaic, value ethics, element 
to the recruitment and training of intelligence officers to help them know the set-
tings of their internal moral compasses. Taken together, drawing on these conse-
quentialist, deontological and aretaic traditions, the UK intelligence and security 
agencies should be better able to demonstrate that their digital activity conforms 
to domestic law that itself is based on ethical principles that have commanded 
a significant cross-party majority in Parliament. As technologies continue to be 
developed, and exploited for intelligence purpose, that “licence to operate” will 
need to be revalidated and renewed. 
The use of AI algorithms to identify individuals of interest and patterns of 
covert communication is now becoming commonplace. The ethical principle that 
must be met is that the computer algorithms being used are sufficiently discrimi-
nating so as to give an acceptable likelihood of picking out the sought-for com-
munication and a lower risk of selecting irrelevant material. To achieve that there 
needs to be careful attention to prevent unconscious biases, for example where the 
data used to train the algorithms does not reflect the actual population of data to 
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filtering and selection processes are sufficiently discriminating so as to minimize 
the extent of invasion of privacy of the innocent.14 
Being pro-active in defending the digital space brings with it legal and ethical 
issues. Advanced digital intelligence tools will be needed for defensive purposes. 
As with conventional weaponry, the same tools will be available to the authorities 
of the autocracies. What matters therefore is to have a system in the democracies 
of legal authorization, oversight and ethical regulation of the purpose for which 
the technology is to be applied. It is this sense of moral purpose, underpinned by 
the principle of restraint, that distinguishes the regulated activity of the intelli-
gence agencies of liberal democracies from those of the autocracies. 
Recent UK experience is that with greater transparency over the necessity for 
secret intelligence to prevent harms to the public and an evidence-based vigorous 
Parliamentary and public debate it is possible to arrive at a democratic consensus 
over how intelligence activity should be regulated under the law ( Independent 
Surveillance Review 2015 ). The debate has enhanced public trust in the security 
and intelligence authorities, whilst the secret agencies and their law enforcement 
partners have been able to use these powers effectively. The UK Investigative 
Powers Act 2016 marked a new deal between the British intelligence communities 
in which a legal “licence to operate” is given for intrusive intelligence methods in 
return for enhanced ethical safeguards and oversight. Even since 2016, however, 
digital technology has continued to develop whilst the public has become much 
more sensitive to the use (and misuse) of their personal data. The long tradition 
of Just War thinking has provided a set of concepts such as right authority, pro-
portionality and necessity that can be used to help manage the additional ethical 
risks that come with the application of digital technology and machine learning 
to the worlds of national intelligence, security and public safety. Offensive cyber 
capabilities expand the realm in which ethical guidelines need to be applied. 
Here, we see again the “3 Rs” framework that defines liberal intelligence in 
operation: the rule of law; regulation and restraint ( Omand and Phythian 2018 , 
225–39). The transparent  rule of law which provides for robust regulation , evi-
dence of which is made publicly available, forms the basis on which intelligence 
managers can act as norm entrepreneurs, shaping developments by emphasizing 
the expectations that surround the exercise of responsible cyber power and setting 
out principles around this that will guide their state’s and organization’s behav-
iour. These interventions also set out the costs that are likely to attach to unac-
ceptable conduct in the digital sphere. Notwithstanding the clear exposition of 
the offensive potential inherent within the notion of a cyber power, and key to its 
deployment as a deterrent, this is an approach characterized by restraint. 
Notes 
1 This represents a revival of the term coined by the Argentinean philosopher of science 
Mario Bunge in the 1970s ( Bunge 1977 ). 
2 Bunge wrote of the Technologist being “Torn Between Conflicting Interests” and set 
out a scenario where: 
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 “M: The management expects an efficient and profitable plant. 
 W: The workers expect satisfactory working conditions. 
 N: The neighbors expect a pollution-free operation. 
T : The professional colleagues expect a technologically advanced design, execu- 
tion and operation of the project. 
 C: The consumers expect useful and reasonably priced goods” .
 ( Bunge 1977 ) 
The possible parallels with the conflicting expectations that can attach to intelligence  
are obvious. 
  3 For example  Marrin and Clemente (2005 )  and  Marrin and Torres (2017 ). 
 4 On the health security dimension specifically, see  Lentzos, Goodman, and Wilson 
(2020 ) and the other articles in that special issue on Health Security Intelligence. 
 5 See also  Rankin (2020 ). 
 6 For example,  Naughton (2020b )  and  Urwin and Wheeler (2020 ). For another perspec-
tive, see  Foges (2020 ). 
 7 See also  Allen (2020 ). 
  8 See also  Omand and Phythian (2018 , 79–83). 
 9 For example, the inquiries by Chief Constable John Stevens and by the Canadian Judge 
Peter Cory examined allegations of collusion between the British Army and Loyalist 
paramilitary groups, subsequently investigated in detail by Sir Desmond de Silva, who 
concluded in his inquiry published in 2012 that there was an absence of clear structures 
and guidelines to ensure accountability for the use and dissemination of intelligence 
and to ensure intelligence is not exploited illegally, had been (de  Silva 2012 ). 
 10 The term comes from  Sunstein (1996 ). 
1 1 On norms and confidence-building measures in cyberspace ( Broeders, Boeke, and 
Georgieva 2019 ). 
 12 A further good example is provided by Alex  Younger’s December  2018 speech at St. 
Andrews University. 
 13 See also  Mandel (2017 ). 
1 4 The most detailed description of how this operates can be found in the Academy of Sci-
ences report,  Bulk Collection of Signals Intelligence (Board, Sciences, and Council 2015). 
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 4 Ethics in the recruiting and 
handling of espionage agents1
 David Perry 
 Introduction 
Before delving into the topic of espionage specifically, I’ll first indicate to the 
reader some of the terms, concepts and assumptions in ethics that will frame my 
analysis. 
Among theories and principles of ethics, there is an important distinction 
between 1) those which consider only the consequences of alternative actions in 
determining whether those actions are morally right or wrong (i.e. consequen-
tialist or teleological), 2) those which give moral weight to aspects of actions 
other than their consequences or in addition to them (i.e. nonconsequentialist or 
deontological) and 3) those which focus on motives and character traits rather 
than right or wrong actions. William Frankena in his classic book Ethics called 
the latter aretaic approaches, drawing on an ancient Greek concept of excellence
of character ( Frankena 1973 ). 2 While classifying an ethical claim one way or the 
other is never enough to prove or disprove it; grasping this tripartite classifica-
tion framework can enable us fruitfully to examine all sorts of ethical claims and 
arguments, as well as avoid getting stuck in one category at the exclusion of the 
others, which can lead to serious mistakes in ethical judgement and deliberation. 
I’m persuaded that there are several ethical principles that apply to all rational 
beings, whether or not they recognize them as such. These principles are objec-
tive in that sense, but prima facie rather than absolute, since none of them always 
overrides the others in cases of conflict.3 They include: 
1 Compassion: concern for the well-being of others; avoiding inflicting suf-
fering; preventing and alleviating others’ suffering; meeting the needs of the 
most vulnerable; promoting others’ happiness 
2 Fairness: treating people the way they deserve to be treated, as having equal 
rights unless merit or need justifies special treatment or if their criminal acts 
cause them to forfeit such rights 
3 Respect for individual autonomy; not manipulating rational people even for 
their own good 
4 Respect for laws enacted by legitimate governing bodies 
5 Honesty: not deceiving anyone who deserves to know the truth; not making 









 6 Courage in opposing injustice, defending the innocent from harm etc. 
7 Integrity: upholding our obligations in spite of personal inconvenience; 
keeping promises that we have freely made 
We also accept particular responsibilities when we take on certain roles, which 
can qualify our fulfilment of those general ethical principles. If I marry and have 
kids, I implicitly accept responsibilities towards my family that are stronger than 
those of the average person towards them. If I am hired by a corporation, I implic-
itly agree to promote the interests of the company’s owners (as well as other key 
“stakeholders”). If I’m a defence attorney, I incur strong obligations of confidenti-
ality towards any client whom I agree to serve. If I’m a journalist, I have a special 
responsibility to establish the veracity of a story before reporting it as news. If I’m 
a soldier or police officer, I’m authorized to kill under certain circumstances, but 
I’m also expected to risk my life to save defenceless people. And if I’m an intel-
ligence officer, I’m permitted and expected to lie when necessary to protect vital 
national secrets, including intelligence sources and methods. 
Business and professional roles can create opportunities to fulfil a wide range 
of ethical obligations and ideals. Physicians and nurses can alleviate suffering, 
promote patients’ health and respect their informed consent. Journalists can 
expose government corruption and improve democratic accountability. Lawyers 
can defend the poor and the wrongly accused from injustice or prosecute danger-
ous or callous criminals. Businesspeople can meet all kinds of human needs in 
efficient and imaginative ways, increasing our quality of life. And military and 
intelligence professionals can provide crucial elements of security for the lives, 
rights and well-being of their fellow citizens. 
But ethical challenges can also arise in business and professional life, where the 
ethical choice is clear (or should be clear), but where there are personal incentives 
or organizational pressures to do otherwise. Corporate purchasing staff might be 
offered bribes to choose certain suppliers over others, undermining the objec-
tive judgement they owe to their companies. Physicians may be tempted to refer 
patients for unneeded tests or treatments if they have a financial stake in them. 
News organizations might emphasize celebrity scandals and shallow political 
controversies to entertain their audiences, instead of investing in careful investi-
gative reporting that might actually serve the public good. And salespeople might 
feel pressure to mislead customers about their companies’ products or services in 
order to meet sales quotas. 
Business and professional life sometimes generates genuine ethical dilemmas 
as well, where multiple ethical principles conflict with one another. Medical treat-
ments might extend the length or improve the quality of life for a patient with 
advanced dementia, but might also conflict with their previously stated wishes. 
Journalists might be subpoenaed to reveal the names of sources to whom they’ve 
promised confidentiality, or face imprisonment if they refuse. Defence lawyers 
might discover that their client is guilty of a horrendous crime but refuses to plead 
guilty. And corporate executives can face decisions that will harm employees and 
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One of the more influential misconceptions to have arisen in Western polit-
ical philosophy is the idea that ethical principles are not appropriate to apply 
to “statecraft” or international politics, as if in doing so one makes a kind of 
“category mistake”. Now, clearly it is important to make conceptual distinctions 
between transactions involving states and those involving individuals, but those 
distinctions do not necessarily mean that ethical considerations are irrelevant to 
international relations. An international treaty, for example, is different in many 
respects from a promise made between individual persons. A treaty that ceases 
to be beneficial to a country is not necessarily accorded the same legitimacy as 
a promise that ceases to be convenient to an individual promisor. Yet a treaty 
is a kind of promise, in that it demands of those who would annul it that they 
provide convincing justification for doing so. Even the idea of a state’s “national 
interest” – which might in fact serve as justification for breaking a treaty – itself 
bears moral weight, an implicit appeal to the rights and well-being of the state’s 
domestic citizens, though whether a state’s action is indeed in its national interest 
and whether that conclusively justifies that action are frequently controversial.4 
Similarly, although society grants to the state the use of deadly force in its 
behalf, it does not thereby accede to all possible uses of that force. The proscrip-
tion of cruelty and excessive violence is as relevant to the relations between states 
as it is to the interactions between persons. 
Moreover, although US government 5 employees – including intelligence offi-
cials – are bound to defend a particular Constitution, that Constitution is based 
upon certain universal principles – including the right of consent of the governed 
affirmed by the Declaration of Independence – which as such apply not only to 
US domestic citizens but also to the citizens of foreign countries, especially as 
the latter are affected by US government actions. Respect for the autonomy and 
consent of persons, whatever their nationality, implies that they not be coerced or 
deceived unless even weightier ethical principles are at risk. 
Espionage and treason 
Espionage conflicts with our normal condemnation of treason, since if treason 
is immoral then it can hardly be ethical to induce someone to commit treason 
by spying on their own government. Treason is considered morally suspect for 
both deontological and teleological reasons: it typically involves a betrayal of 
public trust and a basic obligation of citizenship; and it can expose the nation to 
subversion or military defeat by hostile states. In addition, covert action conflicts 
with our moral sensibility that rational adults and their government representa-
tives ought not to be deceived or manipulated, that people generally deserve to 
be told the truth and allowed to manage their own affairs without paternalistic or 
hostile interference. 
These normal ethical assumptions are challenged in some respects, however, 
when we explore the question, are there certain states, regimes or organizations 
which do not deserve the loyalty or honesty of their citizens or members? Con-
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which clearly does not actually deserve such loyalty – hence the justification for 
the FBI and other law-enforcement agencies to penetrate and subvert them by 
means of informers and undercover agents. 
But if treason and other dishonest acts against certain states can be justified, 
then we can begin also to see the potential justification of espionage and covert 
action carried out against those same states by other states, assuming that the lat-
ter are themselves legitimate and are pursuing just goals.6 
This is a highly loaded assumption, however, since legitimate intelligence goals 
cannot justify any and all means. Many espionage and covert action techniques 
remain morally problematic despite their employment in the service of a worthy 
cause by a justified profession. It is apparent that to manipulate persons into becom-
ing espionage agents, to employ coercive interrogation techniques, or to deceive 
foreign citizens via covert action, may infringe rights that cannot legitimately be 
infringed unless outweighed by more compelling ethical reasons. Although the 
concept of national interest implies the tacit consent of domestic citizens, it cannot 
unequivocally warrant coercive intelligence methods, in part because it cannot be 
assumed to satisfy the tacit or even hypothetical consent of foreign citizens. 
This is not to argue that, in a “zero-sum” conflict 7 between the vital interests 
of domestic and foreign citizens, one cannot justify pursuing the former at the 
expense of the latter. On the contrary, duties to defend one’s country – as long as 
that country can plausibly be described as a constitutional democracy – can be 
justified on the basis of a theory of universal human rights ( Gewirth 1988 ). 
The point, however, is that the moral justification of coercive intelligence 
methods requires either a true zero-sum conflict – a situation which cannot simply 
be assumed to exist in every relation between enemies – or a credible appeal to 
foreign citizens’ hypothetical consent (in the absence of their expressed consent), 
meaning that one has good reason to believe that they would concur if they had 
relevant knowledge and deliberated in an unbiased fashion.8 
Agent recruiting and handling 
Organizations like the Central Intelligence Agency contribute to the formidable 
task of ascertaining the capabilities and intentions of foreign regimes and sig-
nificant sub-state actors like terrorist cells. Much of the work of their analysts 
involves sifting through and evaluating public sources of information as well as 
data obtained by satellites and monitors of electronic transmissions. Such sources 
can by themselves elicit tremendously valuable intelligence, all the more so when 
disparate bits of information can be cross-referenced and pieced together by 
means of powerful computer systems and software. 
But I think we have good reason to believe that espionage using human agents 
(HUMINT) remains an important intelligence tool, even now the only way in 
some cases to gain access to an enemy’s sensitive documents, conversations, 
intentions and plans. 
In the efforts of a state’s intelligence service to recruit agents in foreign coun-












Espionage agents 67 
to build “assets” – human sources of information and influence – for future use. 
Richard Bissell, CIA’s Deputy Director for Plans, 1958–62, testified before Con-
gress in 1975: 
It was the normal practice in the Agency and an important part of its mission 
to create various kinds of capability long before there was any reason to be 
certain whether those would be used or where or how or for what purpose
[emphasis added]. The whole ongoing job of . . . a secret intelligence service 
of recruiting agents is of that character. 
( Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1975 , 186) 9 
The literature indicates that foreign citizens become espionage agents for a wide 
variety of personal reasons. Former clandestine service officer Joseph Smith indi-
cated in his memoir that his trainers boiled down the categories of agents’ moti-
vations to three: financial considerations, ideological convictions and coercion 
( Smith 1981 , 114). Other writers have suggested a broader range of motives and 
situations enabling the recruiting and handling of agents: the lure of adventure, 
excitement and secrecy; ideology or sense of duty; desire for money; sexual and 
other blackmail; agents’ resentment and frustration regarding their overt careers or 
some combination of these ( Felix [McCargar] 1988 ;  1963 ;  Grodzins 1956 ;  Blum 
1972 , chaps. 5–6;  Cooper and Redlinger 1986 , chap. 2;  Pincher 1988 ;  1987 ). 10 
A more instructive approach for our purposes is to distinguish among tech-
niques of agent recruitment and handling according to various degrees of freedom 
of action, although I will also explore ethical issues common to all uses of human 
agents. 
 Voluntary agents 
Some agents, first of all, require little or no persuasion on the part of intelligence 
officers to engage in espionage on behalf of countries like the United States, 
although in the interest of “compartmentation” (the restriction of information to 
only those who can justify their “need to know” it) they may never be told how the 
information they provide is actually used. Some voluntary agents are motivated 
by the sheer excitement of spying and the promise of steady extra income. But 
many commit espionage out of a deep-seated antagonism towards their native 
regimes ( Jacobs 1978 ;  Smith 1981 , 114–15). 11 This was true, for example, of a 
number of high-ranking Soviet military and KGB officials who either passed sen-
sitive documents to the CIA or who defected when they no longer in good con-
science could serve the Soviet regime. 
One such agent, Pyotr Popov, a Soviet military intelligence officer, supplied 
valuable information to CIA during the 1950s largely out of repugnance towards 
the KGB’s treatment of Russian peasants ( Hood 1982 ;  1983 ;  Rositzke 1988 , 
67–9). Another Soviet defector-in-place, Oleg Penkovskiy, fearing that Khrush-
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with thousands of pages of Soviet military documents, including information 
on Soviet nuclear weapon capabilities that proved vital to President Kennedy’s 
actions during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis ( Penkovsky 1965 ). 12 
One of the more interesting viewpoints to emerge fairly consistently from the 
memoirs and other writings of former CIA personnel is that intelligence officers 
and their intermediaries occasionally develop close emotional ties to the agents 
they supervise ( Felix [McCargar] 1988 ;  Phillips 1982 , chap. 4;  Smith 1981 ; 
Copeland 1978 , 129–30;  Hood 1982 ;  DeForest and Chanoff 1990 ) especially 
those agents who engage in espionage out of a sense of duty. For instance, Frank 
Wisner, CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations 1951–58, reportedly suffered a ner-
vous breakdown chiefly as a result of being ordered not to aid rebels resisting the 
Soviet crackdown in Hungary in 1956 ( Powers 1979 ;  Ranelagh 1987 , 306–7). 
It is not too far-fetched to believe that, in a state characterized by an oppres-
sive political system, espionage intended to undermine that system’s power and 
prestige can actually provide authentic hope to agents and dissident groups, and 
in this way can be ennobling rather than exploitative. Former CIA officer Harry 
Rositzke argued that although agents sent on missions against the Soviet Union 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s “knew from the beginning that the cards were 
stacked against them”, they were nonetheless “highly motivated”, having wit-
nessed the effects of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, the Ukraine and the Baltic 
States ( Rositzke 1988 , 26–8). 
However, espionage against one’s government is considered treason in every 
part of the world, and if exposed frequently entails severe punishment for the 
agent. Both Popov and Penkovskiy, for example, were reportedly executed after 
their capture and interrogation by the KGB. Thus the fact that an agent is a vol-
unteer does not thereby purge his or her CIA case officer of moral responsibility 
or liability. 13 
Former CIA officer Glenn Carle touched on several of these themes in his fas-
cinating memoir: 
The relationship a case officer . . . has with his “assets” – the men and women 
we recruited and convinced to commit treason, to provide us with classified 
information, often at the risk of their lives – is the most intense personal rela-
tionship in one’s life. . . . Trust is critical, and we convince an asset to trust us 
with his life. Protecting your asset is a case officer’s greatest responsibility. 
And we take that responsibility very seriously. 
 ( Carle 2011 , 76) 
Similarly, former CIA officer Thomas Mulligan argued: 
Our training, and the culture in the field, was that we had a moral responsi-
bility to look to the welfare and the safety of our agents. And even the lousy 
agents – the fabricators, say – were scrupulously protected both during and 
after their relationship with the Agency. It is absolutely essential that any 
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don’t have confidence that they will be protected, they will not engage in 
espionage on our behalf. 
(Thomas Mulligan, email message to the author, October 19, 2015) 
Although witting agents usually have no illusions about the consequences of cap-
ture, their covert sponsors may ask them to accomplish tasks entailing greater risk 
than they’re aware of or would agree to accept. Rositzke described how a nervous 
double agent was emboldened to meet with his KGB handler: the CIA polygraphed 
the agent, but then showed him a different graph than his own to convince him that 
he could successfully withstand a KGB debriefing ( Rositzke 1988 , 123–4). 14 Pyotr 
Popov reportedly refused a request by over-eager US officials to organize “a small, 
tightly knit resistance group” of his military colleagues out of fear of the KGB’s 
wholesale infiltration of society. In fact, Popov wouldn’t even provide CIA with 
the names of anyone who might be a Soviet dissident, fearing that a failed attempt 
by CIA to recruit any of them could easily “blow back” on him ( Hood 1982 , 96–7). 
Occasionally the desire to ensure the safety of agents can conflict with wider 
diplomatic objectives. Witness these excerpts from a  New York Times article: 
Two or three undercover agents believed to be working for Israel in a Syrian-
based terrorist group were unmasked and killed . . . not long after the United 
States gave the Damascus Government information about terrorist activities 
in the country. . . . Officials said the Administration argued that Mr. Assad 
should be given an unusually detailed briefing about the actions of Syrian-
based terrorists to impress upon him the weight of the evidence against his 
Government. Intelligence officials are said to have warned that such a brief-
ing would put undercover agents and methods of gathering information at 
risk. “It was quite an argument”, said one official who has been informed 
of the debate. “The intelligence guys finally told them, ‘O.K., but the blood 
will be on your hands if something happens.’” Undercover penetrations of 
terrorist groups are among the most difficult tasks in all espionage, and so the 
losses of agents are viewed as especially grave. 
 ( Wines 1991 ) 
Agents working against tyrannical organizations have an especially compelling 
ethical claim to have their clandestine activities very closely guarded by their 
CIA handlers. 
Some voluntary agents, though, have apparently been regarded as “expendable” 
in the interest of maintaining plausible deniability and the secrecy of intelligence 
operations and methods ( DeForest and Chanoff 1990 ;  Felix [McCargar] 1988 , 
107). James McCargar, a former operations officer, asserted that some American 
agents were gratuitously slandered by CIA upon their termination or “disposal” as 
agents, presumably to render them less credible should they attempt to publicize 
their former espionage work ( Felix [McCargar] 1988 , 62–3). 15 
British journalist Tom Mangold learned through extensive research into the 
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of bona fide Soviet defectors and other CIA agents were grossly mistreated – 
some even betrayed to the KGB – due to Angleton’s sloppy homework, para-
noia and damaging reliance on the bizarre, self-serving opinions of one particular 
Soviet defector, Anatoliy Golitsyn. To the agency’s credit, following Angleton’s 
forced retirement it made efforts to compensate some of the agents (and CIA offi-
cers) who had unjustly suffered as a result of Angleton’s and Golitsyn’s suspicions 
( Mangold 1991 ). 
Other issues attending the use of voluntary agents were illustrated in the state-
ment of a character in John le Carré’s novel,  The Little Drummer Girl, regarding a 
request from the character’s supervisor to penetrate a terrorist organization: 
I’ll find you an agent. I’ll train him, help him trail his coat, gain attention in 
the right places, feed him to the opposition. . . . And you know the first thing 
they’ll do? . . . They’ll invite him to authenticate himself. To go shoot a bank 
guard or an American soldier. Or bomb a restaurant. . . . Terrorist organiza-
tions don’t carry passengers. . . . They don’t have secretaries, typists, coding 
clerks, or any of the people who would normally make natural agents without 
being on the front line. They require a special kind of penetration. You want 
to crack the terror target these days . . . you practically have to build yourself 
your own terrorist first. 
( le Carré [Cornwell] 1984 , 242) 
Former CIA officer James Olson confirms that le Carré’s fictional scenario reflects 
real life: “Terrorists test one another by blood. No terrorist is fully trusted by the 
rest of the group until he or she has been directly involved in the planning or 
execution of a deadly terrorist attack” ( Olson 2006 , 108). 16 This illustrates a trou-
bling moral dilemma in demanding or condoning the moral corruption of agents 
to occur in the interest of exposing the members and sponsors of the target orga-
nization, an issue also faced domestically by the FBI in using undercover agents 
and informers against organized crime. (Later in this chapter I’ll also consider the 
deadly risks to innocent third parties that are often posed by such relationships.) 
The CIA has also been criticized for building up the hopes of agents beyond 
what the US Government really intended to support. McCargar stated that US 
intelligence developed a cooperative relationship with an unnamed Eastern Euro-
pean monarchist group (probably Albanian), deceiving them into believing that 
the restoration of the monarchy was intended by the United States (it was not) in 
order to benefit from the “considerable intelligence” the group provided ( Felix 
[McCargar] 1988 , 112–13). John Ranelagh accused the United States of a “cold 
ruthlessness” in supporting partisans in postwar Ukraine and elsewhere when it 
had no intention to commit its military forces to save them from being annihilated 
( Ranelagh 1987 , 137, 226–8, 287, 302–9). 17 And historian John Prados similarly 
assessed CIA support for Tibetan rebels in the 1950s-1960s: 
From the beginning Washington knew that Tibet could never be more than a 
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CIA promised liberation to the Tibetans, caught up in their hopes and dreams, 
who suffered prolonged agony in this war. 
 ( Prados 2006 , 203) 18 
US culpability has been mitigated, however, in regard to certain covert opera-
tions in Poland, Albania and Cuba, where US long-term objectives were defeated 
by the compromise of its operations and communications by enemy intelligence. 
US officials were unaware, for example, that British intelligence officers Kim 
Philby and George Blake were actually Soviet agents (moles) who would succeed 
in betraying numerous espionage and covert action projects and cause the deaths 
of hundreds of Western agents ( Pincher 1988 , 24). 19 The temptation to exploit 
voluntary agents for Realpolitik purposes must be considered as a plausible moral 
risk, though. 
Other espionage agents are not entirely voluntary, raising a number of addi-
tional ethical concerns. 
Deception and coercion in agent recruitment 
When the CIA is unable to obtain voluntary agents, it sometimes “recruits” them, 
so to speak, through deception. In some cases, people who wouldn’t willingly 
work for the CIA are made unwittingly to do exactly that by passing informa-
tion to a trusted friend or associate who happens to be in CIA employ but who 
presents himself as one with loyalties more congenial to the person being duped 
( Copeland 1978 , 125–9;  Felix [McCargar] 1988 , 112). This method is sometimes 
called “false-flag” recruitment ( Olson 2006 , 55–6;  Phillips 1982 , 263–4;  Epstein 
1989 , 89, 182–3), 20 since the recruiter claims to be someone he’s not. It’s essen-
tially a con game, wherein one first ascertains the potential agent’s basic loyalties 
and core values in order to concoct a scheme to persuade him to provide sensitive 
information without upsetting his conscience or arousing his suspicions. 
British spy Miles Copeland suggested in his Cold-War-era memoir, “If the pro-
spective agent hates Americans”, for example, the recruiter “can tell him he is 
acting in behalf of the French – or the British, the Soviets, or some Senator or 
crusading newspaperman”, whatever his conscience is assessed as most likely to 
tolerate ( Copeland 1978 , 128–9). 21 David Phillips, a former CIA officer, attested 
that “there are unsuspecting zealots around the world who are managed and paid 
as spies; they sell their countries’ secrets believing all the while they are helping 
‘the good guys’” ( Phillips 1982 , 264). 
Note that one’s opponent can also play this game; here’s Phillips again: 
A Soviet KGB officer . . . might pose as a right-wing American in approach-
ing a conservative U.S. government employee. He would attempt to persuade 
the American to report on the inner workings of his agency or department “to 
help my patriotic organization to be sure the Commies aren’t infiltrating our 
institutions”. 
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Another example of deceptive recruitment was described by former CIA coun-
terintelligence officer William Johnson: 
Once . . . we found the KGB using a false Israeli flag; that is, pretending to 
represent the Israeli Service in recruiting Jewish refugees who had access to 
Allied secrets. At first, the recruited agents were asked to provide information 
from Allied files on Nazi war criminals, and then they were blackmailed to 
give Allied military information. 
 ( Johnson 1986 , 81) 
More recently, former CIA officer James Olson published several fascinating 
and realistic examples of deception in agent recruitment, from classic false-flag 
approaches to scenarios in which CIA officers and their intermediaries operate for 
long periods of time under the cover of nongovernmental jobs in business, jour-
nalism and non-profit organizations ( Olson 2006 , 52–6, 72–6, 87–93, 194–7). 23 
Presumably, credible cover jobs could enable CIA officers to recruit some agents 
via false-flag techniques. 
A false-flag recruitment is odd from a moral perspective, since in one respect 
the agents thus engaged willingly provide sensitive information, probably knowing 
that they would be punished if their activities were exposed. But of course the vol-
untary nature of such action is only superficial, since if the agents knew to whom 
the information was actually being passed they would most likely not provide it. 
Copeland asserted that agents recruited under false-flag premises might be 
treated more leniently than fully witting agents if caught by their own country’s 
police or counterintelligence agency, if they sincerely believe that they’ve only 
provided information to an investigative journalist, for example ( Copeland 1978 , 
106–7). One doubts, though, whether such a story would be believed. 
But Copeland also related a more plausible illustration of how a false-flag 
scenario can be attractive to an intelligence agency. Apparently a CIA official 
in Prague in 1956 used one of his agents, a Soviet colonel, to organize a net-
work of agents in Czech industries. These agents were told that they were to 
monitor Czech scientific establishments to detect instances in which the Czechs 
were concealing their inventions and their progress from the Soviets, and that 
this information would be forwarded to “a special section of the KGB”. In real-
ity what they unwittingly provided – to the CIA – were details of Czech-Soviet 
exchanges of secret scientific information ( Copeland 1978 , 68–9). 24 Note that 
amid the somewhat comic tone to this case is an element of coercion: the Czech 
agents would have taken as deadly serious the fiction that the KGB was demand-
ing their cooperation! 
Two other general types of coercive recruitment have been mentioned in the 
literature.25 In some cases, knowledge of an agent’s potentially embarrassing or 
patently illegal activities is used to extort espionage service. Prospective agents 
might be confronted with proof of their past crimes and blackmailed into working 
as spies in exchange for their covert employer keeping such evidence from their 
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cases the local police would already be aware of such crimes but would cooper-
ate with CIA in not referring them for prosecution ( Smith 1981 , 115). Since this 
method closely resembles that of the FBI in coercing criminals into becoming 
informers, it might be regarded as less objectionable than some other methods of 
agent recruitment, though, as I’ll argue later, there are ethical concerns regarding 
the agent’s society that should not be ignored. 
In other cases, embarrassing situations might be created for previously inno-
cent potential agents, and the threat of exposure used to extort their compliance. 
One technique regarded by some writers as most effective, and which can be 
used in combination with a false-flag approach, is where an agent’s conscience is 
“stretched” by the recruiter’s careful counselling to gradually allow actions that he 
or she would previously have found unacceptable. Typically the recruiter devel-
ops a friendship or another ostensibly trustworthy relationship with someone who 
has access to sensitive information. Casual requests for seemingly innocuous data 
evolve subtly to more obviously illegal assignments, until the agent either makes 
a conscious decision to remain an informant, or continues out of fear of exposure 
( Copeland 1978 , 127–8). Cooper and Redlinger suggested in  Making Spies: 
Those cultivating the spy will press favors upon him, without, in the initial 
stages, asking for anything in return. This is clearly a matter in which sen-
sibilities must be catered to in order to avoid giving offense or having one’s 
motives suspect. Reciprocity obliges most people to respond in kind; the trick 
is to escalate the exchange to the point where a more compromising engage-
ment can be undertaken. 
( Cooper and Redlinger 1986 , 108) 26 
Espionage activity that is initiated in a deceptive manner can thus at some point 
take on more obviously coercive characteristics. James Angleton reportedly 
described this method as “incremental entrapment in a subtle web of irresistible 
compromises” ( Epstein 1989 , 180). 27 
The degree to which CIA employs blatantly coercive methods in its agent 
recruitment and handling28 has been a topic of contention among former CIA offi-
cers. Arthur Jacobs argued that “there is rarely to be found any effective means of 
exercising absolute control [over an agent], even by such lurid devices as black-
mail, exposure of offensive relationships or personal habits of the source” ( Jacobs 
1978 ).29 James McCargar agreed, stressing that since the case officer is dependent 
upon the actions of the agent, this naturally inhibits the degree to which an agent 
can be dominated: “To this extent every agent is a free agent”. He also argued that 
“compulsion is a very limited technique”, since the agent thus “is in no frame of 
mind to exploit his own skills or possibilities to the fullest” ( Felix [McCargar] 
1988 , 51, 56). 30 James Olson stated, “CIA case officers are taught during their 
training that blackmail rarely works and therefore should generally be avoided. 
This rationale, however, is more practical than moral” ( Olson 2006 , 49). Indeed, 
Jacobs, McCargar and Olson did not imply that coercive methods would be mor-
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But if CIA officials actually concluded that absolute control over an agent was 
impossible, this was not for lack of trying. For at least two decades the agency 
funded extensive experiments using mind-altering drugs, electroshock, hypnosis, 
sensory deprivation, and other techniques in an elusive quest to find foolproof 
ways to manipulate agents. Some of the motivation behind these efforts lay in 
fears that the Soviet Union and China had developed technical “brainwashing” 
methods that needed to be understood and countered by US intelligence. But 
sadly little consideration was given to the rights of the largely unwitting human 
subjects of CIA mind-control experiments ( Marks 1979 ;  1991 ). 
Even if agents cannot be completely controlled by their covert supervisors, it 
may be inferred that espionage agents almost by definition are regarded by their 
sponsors first as means to the end of collecting intelligence. The full range of 
habits, beliefs, virtues and vices making up the character of an individual agent 
are to the prudent espionage officer merely helps or hindrances to the production 
of useful intelligence for his or her superiors ( Cooper and Redlinger 1986 , 10, 19). 
Of course, instrumentalist relationships are common to a wide variety of human 
endeavours, business negotiations being perhaps the most obvious. We have come 
to expect and tolerate such relationships (though perhaps not without regret) as 
a necessary concomitant of modern society. It is therefore the element of crude 
manipulation that can apparently be present in espionage which elicits our height-
ened ethical scrutiny. 
William Hood wrote that an element of control is not simply desirable but 
imperative in agent recruitment: 
No espionage service can tolerate the merest whiff of independence or reserve 
on the part of an agent. . . . With a new agent, the case officer’s first task is to 
maneuver him into a position where there is nothing that he can hold back – 
not the slightest scrap of information nor the most intimate detail of his per-
sonal life. Until this level of control has been achieved, the spy cannot be said 
to have been fully recruited. 
 ( Hood 1982 , 29) 31 
James Angleton, Hood’s former boss in counterintelligence, apparently held a 
similar view, according to Edward Epstein: 
Whereas money, sex, ideology, and ambition provide the means for compro-
mising targets, the lever used to convert a man into a mole tends to be black-
mail. . . . Whatever lure is used, the point of the sting is to make it impossible 
for the recruit to explain his activities to his superiors. He is compromised, 
not so much by his original indiscretion, but for failing to report it. 
 ( Epstein 1989 , 183) 
Note that Angleton here was referring to a special type of agent, the “mole” or 
penetration agent within an enemy’s intelligence service. Not all espionage agents 
would necessarily be compromised by failing to report certain activities to their 
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E Drexel Godfrey Jr, a former CIA analyst, strongly criticized CIA methods
of recruiting agents, stating that CIA officers are “painstakingly trained in tech-
niques that will convert an acquaintance into a submissive tool . . . shred away
his resistance and deflate his sense of self-worth” ( Godfrey Jr. 1978 , 631). 33 
Somewhat less dramatically, James Olson claimed, “Case officers are trained
to exploit other people’s weaknesses to draw them into espionage” ( Olson
2006 , 25).
Miles Copeland, expressing a more sanguine view, asserted that CIA uses coer-
cion in agent recruitment “only when there is a good chance of converting it into 
positive motivation”: 
As quickly as possible, the principal [an intermediary between officer and 
agent] must enable the agent to deceive himself into believing that he would 
have become an agent even had he not been caught with his pants down, and 
that what he is doing is justifiable on its own merits”. 
 ( Copeland 1978 , 150–1) 
Moreover, Copeland said, the agent must be persuaded that the government 
employing him in espionage regards his safety as more important than any par-
ticular piece of information he might forward: 
Maintaining such an attitude might occasionally mean passing up some item 
of tremendous importance, but in the long run it pays off because it keeps 
the agent feeling safe and happy and maintains his productivity over a long 
period of years. 
 ( Copeland 1978 , 130) 
Another former CIA official, Howard Stone, admitted that CIA often recruits 
agents by bribery or blackmail. But believing that such methods often produce 
unreliable agents who only pretend to have access to important information, he 
hoped that CIA would try instead “to win over prominent foreign officials of 
sound moral character” ( Ignatius 1979 ). 34 And former CIA operations officer 
Thomas Mulligan told me in 2015: 
When I went through [CIA] training . . . there was a strict policy prohibition 
on using coercion, blackmail, or sexual exploitation in recruitment opera-
tions. . . . And I have no doubt that any case officer who relied on those tactics 
would be promptly disciplined and recalled from the field. I believe that part 
of the motivation for such a prohibition was moral, but of course there is a 
practical reason as well: If you’re running an agent on those grounds, you 
cannot expect the slightest bit of loyalty from him. . . . The best [officer]-
agent relationships are grounded in mutual respect and a shared sense that the 
work being done together is important. Of course the [officer] must maintain 
control over the relationship. But that is fully compatible with the agent hav-
ing a measure of autonomy. 
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Another former CIA officer who served many years in Latin America told me in 
1991 that none of his agent relations were based on blackmail or other coercion. He 
believed like Howard Stone that such methods invariably produced “servile” and 
unreliable agents who “don’t exercise good judgment”. In contrast, this officer said 
that his agents “produced for me because they knew I was reliable and they could 
count on me in a pinch. They would and did risk their lives for me”. He added, 
though, that different methods might be necessary in totalitarian countries where 
the stakes and pressures were greater (confidential interview with author, Autumn 
1991). Hence, it seems likely that a CIA officer having qualms about deceptive or 
coercive recruiting methods would simply not be assigned to such countries, or 
would not remain there very long at least in an agent-recruiting capacity. 
The disparate opinions expressed in the literature, supplemented by my inter-
views with former intelligence officers, lead me to believe that the degree of 
deception or coercion employed in agent recruitment and handling is a function of 
three factors: 1) the individual officer’s skills, personality and scruples; 2) pressure 
on the officer to obtain information (i.e. faster and more of it in a crisis) and 3) the 
frequency of “walk-in” or voluntary agents, which if plentiful reduce the need for 
deception or coercion to obtain needed information. 
Of course, deception and coercion are morally suspect ways of treating rational 
adults, since they infringe their prima facie rights to privacy and freedom. On the 
face of it, it would seem ludicrous to think that a person could rationally will to 
be coerced into performing espionage, especially since there is theoretically no 
escape from the threat of blackmail. This recognition could lead persons to con-
demn coercive recruitment methods out of hand. 
In cases where prospective agents’ prior perpetration of crimes mitigates their 
right to be free from retributive coercion, the issue of their consent loses some of 
its force. But this cannot be said to provide a “blank check” to a secret recruiter to 
coerce a criminal to engage in espionage. 
However, if we imagine a prospective agent who works in a sensitive capac-
ity for the government of a manifestly tyrannical state, there is another sense in 
which, since that government itself can’t rationally be willed by its oppressed 
citizens, neither can service to that government in ways that maintain its tyranni-
cal nature be justified. But given the fact that opportunities to persuade citizens 
and government officials in tyrannical states that they ought to commit treason 
are sometimes quite limited, the potential justification of coerced recruitment of 
agents to achieve this becomes clearer. 
Coercive recruitment of agents within a tyrannical state becomes even more 
acceptable as that state’s threat to other countries becomes more grave or immi-
nent. The philosopher Sissela Bok claimed that “whenever it is right to resist an 
assault by force, it must then be allowable to do so by guile” ( Bok 1989 , 144); 
by extension, espionage can serve as an effective way to prevent a tyranny from 
launching an aggressive war or intimidating its neighbours. And the same would 
hold for espionage against terrorist organizations: especially since the 9–11 
attacks, Americans are likely to support vigorous CIA efforts to penetrate such 
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We need to be aware, though, of other moral implications of the relationship 
between an intelligence officer, his or her intermediary and the agent. Consider 
the following scenario: 
 An illustration 
Imagine that a CIA officer, using both overt and covert sources of information, 
identifies a particular foreign citizen as one who probably has access or could 
obtain access to sensitive information desired by the US Government.37 The pro-
spective agent’s movements are then monitored to discern any personal habits or 
foibles (like a gambling addiction) which could be exploited in the future. 
Already, then, an issue of the prospective agent’s right to privacy is raised. 
Law-abiding citizens of a democratic country would likely be outraged to find 
themselves being surveilled in this manner. Citizens of a police state might be less 
surprised and more apathetic, having experienced their rights violated on a regular 
basis. But this fact would not be enough in itself to justify an additional infringe-
ment: the burden of moral justification would rest with the intelligence agency 
conducting the surveillance. 
A next step in this hypothetical scenario might be for the intelligence officer 
to arrange for an intermediary to meet the prospective agent in a familiar setting. 
The intermediary himself might be similar to the agent in terms of ethnicity and 
class so that their meeting would seem perfectly natural to the agent and others.38 
From this point the intermediary (guided by the intelligence officer) would take 
one or more of a variety of approaches, many of which were noted earlier in this 
chapter. If the prospect voices opinions critical of his government or sympathetic 
to the United States, a straightforward “pitch” might be made to work for US 
intelligence, though precautions would need to be taken to ensure that the indi-
vidual was not planted by an opposing intelligence service. At least this approach 
entails little deception of the agent by the intermediary. 
If the prospect were deemed unlikely to become a spy voluntarily, but has a 
history of criminal activity, or simply a personal habit that if exposed would be 
objectionable to his superiors or family, a “sting” could be set up to coerce his 
cooperation. We can even imagine a second intermediary telling the prospect that 
the first intermediary had been detained for questioning on suspicious activities 
possibly involving the prospect himself, and that the latter would be prudent to 
cooperate with the second intermediary. This variation on a “good cop/bad cop” 
routine would of course be entirely fictional. But it might be enough to induce the 
prospect to steal sensitive data or plant bugging devices, activities which would 
generate their own grounds for blackmail. 
If the prospective agent were perceived to be immune to blackmail yet unlikely 
to volunteer to serve US intelligence, the intermediary might create a false-flag 
scenario, requesting increasingly sensitive information in return for seemingly 
innocuous favours or in the interest of serving some cause agreeable to the pros-
pect. A false-flag approach in theory might be maintained indefinitely, but once 
the agent begins to provide secret data, the intermediary is able to suggest unpleas-
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Even if we acknowledge that these travesties of friendship might be justified 
under certain conditions, such as the tyrannical or threatening nature of the target 
state or terrorist organization, two additional concerns arise. First, we can imagine 
how the ability to recruit an agent coercively could easily generate its own imper-
ative apart from the perceived value or gravity of the data he or she could credibly 
provide. In other words, the fact that the pool of prospective agents is theoretically 
very large could lead to coercive manipulation as a practice unconstrained by any 
consideration of proportionality. Recall Richard Bissell’s statement that the CIA
typically recruits agents “long before there [is] any reason to be certain whether 
[they] would be used or where or how or for what purpose” ( Senate Select Com-
mittee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 
1975 , 186). 
An additional concern arising out of this discussion has to do with the fact that 
intelligence officers and their intermediaries must be trained to manipulate per-
sons in calculated ways (though some likely have greater native ability in this skill 
than others). This recognition is shocking and disturbing to citizens in democra-
cies, even though we are aware that other vital professions like the police and 
military must by necessity train their recruits in other unpleasant skills in order to 
be effective against criminals and enemy soldiers. Our concern in part is that such 
training may reinforce or result in the moral corruption of the trainee.39 
Comparisons with covert action 
Some writers have noted some interesting similarities and differences between 
espionage and covert action. 
Harry Rositzke argued that the kind of agent manipulation that frequently 
occurs in espionage and counterespionage operations may not apply to some 
types of covert action. Covert financial support for a political leader or dissident, 
for example, need not entail his or her coercion since it serves his or her interests 
( Rositzke 1988 , 185–6). James McCargar expressed a similar opinion: 
In a political operation the case officer must have arrived at a clear and work-
able accommodation of interests with the agent. Control by the case officer 
there must be, but not duplicity. The purposes of case officer and agent must 
have been presented with the maximum permissible clarity, and then a rec-
onciliation of conflicts and limitations negotiated. In brief, the outstanding 
characteristic of the political case officer-agent relationship is that it must be 
an alliance, not a utilization of the agent by the case officer, as often occurs 
in intelligence. 
 ( Felix [McCargar] 1988 , 144–5) 
But the fact that this state of affairs applied for a time to CIA relations with Pan-
amanian dictator Manuel Noriega ( Kempe 1989 ), among others, indicates that 
Rositzke’s and McCargar’s points do not dispel moral concern for the wider con-
text of covert action. In other words, knowing that a covert action coincides with 
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the interests of particular foreign nationals is not sufficient to justify it ethically, 
since covert action may involve the violation of rights that ought to override those 
interests. 
It is also likely that an intelligence of ficer would seek to “vet” (test the authen-
ticity of ) an agent of covert influence against the evidence supplied by informers 
or espionage agents, hence the need to use some method of agent recruitment 
and handling having one or more of the attendant moral concerns previously 
identified. 
Since the “product” of a covert action agent is in some respects public (unlike  
the typical product of an espionage agent), it is perhaps more difficult to  deceive 
a covert action agent than an espionage agent as to the real intentions of his or her 
secret employers. One can more easily imagine, though, a potential agent (such 
as a newspaper reporter or editorialist) being  coerced through blackmail or other 
threats into engaging in covert action. Such considerations provide further quali-
fication, then, to Rositzke’s and McCargar’s assertions of the voluntary participa-
tion of those agents. 
 Wider societal concerns 
Another set of moral issues has to do with the subtle ef fects upon a society in 
which duplicity is engendered by espionage. The logical and practical extension 
of the relentless nurture of duplicity is either a Hobbesian state of nature or a total-
itarian system where basic reciprocal trust between persons is utterly subverted. 40 
Although it is unlikely that an intelligence agency by itself could produce this 
result in a foreign country (without an army of occupation or police powers to 
support it, that is), the fact remains that espionage has morally significant effects 
beyond those experienced by the agent alone. For example, feeding or exploit-
ing an agent’s biases, fears or ideology in order to enhance his or her espionage 
productivity may contribute in some small way to wider social, ethnic or even 
international conflicts – to a greater extent if the agent is or becomes an influ-
ential leader. Undoubtedly many ethnic and religious animosities with ancient 
roots will continue to exist for generations, with or without the added variable of 
American espionage. But intentionally contributing additional fuel to old hatreds 
is irresponsible. 
Of course, CIA  agents no doubt can sometimes be recruited among persons 
with broader vision who seek to counteract violent hatred and those who would 
inflame it. Ideally the infiltrators of terrorist groups would do so out of repug-
nance towards their violence, and not because of blackmail or other coercion. 
Many infiltrators, though, would never be able to bring themselves knowingly to 
work for the CIA, hence the tactical advantage of a false-flag approach. 
 In penetrating a terrorist organization, though, a tension can arise between 
preserving innocent lives and maintaining intelligence sources. US intelligence 
reportedly had curious liaison contacts with PLO officials Abu Hassan (Ali Has-
san Salameh) and Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf), both of whom had planned Black Sep-















80 David Perry 
who apparently made a deal to protect Americans overseas from terrorist attacks 
in order to enhance PLO prestige with the United States ( Ignatius 1983 ; Wood-
ward 1987 , 244–5;  Randal 1991 ). 41 The implication here is that PLO attacks on 
non-Americans would not encounter direct opposition by US intelligence. West 
German intelligence apparently had as an agent a Jordanian explosives expert 
who belonged to the group later blamed for the December 1988 bombing of a 
Pan Am jet over Lockerbie, Scotland, in which 270 people died ( Engelberg 1989 ; 
Raviv and Melman 1990 , 424–7). 42 It’s possible that the Germans did not exercise 
sufficient control over the agent, or that they waited too long to prevent the bomb-
ing, or that the agent simply didn’t inform them of that particular plan. These 
examples suggest that in developing potentially productive intelligence relation-
ships with members of terrorist organizations, a coldly utilitarian calculus would 
entail insufficient consideration of the rights and well-being of many innocent 
third parties. 
Consider also the obstruction of justice involved in sheltering criminals who 
agree to become agents. An extreme example of the questionable moral nature of 
such relationships was the recruitment by US intelligence of a number of Nazi war 
criminals to engage in espionage and covert operations against the Soviet Union 
( Simpson 1988 , chaps. 8–12). 43 Christopher Simpson quoted Harry Rositzke as 
telling him in a 1985 interview: “It was a visceral business of using any bastard 
as long as he was anti-Communist . . . [and] the eagerness or desire to enlist 
collaborators meant that sure, you didn’t look at their credentials too closely” 
( Simpson 1988 , 159). Simpson argued, however, that US intelligence actually did 
know about the war-crimes “credentials” of many of its post-war recruits, as did 
the British, French and Soviets, who also employed suspected and proven war 
criminals in intelligence roles ( Simpson 1988 , 73). 44 Simpson further showed that 
this practice became risky to US intelligence as well, when ex-Nazis threatened to 
publicize US covert operations in which they had participated unless the United 
States helped them to escape abroad to avoid prosecution for their wartime atroci-
ties ( Simpson 1988 , 175). 45 
In hindsight at least, it seems obvious that espionage and covert actions rely-
ing upon violent criminals as intelligence assets46 bear a strong burden of moral 
justification, chiefly since the victims of their crimes cannot be assumed to give 
tacit consent to their shelter from prosecution, but also because they can pose a 
threat to the societies in which they are secretly sheltered.47 Furthermore, in cases 
where perpetrators of mass murder (or even ordinary murder!) have sought refuge 
in intelligence work, it is difficult to see how the practice could be justified at all, 
even under the pressures that CIA officers felt in the early post-war years to quickly 
develop an underground network in the event of war with the Soviet Union. 48 
To the Agency’s credit, in 1995 under its Director John Deutch several guide-
lines were established to screen potential foreign agents regarding their involve-
ment in human-rights abuses and criminal activities ( Risen 1995 ). 49 Some 
clandestine service officers resented that change and became highly risk-averse 
in agent recruitment ( Olson 2006 , 84–5). But their reaction was misplaced, in my 
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 Summing up 
Let us now review the main ethical strengths and weaknesses of the espionage 
methods that have been described. 
The use of human agents – voluntary and non-voluntary – is intended to pro-
vide information believed to be unobtainable through other methods. The risks 
inherent in all espionage activities suggest, though, that for the sake of the agent 
alone, efforts should be made to determine before the agent is recruited that the 
information needed cannot be ascertained by less problematic methods. In addi-
tion, since after an agent is recruited the agent-officer relationship takes on a life 
and momentum of its own, care must be taken to avoid situations where innocent 
third parties would be harmed or justice obstructed in the interest of preserving 
the agent’s identity and continued service. 
Recruiting voluntary agents has the advantage of involving no deception about 
the identity and general motives of the recruiter. Furthermore, a just cause can be 
served by intelligence officers and voluntary agents working together to under-
mine an unjust regime. But such agents usually deserve not to be deceived about 
the risks involved in the operations they are asked to carry out. Nor should the 
fact that their work is secret tempt their handlers to treat them as expendable, 
to allow them callously to be sacrificed to Realpolitik or the shifting winds of 
diplomacy. 
The chief advantage of employing a false-flag approach or blackmail in cer-
tain situations is that intelligence-gathering objectives can be pursued even where 
foreign citizens are highly unlikely to serve voluntarily as CIA agents. But such 
methods raise very difficult ethical questions. False-flag methods by definition 
deceive the agent as to the identity of the recruiter, and thus hide from the agent 
the full risks inherent in his or her tasks as well as their true purposes. Blackmail 
is blatant coercion. It is difficult enough to justify against known criminals; all 
the more so when it arises out of the calculated entrapment of a previously inno-
cent person who merely happens to have probable access to sensitive information 
desired by the CIA. Finally, to the extent that false-flag and blackmail tactics seek 
to “stretch” the agent’s conscience, they can result in the moral corruption of the 
agent in addition to his or her victimization. 
These primarily deontological and aretaic concerns about espionage are chal-
lenged, though, by the consequentialist reply that if one rules out an espionage 
source or method, one may thereby eliminate the possibility of knowing certain 
kinds of vital information. It’s not difficult to construct hypothetical cases in 
which having particular information about the intentions of a tyrannical regime or 
a terrorist cell could mean the difference between life and death for many people, 
cases which would therefore question the validity of strict prohibitions on decep-
tive and coercive intelligence methods or the use of criminals as agents. Clandes-
tine collection of intelligence using human agents will remain vital in penetrating 
hostile intelligence agencies (counterespionage), in monitoring the existence, 
movements, proliferation and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and in 
monitoring and subverting international terrorism and narcotics trafficking. 
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 An additional point needs to be made, however, concerning the meaning of 
moral justification in the present context. To say that a decision or action is mor-
ally justified does mean at least that it is morally permissible, and may also imply 
that it’s the right or best decision or action, all things considered. But it does not 
necessarily mean that the outcome from such a decision is unequivocally good. 
It may be, for example, that coercive recruitment of an agent can be morally 
justified in a particular situation, given the dire consequences of not having the 
information that he or she can provide, say, plus a lack of morally acceptable 
alternatives. But since coercion involves an infringement of the agent’s freedom 
and conceivably other basic rights, the external good that may result from the 
recruitment cannot do away with the fact that the agent – a human person with 
values, emotions, hopes and dreams, not merely an abstract “source”, “asset” or 
“penetration” – suffers real harm or is otherwise wronged in the process. 
 Notes 
 1 I’m grateful to Mitt Regan and Seumas Miller for allowing me to present this paper 
at a conference they hosted in June 2019 at St. Cross College, University of Oxford. 
The topic of ethics in espionage first drew my sustained attention back in 1985 in con-
nection with my Ph.D. dissertation in Ethics and Society at the University of Chicago 
Divinity School. During the past three decades I’ve had several opportunities to pub-
lish my reflections on ethical issues in intelligence operations. Although many of the 
ends and means of intelligence collection have changed significantly in recent years, 
I’m persuaded that my earlier conclusions have held up surprisingly well, so I hope that 
my readers will forgive me for repeating many of my previous points in this essay. My 
doctoral dissertation was entitled  Covert Action: An Exploration of the Ethical Issues , 
but contained a chapter on espionage. Some ideas from that treatise were later pub-
lished as “‘Repugnant Philosophy’: Ethics, Espionage and Covert Action”, which was 
reprinted in  Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional . Revised and 
expanded versions of my arguments subsequently appeared in my book  Partly Cloudy: 
Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation ( Perry 1993 ;  1995 ; 2006; 
 2009 ;  2016 ;  Goldman 2006 ). 
 2 I also follow Frankena in using “teleological” as equivalent to “consequentialist”, but 
recognize that some philosophers use “teleological” as a synonym of virtue ethics, 
which Frankena labels “aretaic”. See, for example  Orend (2006 ). 
 3 Here I’m indebted to W. David Ross, an important twentieth-century British philoso-
pher, who proposed in  The Right and the Good a mixed/pluralistic ethical theory that 
regarded  prima facie consequentialist, nonconsequentialist  and aretaic concerns as 
important to consider in making moral decisions ( Ross 1930 ). For more of my per-
spectives on ethical reasoning, see the Chapter 1 of my book  Partly Cloudy . 
 4 Similar points were made by John Langan in  Langan (1983 ). 
 5 Although I mostly reflect a US perspective in this essay, I presume that most of the 
issues that I explore bear on the intelligence operations of other democracies as well. 
 6 Michael Walzer similarly argued in  Just and Unjust Wars, “a state (or government) 
established against the will of its own people, ruling violently, may well forfeit its right 
to defend itself against a foreign invasion” ( Walzer 1977 , 82). 
 7 A “zero-sum” conflict is one in which one side’s gain unavoidably results in the other 
side’s loss. 
 8 Similar distinctions among types of consent were made in  Gewirth (1986 ), V andeveer 
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an email message to me on October 19, 2015) that my limiting criteria here (zero-sum 
conflict or hypothetical consent) are too narrow, and would preclude the US from spy-
ing on allies like Germany, for example, which he supports. That’s an intriguing coun-
terexample, but I stand by my approach. 
9 Bissell’s statement has some rather alarming ethical implications which will be dis-
cussed later in this article. 
10 McCargar asserted that in the vast majority of cases the motives of agents are mixed 
( Felix 1988 , 61). Henry Crumpton narrates several “sanitized” stories of agents he 
recruited in Africa whose motives to spy were diverse ( Crumpton 2012 , chap. 3). 
11 See also Blum (1972 , chap. 6) for support of the contention that defectors to the US 
(as opposed to defectors from) tend to be motivated more by ideological factors than 
financial inducements. 
12 See also Rositzke (1988 , 69–71),  Powers (1979 , 127, 205)  and Ranelagh (1987 , 400–2). 
13 James Olson identified George Kisevalter as the CIA case officer who handled both 
Popov and Penkovsky, adding that “he was deeply attached emotionally to his two 
agents and had never gotten over their tragic ends” ( Olson 2006 , 232). 
14 Olson asks hypothetically whether South Korean agents about to be sent by the CIA
into North Korea should be told that every previous mission had failed ( Olson 2006 , 
138–9). 
15 Felix [McCargar], Secret War, 62–63. McCargar regarded that practice as “inept” but 
didn’t specifically call it unethical. 
16 Similar claims were made by Phillips (1982 , 331–2)  and Marx (1988 , 144) and a for-
mer CIA officer in a Fall 1991 confidential interview. 
17 See also Prados (2006 , chaps. 2–4)  and Powers (1979 , 44, 403). On the Hungarian 
uprising of 1956, see Ambrose (1981 , 235–40). 
18 Prados acknowledges elsewhere in Chapter 10 that Tibetan partisans achieved some 
impressive tactical victories against the People’s Liberation Army before eventually 
(and inevitably) being overwhelmed. 
19 On Albania, see  Bethell (1984 ). 
20 Phillips preceded his description of false-flag recruitment with this interesting com-
ment: “Most intelligence officers who set out to persuade someone to become a traitor 
have to reach an accommodation of some sort with the code of ethics and morality 
they have inherited or adopted. Sometimes dirty tricks are involved in the recruiting 
of spies” ( Phillips 1982 , 263). Olson claims, “Both the CIA and FBI are very adept at 
false flag operations” ( Olson 2006 , 56). 
21 Copeland also asserted that “most spies really don’t know which espionage service 
they are working for” ( Copeland 1978 , 129)! But that claim was judged to be ridiculous 
by three former CIA officers in separate confidential interviews with me. 
22 Ibid. 
23 According to New York Times reporter Mark Mazzetti, beginning in the 1970s “the CIA
implemented a policy of not recruiting American journalists, clergy, or Peace Corps 
volunteers to spy for the agency, all of which had been routine up to that time”, but 
that those rules “were not cast in stone”, and were loosened significantly in counter-
terrorism efforts after the 9–11 attacks ( Mazzetti 2013 , 282). 
24 Copeland didn’t actually use the term false flag, preferring to call unwitting agents 
“Willies” ( Copeland 1978 , 24). Another former CIA officer told me in a confidential 
interview that Copeland could not have had knowledge of the story of the Soviet colo-
nel in Prague. 
25 Until recently I had seen no evidence that the CIA ever imitated the tactic of the Mafia, 
KGB or Viet Cong of threatening to kill persons or their families if they didn’t agree to 
cooperate. Former CIA officer B Hugh Tovar in a letter to me dated February 25, 1992 
said that any CIA officer who made such a threat “would have been fired outright”. But 
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Intelligence Committee Report on Torture ( Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
2014 , 6). 
26 Cooper and Redlinger, Making Spies , 108. 
27 It is not actually clear whether those were Angleton’s words or Epstein’s only. Epstein 
conducted numerous interviews with Angleton before the latter’s death in 1987. 
28 Examples of coercion applied on informers by US federal and local law enforcement 
agencies are provided in Marx (1974 , 414–15). 
29 The ineffectiveness of blackmail in agent recruiting was also suggested by former CIA
director William Colby in an interview with me on September 14, 1991. 
30 I had the privilege of interviewing Jacobs and McCargar together circa 1991. 
31 But Thomas Mulligan in his October 19, 2015 email message to me characterized 
Hood’s claims as “ludicrous”. 
32 Olson, Fair Play, 46–49, imagines a Cuban intelligence officer working undercover at 
the United Nations who is discovered by US intelligence to be engaging in frequent 
homosexual encounters, which if exposed would at least get him fired and sent home. 
Should his cooperation be sought by means of a threat to expose his behaviour ( Olson 
2006 , 46–9)? Olson claims (115), “The CIA and FBI do not use sexual entrapment for 
recruitment purposes”, but that it’s still widely used today by other nations’ intelligence 
agencies ( Olson 2006 , 115). 
33 But Thomas Mulligan in his October 19, 2015 email message to me flatly denied that 
Godfrey’s claim about CIA training was accurate. 
34 Ignatius offered his own opinion that agents recruited by the CIA “can be a rather 
scurvy lot” ( Ignatius 1979 ). Incidentally, John Prados claims that Howard Stone was 
involved in the 1953 coup against Mossadegh in Iran and an unsuccessful coup attempt 
in Syria in 1957 ( Prados 2006 , 164). 
35 Thomas Mulligan, email message to the author, October 19, 2015. 
36 Craig Whitlock indicated that the CIA and its allied intelligence services had virtually 
no success in infiltrating human agents into Al-Qaeda or recruiting existing members 
to be informers ( Whitlock 2008 ). 
37 A CIA process of identifying potentially valuable agents by carefully compiling and 
cross-checking information files was described in DeForest and Chanoff (1990 ). 
38 I have seen no evidence that the CIA ever kidnaps prospective agents, even in a false-
flag scenario where its intermediaries could pretend to be the secret police of the 
agent’s own country. That of course would be a highly “unnatural” way to contact a 
prospect. But note that this is distinct from cases of secret kidnappings or renditions of 
terrorist suspects for interrogation and incarceration. 
39 I explored in depth several ethical issues in intelligence interrogation in Chapter 11 of 
my book Partly Cloudy ( Perry 2016 ). See also my article, “Some Unsettling Ethical 
Reflections on Interrogation” ( Perry 2010 ), and my book reviews of Sanford Levinson, 
ed., Torture: A Collection ( Perry 2005 ), and Michael Skerker,  An Ethics of Interroga-
tion ( Perry 2011 ). 
40 On the all-too-real “mass atomization” of Soviet society, see Hannah Arendt,  The Ori-
gins of Totalitarianism ( Arendt 1973 , chap. 10). 
41 Both men were assassinated, Salameh in 1979 by Israeli intelligence and Khalaf in 
1991 by Abu Nidal’s rival Palestinian group. 
42 Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman suggested that the Israelis had actually infiltrated the 
group implicated in the bombing and had warned the West Germans in advance. The 
Germans arrested 16 suspects but released 14 of them within two weeks. The bombing 
occurred six weeks after that ( Raviv and Melman 1990 , 424–7). 
43 The only major drawback I find in Simpson’s analysis is his sanguine view of post-
war Soviet capabilities and intentions. Perhaps that resulted in part from his inordinate 
reliance (evident in many of his footnotes) upon the opinions of disaffected former 
CIA analyst Victor Marchetti. But Simpson also exhibited a more general affection for 
revisionist views of the Cold War.
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44 Rositzke mentioned that ethnic Russians, Balts, Ukrainians, Armenians and Georgians 
were recruited as agents for missions against the Soviet Union. He stressed their justi-
fied resentment against Soviet oppression, but didn’t discuss how Nazi collaborators 
identified among them were handled ( Rositzke 1988 , 27–8, 166–73). 
45 Simpson noted Miles Copeland’s role in arranging for ex-Nazis to be brought to
Cairo to serve as advisers to President Nasser’s intelligence service ( Simpson
1988 , 251–2). In Copeland’s memoir, he justified that project by claiming that the
smuggled Germans were all bumbling and stupid – that is it was really a joke on
Nasser – and that Mossad (Israeli foreign intelligence) used Nazis, too – implying
that if the victims of Nazi crimes can justify such action, why should the U.S. deny
itself useful assets? – both highly questionable and self-serving claims ( Copeland
1978 , 181).
46 Former CIA officer Justin O’Donnell told a Senate committee that he refused to accept 
an assignment from his boss Richard Bissell in 1960 to assassinate Congolese leader 
Patrice Lumumba. But O’Donnell nonetheless recruited a criminal whom he trusted 
(albeit “not a man of many scruples”) to assist him in the Congo; that same criminal 
was involved in scouting potential assassins for the CIA to use elsewhere under its 
“executive action” capability ( Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera-
tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1975 , 38–43, 181–7). That testimony was 
attributed in the Senate report to “Michael Mulroney”, who was later identified as 
Justin O’Donnell by John Prados in Prados (2006 , 276). For allegations of CIA uses of 
organized crime figures, see  McCoy (1972 ). 
47 A notable case in which these concerns were implicitly affirmed was the US Drug 
Enforcement Agency’s rejection of a Colombian drug cartel’s offer to spy on leftist 
guerrillas in exchange for amnesty ( Isikoff 1988 ). 
48 Simpson quoted Franklin Lindsay, who in the early 1950s oversaw CIA paramilitary 
operations in Eastern Europe that apparently involved some former Nazi collaborators: 
You have to remember that in those days even men such as George Kennan 
believed that there was a fifty-fifty chance of war with the Soviets within six 
months. . . . We were under tremendous pressure to do something, do anything to 
prepare for war. 
 ( Simpson 1988 , 159–60) 
Rositzke reported that during a heated meeting at the Pentagon in 1949, an Army colo-
nel banged his fist on the table and shouted, “I want an agent with a radio on every 
goddamn airfield between Berlin and the Urals.” That was, of course, before the advent 
of U-2 and satellite reconnaissance ( Rositzke 1988 , 21). 
49 A year later the Intelligence Advisory Board reported that since 1984, 
several CIA assets were credibly alleged to have ordered, planned or participated 
in serious human rights violations such as assassination, extrajudicial execution, 
torture or kidnapping while they were assets – and that the CIA was contempora-
neously aware of many of the allegations. 
 ( Associated Press 1996 ) 
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 5 The rights of foreign intelligence 
targets 
 Michael Skerker 
Liberal states are dedicated to the protection of human rights but protecting the rights
of their citizens may entail infringing upon or violating the rights of foreign citizens.
This is what some call the liberal dilemma of intelligence collection ( Omand and
Phythian 2018 ;  Gendron 2005 , 418). The same is true for military operations, but in
many cases, wars are avoidable, at least in principle, through deterrence and diplo-
matic actions. Yet intelligence gathering, by its very nature, must be ongoing, in part
to forestall wars. If a state can build weapons of war with a reasonable hope that they
will not be used and train military personnel with a reasonable hope they will not be
deployed, the same is not true for intelligence-gathering equipment and personnel.1 
In what follows, I articulate a cosmopolitan model for just intelligence collec-
tion directing all states with a certain character to adhere to the same norms when 
and if they engage in intelligence collection. This chapter focuses on signals intel-
ligence, SIGINT, and image analysis intelligence, IMAGINT. The model ulti-
mately cautions states to be conservative in their intelligence-gathering efforts. All 
states of a certain character are permitted to engage in the most rights-respecting, 
most efficacious techniques they have at their disposal. Given the range of techni-
cal abilities of different states, a state with discriminate, sophisticated means of 
intelligence gathering must consider if its citizens can tolerate the cruder, less 
discriminate retaliatory operations an adversary state might employ. 
Foundation for a theory of just intelligence 
This section develops the foundation of a cosmopolitan theory of just intelli-
gence collection. I develop it in detail elsewhere ( Skerker 2020b ;  2019 ;  2016 ). 
In brief, people living in groups have collective moral responsibilities to protect 
and address other people’s rights that can only be consistently and reliably met 
through coordinated action. Typically, these collective moral responsibilities are 
partially acquitted by creating and supporting institutions to address the relevant 
rights, like schools, hospitals, businesses, churches and militaries. These insti-
tutions are essentially outcome-oriented, set up to foster, create and protect the 
collective moral goods (e.g. health, education, security) that protect rights and 
fulfil morally important needs. Once these institutions exist, the collective moral 
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The professionals who work in morally vital institutions meet their collective 
moral responsibilities in part by adhering to their properly constituted professional 
norms. Since these institutions are created to acquit collective moral responsibili-
ties, professionals have a moral – and not just a professional or legal – duty to 
comply with their professional imperatives to accomplish their institutions’ char-
acteristic ends. The relevant duties are moral duties since actors’ norm-guided 
actions help their institutions meet, foster and protect people’s rights. 
Professional norms are chiefly ends-oriented, directing the professional to take 
steps that bring about their institutions’ characteristic ends for their clients: edu-
cation, justice, health, security etc. Professional norms are also constrained by 
deontological concerns reflecting ex ante rules winning the hypothetical consent 
of all affected by the professionals’ actions. These constraints specify how the 
institutional imperatives are to be met, guided by stakeholders’ presumed aversion 
to being grossly wronged in some areas while being assisted in others.2 
Professional norms  
Certain state agents have a professional duty to meet the collective moral right 
of security for their political entities, but this duty is too vague to be action-guid-
ing. We can take advantage of the criterion of universalizability inherent in most 
schemes of rights and duties to further delineate relevant professional duties. We
can consider if everyone affected by a potential tactic or norm (norms can be seen 
as rules for generating tactics)3 would endorse it for meeting their interests and 
protecting their rights. Those affected would include three stake-holding groups 
for any professional action in an adversarial field (like policing, soldiering, law, 
or intelligence): the professionals themselves, their “targets” and their clients. In 
the abstract, we can see that these groups would endorse tactics and norms strik-
ing an optimal balance between being practically efficacious and rights respect-
ing for all concerned. Any member of the stake-holding groups can be expected 
to endorse professional norms and tactics that efficiently and reliably lead to the 
characteristic end of their professions like security, but in a way that minimizes 
rights violations along the way. This trade off can be expressed by the adage 
“the cure shouldn’t be worse than the disease”. The preferred moral framework 
I call the “security standard” identifies norms and tactics rationally worthy of 
consent by the three stake-holding groups. It endorses norms and tactics surviving 
a three-stage winnowing process. In the context of security-seeking professions, 
the standard 1) canvases locally feasible tactics aimed at securing an environment 
relatively free of rights violations or the threat thereof 2) isolates the most reli-
able, efficacious, proportional and efficient tactics of those locally feasible and 
3) endorses the most rights-respecting among the tactics meeting the practical 
metrics of 2). 
Before proceeding, let me address some potential methodological ques-
tions. Hypothetical consent is sometimes criticized for being inadequate to 
ground norms or obligations. I am not arguing that intelligence gathering norms 
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responsibilities. The hypothetical consent of all stakeholders is modelled to 
delineate the contours of these norms. Hypothetical consent is also sometimes 
criticized as a theoretical flourish adding nothing to what a theorist happens 
to find compelling. A hypothetical consent model  is apt for crafting norms for 
national security actors because the theorist cannot say ahead of time which kind 
of professional norms and tactics in the security sphere are best for all political 
entities in all times. There are two contingent variables affecting national secu-
rity that have to be taken into account: available tactics and the current level of 
danger. The first element of the security standard canvasses locally feasible tac-
tics. Best practices for certain kinds of intelligence operations will shift over time 
as technology improves, social science makes breakthroughs and tactical experi-
ence expands, so what is consent-worthy for being a state-of-the-art intelligence-
gathering method one year may be outmoded years later. Agencies also develop 
insights at different paces, so state A’s intelligence apparatus can be faulted for 
using relatively unreliable or ineffective techniques already abandoned by other 
states, provided that these better techniques are economically and technically 
feasible for state A. Thus, element 2 of the security standard seeks the most 
practically effective norms and tactics that are currently employed somewhere 
in the world, and demands, effectively, that our political entity practice the state 
of the art, or as close to it, as is technologically or economically possible for it 
(further, since the security standard endorses the best norms and tactics, it places 
constant pressure on state agents to refine their capabilities). A second reason 
that different norms and tactics might be consent-worthy in different states is 
that more aggressive security-seeking tactics or less deferential norms might be 
consent-worthy in times of great danger. 
The clients of intelligence officers – the inhabitants of their state – have a posi-
tive right to security. Therefore, they can demand their agents deliver that security. 
Intelligence officers can model their clients’ consent to the most efficacious norms 
and tactics to that end. Their concerns would not be limited to efficacy, but also 
take into account reliability and efficiency. Since any kind of professional action 
might also produce negative effects, proportionality is also important to consider. 
An intelligence officer has no rational grounds to think a generic client would 
endorse relatively ineffective, inefficient, unreliable and disproportionate norms 
and tactics when better ones exist. No doubt some techniques (or norms encom-
passing tactics and techniques) will be more efficient, but less reliable or more 
efficacious, but less proportionate etc. so we can imagine an overall net “value 
score” of these four practical elements answering the question “what norm or 
tactic works best”. Still, the norm or tactic best conducing to security is not neces-
sarily consent-worthy. Among a class of high-scoring norms or tactics, those that 
are the most rights-respecting are most worthy of consent on account of clients’
duties to respect the rights of foreigners and their own intelligence professionals 
and because of clients’ interests in being exposed to the least rights-infringing 
tactics on the part of foreign adversaries. 
This rights-respecting element will itself be the product of an optimal balanc-
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security will be largely met with practically efficacious norms and tactics that 
actually do conduce to protect security. These norms and tactics may have to 
be modified from the highest levels of efficacy or efficiency in deference to the 
rights of the targets as well as the state agents implementing them. While tar-
gets of given actions can also be the clients of the same actions when they are 
wielded by their own domestic intelligence agencies, qua target, their interest 
would be to be exposed to no intelligence collection. Barring that, their interest 
is in being exposed to the most minimal, necessary and discriminate types of 
collection, meaning that qua target, they would endorse the most reliable, effec-
tive, efficient and proportionate measures, infringing on as few as their rights as 
possible. Intelligence collectors should spend no more time or collect no more 
information than is necessary. When it comes to inter-state intelligence collection, 
it is in the interest of the client in one state to endorse the most minimal and dis-
criminate actions targeting foreigners, because as we will see in the next section, 
she implicitly endorses those same tactics being used against herself by foreign 
intelligence agencies. 
Regarding the third stake-holding group, state agents have a right not to be 
ordered to perform actions exposing themselves to wanton risk or threatening 
their long-term mental, moral and physical health ( Skerker 2020a ). For example, 
intelligence officers can probably never be ordered to have sexual relations with 
targets or to cultivate drug addiction in the course of undercover work. 
Thus, acceptable norms and tactics may vary if we take into account rights and 
not merely the efficacy of the norms and tactics. They may also vary if the rights 
of all three stake-holding groups are taken into account as opposed to the rights 
of just one. Examples will be given in a later section. The triangulation of rights 
is in the interests of all since any given person might at some point occupy all 
stake-holding groups. A person might be a state agent for some span of her life; 
be targeted by a foreign intelligence agency and be the recipient of the security 
provided by other state agents. 
Forfeiting, Waiving, and Ceding Rights 
Just because an institutional actor has a duty to do something it does not mean 
she is not wronging her target/client in executing her duty in a norm-compliant 
way. For example, a doctor has a duty to preserve people’s health and must adhere 
to certain norms and tactics balancing healthy outcomes with respect to patients’
rights. Just the same, she may not examine someone in a non-emergency situation 
unless the patient consents. The patient’s consent waives claim rights that would 
otherwise make it morally wrong for the doctor to touch or probe the patient’s 
body. A previous section concluded that security standard-compliant norms and 
tactics will respect the rights of all three stake-holding groups involved with 
intelligence collection. We now need to discuss which rights these groups enjoy. 
We will focus on how targets and non-targets (whose information might be acci-
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One temporarily forfeits certain rights when one acts unjustly and another party 
acting in self- or other-defence needs to materially infringe on those rights to halt 
the unjust action or threat. So, for example, an unprivileged irregular militant, 
bent on committing acts of terrorism, forfeits privacy rights to his operational 
communications if intelligence agencies need to intercept his communications in 
order to interrupt his plots. 
Some intelligence targets like national security actors waive rights that would 
otherwise morally inhibit intelligence agencies from targeting them for collec-
tion. One might expressly waive a claim-right to another person, giving her a 
liberty-right to act in a way that would otherwise violate the rights of the person 
who ceded the right, as when a patient cedes a right to a doctor to touch his body. 
Service personnel arguably waive claim-rights against being attacked to future 
conventional enemies when they enlist in the armed forces, extending permission 
to enemy service personnel to try and attack them in war-time. 4 
Most non-targets of collateral intelligence collection do not waive their relevant 
rights. Some cede relevant rights though. Again, one can  waive rights through 
express consent or tacit consent.5 Ceding rights can come as part of being duty 
bound. A duty to deliver X to Y means one cedes a claim-right for X to Y. One 
could not, for example, object if Y took proportionate means to seize X if one 
did not voluntarily do one’s duty and deliver it. One might have a duty to deliver 
something to someone in the context of a particular practice like a game, but more 
often, one has duties outside of particular practices one voluntarily enters. 
One owes a duty to uphold just institutions to the inhabitants of a state and 
directly expresses the duty to the government employees who are those inhabit-
ants’ agents. A duty to uphold just institutions means ceding claim-rights against 
state agents 1) when those agents are competently pursuing their professional 
obligations and duties and 2) when insisting on those rights would prevent state 
agents from serving their principals. This ceding of claim-rights gives the state 
agents liberty-rights in turn, creating the space for them to perform their norm-
compliant actions without wronging the affected parties. So, for example, domes-
tically, a person’s duty to uphold just institutions means he cedes claim-rights 
against having his liberty curtailed by competent police hewing to due process 
protocols in the event that evidence implicates him of a crime. One does not cede 
claim-rights to professionals acting in violation of their professional norms or 
incompetently executing their norms. 
The duty to support just institutions is not restricted to institutions of one’s own 
state, but extends in different ways to foreign institutions. The duty to support 
just institutions is based on the duty to protect the rights of other human beings, a 
cosmopolitan duty which is unaffected by the nationality of the recipient. So, for 
example, one cedes claim- and liberty-rights to the state agents of a foreign state 
one visits as a tourist when insisting on those rights would prevent foreign agents 
from permissibly performing their duties to protect their own citizens, residents 
and guests (e.g. tourists). 
Normally, the duty to support just institutions does not require one to do any-
thing for state B when one is residing in state A. 6 That said, one should usually 
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cooperate with foreign law enforcement officers if one can provide information 
about a crime committed abroad. This is an expression of the cosmopolitan duty 
to help protect other people’s rights. The foreign law enforcement effort may also 
protect oneself in the case of international crime like drug trafficking or terrorism. 
This claim may not be too controversial. When it comes to another state’s  adver-
sarial actions against one’s own state, the duty to support just institutions owed 
foreigners even entails ceding certain claim-rights against foreign national security 
agents who are acting according to their professional duty. The scope of this rights-
ceding is set, on the restrictive side, by the security standard, and on the permissive 
side, by 1) what is necessary for adversary agencies to keep their people safe and 
2) what intelligence actions the rights-ceder can be modelled as accepting. 7 
On the restrictive side, inhabitants of one state can object to the actions of  
an adversary agency that fail the security standard, for example, if the agency 
is employing norms and tactics that are more unreliable, disproportionate, inef-
fective, inefficacious and rights infringing than alternatives the agency has at its 
disposal. Agencies cannot be criticized for using the best technology they can 
afford, even if it is less sophisticated than the technology used by the inhabitants 
of the targeted state. They can be criticized for failing to train in state-of-the-art 
tradecraft that is based on open-source information and not dependent on technol-
ogy. Again, the duty to support just institutions does not justify the behaviour of 
corrupt or incompetent adversary agents. 
On the permissive side, inhabitants of one state have a duty to support the  
just institutions of other states, which entails ceding the claim-rights necessary 
to create the moral permission for adversaries to keep their clients safe. At base, 
this permission will cover what are essentially investigative efforts to identify 
security threats. These actions include  diagnostic collection efforts designed to 
anticipate threats. 8 We will assume that intelligence gathering will involve  acci-
dental or foreseen but unintentional (i.e.  collateral ) collection on people who are 
not security risks to the collecting agency’s state (e.g. caught in communication 
with the legitimate target). One cedes claim-rights against  accidental collection, 
because if agencies cannot act where there is a risk of collecting or surveilling 
a mistakenly targeted person, they cannot act at all. It may seem odd to cede a 
claim-right against an accidental action since the party to which the right is ceded 
cannot intentionally perform an accidental action. What this ceding involves is 
really an acknowledgement that the agent would not be considered to have acted 
negligently when an agency accidentally collects on an innocent party. Civilians’ 
duty to support just (foreign) institutions does not directly address  collateral col-
lection; this has to be justified via a waiver, discussed later. The ceding of rights 
associated with the duty to support just institutions is also not the main justifica-
tion for  direct and sustained targeting for collection because agencies should only 
be doing that against security threats to their states and those targets will have 
either waived or forfeited rights. Given what was just said about accidental col-
lection, innocent parties are not wronged when an agency mistakenly targets them 
with direct collection efforts and then breaks off collection and purges the relevant 
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Ceding certain claim-rights that enable foreign intelligence officers to engage 
in collective efforts that might accidentally or diagnostically collect the informa-
tion of an innocent person is part of that person’s duty to support just foreign 
institutions protecting foreigners’ rights. The scope of adversary permissions can 
also be widened or restricted based on waivers inhabitants of particular states can 
be modelled as making. These waivers may also simply reiterate the minimal 
permissions based on the duty to support just institutions. 
One waives certain claim-rights when one enters into a permissible, adversarial 
practice. For example, a boxer waives his right against being hit when he engages 
in a bout. This dynamic also applies if one’s adversarial practice is mediated by 
an agent, as in a lawsuit. When one sues someone, one engages a lawyer to try to 
seize some of the defendant’s property or limit her rights. One cannot begrudge 
the target of one’s lawsuit hiring a lawyer to defend her interests in turn. The 
defendant might after all be in the right or the degree of her wrong-doing may 
be contestable. By contrast, one cedes no rights to the agent of a fully culpable 
wrong-doer if one hires an agent to protect one’s rights and interests. A gangster 
may not hire a gunman to bolster his offense against the bodyguard of an innocent 
person whom the gangster threatened. 
So a foreign state agent’s actions are potentially justified indirectly, as a recip-
rocal entailment of a client consenting to his own agents’ outward-facing actions. 
If the inhabitants of state A retained claim-rights against being collaterally, diag-
nostically or accidentally collected on, then intelligence agencies of state B could 
not permissibly engage in the same protective function inhabitantsA have a right 
to demand of (their own) agencies. This is to say that inhabitants B could not have 
their moral right to security met to the same degree that inhabitantsA have their 
right met. 
One cannot complain if one is targeted with the same collection tactics one 
wants one’s own agencies to use against foreigners. Since all have the right to 
protection by their intelligence agencies, consent-worthy intelligence gathering 
norms and tactics, like consent-worthy legal norms, will be those that are accept-
able to all sides equally. They have to be acceptable to one as a client or a target. 
Agency leaders can model their clients’ consent to collection practices at two 
junctures. First, on the permissive side of the equation, they can ask, what action 
does securing national security against a particular adversary demand, given the 
current bilateral situation? Second, on the limiting side of the equation, they can 
ask, what kind of reciprocal response would clients tolerate? Answers to the sec-
ond question may eliminate norms and tactics suggested by answers to the first 
question. 
Unlike diagnostic and accidental collection, collateral collection is only justi-
fied via a waiver consequent to entering into an agent-mediated adversarial prac-
tice. Imagine that a bodyguard can only defend his principal by shooting at an 
unjust attacker in a way that endangers an innocent bystander. The bystander has 
a duty to try to rescue endangered innocent people, but not at the cost of her life. 
We have no grounds to say she would not be wronged if she is injured in the cross-
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that the bystander has ceded claim-rights against being collaterally harmed. We
could say principals have waived rights against being exposed to collateral harm 
if everyone had a bodyguard and bodyguards protected their principals against 
both unjust attackers and other bodyguards. By hiring a bodyguard, one would be 
entering into a quasi-adversarial, agent-mediated practice. By parity of reasoning, 
we can say that agency leaders can model their clients’ waivers of rights against 
collateral collection if they also model them as endorsing their intelligence offi-
cers engaging in collection efforts that might collaterally collect on foreigners. 
The agents of such an agency act permissibly when they collect their innocent 
persons’ communications as a side effect of targeting someone with whom the 
innocent person communicates. Agency leaders can model this consent if and so 
long as it is technologically impossible to only collect one half of a conversation 
or textual exchange. 
The reflexivity of this model should encourage a conservative attitude towards 
intelligence collection. We must ask on behalf of the model consenter if she can 
consent to her state agents using tactics abroad that, via the principle of reciproc-
ity, she must also permit foreign agents to use against her. As will be argued later, 
this reflexive question also applies to intelligence officers concerning the means 
and extent to which they are willing to be targeted or have their relatives targeted. 
Just intelligence-gathering tactics 
Using this reciprocal approach, the rule of thumb should be that security agen-
cies should use the same collection tactics abroad on non-government agents that 
they use domestically. For example, if the security standard indicates that war-
rants issued by judges are necessary for a security service to intercept a particular 
domestic inhabitant’s communications or that a domestic criminal suspect has to 
be warned about a right to remain silent in police interrogation, the same treat-
ment should apply to a foreigner targeted by the security service. Let us now con-
sider several considerations that will present caveats to that rule of thumb. These 
considerations will argue for an expansion of intelligence collection powers. The 
second half of this section will consider the rights of different intelligence targets 
and non-targets, which largely constrain intelligence activities. 
Practical limitations on foreign agents acting abroad or the different nature 
of the target might suggest different tactics leading to greater infringements on 
the target’s rights. Police may be able to conduct line-of-sight surveillance of 
suspects with undercover officers, whereas such intimate operations may not be 
feasible against certain foreign targets, particularly in harsh terrain or repressive 
countries. Long-distance imaging and SIGINT technology may lead to less dis-
criminate operations than domestic operations (e.g. a satellite image can cover a 
huge footprint compared to what an undercover agent can see). To say this more 
privacy-infringing tactic is consent-worthy under the security standard is to say 
the model consenter permits her adversary’s security agencies to attempt the same 
in her country. 9 While this reciprocity is hard to imagine in some asymmetrical 
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(FATA), but anti-Pakistan government irregulars do not train in Vermont – there 
are plenty of peer state rivalries in which reciprocal scenarios are more likely. 
A further disanalogy between foreign intelligence operations and domestic law 
enforcement presents an additional complication. By their nature, intelligence 
operations are prophylactic, dealing with prospective threats. An intelligence 
agency might not be adequately vigilant if it only gathered intelligence on known 
intelligence targets. To anticipate threats or discover new leads, intelligence agen-
cies might wish to engage in bulk data interception and use automated searches 
to scan the content of the messages or scan the metadata for suspicious patterns 
or contacts between new numbers and known intelligence targets. Yet this kind 
of prospective action violates due process in that the target’s privacy is infringed 
prior to evidence of wrong-doing. This form of collection can be made more sen-
sitive to the targets’ rights by automating the collection process so that a human 
analyst only reads or listens to an intercept if there is a high likelihood of its intel-
ligence value, but this is still a significant departure from the standard balance of 
power between liberal state and citizen. We will need to consider if the security 
risks for inhabitants of one state are sufficiently grave that they can be modelled 
by agency leaders as endorsing the risk of being reciprocally targeted by adver-
sary states’ dragnet intelligence operations (more in the following). 
A third qualification is that reciprocity is necessarily with respect to intelligence 
function rather than the technological expression of that function. An endorsement 
of intelligence agencyA’s diagnostic collection including broad satellite coverage, 
selector-guided data intercepts and bulk data collection would permit adversary 
agencyB’s similar diagnostic measures. Yet a wide range of concrete practices 
could be justified if the security standard permits security services to conduct 
foreign operations employing the most reliable, efficient, rights-respecting etc. 
tactics available to the service within a given function area. The best locally avail-
able tactics justified by the security service will vary depending on a given politi-
cal entity’s wealth, size, technological prowess and ingenuity. If the standard then 
effectively permits all security actors to “do their best”, the standard allows situ-
ations in which, for example, wealthy country A’s intelligence services can con-
duct very discriminate, sophisticated, targeted and automated intercepts of foreign 
intelligence target’s communications – so that very few innocent people have their 
privacy infringed or violated – while also permitting poor country B’s intelligence 
services to conduct relatively crude, indiscriminate intercepts that infringe on the 
privacy of far more innocent people. For example, the 2006 film The Lives of Oth-
ers depicts 1980s era Stasi agents steaming open random East German citizens’
letters in order to see if they contained any subversive content. This method of 
intercept is obviously far more invasive than an automated system that only saves 
communications with specific selectors for human analysis. So the leaders of 
technologically sophisticated agencyA, considering targeted intercepts of foreign 
expatsB on A’s soil, would need to consider if their relatively backward adversary 
in state B will reciprocally respond by steaming open the mail or listening to all 
the phone conversations of expatsA in state B. Thus, intelligence collection activi-
ties fail the security standard in particular instances if one state’s adversary’s best 
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methods of intelligence collection are so crude as to be imagined to be intolerable 
to the inhabitants of the target state. In this case, intelligence officers would need 
to refrain from collecting from a certain state if they could anticipate that the state 
would retaliate by engaging in its crude collection methods (political entities with 
more sophisticated adversaries would not encounter this problem). That said, it 
is difficult to think of an example of SIGINT that would be so rights-infringing 
as to be intolerable for any state to suffer at the hands of its dangerous adversary 
if that was the price of garnering signals intelligence. One’s tolerance of risk is 
influenced by the nature of the harm the risky activity forestalls. Crude forms of 
SIGINT might be intolerable if the reward for the risk was lower, such as if the 
target state did not pose a military threat to the collector state. 
One might wonder if any states enjoy a unilateral right to collect against adver-
saries because of the illegitimate nature of the target government. As mentioned 
earlier, one can hire a bodyguard if threatened by a gangster, but the gangster does 
not have a right to hire extra gunmen in response. Since the security standard is 
indexed to the protection of negative liberty, it justifies traditional policing and 
national security actions of even some illiberal and/or autocratic states. While 
the security standard does not justify repressive actions aimed at a government’s 
non-violent political or ideological opponents, it does justify the bread-and-butter 
responsibilities of a state aimed at protecting its inhabitants from street crime, 
piracy, terrorism and foreign military attack. I will follow John Rawls’s usage 
referring to states that do this as well as provide internal law and order in a mostly 
egalitarian manner as “decent states” (I will refer to states, but it could also be the 
case that a political entity within an internationally recognized state might have 
significant autonomy and protect its inhabitants from external threats). Hence, 
Russia, China and Iran, for example, have the right to engage in foreign intel-
ligence operations as a means of defending their people against foreign military 
attack and intelligence collection. The security actions autocratic states may 
legitimately engage in to protect their people also protect the autocratic regimes, 
which, in other moments, may repress their own people. Internal repression has 
to reach a high level to remove hypothetical consent to a state’s national security 
operations. Under these conditions, foreign invasion would be rationally pref-
erable to the perseverance of the repressive regime. The security standard does 
not justify the coercive actions of states with governments that largely neglect 
ordinary inhabitants and use power largely to benefit a ruling clique. Such gov-
ernments are virtually indistinguishable from criminal gangs. I will refer to these 
as unjust states. 
The security standard prefers the most rights-respecting out of the most practi-
cally efficacious tactics and norms that are locally feasible. We therefore have to 
consider the scope of intelligence targets’ rights, applying the justifications for 
intelligence operations to specific categories of targets. In order to accomplish 
this aim, we have to consider both the target and the context for collection. Any 
SIGINT or IMAGINT operation will involve three major relevant variables: the 
collecting agency, the target and the agency with defensive jurisdiction over the 
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with their adversaries; agencies with greater abilities than their adversaries and 
those with lesser abilities. There may also be situations where a target is in a failed 
or unjust state and has no intelligence agency acting on his behalf. In all the cases 
where a functioning and responsible agency exists, the collecting agency has to 
consider if the defending agency’s retaliation or reciprocal actions are tolerable 
for the collecting agency’s own citizens given the overall threat environment. This 
concern will likely be readily addressed in the affirmative if the collecting agency 
is technologically or operationally inferior to its adversary since there is a good 
likelihood that the adversary’s relatively discriminate reciprocal response will be 
tolerable to the collecting agency’s citizens (obviously, this would not be the case 
if both agencies were operating on a very crude level and one was only slightly 
more sophisticated than its rival). The situation facing inhabitants of failed and 
unjust states will be addressed at the end of this section. 
I would suggest there are seven relevant categories of intelligence targets: 
1 a positively identified foreign intelligence officer or service member 
2 a suspected foreign intelligence or military agent (the latter might be 
non-uniformed) 
3 a non-specific target, for example a random person collected against in drag-
net fashion 
4 a civilian of intelligence value, for example a politician, bureaucrat, engineer 
or scientist 
5 the relative, lover, colleague or friend of 1–4 
6 a positively identified unprivileged irregular, for example a member of a ter-
rorist group 
7 a suspected unprivileged irregular 
People have rights to privacy which presumptively cover professional commu-
nications. Certainly, it is wrong for professors, doctors, accountants, priests etc. 
to hack each other’s professional correspondence. Adversary military, privileged 
irregular combatant or intelligence personnel in decent states have a right to com-
municate their operational plans with colleagues since (according to the tradi-
tional post-Westphalian just war tradition) these professionals do nothing legally 
or morally wrong in pursuing national security goals. Yet since their adversaries 
have the same right to pursue the national security goals of their own political 
entities, those adversaries can engage in strategic behaviour such as intercept-
ing their enemy’s communications. 10 National security actors waive their rights 
against having their operational communications intercepted when they join their 
organizations since they know the parameters of the profession include commu-
nication interceptions. Further, assuming that the operationally significant infor-
mation collected regards state secrets, foreign security personnel do not suffer 
personal privacy violations when their communications are intercepted. The pro-
fessional secrets are in a sense, state property, like military materiel. Waiving 
claim-rights against being targeted with collection efforts is not the same thing as 
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to attempt to conceal the information. Intelligence officers can take steps to safe-
guard their communications and resist intrusions. Waiving claim-rights against 
being targeted with collection efforts does not entail a requirement to volunteer 
the relevant information any more than waiving a claim-right against being struck 
in a boxing match means a boxer must refrain from ducking. 
Intelligence agencies will often want to collect personal information about their 
state agent target. The recruitment of intelligence assets from within military and 
intelligence agencies sometimes occurs when recruiting agents identify vulner-
abilities or dissatisfactions on the part of their targets. Further, many intelligence 
officers work undercover. One way to identify undercover agents is to closely 
monitor their communications and examine the documents associated with their 
“legends”. Certainly, intelligence officers know how their game is played, so 
voluntary entrance into the profession, where they are trained about informa-
tion security and the professional perils of personal foibles, can be understood as 
amounting to a waiving of a claim-right against having their personal information 
being targeted by adversary collectors. 
There is a greater separation between public and private for service person-
nel than for intelligence officers. Going to work for service personnel may mean 
physically deploying to a different country or to sea. Stateside service personnel 
conduct most of their professional work on bases in uniform using unique military 
materiél and using specially secured communication and data storage devices. So 
there is usually a physical and social separation between professional and per-
sonal lives. Unlike civilian intelligence officers, service members can readily do 
their jobs in most cases without intercepting their adversaries’ private commu-
nications or information. Further, in most cases, their job is overt; unlike many 
intelligence officers, they present themselves as service personnel while working. 
So the personal communication and data storage of service personnel per se are 
usually irrelevant to adversaries; it does not relate to national security and does 
not identify a service member’s true profession. Yet service members’ personal 
information can be turned into a vulnerability through their own indiscretions. 
Damaging information is of interest to adversary agencies as it can make service 
personnel vulnerable to recruitment. 
I do not think that it is permissible as a matter of course for adversaries to target 
all the private communications of service personnel and hack all their personal 
data files looking for leverage. Militaries need to recruit relatively large number 
of people. Enlistees know of course that they will be physically vulnerable to ene-
mies in the event of war (which statistically, they may well avoid during their time 
of service). Since intelligence collection is prophylactic, agencies would want to 
collect potential blackmail material against service personnel from potential future 
adversaries as soon as they enter the military. It seems unrealistic to think that 
many potential enlistees would be willing to enlist if they knew that all potential 
adversaries would be invading their privacy as a matter of course and that unlike 
intelligence officers, they would not have the advantage of clandestine identities 
to shield them from adversaries’ attention. So, unlike intelligence officers, who 
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clandestine identities, it does not seem reasonable to think enlistees waive a right 
to all their personal information to foreign adversaries. Leaders of intelligence 
agencies would also have to consider the effect on military recruitment if this kind 
of information collection became the new normal, brought about in part through 
their universal collection of their adversary military’s personal information. 
Finally, like intelligence officers, privileged irregular militants engaging in 
guerrilla tactics typically hide in plain sight by presenting themselves as ordinary 
civilians when not engaged in operations. Since they dress as, and live among, 
non-combatant civilians, they cannot begrudge their conventional adversaries 
engaging in counter-insurgency to collect personal information and intercept 
communications on suspected targets in order to distinguish irregulars from 
non-combatants. 
In 3) and 7) a variety of intelligence collection operations, including coun-
ter-insurgent operations, regularly produce false-positives, interdicting innocent 
people mistaken for militants. A clearly concerning case is where the communica-
tions of innocent people might be collected and analysed when their out of context 
remarks trigger automated collection or where intelligence operations wrongly 
indicate that a particular person is a foreign intelligence officer, intelligence asset 
or an irregular militant. In a domestic law enforcement context, rights-infringing 
investigations of suspects (who turn out to be innocent) can sometimes be justified. 
State agents tasked with investigative functions cannot only interact with guilty 
persons or people of intelligence value. Agents’ mandate instead is to investigate 
suspects, people who might be innocent or might be guilty. Agents would not be 
meeting their protective duty if treating all suspects with the benign indifference 
they do apparently innocent people. Similarly, intelligence operations ill-serve 
the state if they are restricted to investigating known threats, to the exclusion of 
anticipating future threats. Investigations require some rights infringements like 
questioning, arrest, interrogation and searches. People in a just state, where state 
agents can be held accountable for bad behaviour, do not have their rights violated 
by security standard-compliant investigative actions since they can be modelled 
as consenting to security standard compliant norms and tactics aimed at protect-
ing their rights. The case is more complicated in international settings since the 
intelligence collector is not necessarily acting to secure the community of which 
the target is a part and the target likely will not have the ability to identify or sue 
the intelligence agents who wrong her. 
As an expression of their duty to support just institutions, inhabitants of one 
state cede claim-rights against having some of their information collected diag-
nostically by an adversary agency in order to ascertain if they are a security threat. 
This diagnostic level of collection would seem to be the minimal requirement 
of a duty to support just foreign security institutions. All people have a right to 
demand that their security agents identify looming threats. Ceding a right against 
diagnostic collection is a way to support this right enjoyed by foreigners. So, intel-
ligence agencies may be justified – contingent on meeting the practical elements 
of the security standard – in conducting automated dragnet signal interception of 
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region is digitally scanned for certain security sensitive references prior to select 
communication being forwarded to a human analyst for consideration. Metadata 
recording and retention may also be justified for the same reason. Agencies might 
want to retain years’ worth of big data in order to have a library to scan if current 
investigations highlight an old communication as being of significance. Agency 
leaders might model inhabitants of their states accepting the risk that their adver-
saries will store their old communications but never view them – unless the adver-
sary finds evidence that a citizen is actually a spy or a terrorist – as a cost of their 
own agencies doing the same thing in a fraught security environment. Inhabitants 
of states without major security concerns could not be modelled as accepting this 
risk. The cost to civilians is steeper, and potentially less tolerable, if an adversary 
had very sloppy selection algorithms and so fed a large number of false-positive 
communications to human analysts. Still, even this cost is perhaps tolerable since 
the foreign analyst presumably reads an anonymized text or email. By contrast, 
the cost might be unbearable if the adversary’s diagnostic efforts involved read-
ing every written communication or listening to every conversation as a matter 
of course. Businesses might fear intercepted and stored communications more 
than individuals. Even if an agency is reasonably sure its rival does not engage 
in industrial espionage, it has to consider if domestic business actions would be 
harmed because of executives’ fears that sensitive communications  could be inter-
cepted and misused or leaked. 
A further point for agency leaders to consider on the subject of big data collec-
tion might relate more to the retention, rather than the collection, of the data. The 
cost to average citizens and businesses is greatly increased if intelligence agencies 
store their intercepted data on relatively insecure servers and then hackers steal 
the data and make it available in a searchable database. One might not worry 
much if one’s online searches and texts are stored on an NSA or MSS server in 
some desert, never to be read unless one starts corresponding with jihadists, but 
worry very much if that information is available on a website prospective employ-
ers, spouses and divorce attorneys can search for a modest fee. 
Due process protections can help make domestic criminal investigations secu-
rity standard-compliant. People can demand to be protected from criminals and 
have crimes against them promptly solved, but innocent people also do not want 
to be regularly inconvenienced or frightened by ham-handed investigations and 
so would endorse checks on investigators by neutral arbiters to help ensure that 
investigations are warranted. Appealing to the reciprocal element of the security 
standard, inhabitants of one state would endorse due process style protections 
appropriate for domestic undercover work for foreign intelligence targets if their 
agencies needed to move beyond the diagnostic phase to target a particular per-
son the initial diagnosis suggested was a threat. Graduated due process protec-
tions are important since the same standards inhabitantsA could be modelled as 
endorsing could guide collection efforts targeting them on behalf of inhabitants. 
Some due process protections involved in an overt domestic investigation such 
as those involving arrest and interrogation are not apt since the target will not 
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the requirement of a warrant from a neutral court prior to engaging in collection 
against foreign civilian targets. Collectors would have to produce evidence that 
the desired target is a person of intelligence value. The court should view foreign 
intelligence targets as having the same privacy rights as domestic inhabitants, be 
it with respect to their physical person, their possessions, their communications or 
their data. This requirement would extend to targets who are suspected of being 
civilian intelligence officers operating outside security-sensitive areas like intel-
ligence agency headquarters and embassies. 
Intelligence agencies might also take an interest in politicians, diplomats and 
civilians working in sensitive industries. Their work product on their computers 
and work-related communications are fair game for interception if they pose a 
potential threat to other states. These professionals can be modelled as waiving 
claim-rights against having work-related communications and devices targeted 
(posing a risk of collaterally capturing personal communication) since they vol-
untarily took jobs where they pose indirect threats to adversaries or are part of 
a state’s overall foreign policy establishment. Security training likely regularly 
reminds them of what is at stake in their communications. Moreover, they should 
choose to be scrupulous in separating personal from professional communication. 
The harder question is whether they have ceded claim-rights to all their per-
sonal data. Intelligence agencies might very much want to gather embarrassing 
or incriminatory information against a politician, diplomat, or defence contractor 
in order to blackmail him or find out personal information about him in order to 
improve a recruiting officer’s ability to develop rapport. I suggested earlier that 
the security standard would likely not permit targeting service personnel in this 
manner because the reciprocal cost is too high. Cost is relative, so it would be 
more accurate to say that the cost of inviting universal collection against one’s 
own military usually outweighs the benefit of collecting against random service 
personnel. The benefit of collecting damaging information against select politi-
cians, diplomats or weapons scientists is far greater. Further, the number of people 
targeted is relatively small. Politicians and diplomats can be trained about the 
risks of extracurricular indiscretions and provided with relatively secure devices. 
Politicians in democracies are also partially vetted during campaigns as their 
opponents try to identify and publicize any damaging information. In many cases, 
scandals foreign intelligence agencies might discover have already been revealed 
to voters. 
Scientists and other researchers working very closely on weapons or intel-
ligence gathering technology can perhaps be modelled as waiving claim-rights 
against having personal information targeted since they likely know or should 
know the tactics of adversary agencies and the importance those agencies place 
on the scientists’ work. It seems a heavy cost to researchers working on more 
peripheral research, perhaps on defence or intelligence grants, if their funding 
comes with a risk that all their personal information will be potentially collected 
and exploited by foreign intelligence agencies. Here, leaders of agencies would 
have to think very carefully if the security environment warrants reciprocal inva-
sions of domestic researchers’ privacy. 
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 Intentionally intercepting the communication or records of friends, relatives 
and lovers of all the aforementioned categories is fraught. To be clear, this tac-
tic involves separate targeting of a target’s familiars, not incidentally collecting 
against them in the course of intercepting the target’s communications. Intelli-
gence agencies may seek personal information that could be used to blackmail 
targets regarding their relatives’ foibles or to reveal vulnerabilities or proclivities 
that intelligence officers might otherwise exploit in order to cultivate the person 
as a spy. Intelligence officers might also offer incentives to targets to help rela-
tives in distress. 
 First, relatives of service members, intelligence officers, weapons researchers 
etc. have not waived rights in the role-based manner of their relatives. Have they 
forfeited their rights by being complicit in their relative’s actions? One cannot 
help what career one’s child, parent or sibling chooses, but what about a spouse? 
The spouse of a service member knows about his or her spouse’s profession, but 
an intelligence officer might never reveal his true profession to his spouse or at 
least not until after they are married. Bearing in mind that reciprocal element of 
the security standard, it seems too high a bar to demand divorce as the price of 
avoiding being targeted for intelligence collection. Still appealing to this recipro-
cal element, intelligence officers have to consider if they are willing to have their 
own relatives targeted for intelligence collection prior to targeting their potential 
assets’ relatives. Such targeting violates the targets’ rights. Except perhaps in the 
most perilous security environments, it seems the reciprocal element would pre-
clude targeting relatives. 
Finally , an international criminal like a drug dealer, a pirate or an unprivileged 
irregular combatant ,11 whose operational communications are intercepted, does 
not have his moral rights violated wherever he is located because he lacks a right 
to contribute to criminal operations via those communications. However, since his 
identity is likely not overt, the collecting agency has to go through due process 
steps of getting a warrant prior to targeting him. Failure to do so would violate the 
target’s rights even if he really was a criminal. 
 The foregoing argument assumes that targets live in decent states with function-
ing governments engaging in national security work on behalf of their inhabitants. 
Unprivileged irregulars and other types of criminals sheltering in failed or unjust 
states have no more of a right to secret operational communications than they 
do if they are operating in just states. Service personnel and intelligence officers 
serving unjust regimes are effectively serving criminal organizations and so, like 
ordinary criminals, forfeit a right to their operational communications. Defence 
contractors or weapon scientists in unjust states may be closer to criminals if they 
are knowingly colluding with an unjust regime. Those who are coerced by their 
repressive governments are wronged by being targeted for collection since they 
have not forfeited their rights through culpable collaboration. Agencies in other 
states need to appeal to the doctrine of double effect or lesser evil arguments in 
order to justify wronging these groups of people. 
 Service personnel, intelligence officers and defence contractors presumably are 











The rights of foreign intelligence targets 105 
just foreign institutions as a way of respecting foreigners’ rights. This duty means 
ceding claim-rights against diagnostic and accidental collection, but not collat-
eral collection. Collateral collection occurs when an agent foresees that collecting 
against a target will also capture information from a target’s interlocutors even 
though they are not intelligence targets. My view is that minimal diagnostic col-
lection meant to ascertain if one is a security threat is included in the duty to sup-
port just foreign institutions, but collateral collection is only justified via a waiver 
consequent to entering into an agent-mediated adversarial practice. A waiver of 
rights against collateral collection is entailed by a modelled endorsement of one’s 
agents engaging in collection efforts collaterally collecting on foreigners. Agency 
leaders can model this consent if or so long as it is technologically impossible to 
only collect against one member of a conversation. Thus, this justification does 
not extend to non-targets in failed or unjust states because these people lack intel-
ligence agents working on their behalf against foreign adversaries. 
One might think that non-targets living in unjust states have a duty to help 
protect foreigners from the non-targets’ unjust leaders. Yet non-complicit civil-
ians in unjust states are like hostages, victims of their own leaders and potentially 
threatened by adversaries as well. Their duties cannot extend beyond those of 
non-targets living in just or decent states. They are wronged by collateral collec-
tion. Agencies would have to appeal to the doctrine of double effect or make a 
lesser evil argument to justify violating these people’s rights. 
Collateral collection is permissible if it will ultimately contribute to rudimen-
tary law enforcement benefiting non-targets like the interdiction of terrorists or 
drug dealers in a failed or unjust state. In that case, innocent people in the target 
area can be modelled as ceding claim-rights to any agency that will act in the 
interest of their rights when local criminals are removed from the scene. 
Notes 
1 Gendron, Pfaff, Diderichsen and Vrist Ronn make the same point in rejecting direct 
application of just war theory to intelligence operations ( Gendron 2005 , 418;  Pfaff 
2006 , 75;  Diderichsen and Rønn 2017 , 482). 
2 Pfaff and Tiel also use a social contract framework ( Pfaff and Tiel 2004 , 4). 
3 For example, an egalitarian norm will exclude certain tactics that focus only on certain 
ethnic groups. 
4 I make an argument for this position in Chapter 7 of my  The Moral Status of Combat-
ants: A New Theory. 
5 The latter can be effectuated by voluntarily entering into a practice involving certain 
well-known concessions on the parts of members. For example, one tacitly consents to 
abide by the rules of a game when one voluntarily begins playing, even if those rules 
might force one to suffer some harm or loss. When one loses a hand in poker, one can-
not object that “I wasn’t playing  that sort of poker”. 
6 Though, for example, one ought not to subvert foreign elections by posting disinforma-
tion on the internet. 
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8 Pfaff and Tiel base the permission to engage in diagnostic collection on tacit consent. 
Their position is vulnerable to standard critiques of John Locke’s famous account of 
political obligation based on tacit consent. Namely, one can ask how tacit consent 
obtains if citizens are never provided with the express terms of the “contract” and do 
not have meaningful refusal options. 
9 The adversary agency’s permission does not mean agencies in the target state are not 
permitted to oppose their actions. 
10 See An Ethics of Interrogation, Chapter 7. 
11 An irregular combatant is a combatant who uses guerrilla tactics and/or represents a 
non-state group (often then using guerrilla tactics). An unprivileged irregular is one 
who fails the criteria for moral and lawful belligerency: obeying a unified chain of 
command, carrying one’s arms in the open, wearing identifying emblems, and obeying 
the laws and customs of war. 
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 6 Digital sleeper cells and the ethics 
of risk management 
 Kevin Macnish 
 Introduction 
The advent of networked systems has brought with it new opportunities in intelli-
gence, giving rise to a sub-species of “cyberintelligence”. One such opportunity is 
that of what I refer to here (for want of a better term) “digital sleeper cells”. These 
consist in code which can be placed on an adversary’s network and left dormant 
for a period of time, before being activated if, and when, needed. There is limited 
written evidence of such cells existing, the most famous being that used on the 
Ivano-Frankivsk power network in 2015 ( Lehman 2016 ), but anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the Ivano-Frankivsk case was not an anomaly. 
Such new opportunities bring with them new risks, including ethical risks. This 
calls for intelligence ethics to expand to include cyberintelligence and with it the 
ethical debate to similarly expand. The problem, as I argue in the following, is 
that traditional ethical frameworks for intelligence, and particularly the notion of 
jus ad intelligentia/in intelligentium, are often insufficiently granular to provide 
ethical guidance in cases of uncertainty. Whereas traditional (analogue?) intel-
ligence has centuries of case studies to draw on, the new ethical issues arising in 
cyberintelligence have no historical analogies. 
In this chapter, I argue that a way forward in developing an ethics of cyberin-
telligence, at least insofar as consideration of proportionality is to play a role, is 
to consider likely reciprocity. I explore this through an analysis of the aforemen-
tioned digital sleeper cells. Following an introduction to some of the challenges 
facing intelligence ethics in the digital, networked age, I consider the nature and 
role of digital sleeper cells and how they are likely to be perceived by those using 
them and by those affected by them. I then suggest that the recently developed 
ethics of risk literature can inform and guide ethical intelligence activities through 
their ability to highlight complicating factors which may otherwise be overlooked. 
It is important to note that in this chapter I am not suggesting that any current or 
former intelligence agencies are being cavalier in their use of digital sleeper cells. 
From private conversations, the impression given is that the use of these tools, at 
least in liberal democracies, is extremely limited and carefully controlled. While 
some may be willing to take such reassurances on trust, many will not, especially 
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by politicians to justify going to war ( Herring and Robinson 2014 ;  Humphreys 
2005 ). Furthermore, while we may currently have morally trustworthy intelli-
gence chiefs in post, it would be complacent to presume that this will always be 
the case. I am hence not writing in critique of any one state or agency, still less any 
individuals. I am, though, writing with an eye clearly on the future moral health 
of the intelligence community. 
 Intelligence ethics 
There are a number of ways, theories and frameworks through which we can 
approach intelligence ethics. If intelligence is about finding out, or trying to find 
out, information that we do not already know, then intelligence ethics is about 
discovering this information in an ethical manner. As such, there are a number of 
standard normative frameworks that can be applied to intelligence ethics. I have 
argued elsewhere ( Macnish 2017 , 78–82) that, at the very least, we can think 
about intelligence ethics from a deontological perspective, a consequentialist per-
spective, a virtue ethics perspective or a reciprocity perspective. Each of these 
has its respective advocates and dissenters. However, I also believe that one of 
the most promising frameworks for understanding intelligence ethics is that of 
the just war tradition. This approach has been promoted by Michael Quinlan, 
David Omand, Ross Bellaby and myself at different times in the past ( Bellaby 
2014 ;  Macnish 2017 ;  Omand 2011 ;  Quinlan 2007 ). The just war tradition carries 
the advantage of a combination of both deontological and consequential thinking, 
coupled with a rich tradition of philosophical reflection and case studies. 
One challenge to using the just war tradition in thinking about intelligence eth-
ics is that, while the aforementioned historical tradition is indeed rich and varied, 
it has only recently started to be applied to intelligence ethics. As such, there are 
far fewer cases or arguments from which to draw when one comes to specifi-
cally intelligence-related problems. The just war tradition is therefore a valuable 
framework through which to understand established ethical problems, but it is 
far weaker when it comes to determining what to do in scenarios with new and 
emerging technologies. For example, we can agree that there is strong rationale 
for thinking that any intelligence activity should be proportionate in terms of the 
harms that it risks when balanced against the benefits that it promises. However, 
proportionality is notoriously complex even in established war thinking. Take, for 
example, the sinking of the Argentinian light cruiser ARA General Belgrano in 
the Falklands crisis in 1982 ( Rice and Gavshon 1984 ). The  Belgrano was in inter-
national waters, sailing away from the Falkland Islands when it was torpedoed 
by HMS Galahad. From a tactical perspective the Belgrano posed no threat and 
so the sinking of the largest ship in the Argentine Navy appears to have been a 
disproportionate action, especially considering the 3000 lives that were lost when 
the ship sank. Yet from a strategic perspective, the  Belgrano was able to protect 
the rest of the Argentine fleet from the British Navy. With the removal of this 
battleship, the British Navy was able to dominate the waters around the Falk-
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Gavshon 1984 , 115–31). Hence we might say that the sinking of the  Belgrano
was disproportionate from a tactical perspective but proportionate from a strategic 
perspective. 
If there are such challenges within traditional war discourse when it comes to 
determining proportionality, how much more difficult is this when thinking about 
new technologies used in intelligence? The challenge here is that the condition 
of proportionality frequently lacks sufficient granularity to be able to determine 
what is and is not a proportionate action in intelligence. We are therefore chal-
lenged to come out with ethical guidance in the face of a very broad brush frame-
work. There are further problems in applying the just war tradition to intelligence, 
not least that the just war tradition is a predominantly Western tradition, rooted 
in a combination of classical philosophy and Judaeo-Christian ethics. As such, 
one wonders how such ethical precepts might be applied on a global level. There 
have been attempts to develop a truly global ethics in recent years, catalyzed by 
the international aspect of the internet and globalization ( Brey 2007 ;  Ess 2008 ; 
2006 ;  Küng and Kuschel 1993 ; Widdows 2014 ;  2016 ). While these concerns are 
hardly new in thinking about military ethics (we have, after all, experienced two 
world wars in the last 120 years) they do leave open concerns that what appears 
proportionate to western values may not appear to be proportionate when one’s 
starting point is Buddhist or Taoist ethics. 
Finally, there is the concern of the Collingridge dilemma ( Kudina and Verbeek 
2019 ;  Liebert and Schmidt 2010 ). This states that we have an essential problem 
in determining the ethics of new and emerging technologies. We frequently do 
not know what the ethical problems with new technologies will be until those 
technologies have become embedded in society. The dilemma then arises because 
when the technology has been fully embedded in society, it is too late to restrict 
or even prevent the distribution of that technology. There have been several sug-
gestions as to how to approach ethics of emerging technology, 1 but the problem 
remains that we will always be left in a position of some uncertainty as to the ethi-
cal implications of new technologies prior to their actual use in society. 
If we bring these three concerns together (the lack of granularity in determining 
proportionality, the varying ethical assumptions across the globe and the empiri-
cal uncertainties of new technologies) then we discover some significant gaps in 
the application of just war thinking to intelligence ethics insofar as this concerns 
new and emerging technologies. In the face of these gaps I want to propose that a 
practical way forward is to consider what we believe will be the likely response 
of the spied upon party upon discovery of a particular act of espionage. This 
would fall within the traditional jus in intelligentia category of considering likely 
consequences without necessarily being consequentialist ( Hurka 2005 ;  Macnish 
2016 ;  2015 ). Furthermore, my proposal is not that we determine our action on the 
basis of a likely response, but rather that we determine our tolerance threshold 
for such responses. That is, we should determine our behaviour on the basis of 
what we may reasonably trigger by our actions. Note that this is not a condition 
of reciprocity through which we may find that we are drawn into a vicious cycle 
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those acts. Rather, it is a matter of asking whether it is acceptable for us to do X if 
we have reasonable grounds to believe that X will trigger Y.
For example, if the act of arresting an intelligence officer from an adversarial 
state is reasonably believed to occasion a declaration of war from that state, then 
we may determine that the arrest of said officer would be a disproportionate act. 
If, on the other hand, the arrest is likely to occasion a reciprocal arrest of one 
of our intelligence officers in that state, then the act might well fall within our 
tolerance threshold of a reasonable price to pay for the action. At the same time, 
the context might be such in which the declaration of war may be appropriate 
for other reasons (and hence fall within our tolerance threshold), or indeed in 
which the arrest of one of our intelligence officers would fall outside our toler-
ance threshold. In the remainder of this chapter I will develop this thought of 
considering tolerance thresholds to the risky application of new technologies in 
intelligence (and specifically, cyber intelligence). 
Cyber intelligence and digital sleeper cells 
We may distinguish between security, counterintelligence and intelligence through 
a lens of active versus passive approaches to state security and economic well-
being. Security is a matter of preventing attacks or espionage against the state 
through relatively passive means, while counterintelligence involves preventing 
attacks or espionage against the state through more active measures designed to 
reveal the intentions and abilities of adversaries. Intelligence itself is then about 
attacking adversaries in order to gather intelligence on their intentions and abili-
ties. More kinetic active approaches such as agents provocateurs and sabotage, 
while not forming a part of intelligence collection in a strict sense, frequently fall 
within the purview of state intelligence agencies. That is, they are not, at least in 
times of peace, the appropriate domain for military action but are rather managed 
by state intelligence. 
A similar continuum can be drawn when it comes to the online connected world 
of cyber. Cyber security is relatively passive, seeking to prevent attacks and espi-
onage through the use of firewalls, monitoring and the development of highly 
secure systems. Cyber counterintelligence is the more active state of preventing 
attacks and espionage through the active gathering of intelligence about the terror-
ist or espionage intentions of adversaries. Cyber intelligence is therefore focused 
on attacking adversaries in order to gain intelligence on their broader intentions 
and abilities insofar as these have a bearing on the state. Acts of cyber sabotage, 
fake news generation and similar cyber activities once more fall beyond the tra-
ditional understanding of intelligence and yet are not clearly military activities 
when enacted during peacetime. As with the physical analogues of  agents provo-
cateur and sabotage, acts of cyber sabotage and active disinformation campaigns 
interfering with domestic activities of adversarial states are typically managed by 
state intelligence agencies. 
One particular approach to cyber sabotage and cyber intelligence gathering is 
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an adversary’s computer network but which remains dormant until activated at 
some point in the future. The analogy is drawn with a sleeper cell in terms of 
intelligence collection, for instance when agents are inserted into a foreign coun-
try and live as regular citizens in that country for years, building networks of 
trust and allowing them to rise to positions of significance and importance before 
becoming active and returning information to their country of origin ( Leuprecht, 
Szeman, and Skillicorn 2019 ). This is an approach which has reportedly been 
employed by China in infiltrating a number of US economic interests over the last 
20 to 30 years as a means of gathering intellectual property on key technological 
developments ( Fialka 1999 , 18–40). 
The digital sleeper cell is therefore distinct from more traditional forms of 
cyberattack such as worms, Trojan horses and phishing attacks. A digital sleeper 
cell may be used to insert one of these traditional forms of malware, but only 
when the sleeper cell is activated. Hence the Stuxnet virus developed by Israel 
and the United States and employed against the Iranian nuclear power system in 
2011 was a virus which brought down that system but was not a digital sleeper 
cell as it became active as soon as it was placed in the system ( Farwell and Rohoz-
inski 2011 ;  Langner 2011 ). Similarly, the WannaCry and notPetya attacks of more 
recent years were straightforward cyberattacks ( Greenberg 2018 ;  Marsh 2018 ; 
Mattei 2017 ;  Mohurle and Patil 2017 ;  Smart 2018 ). By contrast, the Black Energy 
virus used against the power grid in the Ivano-Frankivsk region of Ukraine in 
2014 involved the use of a digital sleeper cell. In this case, the virus had lain 
dormant in the system for some time before it was triggered by various people, 
themselves subject to a spear phishing attack, clicking on macros in Microsoft 
Excel files ( Lehman 2016 ). 
Digital sleeper cells do not have to be used solely for the purpose of sabotage. 
They may, for instance, also be used in intelligence gathering activities. Such a 
cell may be inserted into a country’s network but once more will remain dormant 
until active, at which point it will start returning information to the initiating orga-
nization. In the case of intelligence collection it is perhaps harder to see why one 
would not wish to begin the intelligence collection immediately. It may be the 
case that one wishes to have the potential for intelligence collection on a certain 
network without having the need or perhaps the capacity to deal with the intelli-
gence that the network would reveal in the short term. However, the discovery of 
such a digital sleeper cell would likely occasion a similar response to the finding 
of an active intelligence gathering cyberattack. By contrast, a digital sleeper cell 
aimed at sabotage, if discovered, might occasion a less extreme response than the 
act of sabotage itself. The discovery of a digital sleeper cell is hence similar to 
the discovery of a “real threat”. One may know in principle that there is a threat 
(what we may call a “mere threat”), but the discovery of actual means in place 
to enact the threat elevates it to a “real threat”. A “real threat” poses a greater 
risk to the state than a “mere threat”, but not as much risk as it would were the 
threat to be enacted. There are hence three levels of concern: “mere threats”, “real 
threats” and “enacted threats”. As these increase in terms of harm (from potential 
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It is also worth noting that digital sleeper cells may or may not be anonymous. 
In the analogue equivalent of an espionage sleeper cell, the agents in that cell 
would not wish to reveal the intentions of the sending organization (i.e. that they 
are present purely for the purposes of economic espionage for their sending coun-
try). In the case of the digital sleeper cell, though, it may be that the sending orga-
nization desires that it is recognized as such after the act of sabotage has occurred. 
Through this, the sending organization might gain kudos within the intelligence 
community, gain the advantage of fear over adversaries and potential adversaries 
and show off to its political bosses about the efficacy of its operations. This was 
the case with the Black energy digital sleeper cell in Ukraine around which there 
seems to have been no question but that it had been developed and put in place by 
Russian intelligence ( Lehman 2016 ). 
It is therefore the task of state cyber security agencies to protect against the 
insertion of digital sleeper cells into sensitive state networks. These agencies are 
typically tasked also with the counterintelligence activity of locating digital sleeper 
cells, and frequently also with the development and placing of digital sleeper cells 
themselves in adversarial networks. As such, digital sleeper cells are becoming 
an active and pervasive means of low-level cyber conflict, a “real threat” within 
a domestic networked infrastructure. A key ethical concern with the use of digi-
tal sleeper cells, though, is that we do not know how they will be received upon 
discovery by the recipient state ( Leuprecht, Szeman, and Skillicorn 2019 ). I have 
suggested, for example, that the discovery of a digital sleeper cell with the goal 
of triggering an act of sabotage might occasion a lesser response than the act of 
sabotage itself. However, this is not a given. It may well be that the recipient state 
chooses to interpret the presence of a sabotage-related digital sleeper cell as tanta-
mount to the act of sabotage that it threatens. As Leuprecht at al. note: 
because of the widespread lack of understanding of the operation of cyber and 
cyberphysical systems, the difficulty of distinguishing malice from incompe-
tence when communication and computation systems malfunction, and the 
difficulty of assessing intent, the targets of [digital sleeper cells and other 
offensive threats] cannot easily judge the magnitude of the threat. There is 
at least the possibility that they will overreact, perhaps extremely. This could 
lead to retaliation at higher levels and so escalation, perhaps even spilling 
over into kinetic responses. 
( Leuprecht, Szeman, and Skillicorn 2019 , 400–1) 
In this way, we are returned to the three problems raised earlier regarding the use 
of the just war framework for determining ethical actions in cyberspace. There is 
a lack of granularity in terms of determining whether a digital sleeper cell would 
be proportionate, based in part upon a lack of knowledge as to how the sleeper cell 
would be perceived by the recipient state and the challenge of the Collingridge 
dilemma that we will not know for certain the impact of the digital sleeper cell 
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For example, imagine that South Korea places a digital sleeper cell on a 
North Korean network. In this case, context is crucial. The likely North Korean 
response would probably differ depending on whether the network related to 
the Ministry of Defence, a munitions factory, a power network or a hospital. It 
seems that there are a number of potential responses that North Korea could take 
in this situation. It might decide that digital sleeper cells are what it does as well 
and therefore not worry overly about the situation. It might believe that its own 
digital sleeper cells are not obvious to the South Korean security services and 
try to gain diplomatic advantages by touting the cyber infiltration performed by 
South Korea in the international community. A third alternative is that the North 
Korean state could interpret the presence of the digital sleeper cell as a “real 
threat” against the target. A fourth alternative would be that the digital sleeper 
cell is seen as an attack on the target. Lastly, and the most extreme, would be to 
see the digital sleeper cell as an attack on the state itself. This might appear to be 
an extreme response. After all, it is tragic for a hospital to experience a cyberat-
tack in the way that many British hospitals suffered through the WannaCry attack 
in 2017, but this was not seen as an attack on the state. However, it is not unfea-
sible to think of a scenario in which a liberal democracy employs digital voting 
software for a national election only to find such software has been infiltrated 
by a digital sleeper cell which threatens to sabotage the process by altering votes 
for particular candidates. In this latter case the attack may be seen as tantamount 
to one on the democratic foundations of the liberal state. Such an attack might 
then quite reasonably be interpreted as casus belli and lead to a kinetic military 
response ( Smith 2018 ). 
Furthermore, even thinking in these terms assumes a very high degree of 
knowledge regarding the recipient state’s networks and the potential for damage 
of whatever malware the digital sleeper cell will enact. It is worth remembering 
that the first worm was created in what was believed to be a secure networked 
environment of university computers by graduate student Robert Tappan Mor-
ris in 1988 ( Branscomb 1990 ). What that student did not know was that at least 
one of the computers was attached to the broader network of computers linking 
universities at the time, leading to an FBI investigation. In a similar manner, it 
is not implausible that a Ministry of Defence computer network might at some 
point connect to a civilian hospital network, allowing any attack on the legitimate 
defence target to spread to a non-legitimate civilian target. In this way, the digital 
sleeper cell would form a part of an indiscriminate act of targeting, thus violating 
the principle of discrimination in the just war tradition. 
The use of digital sleeper cells therefore raises a number of ethical issues from 
the outset. As Donald Rumsfeld once famously said in relation to the Iraq War,
there are known unknowns and unknown unknowns ( Daase and Kessler 2007 ; 
Pawson, Wong, and Owen 2011 ). In this case, the known unknowns include the 
likely response of the recipient state upon discovery of a digital sleeper cell. The 
unknown unknowns here involve the precise spread and impact of whatever mal-
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Cyber intelligence, ethics and risk 
I have argued elsewhere that we should understand security as the inverse of
risk. That is, the greater the things we value are put at risk (in terms of greater
probability of harm, or greater harm), the less secure the situation in which we
find ourselves and vice versa. Given the aforementioned continuum between
security, counterintelligence and intelligence, intelligence activities (including
sabotage) can reasonably be seen as acts of risk management in the national
security and intelligence sphere. Cyber security (and, by extension, cyber coun-
terintelligence and cyber intelligence) is a subcategory of this way of thinking.
Cyber security is therefore a measure of risk insofar as that risk occurs in rela-
tion to the cyber domain, and cyber intelligence is a matter of risk management
wherever intelligence and related activities take place in relation to the cyber
domain. Of course, it is increasingly the case that for much of the world every-
thing of significance is at least impacted by, if not reliant on, the cyber domain.
As this tendency increases it will become less relevant to discuss “cyber” secu-
rity and simply refer to “security”. Put another way, the context of security will
likely soon be such that the vast majority of security is in some manner a matter
of cybersecurity.
The benefit of defining security and intelligence in terms of risk is that this 
opens to discussion a vast discourse on the ethics of risk, which has been devel-
oped over the last 30 years by academics such as Sven Ove Hansson. The defini-
tion places risk as the central concern of intelligence and security activities, which 
in turn challenges us to think more carefully about what is meant by and what is 
implied by situations involving risk. 
A standard definition of risk would involve a calculation of severity and prob-
ability. The more severe the harms which are threatened in a risky situation, the 
more risky that situation will be. Similarly, the greater the likelihood of harms 
occurring renders a risky situation more risky. Hence a low probability of a minor 
paper cut is a low risk. The high probability of losing one’s life is, by contrast, a 
high risk. There are then any number of intermediate positions involving the high 
probability of a minor harm (a high likelihood of a paper cut, for example) and a 
low probability of a major harm (a remote chance of death). 
Through breaking down risk into its constituent terms of severity and probabil-
ity we are then more able to see which ethical issues may arise through engage-
ment in risky situations such as the placing of digital sleeper cells in conditions 
of epistemic uncertainty. For example, I have already suggested that we do not 
know what harm may arise through the employment of a digital sleeper cell in 
at least some contexts. We may have a reasonable idea as to what would happen 
if the digital sleeper cell were activated, although even then there is the prob-
lem of unforeseen network connections allowing for malware to travel between 
legitimate and illegitimate targets, but there is also the question as to what would 
happen if the digital sleeper cell were discovered before being activated. We are 
once more in the realm of the unknown unknowns in the cyber domain. Hence the 
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Furthermore, there are additional problems in terms of the subjectivity of harm. 
Generally speaking, harms have both objective and subjective dimensions. It is, 
ceteris paribus, undoubtedly objectively harmful for a person to lose their hand. 
However, it is arguably worse for a concert pianist to lose her hand than for a 
philosopher to lose his. This may be exaggerated when it comes to harms arising 
to people of different cultures and societies. This was brought home to many in 
a recent Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) experiment involving self-
driving vehicles ( Awad 2017 ;  Ganesh 2017 ;  Holstein and Dodig-Crnkovic 2018 ). 
Most research subjects in Europe and the United States, when placed in a dilemma 
in which a self-driving car needed to kill one of a number of people, opted for the 
car to kill an elderly person rather than a child. This was reversed when the same 
experiment was conducted with Chinese research subjects. There may be a num-
ber of reasons for this, not least a traditional reverence for the elderly in China, 
which has been absent from European and American culture for some time and 
issues of overpopulation in China, whereas many countries in Europe are expe-
riencing population decline. The fact remains, though, that the harm of killing a 
child vis-à-vis the harm of killing an elderly person in at least this one scenario 
differed from a subjective perspective depending on whether the person asked 
was Chinese or European. As such, it is extremely difficult to measure the harms 
which might arise as a result of employing a digital sleeper cell in a state with 
radically different values from one’s own. 
There are further questions to be asked about the distribution of risk. It is fre-
quently the case that the person making a risky decision will not be the same 
person who faces paying the costs of that decision ( Wolff 2010 ). If I choose to go 
hang gliding, and sufficiently inform myself of the risks implicit in that, then I 
freely undertake to both experience the benefits of hang gliding (the joy of soar-
ing through the air) and the costs of hang gliding (the chance of something going 
wrong leading to a fatal accident). This, though, is a very different situation from 
one in which I determine whether you should go hang gliding, in which case I 
make the decision while you bear the costs and benefits. Yet another alternative 
may be a situation in which I make a decision from which I stand to benefit but 
you stand to pay the costs. Such was the case, for example, when Ford decided 
not to recall their Pinto model in the 1970s even after the car was determined to 
be unsafe on the roads ( Lütge 2018 ;  Malloy and Lang 1993 ). In that instance, 
the senior management of Ford were almost certainly neither driving a Pinto 
themselves, nor were they making the information about the lack of safety of the 
Pinto available to the general public. The decision makers were therefore benefit-
ing from the decision in terms of salaries arising from sales of the Pinto model 
(coupled with savings on not conducting a recall) while the general public, both 
drivers and passengers in Pinto cars and those on the road with them, stood to pay 
the costs arising from having unsafe vehicles on the roads. In the case of digital 
sleeper cells, we are almost certainly talking about a scenario far closer to that of 
the Ford Pinto than of my going hang gliding. The digital sleeper cell is put in 
place by one state which stands to benefit from the activation of that cell at some 
point in the future, while the recipient state gains nothing but bears the cost of any 
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sabotage that may occur. This distribution of the risk in using sleeper cells renders 
them, in and of themselves, a highly attractive approach to intelligence activi-
ties. The way in which that risk is balanced out is through the threat of reciprocal 
action on the part of the recipient state. However, as noted earlier, we frequently 
do not know what that reciprocal action will be and therefore are left in a position 
of uncertainty. 
While these are relatively broad problems which come from looking at the eth-
ics of risk, there are a number of very specific problems which occur in debates 
surrounding risky situations on a frequent basis and are nonetheless fallacious. 
These have been highlighted as fallacies of risk by Sven Ove Hansson ( Hansson 
2004 ). Of these, at least three seem to pertain particularly to problems in cyber 
intelligence and digital sleeper cells. The first is what Hanson calls the tuxedo 
fallacy ( Hansson 2009 , 426). This is essentially a critique that calculations of risk 
are often undertaken under conditions of extreme simplification, in the process of 
which complicating but important externalities are ignored. In this way, risk can 
be calculated with a seemingly mathematical certainty, just as one can be sure of 
the 1 in 38 probability of the ball on a roulette wheel landing on any particular 
number. However, Hanson’s point is that quite clearly in real life we are not able 
to calculate probabilities with anything like the level of accuracy that we are in 
an ideal casino. We may be able to talk of more or less probability of a particular 
event occurring, but in many cases, it is relatively meaningless to talk of a 56% 
chance versus a 62% chance of a particular event unfolding. As such, we can 
talk about likelihoods in terms of particular states responding to the discovery of 
a digital sleeper cell within a network, but it is hard to say that the risk of plac-
ing a digital sleeper cell in the network pertaining to a Ministry of Defence, for 
example, would be numerically greater than the risk of placing the same digital 
sleeper cell in the network of the same state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
A second fallacy that Hanson raises is what he calls the “sheer size fallacy” 
( Hansson 2004 , 353). This fallacy holds that if a prospective risk appears to be 
smaller than a currently accepted risk then the prospective risk is worth taking. 
There are several problems with this position, not least that the currently accepted 
risk might actually be unacceptably large but not recognized as such. For exam-
ple, it is frequently argued that the risk of accidents occurring with self-driving 
vehicles is lower than the risk of accidents occurring with manually driven vehi-
cles. The conclusion of this line of argument is therefore we have an imperative to 
get self-driving vehicles on the roads as soon as possible. While this may be true, 
it may also be the case that the risks of driving both manual and self-driving vehi-
cles could be too high (i.e. above a threshold of acceptability to the majority in 
society). It also obscures the potential to reduce the risk self-driving vehicles fur-
ther, permitting one to settle for a mere improvement on risk rather than seeking 
to achieve a significant or substantial improvement. The parallel here with digital 
sleeper cells is their apparently low-risk nature. Without considering potential 
or likely retaliatory measures, as suggested here, a digital sleeper cell appears 
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The third fallacy to consider here is what Hansson calls the “infallibility fal-
lacy” ( Hansson 2004 , 359). This arises when experts and the public have differing 
attitudes to a course of action, leading to the conclusion that the public are wrong 
about the right course of action. The response of those guilty of the fallacy is 
typically that the public need to be better informed in order to come to the “right” 
conclusion. However, as Hansson points out, it may also be that the experts are 
wrong (as they have been on many occasions). He notes that 
when the output of a risk analysis of a complex technology indicates a low 
level of risk, the possibility that this analysis was wrong may very well be a 
dominant part of the legitimate concerns that a rational decision maker can 
and should have with respect to the technology in question. 
 ( Hansson 2004 , 359) 
In the case of intelligence activities, it is rare that the general public becomes 
aware of operations until 30 years or more after the event, unless there is a scan-
dal. Rather than running all potential intelligence activities past the public for 
comment (even in the abstract), the “public” in intelligence cases is typically, at 
least in liberal democracies, represented by parliamentarians in committees that 
oversee the intelligence agencies. In this case, the fallacy would unfold as par-
liamentarians expressing concerns about a particular course of action (the use of 
digital sleeper cells either in the abstract or in a particular instance) and being told 
by the heads of the respective intelligence agencies (in this case, the experts) that 
they are simply wrong. 
There is already a general lack of expertise in intelligence matters, which may 
be compounded by a tendency to hold the intelligence agencies somewhat in awe. 
This is then further compounded by a lack of expertise in cybersecurity (quite 
possibly shared by the head of the intelligence agency), which means they are 
likely to be swayed in favour of accepting operations proposed by the experts. 
Due to the composition of the accountability process, there is unlikely to be strong 
evidence to the contrary of what is being proposed, leading to an assumption that, 
as the fallacy states, the experts are right and the politicians wrong. This could 
once more lead to a more risk-prone scenario. 
As Hansson notes, this fallacy can be overcome to some degree through educa-
tion and politicians (and others) with oversight of intelligence activities have a 
duty to become as informed as possible within any reasonable confines of national 
security considerations. However, the responsibility does not (should not) lie with 
politicians alone, but with the intelligence agencies to present the alternatives as 
clearly and impartially as possible with the aim not of winning an agenda but of 
gaining a clear sense of direction from political masters. Furthermore, the mere 
awareness of the fallacy’s existence is a first step to countering its effects. 
In summary, there are a number of benefits of seeing cybersecurity in terms of 
risk, not least in being able to draw on a growing body of literature dedicated to 
discussing the ethics of risk. Some of the challenges raised here in relation to digi-
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in calculating harms and the distribution of risk costs and benefits. In addition, 
there are at least three fallacies that Hansson suggests in relation to risk which have 
application to the deployment of digital sleeper cells and cyber intelligence in gen-
eral. The three on which this chapter has focused have been the tuxedo fallacy, the 
sheer size fallacy and the infallibility fallacy. Each of these can have a significant 
impact on how risk is calculated and determined to be acceptable or not. 
It is, once more, important to be clear that in raising these issues I am not direct-
ing criticism at any one state or intelligence agency, still less any individual. To
the best of my knowledge, most western liberal democracies have accountability 
structures surrounding their intelligence agencies of varying degrees of robust-
ness. Furthermore, those who reach significant positions of authority within those 
agencies tend to be conservative and risk-averse, often far more so than their 
political masters.2 Nonetheless, while this is currently the case, it would be foolish 
to rely entirely on internal cultures of conservatism to ensure that only those who 
were generally risk-averse became the key decision makers in these organizations. 
Conclusion and call to action 
The realm of cyber intelligence, just as the realm of cyber security, is introducing 
new technologies and new techniques which carry ethical consequences. While 
we have developed ethical frameworks for approaching intelligence, my argu-
ment in this chapter has been that these frameworks, and particularly the just 
war tradition on which I have focused, lack the degree of granularity necessary 
for determining whether these new technologies are ethically acceptable in their 
application. In response to this, I suggested that we may add a consideration within 
the proportionality principle of jus in intelligentium to the effect that we consider 
the proportionality of a particular intelligence technique through the lens of the 
likely response that this technique will occasion if discovered by an adversary. 
This approach is both plausible and helpful in determining at least one set of 
likely outcomes from the use of a new technology in intelligence. At the same 
time, the focus on the need to determine an adversary’s reaction highlights how 
little we may know about the likelihood of that reaction. In many cases, we are 
operating blindfolded in a dark room, exacerbated by differences in ethical values 
on a global scale and a lack of knowledge sufficient to provide certainty as to the 
full extent of the potential damage of any malware inserted into a network by a 
digital sleeper cell. 
I have also argued that intelligence and security are areas which involve risk 
management, which, as we have seen, introduces further ethical complications in 
terms of the determination of risk, its distribution and a number of fallacies which 
are frequently associated with it. Through approaching intelligence situations 
with the ethics of risk in mind, we may be better able to at the very least avoid or 
mitigate some of these fallacies and at the same time recognize the shortcomings 
of our own rational beliefs. 
Ultimately, my concern in this chapter has been that if we compensate for a lack 
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likely responses to the implementation of new technologies such as digital sleeper 
cells, then we will be confronted with our own significant epistemic uncertainties. 
There are, of course, means to respond to such uncertainties. The most obvious 
is perhaps that of international law. However, international law is itself at times 
very vague, and, like all laws, frequently lags behind technological innovation. 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 has been a valuable contribution to determining the man-
ner in which international law applies to cyber security and cyber intelligence 
operations between states. Yet Tallinn 2.0 runs into similar problems as the just 
war tradition. As with the just war tradition, it is at times insufficiently granular 
to provide clear guidance on the employment of novel technologies. The manual 
also evidences a lack of agreement between experts on key issues of applying 
international law to the cyber realm. Finally, as the manual itself makes clear in 
the introduction, it is no more than the views of a limited group of experts. The 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 is not legally binding and is intended as the start of the con-
versation rather than its conclusion. 
Instead of encouraging further international law around cyber intelligence 
activities, more effort should therefore be placed into informal bilateral and mul-
tilateral agreements between operators.3 As Leuprecht et al. note, 
there is an opportunity to constrain and shape the way that states engage in 
cyberwarfare in the future in the way the Law of Armed Conflict, the UN 
Charter, and the UN Declaration of Human Rights have done in the kinetic 
realm. 
( Leuprecht, Szeman, and Skillicorn 2019 ) 
While such informal agreements as I am proposing may lack the compelling nature 
of international law, through their informal nature, they can allow for respective 
intelligence agencies to be more open about what they do and do not wish to see 
happen as a result of cyber activities. 
Notes 
1 See for example Boenink, Swierstra, and Stemerding (2010 ),  Brey (2017 ;  2012 ;  2011 ), 
Lucivero, Swierstra, and Boenink (2011 ),  Palm and Hansson (2006 )  and Wright (2011 ). 
2 One may think here of the reported instance when the then British Prime Minister asked 
his intelligence chiefs if they couldn’t just assassinate Idi Amin, the Ugandan dictator. 
The response was said to be a polite, “We don’t do that sort of thing”. If that is genuinely 
reported then it reflects well, but is clearly not universal, as the CIA evidently were 
actively engaged in assassination attempts in the 1960s viz. at least Fidel Castro and 
Patrice Lumumba ( Johnson 1992 ). 
3 See for example Meyer (2011 ). Also see OSCE,  Decision 1202 OSCE Confidence-
Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies, PC.DEC/1202 (March 10, 2016); United 
Nations, General Assembly,  Group of governmental experts on developments in the 
field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, 
A/70/150 (July 22, 2015); UN General Assembly,  Resolution adopted by the General 
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 7 Intelligence sharing among 
coalition forces 
Some legal and ethical challenges 
and potential solutions 
 David Letts 
 Introduction 
Since the end of World War II there have been numerous examples of coalition 
operations involving two or more military forces, including some operations that 
have been held under the authority of the United Nations through the passing 
of a UN Security Council Resolution.1 Other types of multinational operations, 
comprising both formal alliances that are set up under treaty arrangements, such 
as NATO, 2 and more informal coalitions that are typically established under ad 
hoc arrangements that deal with a specific issue or incident, such as the Interna-
tional Maritime Security Construct,3 have been a feature of military operations 
for centuries.4 Changes in the structure of alliances and coalitions have also been 
a regular occurrence, often driven by changes that occur in the political landscape 
of one or more partner State. There are also other types of cooperation that occur 
between military forces, such as routine participation in exercises and training 
activities, as well as exchange of personnel, staff meetings and high-level discus-
sions between senior officials. Overall, these activities are all examples of two or 
more foreign militaries working together to achieve a common objective. 
An integral aspect of these coalition operations is the collection, pooling and 
sharing of intelligence between the forces of the coalition states involved and such 
sharing often represents an indispensable element of the effective conduct of these 
operations. However, intelligence sharing among coalition forces can raise diffi-
cult questions of domestic and international laws. This is especially true in situa-
tions where one State contributes intelligence to a combined operational pool that 
is then used by all of the coalition partners as they pursue their individual goals. In 
such situations, there may be differences in legal and ethical perspectives on the 
use of the pooled intelligence even among liberal democratic states. 
This chapter will initially identify what is meant by the term “intelligence” and 
then outline some of the mechanisms used by states to collate and pool their intel-
ligence resources. The next part of the chapter will review two recent case studies 
where coalition states have relied on intelligence to undertake military operations 
and assess the implications that arise from these cases. The case studies will be 
supported by consideration of some hypothetical scenarios that illustrate the prob-
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possibility that an operational partner state may use pooled intelligence to under-
take an activity that does not correspond with the legal obligations that apply to 
the “providing” state. 
Why is this analysis being undertaken? Reviewing some of the challenges 
involved in sharing intelligence among coalition partners can help to identify 
where the legal and ethical risks lie for coalition states so that conscious decisions 
regarding intelligence sharing can be included in the working methodology of 
shared intelligence agencies and the planning of such operations. The chapter will 
conclude with some suggestions that coalition states may want to consider so that 
concerns regarding the legal issues that arise from intelligence sharing between 
states can be adequately addressed. 
What is “intelligence” and how is it used? 
The collection of information to assist military commanders discharge their duties 
has been an element of warfare for as long as battles between opposing forces 
have been held. One way of describing the concept of intelligence is the approach 
used by the RAND Corporation who note that “military intelligence includes 
information on other countries’ military forces, plans, and operations gained 
through a variety of collection methods” ( RAND Corporation n.d .). In its sim-
plest form, the term “intelligence” refers to “information concerning an enemy or 
an area” that is then available for a commander to use ( Watson n.d .). These days, 
collection of intelligence occurs from a wide variety of sources, including “satel-
lites, ultramodern aircraft, electronic systems, human sources, cameras, imaging 
and electronic devices, and a host of other systems” which all combine so that 
information collection can be now undertaken on a scale that was not previously 
achievable ( Watson n.d .). 
The pooling and sharing of intelligence between the forces of states involved 
in a coalition is also a common feature of modern military operations, and this 
shared material is usually indispensable for the effective conduct of these opera-
tions. There are different methods used to establish intelligence sharing networks, 
with perhaps the most famous (or infamous?) being the “Five Eyes” network that 
is established under the UKUSA Agreement of 1946. 5 The Five Eyes network 
originally only included the United Kingdom and the United States of America 
but by 1956 it had been expanded to include Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 6 
Other states have more recently established military intelligence sharing agree-
ments but the volatility that can impact inter-state relations has meant that some 
of these arrangements have not been without a certain level of difficulty. For 
example, in August 2019 it was reported that the South Korean government had 
decided to give the necessary three months’ notice that the 2016 military intel-
ligence agreement between Japan and South Korea would not be renewed due to 
“ongoing tensions over wartime history and trade”.7 However, at the last minute 
in November 2019 it was announced that a solution had been reached between the 
two states that allowed the agreement to be renewed “six hours before the agree-
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Another way in which intelligence is shared between states is through the cre-
ation of pooled resource centres, and again these may, or may not, be part of a 
formal alliance structure. An example of intelligence sharing as part of a formal 
alliance is the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) that has been operating 
in the United Kingdom since December 2007 ( NIFC n.d .). The NIFC’s website 
identifies its mission as being the provision of “intelligence to warn of potential 
crisis and the support the planning and execution of NATO operations”. 8 More 
recently, in 2017 NATO reformed its headquarters organization by establishing a 
Joint Intelligence and Security Division with a mission to “initiate a broad series 
of reforms to improve the quality and utility of intelligence provided to NATO’s
most senior political and military leaders” ( von Loringhoven 2019 ). 
Intelligence centres that operate with pooled resources may also be focused 
on specific issues, and can be constructed in separate and distinct ways. Three 
examples of this occurring in the maritime domain are: 
• The Singapore Information Fusion Centre (IFC) which is a permanent 
arrangement that was established in 2009 to provide regional maritime 
domain awareness and is hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy. The 
IFC uses a network of International Liaison Officers (ILOs) from a range of 
different countries that collect open-source information in order to compile a 
range of products that contribute to maritime domain awareness in the IFC’s 
area of interest ( IFC 2019b ). The IFC holds a “Shared Awareness Meeting” 
approximately every six months where information is provided regarding 
maritime security incidents that have occurred in the region during the previ-
ous six-month period. At the time of writing, 24 different states have contrib-
uted ILOs since the IFC’s inception. 9 
• Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which operates as a partnership of 
approximately 30 states at any one time, has three discrete missions related to 
maritime security in the middle east region: CTF 150 Maritime Security (out-
side the Gulf), CTF 151 Counter-Piracy and CTF 152 Gulf Maritime Security 
( CMF 2020 ). CMF’s website describes the organization as a “coalition of 
the willing and does not proscribe a specific level of participation from any 
member nation” ( CMF 2020 ). Nevertheless, CMF does have a headquarters 
in Bahrain where intelligence is shared – at least in the form of maritime 
domain awareness – and the CMF hosts a regular Shared Awareness and De-
confliction (SHADE) conference where senior officials can discuss maritime 
issues and threats in CMF’s area of operations. 10 
• The relatively open reporting and sharing of information that occurs with 
the IFC and CMF can be contrasted with United Kingdom Maritime Trade 
Operations (UKMTO), “a Royal Navy capability with the principal purpose 
of providing an information conduit between military which (includes/secu-
rity forces) and the wider international maritime trade” ( UKTMO n.d. ). In 
relation to sharing information, UKMTO declares that it “shares relevant 
information with appropriate authorities within states in the region. All infor-
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recognises that the source and content of the information is often extremely 
sensitive” ( UKTMO n.d .). 
This section of the chapter has shown that intelligence can be collected and shared 
in a number of different ways, and these methods will vary according to the man-
ner in which a coalition has been established and the type of intelligence being 
collated. In the case of the “Five Eyes”, the intention behind that coalition has 
always been to collect sensitive and highly classified intelligence, while other 
intelligence collection centres, such as the IFC in Singapore, are constructed to 
receive and disseminate open-source intelligence. 
Regardless of whether intelligence being collected is open source or highly 
classified, the potential legal and ethical risks associated with its dissemination to, 
and use by, coalition partners should be properly understood. The next part of the 
chapter will examine some case studies to illustrate the problem. 
Coalition operations – two case studies 
Many military operations that have taken place in the past few decades have been 
characterized by the involvement of coalition forces: the 1999 NATO intervention 
in Serbia and subsequent deployment of peacekeeping forces in Kosovo; Afghani-
stan after 2001; Iraq after 2003, including operations against the Islamic State 
(ISIS) since 2010; the 2011 intervention in Libya; recent Saudi-led airstrikes in 
Yemen; and even the activities of the Combined Maritime Forces off the east 
coast of Africa and in the Gulf region that was mentioned in the previous section. 
The previous sections of this chapter have identified that intelligence sharing in 
coalition operations, regardless of whether or not the laws of armed conflict apply, 
is now a regular and expected feature of these activities. However, in recent years 
there have also been numerous reported instances of intelligence sharing being 
one of the key reasons why states have engaged in conduct that has subsequently 
proved to be wrongful – or at least, perhaps, regrettable. Examples that will be 
briefly examined in this section of the chapter are the Iraq War in 2003 and the 
recently released Report of the Government Inquiry into Operation Burnham and 
related matters ( Arnold 2020 ). In both of these incidents, intelligence available 
to the coalition forces played a key role for at least part of the legal justification 
that was provided for the operation. The issue that arises for consideration in 
this chapter is whether there is a resultant legal and ethical risk that intelligence 
provided by one coalition partner could be, or was, misused by another coalition 
partner to commit a violation of international law. 
 Iraq War 2003 
Much has been written regarding the use of intelligence to inform the decision-
making that preceded the entry of coalition forces into Iraq in 2003 and there are 
plenty of opinions about whether or not the use of military force at that time was 
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the purpose of using this period as a case study in this chapter. Rather, the purpose 
is to make some remarks about the key pieces of intelligence that coalition forces 
relied upon, and assess whether legal consequences arise. 
The central legal document relevant to this present assessment is United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1441 which was adopted by a unanimous 
vote of 15–0 on November 8, 2002 ( UNSCR n.d .). It is not necessary to delve 
too deeply into the text of UNSCR 1441 for this chapter, other than to mention 
the critical concept that is directly relevant to the intelligence assessment regard-
ing Iraq, namely that it “has been and remains in material breach of its obliga-
tions under relevant resolutions”. Contentious arguments were then subsequently 
raised in relation to who had the legal authority to decide that military action 
should take place as a result of these “material breaches” but again, this question 
is beyond the present scope.12 
In order to authorize military action, clearly there needed to be an assessment 
of whether sufficient evidence to support the claims of material breach existed. It 
is this point that provides the area of most concern for the topic of this chapter, as 
it has been noted that during “Security Council debates during the conflict, China, 
France, Germany and Russia were all unsatisfied that the US and UK allegations 
about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism had been sub-
stantiated” ( Anton 2013 ). The primary reason for this dissatisfaction, of course, is 
that the United States and the United Kingdom (and Australia) did not share the 
intelligence that they supposedly relied upon in forming the opinion that military 
action against Iraq was necessary under one of the legal bases that were provided 
at the time.13 Additionally, it is noted that subsequent to the cessation of coalition 
military action in Iraq, it was found that neither weapons of mass destruction 
were held by Saddam’s regime nor were the supposed close terrorist links with 
Al-Qaeda ever proved. 
The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) in Afghanistan: Operation 
Burnham 
The second case study to briefly consider is Operation Burnham which was a 
New Zealand Special Air Service operation that took place in Afghanistan in 
August 2010. The reason this case study has been chosen is that it involved,  inter 
alia, allegations that faulty intelligence had been used during the operation and 
this criticism, and others, were subject to a detailed and lengthy inquiry with the 
result being that publicly available information can be reviewed ( Arnold 2020 ). 
The purpose of the inquiry was to examine a number of “allegations of wrongdo-
ing by NZDF forces” during the operation including the killing of civilians in 
violation of the law of armed conflict, deliberate destruction of civilian houses 
and an alleged “cover-up” by the NZDF ( Arnold 2020 , 7–8). 
As far as the purpose of this chapter is concerned, a number of aspects of the 
Operation Burnham Report are relevant.14 First, the Report contains a detailed 
analysis of the intelligence assessment that was relied upon to undertake the NZ 
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of the intelligence raised by, and shared with, the NZDF was that it was largely 
accurate and could be reasonably relied upon ( Arnold 2020 , 189, 197). Next, the 
Report addresses the situation of NZDF being aware of the possibility that hand-
ing over a detainee to Afghan authorities may result in that person being tortured 
(i.e. that the NZDF had intelligence to that effect) and then looks at the issues that 
arise. The Report stated that: 
the core obligations fall into three broad categories: preventive obligations, 
conduct obligations and response obligations. States need to do all they can 
to prevent torture, not commit it or be complicit in it, not return or transfer 
people to places where they face a real risk of torture, and respond swiftly and 
effectively if torture may have, or has, occurred. 
 ( Arnold 2020 , 302) 
The final point regarding the Report is its conclusion that significant mistakes
were made by the NZDF in relation to events that took place while the force
was deployed to Afghanistan, including a failure to adequately deal with the
transfer of a detainee to Afghan custody despite a real risk of torture exist-
ing. Additionally, “NZDF and other New Zealand agencies did not respond as
they should have when they learnt of the possibility that he had been tortured”
( Arnold 2020 , 385).
The salient point from this case study is that intelligence can be used, or mis-
used, in a variety of ways. In a situation like that faced by the NZDF on operations 
in Afghanistan the collection and use of shared intelligence to inform a combat 
mission was found to be quite appropriate. However, the Report also found that 
there was a lack of adequate action taken in relation to credible intelligence that a 
detainee was likely to be tortured and that proper consideration of that likelihood 
created a legal responsibility to prevent the detainee’s transfer to Afghan authori-
ties in those circumstances ( Arnold 2020 , 315–16). The potential consequences 
that arise from such transfers will be dealt with later. 
The applicable legal frameworks 
The legal framework governing intelligence sharing among coalition partners can 
be influenced by a number of overlapping regimes and comment regarding the 
main legal frameworks will now be provided. 
The law of state responsibility 
Under the general international law principle of state responsibility, states can be 
responsible for internationally wrongful conduct attributable to them, normally 
because such conduct is committed by the state’s own organs and agents. 15 A 
number of rules, however, allow for state responsibility to arise in connection 
to the wrongful act of another state. The most relevant of these rules in relation 
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International Law Commission’s (ILC)  Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASRs): 
Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internation-
ally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the interna-
tionally wrongful act; and 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State 
( International Law Commission 2001a , 65) 
This rule, however, is subject to a number of limiting elements, as explained by 
the ILC’s commentary: 
Article 16 limits the scope of responsibility for aid or assistance in three 
ways. First, the relevant State organ or agency providing aid or assistance 
must be aware of the circumstances making the conduct of the assisted State 
internationally wrongful; secondly, the aid or assistance must be given with a 
view to facilitating the commission of that act, and must actually do so; and 
thirdly, the completed act must be such that it would have been wrongful had 
it been committed by the assisting State itself. 
( International Law Commission 2001b , 66) 
Of particular relevance here are the requirements of knowledge by the assisting state
and the parity of obligations on the part of the assisting and the assisted state, both of
which are more complex than it might appear at first glance. Similarly, the scope of
the rule appears to be limited to aid and assistance provided by one state to another,
and therefore if that approach is taken it would not apply to assistance provided by
states to non-state actors. However, in the  Bosnian Genocide case the International
Court of Justice not only affirmed the customary status of Article 16 but also applied
it by analogy to assistance provided by a state to a non-state actor, albeit in the specific
context of state responsibility for complicity in relation to the crime of genocide.16 
Therefore, despite some questions regarding limitations, which exist about the 
breadth of Article 16’s scope, there is potential for coalition states to be attributed 
some level of responsibility for aiding or assisting a third state’s internationally 
wrongful act through the provision of intelligence. While normally the assist-
ing state would only be responsible for its own (now wrongful) act of providing 
assistance, it may also be that in some cases the assisting state will share in the 
responsibility of the assisted state for committing the principal wrong. 
Responsibility of international organizations 
In addition to state responsibility, the possibility also exists that if a coalition 
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such as the UN or NATO, the organization itself might accrue responsibility as 
an international legal person for aiding and assisting a state or another organiza-
tion in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. The provision of intel-
ligence, that was then used to enable a violation of international law, could easily 
assist with the commission of such an act. However, the ICJ has made it clear 
that any such responsibility for an organization will not be of a criminal nature, 
but arises as a matter of its “obligations and responsibilities under international 
law”.17 
Further, in 2011 the ILC concluded its project on the responsibility of interna-
tional organizations and Article 14 of the ILC’s draft articles is an equivalent rule 
to Article 16 in the articles on state responsibility ( International Law Commission 
2011 ). Whether the ILC’s work accurately reflects customary law is a difficult 
question, but in any case there is support for considering that “the notion of the 
responsibility of international organizations presupposes, naturally, that interna-
tional organizations are considered separate actors in their own right, with their 
own legal personality and moral agency” ( Klabbers 2017 , 1136). One obvious 
difficulty in attributing responsibility to international organizations is that they 
are not normally parties to the relevant International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
and human rights treaties, thus requiring an exploration of whether they are bound 
by similar obligations under customary international law – a task that is, unfortu-
nately, beyond the scope of this chapter. 
International Humanitarian Law 
 While IHL 18 does not specifically regulate the collection or sharing of intelli-
gence, it does impose some primary obligations on states with respect to the con-
duct of other states. These primary rules operate in addition to the secondary rules 
of state responsibility under general international law. Most importantly, under 
Common Article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, all “High Contract-
ing Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention 
in all circumstances”.19 
In the words of the authoritative Pictet Commentary of 1960, Article 1 of 
Geneva Convention (III), this overarching obligation: 
applies to the respect of each individual State for the Convention, but that 
is not all: in the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, each of 
the other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) should endeavour to 
bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Convention. The proper working 
of the system of protection provided by the Convention demands in fact that 
the States which are parties to it should not be content merely to apply its 
provisions themselves, but should do everything in their power to ensure that 
it is respected universally. 
Parallel obligations exist under customary IHL. For example, Rule 139 of the 
ICRC Customary IHL Study provides that “[e]ach party to the conflict must 
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and other persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions, or under its direction 
or control” ( ICRC n.d .). Rule 144 stipulates that “States may not encourage viola-
tions of international humanitarian law by parties to an armed conflict. They must 
exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of international 
humanitarian law” ( ICRC n.d .). 
It is therefore at the very least arguable that a state which shares intelligence 
with another state (and possibly a non-state actor) in the course of a coalition mili-
tary operation can violate these rules. If that state does so in the knowledge that 
the other state (or non-state actor) is engaged in serious violations of IHL, such 
as war crimes, or that there is real risk that such violations might occur, then legal 
responsibility would arise. 
International human rights law 
The applicability of human rights treaties extraterritorially and in times of armed 
conflict is a matter of both complexity and controversy. Judicial authority and 
academic literature on the topic are voluminous and somewhat confusing. It is 
however beyond dispute that there is an increasing trend towards applying human 
rights law to such situations, and it seems unlikely that this trend will reverse itself 
in the future. Some partners in coalition military operations, such as the United 
States and Australia, are subjected to less exacting scrutiny of their compliance 
with the relevant human rights treaties than other states, such as those in Europe 
or the United Kingdom, which have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).20 Even so, because of the close rela-
tionships of cooperation in coalition operations, it is inevitable that the increased 
level of scrutiny by the ECtHR will have ripple effects even on non-European 
coalition partner states. 
Importantly, just like the Geneva Conventions, human rights treaties impose 
both negative and positive obligations on states’ party. These obligations not only 
require respect for the provisions themselves, but also oblige states to ensure they 
are not complicit in violations by third parties, as well as exercising due diligence 
to prevent and suppress violations by third parties against individuals within 
the state’s jurisdiction. Close scrutiny of the way in which states have met these 
obligations has occurred, and one recent example is the Report into Detainee 
Mistreatment and Rendition 2001–2010 released by the United Kingdom’s Intel-
ligence and Security Committee of Parliament in 2018. In relation to intelligence 
sharing, the Report found that British “Agencies shared an unprecedented amount 
of intelligence with foreign liaison services to facilitate the capture of detain-
ees . . . [but] . . . the Agencies failed to consider whether it was appropriate to 
pass intelligence where mistreatment of detainees was known or reasonably sus-
pected” ( Grieve 2018 , 3). 
Scrutiny of the outcome from intelligence sharing is only likely to escalate as 
more information enters the public domain via freedom of information requests, 
publication of information on the internet, formal public inquiry processes like 
the UK inquiry mentioned earlier, and through the cross-referencing and linking 
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data permits. Similarly, intelligence operations generally have been subjected to 
increased public scrutiny after the “Snowden revelations” of the electronic sur-
veillance capabilities of agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA) 
and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) were made public in 
2014 ( BBC News 2014 ). This has in turn provoked much litigation, as well as 
important activities within the UN system, including the adoption of a number of 
resolutions on the right to privacy in the digital age by the UN General Assembly. 21 
It is simply inevitable that intelligence sharing in coalition military operations 
will increasingly become a live issue before both domestic courts and interna-
tional institutions applying human rights law. Accordingly, some serious thinking 
is required to understand how human rights standards might apply to such extraor-
dinary situations, beyond simply rejecting their applicability outright – a strategy 
that has been previously known to backfire. 
Other areas of uncertainty 
Legal uncertainty can arise due to other legal regimes that could potentially 
impact on partner use of shared intelligence. For example, international or domes-
tic criminal law could be relevant if lethal targeting operations are conducted by 
a coalition partner following the provision of shared intelligence. Again using 
the United Kingdom as an example, in 2016 the UK Parliament’s Joint Commit-
tee on Human Rights examined the “Government’s policy on the use of drones 
for targeted killing” ( Joint Committee on Human Rights 2016 ). Issues that were 
canvassed by the Committee included assessing whether “those involved in 
implementing the Government’s policy . . . are . . . running the risk of criminal 
prosecution for murder or complicity in murder” ( Joint Committee on Human 
Rights 2016 , 24). The Committee had particular concern about the provision of 
intelligence to a partner that then prosecutes a lethal strike against an individual 
whose status as a lawful military target under the applicable legal regime is con-
tested. The Committee noted that the: 
possibility of criminal prosecution for complicity in murder also arises for 
all those UK personnel who have a role in assisting or facilitating the use 
of lethal force by coalition allies, such as the US, which has a much wider 
approach to the use of lethal force outside of armed conflict. Such assistance 
might take the form of logistical support (for example, permitting US jets to 
use UK airbases), or the provision of intelligence about targets gathered by 
UK surveillance and reconnaissance. 
( Joint Committee on Human Rights 2016 , 24) 
It should also be noted that while a potential charge of complicity could be a mat-
ter of individual criminal responsibility at the micro level, it could also elevate to 
state responsibility for an internationally wrongful act at the macro level. 
Uncertainty as to the status of an individual could also arise due to differ-
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in hostilities.22 For example, in Australia’s case, membership of an organized 
armed group could be enough to warrant the lethal targeting of an individual in a 
non-international armed conflict.23 However, a coalition partner may not have the 
same legal opinion, and therefore sharing intelligence with Australian forces may 
lead to a kinetic operation resulting in the death of an individual where the legality 
of that death is not agreed. A further risk potentially arises for those states that are 
party to the International Criminal Court.24
 Potential solutions 
The potential legal issues associated with intelligence sharing are many and var-
ied, so it is not possible to provide a simple, cohesive set of solutions that would 
cover every conceivable eventuality. Rather, it is necessary to contemplate how 
a few selected initiatives might contribute to overcoming the challenges that are 
created by the issues identified in this chapter. 
One step along the way has already occurred with the creation of the Five Eyes 
Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC) in 2017. The FIORC has the 
stated aim, inter alia, of creating a forum where Council members can: 
exchange views on subjects of mutual interest and concern, compare best 
practices in review and oversight methodology, explore areas where coop-
eration on reviews and the sharing of results is permitted where appropriate, 
encourage transparency to the largest extent possible to enhance public trust; 
and maintain contact with political offices, oversight and review committees, 
and non-Five Eyes countries as appropriate. 
( Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council 2017 ) 
The fact that this Council exists at all, in an area that is notoriously reluctant to 
shed too much light on its activities, is testament to the progress that has been 
made in recent years towards transparency and accountability in relation to intel-
ligence activities. 
Other potential solutions include the production of guidelines and policy rec-
ommendations for organizations such as NATO and its partner state armed forces 
that would enable them to engage in effective intelligence sharing in the modern 
battlespace, while ensuring that this is done in compliance with applicable legal 
frameworks. These guidelines should result in simplifying the decision-making 
processes for the military legal advisers and their operational commanders, which 
would go a long way towards improving legal certainty and providing improved 
situational awareness and intelligence analysis. This, in turn, should result in bet-
ter operational outcomes for those involved in coalition operations. 
A final point here is to note the role played by various civil society interest 
groups and the press who routinely subject the activities of armed forces to rigor-
ous scrutiny. There have been many occasions when reports of violations of appli-
cable legal standards have emerged through the work of such interest groups and 
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occur. In fact, the important oversight function of external bodies was explicitly 
recognized in the Operation Burnham Report as being able to “provide a platform 
to enhance public understanding of complex legal and operational issues, and 
to identify good (or bad) practice in a fair, independent and impartial manner” 
( Arnold 2020 , 370). The Report observed that military forces can be unable to do 
this without external assistance due to: 
what we regard as failings of culture at the upper echelons of NZDF – con-
firmation bias, lack of objectivity and rigour in scrutinising “facts”, unnec-
essary defensiveness coupled with an unwillingness to acknowledge error, 
failure to follow up inconvenient information, and non-compliance with the 
disciplines and obligations inherent in the principles of ministerial control of 
the military and ministerial responsibility to Parliament. 
 ( Arnold 2020 , 379) 
This criticism is not just applicable to the NZDF; it can easily be applied to other 
military forces when assessing their response to allegations of unlawful activity. 
Conclusion 
Intelligence sharing by coalition forces is a necessary element of many activities 
undertaken by modern military forces. Coalition operations may be increasingly 
frequent in a polycentric international order in which no single state is dominant. 
The use of intelligence can not only provide coalition forces with a distinct bat-
tlespace advantage but also raise legal and ethical questions for states and military 
commanders if shared intelligence is used in a manner that is inconsistent with a 
range of existing legal obligations that reflect different ethical perspectives. This 
chapter has described how issues can arise even among liberal democracies with 
a common political and ethical heritage. Even more pressing concerns will arise 
in coalitions comprised of states with more diverse sets of values. 
Clarifying the applicable legal frameworks that accompany sharing of intel-
ligence is a task that needs further work, and achieving this will help to delineate 
between what is permissible and those practices that are prohibited, as well as out-
line any zones of constructive ambiguity. This chapter has attempted to highlight 
some of the legal considerations that apply to intelligence sharing by coalition 
partners. It is really only a starting point on a journey, however, that has many 
miles yet to run. States and their armed forces, the United Nations and other inter-
national organizations such as NATO must devote sufficient attention to the topic 
in order to foster the detailed academic and military consideration that is needed 
to satisfactorily address the issue in a satisfactory way. 
Postscript 
The impetus for writing on this topic originated from a paper produced by The 
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a subsequent Workshop on Intelligence Sharing in Multinational Military Opera-
tions that was convened at the University of Nottingham in January 2018.26 The 
author is very grateful to all those involved in both of these activities for their 
valuable and thoughtful contributions, but responsibility for the opinions in this 
chapter rests with the author alone. 
Notes 
1 An early example is UN Security Council Resolution 84 of June 25, 1950 which autho-
rized military operations in Korea, while a more recent example is UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1973 of March 17, 2011 which  inter alia enforced an arms embargo, 
imposed a no-fly zone and strengthened the sanctions regime in relation to Libya. 
2 NATO is formally known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and was estab-
lished in 1949 pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty 34 UNTS 243. 
3 The International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) is a coalition currently com-
prising eight nations (Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Lithu-
ania, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States of America) that was 
formed in 2019 to support maritime security in the Gulf region. See IMSC Public 
Affairs (2020 ) for further details about the IMSC and “ Australia Joins International 
Maritime Security Construct in the Gulf” (n.d .), a press release from the Australian 
Prime Minister announcing Australia’s involvement in the IMSC. 
4 In this chapter, the term “coalition operations” will be used for convenience to describe 
the various types of multinational operations, regardless of whether the states involved 
are part of a formal alliance or some other more informal coalition; the term “partner 
operations” can also be sometimes used to describe situations when military forces are 
working together. One analysis of the distinction that may be drawn between a “coali-
tion” and a “wartime alliance” can be found in Weitsman (2010 ). 
5 Details of the 1946 UKUSAAgreement which was a “top secret, post-war arrangement 
for sharing intelligence between the United States and the UK” can now be obtained 
from the UK National Archives after the files that relate to the Agreement were pub-
licly released in June 2010 ( The National Archives 2010 ). 
6 Details of the UKUSA agreement were made public in June 2010 after FOI requests 
were lodged in the UK and the USA ( Norton-Taylor 2010 ). 
7 In the period prior to the deadline for the termination of the agreement, calls were made 
for the two parties to resolve their differences and ensure that the agreement continued 
to operate ( Harold 2019 ). 
8 https://web.archive.org/web/20200128162530/http://web.ifc.bices.org/about.htm 
9 See  IFC (2019a ). 
10 The 45th SHADE was held in Bahrain in November 2019 and although the 46th 
SHADE was scheduled to be held in April 2020, it has been delayed until November 
3–5, 2020. 
11 Compare, for example, the contrasting positions on this topic taken by O Corten Y
Dinstein ( Corten 2010 ;  Dinstein 2011 ). 
12 See generally  Simpson (2005 ) and  Iwanek (2010 ). 
13 The two main legal arguments were that action was, in fact, authorized under existing 
UNSC Resolutions and/or it was necessary to respond in self-defence to the threat 
posed by Iraq. Previous references to the works of Corten, Dinstein, Simpson, Iwanek 
and Anton, provide details of critical assessments of the legality of these arguments 
( Corten 2010 ;  Dinstein 2011 ;  Iwanek 2010 ;  Anton 2013 ). 
14 The Operation Burnham Report comprises 12 Chapters and 2 Appendixes and covers a 
far greater breadth of topics than is possible, or necessary, to address in this chapter. 




























 16 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007], ICJ 
Rep, paras 420–421. 
17 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007], ICJ 
Rep, para 170. 
18 The term International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is widely used, but the body of law 
it encompasses is also known as the law of armed conflict (LOAC) or the law of war. 
IHL is sometimes narrowly construed to refer to the law that protects victims of armed 
conflict. For one explanation of this law, see  ICRC (2004 ). 
19 Article 1 is identical in each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949: Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field 75 UNTS 31 (GC I); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II) 75 
UNTS 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III) 
75 UNTS 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Times of War (GC IV) 75 UNTS 287. 
20 The United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union did not result in the UK 
ceasing to be a member of the European Court of Human Rights ( Cowell 2021 ). 
21 UN General Assembly Resolution 71/199,  The right to privacy in the digital age , A/ 
RES/71/199 (December 19, 2016). 
22 Agreement on what constitutes “direct participation in hostilities” is widely contested 
with many states critical of the approach adopted by the ICRC as set out in Melzer 
(2009 ). See generally  McLaughlin (2019 ). 
23 Clarifying the position for members of the Australian Defence Force, the  Criminal 
Code Amendment (War Crimes) Act 2016 included membership of an organized armed 
group within the category of what constitutes a lawful target. 
24 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 3. 
25 See  Moynihan (2016 ). 
26 This Workshop, conducted under the “Chatham House Rule” involved a number of gov-
ernment practitioners, academics and representatives from international organizations and
NGOs, was co-organized by the University of Nottingham’s International Law and Secu-
rity Centre and the ANU College of Law’s Centre for Military and Security Law.
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  8 Privacy, bulk collection 
and “operational utility” 
 Tom Sorell 
The Snowden revelations in 2013 concerned the large-scale secret collection of 
normally private personal communications data for counter-terrorism purposes. 
Both the American NSA and the British GCHQ were implicated. It is widely 
believed that the privacy rights of large numbers of entirely innocent US and UK 
citizens were violated or at least significantly limited by bulk collection. In earlier 
work, I have expressed scepticism about privacy-based criticisms of bulk collec-
tion for counter-terrorism ( Sorell 2018 ). But even if these criticisms are accepted, 
is bulk collection nonetheless legitimate on balance – because of its operational 
utility for the security services, and the overriding importance of the purposes that 
the security services serve? David Anderson’s report of the Bulk Powers review 
in the United Kingdom suggests as much, provided bulk collection complies with 
strong legal safeguards ( Anderson 2016 ). 
I think it is hard to mount a uniformly compelling operational utility argu-
ment, because purposes other than counter-terrorism are pursued by the security 
services with the help of bulk collection. For example, the Intelligence Services 
Act 1994, section 1(2) says that apart from the interests of national security and 
the prevention and detection of serious crime, the Secret Intelligence Service may 
act “in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”. The 
phrase “interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom” is open 
to a disturbingly wide range of interpretations. It might be taken to include the 
cybersecurity interests of very large companies headquartered or merely located 
in the United Kingdom ( PwC 2017 ;  Zetter 2010 ), or intellectual property inter-
ests of UK companies that are targets of foreign government or foreign company 
espionage. Do these interests justify (morally justify) government acquisition and 
analysis of large personal data sets? In my view the answer to this question is 
“No”, unless there is a clear and significant benefit to UK citizens in general from 
the cybersecurity of the large companies in question. Even when relevant “eco-
nomic interests” are confined to those “also relevant to the interests of national 
security”, as required by the Investigatory Powers Act (2016) section 204 (3a), 
the legitimacy of intelligence service action to promote or protect these interests 
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For example, domestic manufacturers of weapons and military equipment are 
economically important to the United Kingdom and also important to UK security 
in some sense; it does not follow that intelligence services can legitimately act in 
the interests of those companies by directly supplying them commercially use-
ful information obtained by bulk collection. Yet electronic interception for these 
purposes has taken place ( Dover 2007 ), possibly assisted by acquisition of bulk 
personal data sets. 
Other purposes that bulk collection serves include the recruitment by the 
United Kingdom of intelligence agents abroad. Is this purpose not at the very least 
morally ambiguous, given the mortal dangers faced by agents in some countries, 
and the moral dubiousness of treachery when agents are recruited to act against 
their own country’s interests? The answer appears to be “Yes”. Counter-terrorism 
and other purposes closely allied to life-saving are differentially compelling as 
grounds for bulk collection if bulk collection is effective. Counter-terrorism is 
unsurprisingly emphasized in the case studies favouring the use of bulk collection 
in the Bulk Powers report. But it is unclear what proportion of uses of bulk collec-
tion are for counter-terrorism, and so the utility of bulk collection may not have 
the justificatory power that Anderson’s report implies it has. 
The rest of this chapter falls into three parts. In the first, I go into some of the 
privacy objections to bulk collection, and why even some of the more sophisti-
cated of these do not appear to me to engage with the mechanics of bulk collection. 
Then I consider the Anderson Bulk Powers report. It concedes that bulk collection 
is privacy-violating, but maintains that the right to privacy can be limited by the 
right to security, and that bulk collection can be effective for ensuring security, 
as illustrated by the case studies in his report. Since the purposes served in the 
case studies are not exhaustive of the purposes to which bulk collection is put, 
the question arises whether the remaining purposes legitimately limit personal 
privacy. If the answer is “No”, there may be an argument for limiting the purpose 
of bulk collection to more or less uncontroversial security concerns, where being 
uncontroversial depends on probable prevention of large-scale injury or loss of 
life, rather than the pursuit of ill-defined “national economic advantage” or even 
strategic advantage. The subsequent sections deal with these remaining purposes. 
A final section draws conclusions. 
Bulk Collection and Privacy 
As I use the term, “bulk collection” refers to obtaining large personal data sets 
containing the information of, for the most part, entirely law-abiding persons. 
To illustrate, data sets composed of the names and addresses of bank account 
or credit card holders might be of interest to investigations of fraud or money-
laundering or organized crime even if few people whose names are included have 
anything to do with those offences. Location data for people’s telephones forms 
another relevant kind of data set, even if few of the telephones in question belong 
to persons of interest to the security services. In the same way, the names of pas-
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the majority of passengers concerned are travelling for entirely innocent reasons. 
Data concerning telephone or email exchanges is a further example. 
After the Snowden disclosures, the bulk collection of communications data in
the United States and the United Kingdom was widely condemned as a large-scale
violation of the privacy of those whose data was collected ( Shorrock 2013 ;  Lyon
2014 ). The US legal understanding of  whose privacy matters has changed since
2013, when Snowden first publicized the activities of the US National Security
Agency. Before the disclosures, American law normally prohibited the collection
of content from conversations between “US persons”, but treated communications
between foreigners or between US persons and foreigners, especially “agents of a
foreign power”, as fair game for purposes like counter-terrorism. In other words, the
content of emails and other communications between US persons was normally out
of bounds, but the content of emails and other communications between foreigners
was not, if the purpose of collecting content was a legally recognized purpose of
intelligence service activity. In the intermediate case of communications between
US persons and foreigners, content collection was not necessarily ruled out, and
might be permitted if the foreigners were employed by a foreign government. As for
US persons’ communications, although their  content was normally out of bounds,
their meta-data might be collected for purposes like counter-terrorism. Meta-data is
information about email or telephone exchanges apart from their content. It might
include the time an email arrived, the route it took through the internet to or from a
particular IP address, how big the email was and what address it was sent to.
The American government’s view before and even immediately after the 
Snowden disclosures was that US persons’ communication data privacy matters 
more than the communication data privacy of foreigners, and that the collection 
of mere meta-data rather than content either does not rise to the threshold of a 
privacy violation at all, or at least counts as a relatively minor intrusion. After 
the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act in 2015, two things changed. First, bulk 
collection of US persons’ meta-data was supposed to be discontinued. Second: 
the policy of the United States [was] that the privacy and civil liberties of 
everyone in the world must be taken into account when agencies collect sig-
nals intelligence. 
 ( Edgar 2017 , 4) 
In the United Kingdom, the Snowden disclosures also led to an official reconsid-
eration of bulk collection by the intelligence services. David Anderson, a law-
yer appointed as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in the United 
Kingdom, issued influential reports successfully recommending law reform in 
the area of UK government access to communications data. These recommenda-
tions resulted in the Investigative Powers Act (2016), which introduced a regime 
of judicial oversight of warranting of targeted interception, bulk collection and 
“equipment interference” (hacking or malware installation). Anderson also con-
ducted a review in 2016 of the actual security benefits of bulk collection, based on 
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services made available to him. This is the Bulk Powers Review that gives rise to 
this chapter. 
The Conclusion of the Review concedes that bulk collection results in the stor-
age and analysis without consent of large amounts of personal data. Under Euro-
pean law and international human rights treaties, this is an intrusion into privacy 
even if the data is not the content of messages, even if it is not “sensitive” or 
“protected” data to do with for example health, sexuality or religion, and even 
if it is not humanly inspected, but only held and processed by IT systems. The 
fact that bulk collection is invasive does not, however, mean it is impermissible. 
Anderson writes: 
international human rights instruments are pragmatic enough to recognise that 
intrusions into individual privacy will often be justified in the public interest. 
The privacy right may be overridden, where it is proportionate to do so, in the 
interests of national security, safety and the prevention of disorder or crime. 
 ( Anderson 2016 , 119) 
And, Anderson goes on, these are the interests promoted by bulk collection as 
used by the Intelligence services in the Review case studies. 
Each of the case studies is said to represent a success, small or large, against 
serious crime or threats to national security. They all involve intrusions, how-
ever technical, into the rights [to a private life and personal data]. But as they 
also illustrate, the benefits of successful operations are not simply measur-
able in a dry tally of operational gains. Individually and cumulatively, they 
change lives for the better. 
 ( Anderson 2016 , 120) 
At this point, several questions arise. First, granted that bulk collection violates a 
right to privacy, are the interests that it arguably serves weighty enough to over-
ride that right? Some of Anderson’s illustrations – I come to them in a moment – 
might suggest the answer “No”. Second, even if the interests that Anderson lists 
are overriding, do they exhaust the interests pursued by the intelligence services 
through bulk collection? Here the answer is a clear “No”, since uses of bulk col-
lection listed by the Intelligence services themselves for the Review include the 
pursuit of economic well-being and recruitment to MI6. These interests are  not
necessarily overriding, as I go on to argue. 
A further question, and one that is perhaps more fundamental than the questions 
about overridingness just raised, can be put by asking whether privacy is satisfac-
torily understood in European or human rights law. In particular, it can be asked 
whether a loss of privacy or intrusion takes place when, as European law pro-
vides, someone loses control of his or her data (without consent) ( De Hert 2008 ). 
It is clear that one can lose control of information against one’s will without los-
ing privacy, as when one’s diary is lost under a tonne of rubble after an earthquake. 
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owner’s control, it is not readily accessible to an interested reader. Even if it came 
to be in someone’s control, say, because someone excavating the rubble comes 
across it, it does not divulge any information until someone actually reads the diary 
and takes in its contents. Until information is extracted and understood, there is no 
loss of privacy. But now suppose someone does read the diary. Even then it may 
be of no interest to the reader so that he or she disregards and forgets the diary’s 
contents. If there is a loss of privacy at all, it is limited and temporary. 
In view of cases like these, I favour a more restricted understanding of loss 
of privacy: namely when sensitive information – not just any old information – 
about someone (a) comes to the attention of someone else without the data sub-
ject’s consent; (b) is grasped and remembered by that second person, and (c) the 
information is not normatively public. To take the last part of this formulation 
first, it seems clear that some information about oneself ought (morally ought) to 
be public – in the sense of being available for some time on the public record – 
whether one likes it or not – for example, the fact that a court has passed a sentence 
against one, or that one holds a public office, or that one has signed a petition, or 
that one is a qualified doctor. These are legitimately public pieces of information 
even though they are personal, because the institutions they are associated with 
are partly public-facing. 
For example, the fact that someone has been sentenced to a crime should be 
on the public record because justice, as the saying goes, must not only be done 
but also be seen to be done. This is the effect of having public trial proceedings 
in due process-respecting jurisdictions, and records of verdicts and sentences. 
If the proceedings are normatively public, why is not a record of the proceed-
ings normatively public? Again, certification bodies assure the public that identi-
fied people have the training to do certain potentially dangerous things, such as 
administering medical treatment, and where the certifications are missing, people 
should beware. Publicity in the case where certifications are missing or fraudulent 
is therefore obligatory. If it is discovered by an official or a patient that Smith is 
not a qualified or competent cosmetic surgeon, that fact needs to be made public, 
notwithstanding the fact that it is personal information about Smith. If a trial pro-
ceeds to a sentence before the eyes of anyone who wants to visit the public gallery 
of the court, then it is on the public record and ought to be available to members 
of the public who are not able to get into the public gallery. 
Coming now to privacy and attention, it seems clear that this is what makes the 
difference between sensitive information being merely available for sharing and 
information actually being shared. Privacy is violated when availability of infor-
mation turns into possession of information, that is, someone’s taking in informa-
tion intended not to be shared. Although mere availability facilitates possession 
of private information, it is not sufficient for loss of privacy, unless there is a rea-
sonable probability that availability turns into possession. To return to the diary 
under a tonne of rubble, it is in some sense available to any excavator, but it is not 
likely to come into anyone’s possession, because of the difficulty of excavation. 
Finally, let us turn to sensitivity. Not every piece of personal information is 
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cream does not normally rise to the threshold for sensitivity, because there is no 
clear connection between that information coming into someone else’s possession 
and probable loss of status or disadvantage or harm to the person the information 
concerns. Some kinds of information are conventionally protected against dis-
closure whether intended to be shared or not, because they so engage prurience, 
idle curiosity, prejudices, malice or other kinds of threats to the status of the data 
subject, that he or she should have the last word about disclosure. 
In previous (sometimes joint) papers ( Sorell 2018 ;  Guelke and Sorell 2016 ), I 
have tried to give some indication of the range of sensitive information by reference 
to zones of privacy. These zones include the human body, the human mind (under-
stood as the locus of one’s fundamental beliefs and emotional attachments) and 
the home. Targeted surveillance using cameras, bugs and telephone taps penetrates 
many of these zones and is therefore often highly intrusive, as it gives surveillance 
agents access (visual or auditory) that is willingly extended by the surveillance tar-
get only to intimates, including access to unguarded expression of information that 
is not normally divulged to everyone. When cameras or taps or direct inspection 
are used, information normally classified as “sensitive” such as health information, 
or information about deep convictions, or about intimates, is extracted from secret 
observation of the body, secret listening in on people speaking their mind, or secret 
searches of a home. Again, targeted secret surveillance often bypasses triggers for 
voluntary concealment of one’s body, or guarded or coded disclosure. 
By contrast with targeted surveillance by means of bugs or taps, bulk collec-
tion does not necessarily penetrate the zones of body, mind or home. In particular, 
bulk collection of telephone meta-data – the staple of NSA work – is relatively 
unintrusive. It is not in itself a penetration of private zones, though it may lead 
to such a violation for example in a case where analytics of bulk collected data 
identifies someone as a suspect who merits targeted surveillance, say because he 
is in frequent email communication with a known jihadist. 
Although bulk collection is not necessarily a privacy violation, other things 
are often wrong with it: for example, its secrecy ( Sorell 2018 ;  Lucas 2014 ), its 
eluding legal oversight and its supporting a far greater volume of searches and 
analyses than intelligence services are able to take in or act upon, so that it self-
defeatingly produces acute information overload. 
Doubts about bulk collection as a privacy violation are rarely heard from those 
writing on the ethics of intelligence.1 But this may be because examples used by 
these writers are out of keeping with the way most bulk collection works. For 
example, Isaac Taylor writes: 
the privacy at stake when data collection is being carried out is what we can 
call informational privacy. The interest here is in not having certain pieces 
of personal information revealed to others under certain circumstances. 
Yet, even with this narrowing of the issue, the interest at stake is difficult 
to identify. I might have an interest in various people not having access to 
my medical records, but the reasons why I might want to keep those records 
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different from the reasons I want to keep them hidden from another group 
(like co-workers). 
 ( Taylor 2017 , 329) 
This passage makes it sound, first, as if bulk collection homes in on “sensitive” 
information, namely content from health or employment data bases, and as if this 
content might somehow come through bulk collection to the attention of people 
personally known to the data subjects (employers, co-workers) to whom they are 
sure they do not want to disclose this information. But this way of thinking misses 
the facts that (a) it is not nosey colleagues or bosses but machines with no human 
curiosity who are collecting the relevant data,2 (b) counter-terrorism is the purpose 
of the collection, (c) connections with personal information depend on queries 
happening to excavate a name from a mountain of data and (d) meta-data rather 
than content is what has mainly been collected in cases emphasized post-Snowden: 
telephone meta-data at that. The latter point is worth making because a lot of per-
sonal communications meta-data, such as what number reaches a particular named 
person at a given address, has long been available in public telephone directories 
available to everyone – without anyone thinking that it is an invasion of privacy. 
Operational Utility and Agent Recruitment 
So far, I have argued that machine-collected communications meta-data is not 
particularly intrusive. Even if it were, its being useful for counter-terrorism would 
normally justify the invasion of privacy. I now consider uses of bulk collection by 
the intelligence services for purposes other than counter-terrorism. The Bulk Pow-
ers review report itself calls attention to the role that bulk collection by GCHQ 
plays in the identification of possible agents for recruitment as Secret Intelligence 
Service agents ( Anderson 2016 , 153). Again, the Intelligence Services Act 1994, 
section 2, authorizes activity by the SIS for pursuing the economic advantage of 
the United Kingdom. Are these uses of bulk collection unobjectionable? In this 
section I consider recruitment of foreign agents; in the next I turn to secret service 
action in the interest of national economic advantage. 
The SIS in the United Kingdom recruits agents both at home and abroad.3 Some 
recruitment is open and consists in part of inviting applications from university 
graduates, in much the way mainstream employers in the United Kingdom might. 
This form of recruitment would not normally require bulk collection, and there 
is reason to think that applicants who go through it get full information about the 
risks they run, as well as reasoned assessments of their aptitude for the work. In 
this way, both potential employees and the agencies decide to work together with 
their eyes open about what will be involved. 
Matters stand differently where the agents to be recruited are from abroad and 
are identified, possibly with the aid of bulk collection, and approached secretly. 
There are good reasons why people should not (morally should not) act as secret 
agents for foreign powers, and these are also reasons why foreign powers should 
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of these reasons are drawn from the moral character of the foreign powers doing 
the recruiting, and some are drawn from the character of the jurisdiction against 
whose interests a recruited agent would act. 
If the power for which the prospective agent would operate is illiberal and 
undemocratic, perhaps even unapologetically authoritarian, then it has question-
able domestic legitimacy; and the ground for its pursuing its own interests at 
the expense of another country’s, still less another liberal democratic country’s, 
seems weak. In a sense there is little reason for even a citizen of such a jurisdiction 
to promote its official interests abroad, since that country’s official interests are 
often detached from those of its citizens. But, by the same token, there is even less 
reason for a foreigner to act against their own country’s interests in the service of 
that sort of recruiting country’s interests. 
It is possible that agents do not see the interests they oppose or promote as 
strictly national ones, but instead as class interests or ideological interests with 
global constituencies. Perhaps agents for communist countries saw things this 
way in the closing stages of World War II and immediately afterwards. This 
does not make talk of betrayal of one’s country or colleagues inappropriate. Kim 
Philby’s information for the Russians compromised many UK agents. In particu-
lar, many of those sent to Eastern Europe were killed immediately after being 
deployed ( Bethell 1994 ). Philby betrayed UK agents, and therefore in some sense 
the United Kingdom, even if Philby was setting out to advance the interests of an 
international proletariat. 
So much for agents of illiberal powers, such as the former Soviet Union or Rus-
sia in our own day. There are further reasons why citizens or residents of liberal 
democratic countries should not be the agents of foreign powers – even if the for-
eign power is liberal and democratic itself. These are reasons drawn from the char-
acter of the agent’s home jurisdiction. Quite apart from the existence of legitimate 
local laws against espionage – their legitimacy is by itself a reason for prospective 
agents to respect those laws – targets of recruitment in these jurisdictions benefit 
from local liberal democratic protections and probably enjoy economic opportuni-
ties for which they should be grateful. The minimal expression of such gratitude 
is to be law-abiding. Acting as an agent of a foreign power not only shows ingrati-
tude: it also renders the agent an adversary of the local jurisdiction whose freedoms 
benefit him or her. The agent is rendered an adversary without necessarily having 
a grievance against that jurisdiction (he or she may simply want the money paid 
to an agent). So the betrayal can seem (morally) gratuitous. It can seem gratuitous 
even if the recruiting country has the same moral character as the local jurisdiction. 
What about the recruitment of agents by liberal democratic countries from illib-
eral and undemocratic countries that systematically oppose the recruiting country?
In particular, what are we to say about prospective agents who, while they are citi-
zens or residents of a certain illiberal and undemocratic regime, deplore its illiber-
ality and lack of democracy? In this case the citizens or residents may not benefit
much from citizenship, and acting for the foreign power might contribute to the
removal of a regime facing both domestic and foreign opposition for its illiberal and
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double as a case for accepting foreign assistance for a pro-democratic movement.
Might it not also function as a justification for co-operation as an intelligence agent
with a foreign power interested in, among other things, local democratization?
No. Intelligence agents respond to demands for information from a foreign 
jurisdiction. The foreign jurisdiction may itself be democratic, but  its demos 
is not that of the agent’s country. Its interests are not likely to be the same as 
those that would be pursued by a local demos after a regime change. So the idea 
that a local citizen interested in democratization might choose for that reason 
to become an intelligence agent for a foreign democracy seems ill-grounded. A
person interested in democratization might look to external sources for funds, 
for example a would-be political party intending to operate in a democracy, but 
only by risking the impression of a party being directed from another jurisdic-
tion. If, to avoid this impression, the money was secretly outsourced, that would 
undercut another norm of democracy – transparency – without cancelling the 
risk of undue foreign influence. In any case, if the choice of sources of funds 
were between an intelligence service and almost any other institution – an NGO, 
a private foundation, an international governmental organization – it is hard to 
see why the intelligence service would be preferred: it is too closely tied to the 
interests of a particular country rather than an interest in democratization. From 
many points of view, then, the promotion of liberal democracy does not seem to 
be an appropriate purpose of a foreign intelligence service, even the intelligence 
service of a democratic country. 
The reasons for citizens of illiberal, non-democratic countries not to become agents
of other country’s intelligence services do not stop there. I have left out the obvious
consideration that traitors in countries without due process are in mortal danger if
discovered. They are likely to put not only themselves but also their families at risk.
Even if their betrayal has been discovered, punished and officially acknowledged by
all concerned through a public prisoner exchange and relocation to the country of
their intelligence handlers, the agents are not necessarily safe, as the recent poisoning
of Sergei Skripal by the KGB in Salisbury shows ( Dejevsky 2019 ).
Even when the jurisdiction betrayed by an intelligence agent is sinister or 
worse, as in the case of Skripal, the fact remains that the agent is a traitor, and 
so is intelligibly an object of hatred of his countrymen and not only his country’s 
officials. Especially where someone has acted enthusiastically as an intelligence 
agent for his own country before acting as an agent for another, the fact of his 
ending up in the pay of a human rights-respecting government does not confer on 
him much moral credit or put in a more favourable light his previous work for the 
illiberal government’s intelligence service. In this respect, Skripal at his best was 
less estimable than a dissenter-turned-foreign-intelligence-agent. 
Whether recruited at home or abroad; whether he or she acts for a liberal or an 
authoritarian regime, an agent accepts to lead a compartmentalized life, part secret, 
part open to his or her intimates. The role inevitably involves systematic decep-
tion of various audiences, some professionally hostile, others harmless, others 
positively supporting and loving. It also involves casually breaking confidences, 
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(AKA John Le Carré, the celebrated author of spy novels) was recruited while 
still a student at Oxford to work for MI5, and conscientiously infiltrated both left-
and right-wing clubs. He was not above reporting the activities of close friends 
( Sisman 2015 , chap. 6). This rather seedy behaviour appears only to have served 
the purpose of ingratiating himself with his handlers. The same casual betrayal of 
friends is associated with top-echelon spies. When Kim Philby’s status as a Rus-
sian agent was conclusively established by MI6, he was not summarily arrested, 
but told privately in Beirut by an old friend and MI6 colleague, Nick Elliot, that 
the game was up ( Macintyre 2015 , chap. 14). This humane gesture was supposed 
to have led to a gentlemanly surrender by Philby after taking the opportunity of 
saying goodbye to his family. Instead, Philby promptly absconded and was next 
heard of in Moscow. Absconding was both a personal betrayal of the friend  and an 
abandonment of his family, who were left with the shame of their relation to him 
and the embarrassment of being seen by others as possibly complicit. 
Operational Utility and National Economic Advantage 
I have been arguing that the use of bulk collection for prospective agent recruit-
ment abroad is morally questionable, because prospective agent recruitment 
abroad is itself morally questionable. Agent recruitment from one’s  own citi-
zenry for intelligence work abroad is morally justifiable, but it is presumably 
often possible without bulk collection. I now turn to a third purpose of bulk col-
lection, namely pursuing national economic advantage. Unlike bulk collection 
for counter-terrorism or for the purpose of acting against serious and organized 
crime, bulk collection for national economic advantage is not readily connected 
to defence from life-threatening attack or even defence against other non-lethal 
harms, and it is notable that all of the bulk collection success stories presented to 
the Anderson review come from defensive activity. 
In addition to its departure from self-defence, bulk collection for economic
advantage seems to make countries who are otherwise military and intelligence
allies into adversaries, at least temporarily. For example, France and the United
Kingdom share intelligence about terrorists and people traffickers, but they have
been, and will probably again be, competitors in procurement processes for military
equipment in the Middle East and South Asia. In the context of competitive pro-
curement, timely intelligence about discounts offered by France for large orders of
military equipment are clearly of the utmost value to the United Kingdom (or UK
companies bidding for contracts), and obtaining this intelligence is certainly within
the remit of the SIS. Bulk acquisition has a role in identifying which officials in
countries buying the equipment would have received price information, and which
email accounts might therefore be worth penetrating. The same methods might also
reveal who is in a position to be successfully bribed (SIS agents have exemptions
from prosecutions under recent bribery law in England and Wales) ( Horder 2011 ).
Espionage for economic advantage against competitors (as opposed to fully 
fledged adversaries) is a by-product of the end of the Cold War.4 It takes at least 
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services to firms from that country, and espionage in the service of the home gov-
ernment’s economic policy. The second kind of activity might consist of equip-
ment interference at laboratories or companies in a competitor nation. This sort of 
activity has relatively recently been agreed to be out of bounds by the G20, and by 
the United Kingdom in respect of China ( Foreign & Commonwealth Office UK 
2015 ). The first kind of activity has long been informally outlawed in the United 
States ( Rascoff 2016 ), but not in the United Kingdom. 
Dover documents a case in relation to UK arms manufacturers from around 
2005. He highlights the process of a manufacturer’s being introduced to foreign 
procurement officials by a local UK Defence Attaché, supported by a now defunct 
UK government body, the Defence Export Services Organization (DESO), and 
several intelligence services: 
Having received first indications marketing and been introduced to agents 
and procurement officials the manufacturer takes steps to provide them with 
a corporate presentation. Information on these officials and agents will have 
been collated locally by embassy officials  and might also have been sub-
ject to general or centralised information trawls by MI6, DIS and GCHQ
[my emphasis] – depending on the character and positioning of the person in 
question (interview 05IS; interview24IS; Scott, 1996, C2.26). These presen-
tations are discreet and are held without publicity. The DA [Defence Attaché] 
will nearly always be in attendance at these presentations, as a representative 
of the UK government, and will often be in full dress uniform (interview 
24IS). This emphasizes the UK government’s backing of the product and also 
allows the DA to pass on convincing accounts of how the equipment has been 
successfully used by the UK’s armed forces (interview 24IS; interview 18IS). 
 ( Dover 2007 , 695) 
A subsequent intervention might consist of an embassy reception held to under-
line UK government support for the proposed sale. At this stage, too, the intel-
ligence services sometimes made a contribution: 
The primary motivation for hosting such an event is to give the manufactur-
ers an overt ‘kitemark’ [mark of trust] of British government support. Such 
events also serve an information-gathering purpose – in soft terms as a means 
by which to network locally and illuminate matrices of influence and busi-
ness. Of course, such ‘soft’ methods do not preclude the use of central intel-
ligence assets – such as GCHQ to intercept communications or with human 
intelligence to reveal negotiating positions within rival companies or the cli-
ent government, although this occurs only in a few notable cases (interview 
05IS; interview 27IS). 
 ( Dover 2007 , 696) 
Dover does not emphasize automated evidence trawls; he is interested in 
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gathered or not – direct to officials of a company seeking a sale, as opposed to 
officials in government. His discussion nevertheless illustrates what sometimes 
happens when the intelligence services act “in the interests of the economic well-
being of the United Kingdom”. 
Now for the central question: “What, if anything, is morally wrong with what 
Dover describes?” First, and most obviously, it is not immediately clear that pro-
moting sales of a UK company always contributes much to the well-being of 
the United Kingdom as a whole. Whether it does depend on for example how 
much UK tax the company pays, how many UK citizens it employs and how 
well it pays them. Supporting a UK arms manufacturer raises further issues. For 
one thing, arms sales have traditionally been associated with corrupt payments of 
“commission” or other euphemistically labelled charges ( Gilby 2014 ). Again, it 
matters what type of customer is buying. Is it a liberal democratic regime that is 
constrained in its resort to force? Or is it an authoritarian government that is not 
above using its weapons against its own or other civilians, for example in a proxy 
war? When these questions are pressed in the case of sales to Saudi Arabia – 
highly relevant at the time Dover carried out his research – it is not clear that 
moral justification for intelligence service assistance for arms deals is very strong 
if it exists at all. 
It might be thought that while intelligence service pursuit of UK economic well-
being in general is perhaps open to the criticisms made in the last paragraph, intel-
ligence service pursuit of UK economic well-being through bulk collection is not,
at least when it is lawful. Under the Investigatory Powers Act (2016) section 204
(3a), bulk collection for national economic well-being is permitted only where it is
“also relevant to the interests of national security”. Not every company seeking to
sell goods or services in foreign procurement exercises will contribute to national
economic well-being as well as having relevance to national security. So, clause
3a does seem to work in some cases to limit what the intelligence services can do.
Unfortunately, this is not its effect in the problematic area of arms. Supporting big
UK arms manufacturers is arguably always “relevant” to the interests of national
security, in the sense that sales (even to dubious regimes) finance research that leads
to innovation in military technology that undoubtedly helps to protect the United
Kingdom. So, if the “relevance” clause was intended to limit economically moti-
vated bulk collection to unproblematic cases, it does not seem to go far enough.
Perhaps the cases that the “relevance” clause most uncontroversially applies to 
are those in which the intelligence services assist in monitoring and responding to 
cyberattacks on UK companies. Here the purpose of bulk collection, for example 
of email meta-data for attack attribution, is defensive, and the beneficiaries are 
a very large range of organizations in both the public and private sectors of the 
United Kingdom. In the past, cyberattacks have been directed at UK communica-
tion companies with large customer bases as well as the National Health Service: in 
the latter case, the connection between preventing those attacks and increasing UK 
economic well-being is obscure. Other kinds of well-being are relevant instead. 
Protecting these seems more urgent morally than in the case where the interests 
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The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) is a branch of GCHQ. As its 
2019 Annual Report makes clear, it has developed a number of software tools for 
companies and public sector organizations to use in routine cybersecurity, and it 
has devised special safeguards for government networks that it is adapting for the 
NHS to prevent attacks like the WannaCry ransomware exploit in 2015 against 
the National Health Service. The NCSC Annual Report for 2019 gives examples 
of tools it has developed: 
• the NCSC “Internet Weather Centre”, which will aim to draw on multiple 
data sources to enable full understanding of the United Kingdom’s digital 
landscape 
• the Infrastructure Check service: a web-based tool to help public sector and 
critical national infrastructure providers scan their internet connected infra-
structure for vulnerabilities 
• Breach Check: a web-based tool to help government and private sector orga-
nizations check whether employee email addresses have been compromised 
in a data breach 
( National Cyber Security Centre 2019 ) 
At least the first of these three tools seems to involve bulk collection, and this time 
for cybersecurity and economic purposes that seem reasonable. The reason is that 
the tools are defensive, and are partly used to defend public institutions. The use 
of these or other tools to give the UK or UK companies is less strongly justified 
at first sight, because the question of who benefits from UK economic advantage 
and to what extent, needs to be specified first. 
Conclusion 
I have been arguing that the best case for the moral justifiability of bulk collec-
tion is where bulk collection clearly contributes to counter-terrorism. Anderson’s 
claim that bulk collection of this kind is privacy-violating, but that privacy viola-
tions are a price worth paying for the prevention of terror attacks, concedes too 
much to privacy concerns. According to me, the simple collection and machine 
processing of personal information that never comes to personal attention, and 
that does not lead to targeted surveillance, is not by itself a privacy violation. 
The personal information of the average citizen in the United Kingdom, though 
held in data bases, is no more likely to receive attention than the diary under 
tons of rubble after an earthquake. It is simply too disconnected from the elec-
tronic travel, communication and financial transaction profiles of people who 
are reasonable targets. What is more, the information is not typically “sensitive” 
in senses I tried to elaborate in the first section. Typical personal information is 
protected not only by the law but also by judicial interventions in the authoriza-
tion of bulk collection; it is also protected by the sheer amount of data and the 
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Not every goal pursued by the UK intelligence services is as closely con-
nected to the protection of lives as counter-terrorism. Agent recruitment is not. 
The pursuit of greater UK economic well-being is not. On the contrary, these 
purposes are arguably morally questionable in many cases. Foreign agent recruit-
ment is an invitation to treason with all the attendant risks to the welfare and 
life of the agent and his or her family. The pursuit of UK economic well-being 
is conducted by the SIS under a regime that permits bribes and perhaps encour-
ages “stove-piping” and the over-identification of state interests with the inter-
ests of economically important UK companies. Bulk collection in the service of 
these morally questionable purposes is itself morally questionable – whatever its 
operational utility. 
Notes 
1 An exception is  Macnish (2018 ). 
2 Of course, it is possible that people with access to data sets captured through bulk collec-
tion are personally interested in the addresses and financial records of particular people, 
but this fact is a reason for their not being employees of institutions that compile and 
analyze the data bases for counter-terrorism. It is not a reason for abolishing the data 
bases or for not building them in the first place. There have been cases of security service 
misuse of bulk data bases, including out of noseyness or simple convenience but no one 
suggests these are very numerous ( Bowcott and Norton-Taylor 2016 ). 
3 Not every intelligence service recruits foreign agents. The CSIS in Canada apparently 
does not. 
4 See  Porteous (1996 ; 1995 ). 
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 9 Surveillance, intelligence and 
ethics in a COVID-19 world 
 Jessica Davis 
 Introduction 
In the initial weeks and months of the COVID-19 pandemic, states grasped at any 
possible tools to help them battle the economic, health and human impacts of the 
disease. The severity of the crisis led states to use, or consider using, any tools 
at their disposal, including those that had previously only been used for national 
security applications. The pandemic struck at a time when personal technology 
(such as smartphones) and surveillance technology uses were at an all-time high 
and states looked to both of these types of technology to stop the spread of the 
virus. The use of intelligence and surveillance tools that were once largely pur-
view of security, intelligence and law enforcement being used for pandemic sur-
veillance represents the lengths that many states have been willing to take to stop 
the spread and limit the damage ( Davis 2020 ). 
States leveraged personal technologies primarily for contact tracing purposes, 
or to provide notifications to users of possible exposure to COVID-19. However, 
some states sought to use tools developed for national security purposes (such as 
counter-terrorism or counter-espionage), which often exploit personal technology 
data, to help contain the virus. Other surveillance technologies, such as closed-
circuit cameras and facial recognition software, were also deployed to combat the 
virus. The use of these tools and techniques, once largely the purview of secu-
rity, intelligence and law enforcement, represented the extraordinary lengths that 
many states took to stop the infection. These efforts involved collecting data on 
citizens from cell phones, financial transactions and social media intelligence and 
combined it with or exploited it for health data, raising significant concerns about 
privacy and civil liberties. 
The nature of the pandemic has in part driven this reliance, or at least turn, 
to technology and national security surveillance techniques. Traditional contact 
tracing works well when transmission requires sustained, intimate contact, but 
when transmission can occur through limited exposure and the virus can be spread 
by asymptomatic people, traditional models of health surveillance may fall short 
( Berman, Fowler, and Roberts 2020 ). In the first six months of the pandemic, 
however, the disease has proven largely impervious to these efforts. Many of 
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tracing close contacts and the source of infection. In many cases, the ability to 
trace specific cases has proven only partially successful due to the widespread 
infection rates many countries experienced. 
Of course, public health surveillance and national security surveillance are two 
distinct paradigms with different values and governing norms ( Berman, Fowler, 
and Roberts 2020 , 1). For the purposes of this chapter, I will make a distinction 
between the two by using the terms national security surveillance to describe tech-
nologies and techniques of surveillance usually associated with law enforcement, 
intelligence, and security services, and health surveillance to refer to more tradi-
tional modes of the collection of health, infection and pandemic-related informa-
tion. National security surveillance and public health surveillance also have very 
different purposes and applications, differences that have an impact on any discus-
sion of intelligence, ethics and surveillance during a pandemic. Health surveil-
lance is cooperative, minimizes data collection and limits subsequent use ( Berman, 
Fowler, and Roberts 2020 , 1). National security surveillance operates coercively, 
maximizes data collection, and in some countries, there are few limits on use of 
lawfully collected data ( Berman, Fowler, and Roberts 2020 , 1). In these two forms 
of surveillance, the role of consent, scope of collection and subsequent use are all 
different and differently restricted ( Berman, Fowler, and Roberts 2020 , 19). 
This chapter will look at the surveillance methods used by states in an effort 
to stop the pandemic and discuss the ethical implications of those efforts, draw-
ing on literature in the field of ethics of surveillance and bio-surveillance. This 
analysis will be structured on two frameworks for the ethical collection and use of 
intelligence by Bellaby and Omand ( Omand 2006 ;  Bellaby 2012 ). 
National security surveillance in the first six months 
of the pandemic 
In the first six months of the pandemic, a number of states discussed the possi-
bility of exploiting national security surveillance tools to fight the pandemic. In 
most cases, states opted to forgo these efforts due to a host of practical, privacy, 
legal and technological challenges. However, to curb the spread of COVID-19 
some countries have been moving to implement technologies to monitor and sur-
veil their citizens and provide early warning of infection and spread. Indeed, the 
policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been to categorize and compare a 
mix of policy tools that have been deployed by governments, some of which have 
been national security surveillance tools. In almost every country, the COVID-19 
pandemic has seen an unprecedented use of technology ( The Soufan Center 2020 ; 
Dunlop, Ongaro, and Baker 2020 ;  Berman, Fowler, and Roberts 2020 , 1). 
In a survey of 56 countries conducted between March and August 2020, 45 
(80%) were using technology to track COVID-19 outbreaks. Of those 45 coun-
tries, another 18 (40%) were using national security surveillance technology to 
track infected individuals, individuals required to self-quarantine, or to surveil 
their population writ large for signs of infection or compliance with local regula-
tions, illustrated in Figure 9.1 . 
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USE OF TECHNOLOGY FOR COVID19 SURVEILLANCE 
No technology used 
Use of technology (personal) 




Figure 9.1 Use of technology for COVID-19 surveillance. 
These technologies primarily involved facial recognition and closed-circuit cam-
eras, location monitoring, financial transaction and social media intelligence and 
other (unspecified) tools that were developed to combat terrorism but that had 
been re-deployed to combat the pandemic. For example, in the United States, 
Army technology developed to combat terrorism was deployed to help moni-
tor the spread of COVID-19. The Army used social media, news media, blogs 
and government sources to create actionable data to be used for force protection, 
including information about COVID-19 derived from all of these sources ( Brad-
ing 2020 ). 
In another example, in March 2020, Israel invoked emergency powers to use 
cell phone tracking data to retrace the movements of those believed to be infected 
and to implement quarantines. The data had previously been acquired by the 
Israeli Security Agency (colloquially known as Shin Bet) for counter-terrorism 
purposes. The disclosure of the programme raised concerns that it violated the 
privacy of Israeli citizens and that granting of emergency powers would open 
the door to future abuses ( Sachs and Huggard 2020 ). The utility of these sur-
veillance tools during the COVID-19 pandemic is questionable, as in September 
2020, Israel announced that it was undertaking another three weeks of lockdown 
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Israel was not alone in deploying existing national security surveillance tools 
for pandemic surveillance. In Pakistan, a secret surveillance system that was 
used to track terrorist suspects by the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate 
(ISI) (Pakistan’s primary intelligence service) was deployed to combat the pan-
demic. While few details have been released regarding its actual application for 
pandemic surveillance, the system has geo-fencing and telco-tracking mecha-
nisms and allows for the monitoring of confirmed patients and potential virus 
carriers. The system is also reported to track movements and be able to listen to 
private phone conversations as part of its efforts to monitor possible symptoms 
( Shairani 2020 ). 
While counter-terrorism tracking programmes have been deployed in at least 
two countries, other states have deployed national security surveillance tools 
more selectively in their bid to stop the spread of the virus. For instance, South 
Korea used mobile technology against the outbreak to facilitate contact tracing – 
people who tested positive for the virus were asked to describe their recent move-
ments, and the state facilitated this process by using Global Position System (GPS) 
phone tracking, surveillance camera records and credit card transactions ( McCurry 
2020 ). For its part, Hong Kong opted for physical location monitors in the form of 
wristbands that linked to smartphones to provide location-tracking services to help 
enforce quarantine requirements for new arrivals ( Sharwood 2020 ). 
The use of closed-circuit cameras and facial recognition software was also 
deployed in the early stages of the pandemic. These efforts were aimed at detect-
ing possible signs of infection and to detect compliance with quarantine or reg-
ulatory requirements. In China, facial recognition technologies that can detect 
elevated temperatures in a crowd were deployed and cameras were used to flag 
and identify citizens not wearing a mask. These surveillance activities were 
described by the state as part of a response during an “extraordinary time” that 
requires extraordinary measures ( Kuo 2020 ). However, Chinese citizens noted 
that the same justification was used in deploying other surveillance technolo-
gies in advance of the Olympics, technologies that have since become a perma-
nent feature in China ( Kuo 2020 ). In Russia, closed-circuit cameras were used 
to enforce lockdown while in France, surveillance cameras were used to check 
adherence to rules ( BBC News 2020 ;  Rosemain 2020 ). As part of a three-month 
experiment, artificial intelligence-powered technology checked for adherence to 
local rules in place during the pandemic, such as wearing masks and adhering to 
physical distancing requirements ( Rosemain 2020 ). 
The use of national security surveillance technologies and tools for pandemic 
surveillance has been relatively constrained to a small number of countries. Many 
other states have adopted personal technologies like applications installed on 
smart phones for pandemic surveillance, monitoring and alerts, but for the most 
part these applications have been limited in scope and have privacy protections 
in place. While many states initially considered using more invasive and targeted 
measures for pandemic surveillance, privacy, legal and regulatory and practi-
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security appealed during the initial phase of the pandemic, the actual nature of 
how the virus spreads, along with the rate of infection, also worked to preclude 
the use of national security surveillance technologies. 
Thinking ethically about national security surveillance 
during the pandemic 
Times of crises and emergencies often lead states to consider or implement leg-
islation, regulation and practices that they otherwise would not in the name of 
national security. Even though there are almost certainly critics of these practices, 
in many cases, public support is often on the side of governments implementing 
these changes in the name of national security. States of emergency may also stifle 
or silence critiques of these practices. However, the COVID-19 pandemic is rela-
tively unique in terms of national and international emergencies: it is far lengthier 
than most, which creates space for critique and re-considering practices adopted 
early during the pandemic. It also allows for the consideration of best practices for 
the duration of the pandemic and future emergencies. 
Intelligence studies have furnished us with two very useful frameworks for 
investigating the ethics of the practice of intelligence, which is a collection of 
activities such as information gathering, exploitation, all-source analysis and 
covert action ( Herman 2013 ). Omand’s framework calls for intelligence to be col-
lected and analysed using six main principles: 
1 sufficient sustainable cause 
2 integrity of motive 
3 proportionate methods 
4 right authority 
5 a reasonable prospect of success and 
6 recourse to secret intelligence as a last resort 
 ( Omand 2006 , 618–19) 
Bellaby’s framework has similar elements and a few key differences. Bellaby 
argues that the practice of intelligence should be conducted along six principles 
as well: 
1 just cause 
2 legitimate authority 
3 intention (intelligence should be used for the intended purpose) 
4 proportionality (the harm caused outweighed by gains) 
5 as a last resort and 
6 targets should be discriminate (between legitimate and illegitimate) 
 ( Bellaby 2012 , 109) 
Both frameworks have significant overlap in the principles they espouse, includ-
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turning to intelligence as a last resort. They differ in that Omand also includes the 
proposition that intelligence activities should only be undertaken when they have 
a reasonable prospect of success, while Bellaby proposes that targets of intelli-
gence collection should be discriminate, in that some targets are legitimate, while 
others are illegitimate. For instance, it could be argued that mass surveillance 
breaches this principle because it does not discriminate between targets – every-
one is a target of the intelligence collection mechanism. 
In terms of using intelligence and surveillance during the COVID-19 pandemic,
the cause can certainly be justified or found to be sufficient. As of September 2020, at
least a million people had died worldwide from the virus, and millions of others had
fallen ill, some with effects lasting in excess of six months and the economic effects
of the pandemic have also proven significant ( Yong 2020 ). These simple measures
only scratch the surface of the pain and suffering that COVID-19 has caused. As
such, using intelligence and national security surveillance to combat the pandemic
could certainly be justified and be found proportionate as well in many societies. The
proportionality question, however, is an essentially contested one and one that will
differ from society to society depending on the importance that is placed on privacy.
The question of the legitimacy of authority of using intelligence and national 
security surveillance tools and techniques for pandemic surveillance is an inter-
esting one and one that has already been breached. In the Israeli case, the legal 
foundation for the data set was for counter-terrorism and could not easily be trans-
ferred to pandemic surveillance. This lack of just authority resulted in a ban on 
the use of some of these tools until new laws are passed ( BBC News 2020a ). In 
Pakistan’s case, the lack of legitimate authority does not seem to have stopped 
the ISI from employing its tools and techniques, a clear violation of the ethical 
principles of intelligence. 
In the context of a global pandemic, the idea that intelligence and national secu-
rity surveillance could be used as a last resort is an interesting one. Many tools 
exist that could facilitate contact tracing and population monitoring other than 
those employed by national security and intelligence agencies. In fact, most states 
have chosen to employ those tools rather than use their more contested tools for 
pandemic surveillance. However, if a vaccine for the virus proves illusive or only 
partially effective, states may increasingly be tempted to employ these tools and 
they may in fact be justifiable as a last resort. 
The differences between the two ethical frameworks presented here are also 
worth considering. Omand argues that intelligence should only be undertaken 
when it has a reasonable prospect of success. In the case of COVID-19, early 
results from surveillance practices have demonstrated (particularly in the case 
of Israel) that the deployment of national security surveillance has not been suc-
cessful. This is largely the result of the specific nature of the virus – it is easily 
transmitted and can be transmitted by asymptomatic people. For its part, most 
national security surveillance systems are targeted surveillance systems, most 
easily deployed and most useful against a set number of targets. Surveilling an 
entire population for possible signs of infection is something better left to health 
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Finally, Bellaby argues that targets of surveillance and intelligence practices 
need to be discriminate, meaning that there needs to be a difference between legit-
imate and illegitimate targets. In many of the cases of national security surveil-
lance deployed against COVID-19, this distinction has not been made. Instead, 
these tools have been deployed in the faint hope that they can provide some assis-
tance for states fighting the pandemic. They have failed to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate targets. However, this principle is perhaps of use in 
the future, if the scenario described earlier (no vaccine, or a minimally effec-
tive vaccine), and in a situation where a state has low levels of virus transmis-
sion. In that case, then some of the national security surveillance tools (such as 
enhanced location monitoring) could prove useful for reducing the spread of the 
virus and enforcing quarantine. In this instance, it would be critical to differentiate 
between legitimate targets of surveillance (perhaps those suspected of infection 
and unwilling to comply with quarantine) and those not (healthy or quarantine-
abiding individuals). 
In addition to this framework, I also propose that in the case of health surveil-
lance (particularly when done by national security agencies, or using national 
security surveillance tools and techniques), that transparency is a critical element. 
The authority for national security agencies to collect and use data – and the use 
of techniques and methods should not come as a surprise to citizens of democratic 
state. In the current case, the enemy is a virus, not an adaptive adversary, so the 
need for secrecy about specific methods may exist, but actual collection and use 
of information should be transparent and open to democratic debate ( Davis 2020 ). 
Civil liberties should not be abandoned quickly or easily, even in the face of a 
global pandemic. Instead, any sacrifices made should be done by considering the 
ethics of the proposed action and balancing the welfare of individuals and the 
population writ large. 
Consistency of use is another critical consideration. Indeed, in talking about the 
use of intelligence for counter-terrorism, Omand notes that there are worries over 
the wider uses to which information derived from information technology might 
be put ( Omand 2006 , 616). While all the propositions proposed in these frame-
works are important, the consistency of use of data is one of the most important 
propositions in terms of ensuring ethical use of intelligence collected to combat 
the pandemic. Data must be used in a manner consistent with how and why it was 
collected ( Davis 2020 ). These concerns should be central during the pandemic 
and any discussion of using national security surveillance. Consideration needs 
to be given to what will happen to the information, how long it will be retained 
for, who will maintain (and have access to) the data and its ultimate destruction. 
Information collected for public health can result in stigma, embarrassment and 
discrimination ( Berman, Fowler, and Roberts 2020 , 24). Discrimination based 
on health status is a very real concern and one that will only grow if an effective 
vaccine is not found. 
A particular problem with using national security surveillance for pandemic 
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is not useful, in aggregate, they reveal intimate details of life ( Berman, Fowler, 
and Roberts 2020 , 23). One single data point is not that useful; but a comprehen-
sive record of what a person purchased over a sufficient period of time will reveal 
intimate life details (the whole adds up to more than sum of its parts) ( Berman, 
Fowler, and Roberts 2020 , 23). The aggregation problem needs to be part of the 
ethical framework for considering the use of national security surveillance tools 
and techniques for pandemic surveillance. 
In considering the use of national security intelligence practices for pandemic 
surveillance, states should consider the elements of Omand and Bellaby’s frame-
works. They need to balance just or sufficient cause, proportionality, intention-
ality, legitimate authority and turning to intelligence as a last resort. An ethical 
framework also needs to consider the prospect of success, as well as the discrimi-
nation of targets of surveillance. In addition to these considerations, any use of 
national security surveillance tools should be done in a transparent manner, with 
any subsequent data being used consistently within its purpose (the reason why it 
was collected) and in consideration of the aggregation problem. 
Conclusion 
The news is not all bad from a privacy and intelligence perspective. In some ways, 
modern technology has made health surveillance and reporting more private and 
real time than traditional methods of contact tracing and exposure notification. In 
some cases, no personal data is collected (e.g. in Germany, Canada and Vietnam) 
and a positive exposure results in a notification, rather than it being traced back to 
an individual contact, which has the obvious impact of informing a third party of 
the health status of an infected individual. In addition, concern over the expansion 
of national security surveillance has chilled uptake of disease tracking technolo-
gies in the United States ( Berman, Fowler, and Roberts 2020 , 1), and likely many 
other countries as well. When considering information sharing, Maxwell also 
raises questions about the legitimacy of state access to the private data of citizens 
in pursuit of the public good ( Maxwell 2020 ). 
When national security surveillance techniques are combined with health infor-
mation, there is a strong potential for harms. On their own, national surveillance 
techniques certainly have risks, and the same can be said for health information. 
Combining these together creates greater potential for harms due to the sensitive 
nature of the information being collected, the intrusive means being proposed and 
the possibility of the information being used for a purpose other than just pan-
demic surveillance. It raises a host of potential issues including the involvement 
of national security agencies in health surveillance (where many of the proposed 
tools, techniques and analytic capabilities reside), information management, con-
trol, access and destruction and limits and sunset clauses on any of this proposed 
activity. 
Surveillance systems are necessary to track (and eventually stop) the spread of 
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such as by limiting freedom of movement and speech ( Youde 2012 , 83). This is 
true when national security surveillance tools are used and there are additional 
risks and vulnerabilities. The international community has a moral and interna-
tional legal obligation to track the spread of the outbreak of an infectious disease 
and use any data collected in this process to benefit the general population ( Youde 
2012 , 83). 
It is not sufficient to simply ask IF something is legal; we should ask whether 
it should be and under what circumstances ( Davis 2020 ). This is especially true 
in the case of pandemic surveillance, or really any extraordinary measures put in 
place in a time of crisis. We also need to acknowledge that it may be difficult or 
impossible to roll back or limit powers once in place and that sunset clauses and 
benchmarks are only a start ( Davis 2020 ). 
In the far past, pandemics transformed international politics but in more recent 
pasts, their effect on the international system has been more muted. Drezner 
argues that COVID-19’s effects in this regard will be minimal ( Drezner 2020 , 
14), although one area that may change is tolerance for surveillance. There has 
not been a widespread uproar about the use of national security surveillance 
technologies or tools, or other kinds of surveillance, by citizens, which implies 
that many may be willing to trade some aspects of privacy for the promise of 
increased security. Of course, the risk is that these technologies become a per-
manent feature of life ( The Soufan Center 2020 ), even after the pandemic is 
over and COVID-19 spread is under control. Indeed, surveillance may, for some 
people, be preferable to movement restrictions, mask protocols and physical dis-
tancing requirements. 
At the same time, in considering the prospect of national security surveillance 
for the COVID-19 pandemic, it is critical to remember the limitations of these 
tools and technologies. The “promise” of national security surveillance for the 
pandemic may have fallen short. National security surveillance involves tools and 
techniques that are largely targeted means of surveillance. While this has been of 
little use in the early stages of the pandemic, as the pandemic spreads, and perhaps 
comes more under control, these targeted measures may have more appeal and 
utility and may have particular appeal if a vaccine is not forthcoming or turns out 
to minimally effective. 
It is also important to remember the enduring nature of emergency pow-
ers. Indeed, parallels can be drawn between the first six months of the global
pandemic and the era immediately following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, which saw significant broadening of state surveillance and intel-
ligence powers around the world – powers that were never rolled back, and
have instead become part of the fabric of the state intelligence and security
apparatus. As we consider what, if any, national security surveillance tools and
techniques should be deployed to combat the global pandemic, we would be
wise to remember that privacy and civil liberties are hard-won rights, and yet
are easily surrendered for the promise of economic prosperity, physical health
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 10 Ethics and covert action 
The “Third Option” in American 
foreign policy 
 Loch Johnson 
Covert action as an instrument of American foreign policy 
Covert action (CA) has been defined by a former high-level practitioner as 
“influencing people, organizations, and events in other countries secretly, using 
a variety of inducements and pressures while attempting to conceal sponsorship” 
( Bissell, Pudlo, and Lewis 1996 , 207). Put simply, this hidden approach to foreign 
policy consists of government attempts to shape events and conditions overseas 
through the use of propaganda, political and economic programmes, as well as 
paramilitary operations (PM “ops” or warlike activities). 
The aspiration is to channel the currents of history in a direction favourable to 
the United States. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated the case for 
the Third Option: “We need an intelligence community that, in certain compli-
cated situations, can defend the American national interest in the gray areas where 
military operations are not suitable and diplomacy cannot operate”.1 Thus, the 
purpose of covert action is to give the world a secret nudge – or even a shove – 
in a pro-American direction. This chapter examines the range of covert actions 
adopted by the United States, and explores their pros -and cons.2 
Covert action as a government process 
With sensitivity to ethical implications, this section addresses the legal founda-
tions of covert action in the United States, along with its decision-making proce-
dures and degree of accountability. 
The legal foundations 
The United States has resorted to covert actions since the nation’s earliest days. 
President Thomas Jefferson, for example, ordered paramilitary operations (PM 
ops) against the Barbary Pirates ( Wallace 1975 ). Not until enactment of the 
National Security Act of 1947, though, which created the modern American intel-
ligence establishment, did covert action have a formal, legal underpinning. That 
landmark law provided boilerplate language for the newly minted Central Intelli-
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not only in intelligence collection and analysis, its main charge, but to pursue as 
well “such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national 
security as the President or National Security Council may direct”. 
The Truman Administration turned to this spongy wording (supplemented by 
executive orders) for authority to launch a series of covert actions around the 
world, crafted mainly to shore up Western defences against a perceived rising 
Soviet threat. Since the CIA enjoyed access to unvouchered funds as a result of its 
sensitive activities, the agency became all the more attractive as an organization 
to carry out clandestine operations beyond the prying eyes of Washington’s media 
corps and inquisitive lawmakers ( US Department of State 2019 , 35). 
In 1974, as the CIA was in the throes of controversy over domestic spying and 
the agency’s secret manipulation of elections in Chile (as directed by the Nixon 
White House), the government finally addressed the subject of covert action spe-
cifically in a statute. The Hughes-Ryan Act, passed in the waning days of that 
year, still lacked a robust definition of covert action; nevertheless, the new law 
was revolutionary in its reach. Henceforth, the CIA (or any other organization 
assigned a CA task) had to seek formal White House authority, with the president 
required to “find” that a proposed covert action was important to the nation and 
should proceed – a so-called findings process. Gone were the days of “plausible 
deniability” when the nation’s chief executive could claim ignorance about a CA
endeavour that became public and proved embarrassing. More sweeping still, the 
president was required to report all CA approvals to the appropriate oversight 
committees in Congress. Suddenly, dramatically, lawmakers were now in the loop 
for the Third Option. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) would now receive 
regular briefings on presidential findings within two days of their approval by the 
president. 
Lawmakers further tightened the legal screws on covert action six years later 
with passage of the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980. In another revolutionary 
move, this law mandated prior notice to SSCI and HPSCI on all covert actions 
approved by the president. No more two-day delays were allowed, as had been 
the case under Hughes-Ryan and which often made it too late for lawmakers to 
object. From now on, members of Congress had an opportunity to offer their cri-
tiques before operations were launched – perhaps managing to close the barnyard 
door (if necessary) before the CA horse had bolted out. 
By virtue of this chance for genuine debate within the secure confines SSCI 
and HPSCI, lawmakers could skewer (if necessary) untoward proposals – even 
threaten budgetary retaliation should the executive branch ignore suggested 
modifications offered by the congressional Intelligence Committees. The 1980 
statue did not expressly require legislative approval of covert actions; however, 
it did establish a setting that permitted lawmakers to weigh in. Congress holds 
the power of the purse; as a result, the opposition of SSCI and HPSCI members 
could not be taken lightly by the White House, whether the criticism was just 
verbal or followed by a formal (if technically non-binding) vote against a spe-
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Subsequently, in the aftermath of the Iran- contra scandal involving covert 
actions during the Reagan Administration (the 1980s), Congress at last placed 
into law a formal definition of the Third Option, by way of the Intelligence Over-
sight Act of 1991. This statute continues to stand as the current legal foundation 
for America’s secret interventions abroad. The definition states that covert action 
is “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, 
economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the 
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly”. The 
name of the CA game was, in a word,  influence. The law also emphasized that, in 
times of emergency, the president had to provide advanced reporting just to eight 
leading members of Congress, four in each party (the “Gang of Eight”). Within 
two days of a presidential finding, however, the full memberships of SSCI and 
HPSCI were supposed to be briefed – a rule not always honoured by the executive 
branch in recent years. 
What ethical ramifications emerge from this set of intelligence laws 3? An 
important aspect of such considerations in a democracy is the extent to which 
government officials and agencies act in a manner faithful to a nation’s constitu-
tional framework. From this point of view, an ethical evaluation of covert action 
carried out by the United States rests on one’s interpretation of the Constitution. 
Almost all of America’s leading legal authorities, along with most of its political 
scientists, understand this document to have established co-equal executive and 
legislative branches of government. “Ambition would be made to counter ambi-
tion” was the prescription advocated by James Madison, the leading drafter of 
the Constitution in 1787 (Federalist Papers, No. 51). The nation’s founders gave 
to Congress, whose duties are outlined in Article I of the Constitution, strong 
authority to curb executive power, extending from a tight grip by lawmakers on 
spending authority to their right to authorize war – and even impeach and remove 
a sitting president from office. 
From this vantage point, the intelligence laws in the modern era as they relate to 
covert action display a moral goodness; they establish, for the first time in world 
history, a muscular legislative branch able to monitor the nation’s proposed secret 
interventions around the globe. However belatedly, the bedrock principles of rep-
resentative democracy as expressed in the Constitution had been brought into the 
invisible side of America’s government. 
If, however, one believes that Article II of the Constitution, which addresses 
presidential authority, has a superior status over Article I, and that it grants unfet-
tered authority to the White House when it comes to national security affairs, then 
the CA statues enacted from 1974 to 1991 are morally bankrupt, because they 
hobble (so critics allege) the ability of a president to protect the United States 
from foreign threats and internal subversion. The congressional checks and bal-
ances in the sensitive domain of intelligence place (according to this pro-Article 
II perspective) an undue burden on the executive branch in its struggle against 
global terrorism and other dangers. The survival of democracy – the ultimate 
moral good – is held hostage to a perverted doctrine of “the separation of pow-
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agriculture or health care, is sensible, but certainly not when the very survival of 
the nation is at stake in a hostile and uncertain world. So goes the argument of 
Article II devotees. 
This unrestrained pro-presidency point of view had been roundly rejected by 
drafters at the Constitutional Convention in 1787; and, in the modern era, it was 
crushed again by America’s painful experiences from the mid-1960s to the mid-
1970s with presidential excesses during the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal 
and revelations of the CIA spying at home. James Madison, George Washington, 
Lord Acton, Justice Brandeis, J William Fulbright – the list goes on of those wise 
counsels over the years who understood the risks of power concentrated in the 
hands of the president. 
In contrast, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Dick Cheney and legal scholar 
John Yoo, as well as Donald J Trump and his Attorney General William “Bill” 
Barr (to mention a few), rejected the notion that Madison’s anti-power moral 
imperative lies at the heart of the American Republic. 4 As a result, they contrib-
uted to the subversion of the most basic ethical principle that undergirds democ-
racy: freedom from autocracy. They routinely stiff-armed a role for Congress in 
international affairs, as though the value of executive branch efficiency surpassed 
the need for congressional restraints on the possible abuse of power. They turned 
their backs on the central motivating goal of the constitutional founders: no more 
King George IIIs ruling over America – or any future tyrants. 
The history of intelligence law and covert action is, from the perspective 
offered in this chapter, an impressive unfolding of measures designed to improve 
the chances that the United States will test and temper executive branch initiatives 
with at least some degree of debate within SSCI and HPSCI over proposed “spe-
cial activities”. The disquieting alternative is to rely solely on only two elected 
officials, the president and vice president, along with CIA bureaucrats, to make 
these important judgements on behalf of the American people. That approach pro-
duced, among other examples, the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961; the dubious CIA
assassination plots against foreign leaders in the 1960s; the domestic spy scandals 
revealed in the mid-1970s and the Iran-contra affair in the mid-1980s. 
Decision-making for covert action 
Statues related to intelligence have attempted to “democratize” CA procedures 
in recent years, bringing lawmakers into the picture just as the founders broadly 
advocated at the Constitutional Convention. These efforts also display a moral 
goodness that allows basic democratic values to enter into the practice of choos-
ing what covert actions, if any, the United States should pursue – primarily, a 
meaningful role for representatives of the people in Congress. 
In the years leading up to the Hughes-Ryan Act in 1974, the democratic prin-
ciples of representative government – the heart of moral goodness in an open 
society – had been largely abandoned when it came to intelligence matters. 
The spy power would be an exception to the normal, constitutional interactions 
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Church Committee, which in 1975 investigated intelligence practices in America, 
reported that only 14% of covert actions carried out by the United States from 
1961 to 1975 had been approved by the National Security Council (NSC) ( Senate 
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities 1976 , 56–7). 
On those occasions when the president and vice president were in the “witting 
circle”, rarely were members of Congress informed – including those who served 
on the small subcommittees in both chambers that dealt with CIA budgets. In 
post-Hughes-Ryan days, however, the moral foundations of CA decision-mak-
ing have been more in harmony with the intent of the Constitution. A handful of 
senators and representatives, supported by expert aides, now review key intel-
ligence initiatives. As the law has evolved since 1974 to strengthen democratic 
procedures – within the necessary limits of protecting legitimate national secu-
rity secrets, which obviously prohibit debate in the full legislative chambers on 
delicate CIA activities – so have covert-action decisions become more open to 
legislative review (chiefly via SSCI and HPSCI) and, therefore, more ethically 
defensible in an open society. 
Covert action and accountability 
As with covert action innovations in US law and decision-making procedures, so, 
too, has intelligence accountability moved in a direction of a higher ethical stand-
ing, at least as that concept is defined in a democracy as supporting significant 
checks on unbridled executive power – in this case, secret power. With regard to 
CAs, their shaping and review have gone from the sole domain of bureaucratic 
specialists and their managers in the executive branch, with occasional course 
corrections from the White House, to serious question-and-answer sessions 
within the inner sanctums of SSCI and HPSCI on the merits of specific covert 
action findings authorized by the president. 
As for the canard that CA as a policy option has been ruined by the new laws 
and procedures since Hughes-Ryan and the Church Committee, because lawmak-
ers are unable to keep a secret and leak information about findings to the media, 
the evidence since the creation of SSCI and HPSCI simply does not support that 
claim – which is expressed mainly by those who long for a return to the “good old 
days” of Article II supremacy, when the CIA operated with minimal supervision 
even from the White House, let alone the Congress. Since the mid-1970s, almost 
all of the top intelligence leaders (DCIs, and after that office was abolished in 
2004, Directors of the CIA or D/CIAs) have endorsed the new and more rigorous 
forms of intelligence accountability, with William J. Casey, architect of the Iran-
contra affair, the exception. 
The covert action process and democratic principles 
Process, that is, the procedures established by the Constitution and law for deci-
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whether or not elected officials beyond the White House and the executive branch 
agencies are included in the determination of covert action policies. As Treverton 
has observed with respect to the Iran-contra scandal, in which lawmakers were 
completely bypassed by the Reagan White House in its pursuit of covert actions: 
“Excluding Congress also excluded one more ‘political scrub,’ one more source 
of advice about what range the American people would find acceptable” ( Trever-
ton 1990 , 43). Ethical covert actions depend on an ethical CA process, based on 
honouring the shared-power prescripts of the Constitution. 
Covert action in practice 
In tandem with the question of CA process is the critical matter of practice: the 
actual implementation of the Third Option overseas. What kinds of covert actions 
have America embraced, how well have they succeeded and how have they 
stacked up ethically? An examination of these operational dimensions requires 
another set of criteria beyond, but related to, the democratic principles expressed 
in the Constitution. This chapter looks next at the scope of covert actions over the 
years; though in abbreviated form since space constraints prohibit a more exhaus-
tive presentation. The guiding question is: to what degree have America’s CAs 
reflected a commitment to an ethical foreign policy? 
From 1947 to 2020, the scope of US covert actions has been wide. They may be 
divided into four categories, according to their focus and methodology. By far the 
most extensively used form has been secret propaganda, or what the CIA refers 
to – in one of its more creative euphemisms – as “perception enhancement”. 
CA as propaganda 
In this approach, the CIA has disseminated around the globe what it calls “per-
spectives” on world affairs, that is, secret media insertions that shine a favourable 
light on the United States, while portraying its adversaries in dark tones. The mes-
sages have been, in most instances, placed into foreign media channels – news-
papers, magazines, television and more recently social media – by CIA foreign 
agents known inside the agency as “media assets”. 
Into hundreds of media outlets around the globe, the CIA pumped roughly 70 
to 80 insertions per day during the Cold War (1947–1991). This approach seems 
to have helped in the coups against the leaders of Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 
1954, for instance; further, according to CIA officials, the agency assisted sig-
nificantly in the aftermath of World War II in buttressing fledgling democracies 
across the latitudes against secret media assaults concocted by the Soviet Union – 
early examples of the internal manipulation in democratic societies for which 
Russia became infamous in the United States after its meddling in the 2016 and 
2020 presidential elections ( Roosevelt 1979 ; Wise and Ross 1964 ). In its efforts 
first to defeat, then when he was elected anyway (in a free and open contest during 
the 1970s), to topple the President of Chile, Salvador Allende, the CIA expended 
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The agency also ran its own radio stations in different parts of the world, such 
as Radio Free Europe, to propagate messages worldwide; and smuggled anti-
communist books and magazines into Russia, Eastern Europe and other com-
munist countries ( Johnson 1989 , 22–4). The CIA has gone so far as to encourage 
its copious media contacts inside the United States to write negative reviews 
and commentary about books critical of the agency, and positive evaluations of 
pro-CIA publications; or to attack investigating congressional committees – a 
disquieting illustration of how on occasion the Langley propaganda machine has 
been turned against an American audience in an attempt to marginalize critics 
( Wise 1976 ). 
Recently, the CIA promulgated a steady drumbeat of favourable and similarly 
worded media coverage inside the United States on the subject of its torture prac-
tices against suspected terrorists in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Current and for-
mer intelligence officers appeared up on multiple television and radio talk shows, 
as well as sending out choreographed emails and twitters, and giving speeches 
that tried to defend the agency’s “enhanced interrogation” methods ( Johnson 
2018 , 201–2). Controversial, too, has been the dilemma of “blowback”, whereby 
CIA propaganda insertions abroad waft back in this media-compressed world to 
influence American citizens at home. 
Political covert action 
The CIA’s early efforts to thwart communist takeovers in countries around the 
globe included not just propaganda but also support to pro-Western (or at least 
independent) political organizations and individuals. British Intelligence – MI6 – 
has an expression that captures the attempts of spy agencies to influence political 
events abroad through the judicious dispersal of money: “King George’s cav-
alry”, a euphemism for “cold cash to the rescue” – a sure way to influence some 
people. 
The CIA paid money secretly to advance its well-known 1953 and 1954  coups
(Iran and Guatemala), and supported the Christian Democratic Party in Italy 
from 1948 throughout the 1960s in its electoral competitions against the Italian 
Communist Party (supported just as vigorously and secretly by Russian rubles 
dispensed by the KGB). Neither superpower thought it wise to make its cash inter-
ventions openly for fear that the Italian voters would balk at supporting candidates 
who seemed to be dancing on the strings of an outside power. 
Should the United States pay brides to modern-day politicians in other coun-
tries, in return for their support of US global initiatives? Critics maintain that
the United States would be considered more honourable around the world if,
unlike Russia, it refused to use secret political operations – or any other form
of covert action – against fellow democratic states. This is a rule already fol-
lowed by Washington officials with respect to members of the “Five Eyes”
intelligence alliance – the spy services of the United States, the United King-
dom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Should this principle be extended
to all free nations?
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Economic covert action 
In the economic sphere CAs can become particularly nasty. They often skate 
across the boundary of ethical propriety, as with proposals to contaminate foreign 
food supplies; crop and livestock destruction; the incitement of labour strikes and 
mining harbours to discourage shipping, as well as blowing up electrical power 
lines and oil depots – favourite operations carried out in Nicaragua during the 
contra segment of the Iran-contra affair. 
In addition, the CIA (and no doubt the KGB as well) has counterfeited foreign 
currency to trigger inflationary pressures in a target country; depressed the world 
price of certain agricultural products vital to the economies of adversary nations – 
especially devastating in one-crop economies; contaminated oil supplies; culti-
vated parasites that might be useful for the ruination of crops overseas; diluted 
pesticides bought in the international marketplace by nations hostile to the United 
States and attempted environmental alterations via cloud-seeding in the skies over 
enemy territory. 
Here the negative moral implications scream out and such initiatives deserve 
severe condemnation, especially food, livestock and environmental tampering. As 
with all covert actions, the Golden Rule provides a North Star: do unto others as 
you would have them do unto you. Imagine posing the question to an American 
citizen: would you find any of these operations fair play if aimed at the United 
States? Few CAs would qualify for a “yes” answer. 
 Paramilitary operations 
Within the realm of PM ops, one confronts the most dangerous, extreme and con-
troversial forms of covert action. They are the responsibility of the CIA’s Special 
Operations Group (SOG), located in the Special Activities Division of the Direc-
torate for Operations (DO). The SOG’s officers are recruited (“sheep-dipped”, in 
the odd phrase) from the US military for the most part. The activities they pursue 
can range from supplying weapons to allies overseas, such as Stinger missiles to 
the mujahideen in the agency’s 1980s struggle against a Soviet army occupying 
Afghanistan, to managing full-scale “covert” wars – as if anything large in scope 
could stay covert long. Journalists have amusingly labelled this latter phenom-
enon “overt-covert action”. 
The most significant change in the conduct of paramilitary activities by the 
agency in recent years has been the adoption of drone attacks against suspected 
terrorists. Drones, such as the Predator and the Reaper, feature Hellfire missiles 
nestled beneath their wings that can quickly incinerate targets below, making 
this most lethal form of covert action in the CIA’s contemporary arsenal. First 
employed by the second Bush Administration, then (in higher numbers) by the 
Obama Administration, President Donald J. Trump further escalated their use. 
Each of these administrations turned to drone warfare not only on authorized bat-
tlefields, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in such far-flung locales as Somalia, 







Ethics and covert action 177 
effective form of covert action yet devised, others – including an agency director, 
John Brennan, a former analyst – see this approach as a troubling departure from 
Langley’s basic mandate as an analytic organization, not a combat unit. Disturb-
ing, too, has been the “collateral damage” caused by CIA drones, including mem-
bers of a wedding party in Pakistan mistakenly identified as a terrorist gathering. 
Another controversy revolves around whether suspected terrorists should be 
assassinated by drones, or merely identified by these aircraft for later capture on 
the ground by US Special Forces for trial in a court of law. One suspect targeted 
for death was an American citizen, Anwar al-Alaki, who left the United States for 
Yemen and became a popular radio personality spouting anti-American rhetoric – 
perhaps driven to radicalism by ham-handed FBI surveillance against him when 
he lived in the DC area working as a Muslim cleric ( Shane 2015 ). Disputes have 
arisen, as well, over the target list generated in the Department of Justice (DoJ) 
and the White House, based on Intelligence Community and Department of 
Defense (DoD) recommendations. A couple of attorneys in the DoJ are reportedly 
assigned to establish the kill list, which the White House then approves or disap-
proves. Critics maintain that this decision is too important for such a limited form 
of review; as a supplement, they argue, there should be a warrant process (like 
those provided for national security wiretaps in the United States since 1978), 
accompanied by reporting to SSCI and HPSCI before the drones take flight on 
their deadly missions. 
Finally, secret cyberwarfare has become a household word and common prac-
tice among nations. As Russian manipulation of US elections attests, its poten-
tial is unsettling, to say the least – not to mention the possibility of cyberattacks 
against America’s energy grid, stock exchange, hospitals, schools, air-traffic con-
trol and nuclear reactors. Quite properly the United States is ramping up its cyber-
defenses – and, as a stand-by, its offenses as well. 
CA practice as it relates to process and principles 
Covert actions might be thought of as secret intelligence interventions that lie 
along a continuum marked by Red Zones at either end, like a football field, with 
most operations taking place on the green expanse between these zones. 
The red zone of the ludicrous 
One can envision a Red Zone on the south end of the field that encompasses 
proposed CA initiatives that can only be described as Vaudevillian in nature: so 
comical, were they not seriously proposed, as to require a quick dismissal by any 
official with an ounce of good sense. An example of a South Red Zone candidate 
was the CIA’s proposal to rid Cuba of Fidel Castro, in an operation known as 
“Elimination by Illumination”. The plan was to spread the word through media 
assets in Cuba and leaflets dropped over the island that the Second Coming of 
Christ – the arch anti-communist – was imminent and spelled the end of Fidel 
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would surface off the coast of Cuba and shoot star shells into the midnight skies: 
the manifestation of Christ’s arrival. The people of Cuba would then supposedly 
rise up against Castro. When this idea was run by the Kennedy Administration at 
a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), a chorus of snickers quickly 
quashed the madcap scheme. 
Into this Are-You-Kidding Zone should have fallen, as well, such other CIA
initiatives against Castro as sending him exploding cigars and sprinkling depila-
tory powder in his boots at night to make his charismatic beard drop out. Neither 
worked. Each of these proposals made it through the CA decision process, which 
in these instances did not involve formal NSC review – and certainly no legisla-
tive oversight. 
The red zone of the extreme 
At the other end of the CA “football field” – the North Red Zone – are a set 
of operations that are so repugnant and contrary to American values that they 
should be automatically denied as well. Here are the most extreme forms of covert 
action that, one would hope, the US officials would eschew reflexively on moral 
grounds.5 Hypothetically, one can envision these possibilities: using CA methods 
to disperse chemical and biological agents against a foreign adversary; bringing 
about major environmental alterations that would harm an enemy or engaging in 
significant economic dislocations incurred by crop and livestock destruction. 
America has never engaged in such practices, although any nation with an 
advanced CA capability could and, on a couple of occasions at least, government 
planners in Washington proposed such measures during the Kennedy years. In 
one instance, the CIA considered undermining Cuban-Soviet relations by lacing 
sugar exported from Havana to Moscow with a bitter (though harmless) chemical 
substance, rendering it unpalatable. Discovering this initiative by way of a leak to 
the White House, a senior NSC aide intervened and had the 14,125 bags of sugar 
destroyed before they were shipped to the Soviet Union ( Wicker et al. 1966 ). 
Another scheme – more chilling – with the codename Operation Square Dance 
was the product of someone’s fertile mind in the Department of Defense, trying 
to edge the military into the covert action game during the 1960s. This plan envi-
sioned the destruction of the Cuban economy, and the resulting demise of Fidel 
Castro, by dropping from aircraft onto the island late at night batches of a para-
site known as Bunga. This pest craves sugar cane, Cuba’s main crop. The over-
heated DoD planner suggested further that the attack could be “exacerbated and 
exploited by such measures as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among draft 
animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seeding, mining cane fields, burning cane, 
and directing other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and 
transportation system”. An exasperated National Security Adviser (and former 
dean at Harvard University), McGeorge Bundy, rejected the proposal out of hand 
as beneath the dignity of any civilized nation ( Johnson 2017 , 92–3). 
One does not have to be Immanuel Kant (“Do not evil, though the world 
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remotely – to what the United States stands for. Extreme proposals of the North 
Red Zone variety ought to be readily recognized and dismissed out of hand. 
The middle kingdom 
In between the ludicrous and the extreme lie the bulk of CA initiatives. How 
useful have they been down through the years? Opinions on this question vary 
widely. On the side of scepticism is a proposal from national security expert 
Morton Halperin to ban covert actions altogether ( Johnson 2019 ); and Senator 
Frank Church’s lukewarm acceptance of the Third Option, but only in rare cases 
to thwart terrorists or help friends in narrow circumstances (such as preventing a 
communist takeover in Portugal in the 1980s) ( Church 1976 ). At the other end of 
the spectrum, one can find unbridled support for this approach from DCI William 
J. Casey of the Reagan Administration, an architect of the Iran- contra affair, and 
academician Roy Godson ( Godson 1981 ). 
In between are those who accept the need for at least a CA standby capability, 
for use in emergencies; those who would endorse this means periodically – but 
only under certain conditions, including most importantly the presence of exec-
utive and legislative accountability; and those who recommend an embrace of 
every arrow in the foreign policy quiver, especially when the United States is at 
war against another country or a terrorist organization. Two of the most thought-
ful policymakers who appeared before the Church Committee to testify on covert 
action, former Secretaries of Defense Clark Clifford and Cy Vance, argued in 
favour of retaining a CA capability, but strictly as a last resort when diplomacy 
had failed and fighting an overt war was too risky and expensive ( Johnson 1985 , 
147–8). 
Officers in the DO and their seventh-floor leaders at the agency often point 
with a special pride to a number of covert actions. High on this list are the CIA’s
successes soon after the Cold War began in thwarting communist party takeovers 
in Italy, Greece and Turkey, as well as nations in Asia, Latin America and Africa. 
Agency officers also view the Iran  coup of 1954 and the Guatemala coup the next 
year as feathers in their caps. They then skip forwards – quickly over the Bay of 
Pigs paramilitary fiasco in 1961 – to the agency’s secret war in Laos, which lasted 
from 1962 to 1968 ( Prados 2006 ;  Colby and Forbath 1978 ). In this instance, the 
CIA played an important role in keeping communist guerrillas preoccupied with 
civil war in that nation, rather than have them cross the border into South Vietnam 
and attack American troops. 
Another highlight, from the vantage point of the front porch at Langley, Virginia 
(CIA Headquarters), was support for the  mujahideen during the Reagan years, 
helping the Taliban repel the Soviet Army from Afghanistan. A high mark, too, 
was the agency’s response in the wake of 9/11, when DO officers assisted the 
US military drive the Taliban out of power, after these erstwhile American allies 
turned against the United States and provided a safe haven for Osama bin Laden 
(OBL), the Al-Qaeda leader ( Coll 2019 ). Most recent on the list of positive out-
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On the assassination front more generally, some at Langley view the capacity of 
drones to strike down future “9/11” perpetrators as a significant contribution to 
America’s safety. Some agencies have also found merit in the agency’s propaganda 
programmes as a way to counter the active disinformation machines of Russia, 
North Korea, Iran and other nations markedly hostile towards the United States. 
Critics of the Third Option are quick to respond, though, that the Marshall
Plan, the Truman Doctrine and the placement of American soldiers permanently
in Europe and Japan were of much greater importance in thwarting communism
worldwide than the Third Option, which played a part only at the margins. The Iran
coup, they point out further, eventually led to an uprising against America’s puppet,
the shah (king), along with a discrediting of the United States that lingers in Iran.
Moreover, they argue, Guatemala has continued to endure extreme poverty in the
years since the CIA intervened; Langley may have aided the United Fruit Company
in its desire to extract bananas more cheaply from Guatemala, but did nothing to
help the people of that desperately poor nation. As for Laos, when the PM opera-
tions ended in 1968, the agency’s local allies – the Hmung – were decimated by
communist forces; and, though the mujahideen were successful against the Soviet
Army in Afghanistan during the 1980s (thanks in part to CIA-provided Stinger mis-
siles and other sophisticated arms), the Taliban soon turned against the United States
and befriended Al-Qaeda as it planned the 9/11 attacks against the United States.
Even critics of covert action usually grant some merit to the agency’s role in 
routing the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11, but they point to bin Laden’s escape 
for a decade and, even more significantly, the Taliban’s ongoing military opera-
tions against the United States today in Afghanistan. On the death of bin Laden, 
most Americans were pleased about that joint military/CIA operation, although 
some would have preferred to see him captured and tried in court for his terrorist 
activities. Critics are generally critical of the agency’s drone programme, label-
ling it indiscriminate, highly unpopular abroad even with those in the Middle East 
who favour the United States and likely to result in drone retaliations directed 
against Americans and their homeland. 
Joining a recent director of the CIA, John Brennan, in expressing dismay that 
the CIA has become a killing machine instead of focusing on its core mandate 
of intelligence collection-and-analysis is a key congressional overseer, Senator 
Angus King (I, Maine). He chastises the executive branch for being “the prosecu-
tor, the judge, the jury, and the executioner all in one” when it comes to drone 
attacks – a development that he sees as “very contrary to the traditions and the 
laws of this country” ( Greenberg 2016 , 15). Finally, critics well remember the 
Bay of Pigs disaster, along with – the lowest point in the modern history of covert 
action – the deeply troubling abuse of the government’s secret powers during the 
Iran-contra affair ( Byrne 2014 ). 
Evaluating the merits and the ethics of covert action 
On the positive side, covert action seems to have been useful in its PM forms as a 
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struggles against global terrorism. Also, the roll-back of the Taliban after 9/11 was 
a shining example of how the CIA and the military can work together in emergen-
cies to defeat America’s foes. 
Less convincing has been the excessive use of drone assassinations, along with 
the periodic lack of coordination between CIA and DoD drone attacks. Critics 
make a strong case that, outside of an authorized battlefield, drone warfare should 
be prohibited altogether. So should assassinations. Despite these widespread res-
ervations about murder-by-drone, in January of 2020, President Trump ordered 
the death of Qassem Soleimani while this high-ranking Iranian leader and head 
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force was visiting in Iraq. This 
decision was an unfortunate use of a US Reaper drone, extending this method of 
killing to a government official and inviting similar retaliations against US offi-
cials by Tehran’s secret agents. Outside of official battlefields, killing is  ipso facto
immoral – with the exceptions of immediate self-defence or the careful targeting 
of terrorist groups proven to have murdered US citizens. 
This Trump-ordered hit invites an international free-for-all among state and 
non-state assassins, whether at the controls of a drone, wielding a poison-tipped 
umbrella, or wearing a suicide vest. The end result could be international chaos, 
with outcomes unlikely to benefit the United States – mainly a crumbling world 
order that would surely endanger America’s own leaders. After all, government 
officials in the democracies live in fishbowls and are comparatively easy targets. 
As well, assassinations seldom achieve their ostensible goal of bringing peace to 
a region; and they mostly fail in execution, as the more than 30 plots by the CIA
against Fidel Castro testify ( Turner 2005 ). 
As for covert actions overall, based on the historical record, one should be 
sceptical about any claim that the vast majority of such operations have pro-
tected and advanced America’s global interests. Among the knowledgeable and 
thoughtful sceptics is former Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Admiral 
Dennis Blair, who has observed: “if we’d have done none of them we would 
probably be better off, and certainly no worse off than we are today” ( Maz-
zetti 2013 , 80). One of the top leaders on the Church Committee, Senator Walter 
“Fritz” Mondale (D, Minnesota), concluded that past covert actions have been 
characterized by “high political costs and generally meager benefits” ( Johnson 
1985 , 224). In brief, covert action has had occasional success and should be 
kept in reserve, but with the caveat that this method should be resorted to only 
in emergency situations, most notably as a PM supplement in times of autho-
rized overt warfare or to stymie terrorist activities aimed at the United States and 
its allies. 
While the future is too unpredictable to construct precise and binding rules in 
perpetuity regarding the proper use of these secret initiatives, some sensible rules 
of the road have emerged over the years as the United States gained experience in 
world affairs. A starting place is to acknowledge that PMs in support of authorized 
overt warfare make sense, as long as they stay out of the Red Zones. William H 
Webster, DCI from 1987–91, has offered additional benchmarks for deciding on 
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the DO to a series of thoughtful questions before he would approve a covert action 
( Johnson 2011 , 281): 
• is it legal (that is, does it follow the approval and reporting rules laid out by 
Hughes-Ryan and the Oversight laws of 1980 and 1991)? 
• is it consistent with American foreign policy and, if not, why not? 
• is it consistent with American values? 
• if it becomes public, will it make sense to the American people – what is 
sometimes referred to as the New York Times test? 
Most important, though, is the vital ingredient discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter: the pride of place that process must claim in any true democracy. The 
glory of an open society is debate, and the precious gift given to the American 
people by the founders was a system of government designed to require debate 
among the branches of government. Sole executive authority was anathema to 
their philosophy, and, indeed, to the wisest philosophers throughout history. 
Debate – held within the confines of the CIA (experts) and the NSC (elected 
officials and experts), along with the SSCI and HPSCI (elected officials and 
experts) – is the  sine quo non for elevating the chances of foreign policy success 
while, at the same time, retaining a high moral standing in America’s use of the 
Third Option. 
Further, the United States should always be mindful of a Fourth Option: leading 
by example – doing the right thing that others, at home and abroad, will respect 
and admire; acting with a dignity and patience befitting the world’s oldest and 
strongest democracy; staying within the white lines of law and propriety; keeping 
the high moral ground by pursuing a principled foreign policy. “If America has 
a service to perform in the world – and I believe it has”, observed the chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the 1960s, J William Fulbright, 
D-Arkansas, “it is in large part the service of its own example”. 6 Exploding cigars, 
poisoned dart guns, foreign crop and livestock destruction, mining distant har-
bours, the use of torture – these are not the kind of activities that America has 
valued since its founding. On the contrary, the United States is the nation that 
supported the Marshall Plan, that sends hospital ships around the world to aid the 
unwell, that responds to hurricane disasters wherever they may strike, that cham-
pions human rights in the international arena. 
Two of America’s finest diplomats have reached similar conclusions. “When 
we mine harbors in Nicaragua, we fuzz the difference between ourselves and the 
Soviet Union”, lamented George Ball during the Cold War ( Ball 1984 , 37). “We 
act out of character, which no great power can do without diminishing itself”. 
More recently, a former US Ambassador to Mexico with 31 years of service at the 
Department of State, Roberta Jacobson rues the abandonment of the moral high 
ground that America once enjoyed. “The loss of those principles makes us ‘like 
everyone else’ in a world where ‘everyone does it’”, she concludes ( Jacobson 
2019 ), adding that this loss “makes us less safe, less prosperous, and less of an 
example”. 
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In contrast to these views, Mike Pompeo, a recent agency director who went on  
to become Secretary of State in the Trump Administration, recommended a rather 
different approach to world affairs. “The CIA, to be successful”, he advised, 
“must be aggressive, vicious, unforgiving, relentless” ( Mogelson 2019 , 43). He 
seemed to be channelling his hyper-realist predecessor at State, Henry Kissinger, 
who believed that morality is something best left for Sunday morning church 
gatherings, not for use as a guide in the Machiavellian world of international rela-
tions. In response to State Department officials who were advocating more US 
attention to global human rights, Secretary Kissinger reportedly observed, “The 
State Department is made up of people who have a vocation for the ministry. 
Because there were not enough churches for them, they went into the Department 
of State” ( Rohter 2003 , 7). 
 Which of these pathways should America follow? That question is for US citi-
zens and their representatives in Washington to resolve. This chapter suggests, 
though, that the United States has much work ahead if it wishes to restore its 
moral leadership in the world, becoming again the beacon of hope and democracy 
that it once was during the early years of the Cold War. Adopting a more discrimi-
nating approach to covert action would be a worthy place to begin. 
 Notes 
 1 Remarks delivered by Kissinger on “Evening News”,  NBC Television Network , January 
13, 1978. 
 2 It would be easy, and entirely wrong, to misconstrue the remarks presented here as an 
attack on the CIA. Over a 100 agency officers have given their lives for the United States 
as paramilitary operatives and in other intelligence-related duties abroad. I admire and 
respect the service given to the nation by its intelligence officers; I am only trying here 
to evaluate objectively the merits of covert action as an arm of American foreign policy. 
3  On the importance of morality in the conduct of intelligence activities, see Omand and 
Phythian, who write: “ethical issues should not be left to the intelligence community to 
assess alone within that secret world” ( Omand and Phythian 2018 , 198). 
 4 “Bill’s view on the separation of powers was not overlapping authority keeping all 
branches in check, but keeping the other branches neutralized, leaving a robust execu-
tive power to rule”, observes law professor Douglas Kmiec, who proceeded Barr as head 
of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice ( Bazelon 2019 , 4). 
5  For a “ladder of escalation” of CAs, rising from modest to extreme proposals, see  John-
son (1992 ). 
 6 112  Cong. Rec . 10808 (1966). 
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 11 Jus ad vim 
War, peace and the ethical status 
of the in-between 
Nicholas Melgaard and David Whetham 
A good crisis 
“Never let a good crisis go to waste” has been attributed to different political 
leaders at different times, in different political circumstances. The difficulty in 
crediting this aphorism is probably evidence of its near universal applicability. 
Opportunistic coercive activity that falls through the cracks between war and 
peace, is the subject of this chapter. Political actors can use significant events 
within or between countries to circumvent normal barriers. While attention is 
focused on a major issue elsewhere, it creates opportunities for action in areas 
that would normally have a much higher transaction cost for getting involved. The 
world looks left; some cunning political actor moves right. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has been one such unwasted crisis. Russia and pos-
sibly China seem to have done just this with the recent coronavirus pandemic.1 
Reports quickly spread of the large-scale, coordinated state-supported effort to 
amplify division, spread misinformation, undermine trust in national and inter-
national responses ( Rankin 2020 ). A campaign began by simply amplifying the 
disinformation that an open society was perfectly capable of creating itself. But 
this was then developed into a focused attempt to hack the labs creating a vaccine 
for information about its storage and distribution protocols ( Corera 2020 ). The 
direct goal might not have been the loss of life. Still, the entirely predictable effect 
of such actions will be the undermining of public confidence in a necessary health 
initiative. The indirect result could certainly be an increase in deaths. 
Oscar Jonsson (2019 ) argues convincingly that the Russian government sees 
war and peace not as binary states but as a spectrum, with information warfare 
now being capable of achieving political goals commensurate with war ( Jonsson 
2019 ). With this in mind, Gary  Corn (2020 ) discusses in a recent article how Russia 
hates to waste a crisis ( Corn 2020 ). He summarises, “Information operations are 
a key component of Russia’s strategy for confronting Western democracies, and 
covert deception and disinformation form the core of its active campaigns”. Yet 
another modern actor to whom our ancient aphorism could credibly be credited. 
The sowing of controlled chaos, promotion of dissension and disorder: these are 
not incidental effects, but rather consciously deployed instruments aimed at the 
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They target the faith and confidence between societies, and the international insti-
tutions that have supported the cooperation that has underpinned the flourishing 
of the West since the end of World War II. Russia’s actions aren’t about defeating 
the West. The intention is to weaken it and level the playing field. Perhaps then, 
Global Russia will be able to reassert itself. 
An important question then arises. Brutal as it is, we have an appropriate ethical 
framework for dealing with the traditional means of warfare. The just war tradi-
tion, a constantly evolving body of thought seeking to enable structured ethical 
discussion at the very extremes of human behaviour, has been developing since 
antiquity. But we have next to no specific ethical framework to deal with this 
other kind of subversive political activity. What rules should govern a response to 
dishonest coercive opportunism? In this case, we might ask what level of sub-war 
threshold political activity we are willing to find “acceptable”, or at least, what 
do we recognize as falling short of an “armed attack”, permitting us to cross the 
threshold into war ourselves as a response? If not war, what is the appropriate 
response to information- and communication-based threats? What are we morally 
permitted actually to do? 
Why does it matter? 
It would be a mistake to consider the Just War a purely Western Tradition. Still, 
in the form it is most often framed, it is a synthesis of classical Greco-Roman and 
later Christian values ( Johnson 1981 ). It also embraces a way of thinking that 
results in a “common language for discussing and debating the rights and wrongs 
of conflict” ( Whetham 2010 , 65). The just war tradition provides guidance on 
what is acceptable, and (most importantly) not acceptable, even in times of war. 
It states that there should be limits on when the use of force can be considered 
legitimate (the jus ad bellum), and that there should also be limits on what and 
whom that force can be directed against (the jus in bello). 
Fundamentally, this way of thinking assumes that there is a difference between 
the situation of war and the situation of peace. This is very important to the pres-
ent discussion. The “declaration by a legitimate authority” is considered so impor-
tant, not just because of the need to ensure one has the right to wage war, but the 
declaration element signifies a political community’s move from one understand-
ing of context to another. The new context permits one to do things that one would 
otherwise not be allowed to do. This includes, of course, the deliberate taking of 
human life as an extension of the idea of collective self-defence. This is the apex 
of ethical discussion in armed conflict; the reason why some things are allowed in 
war that would be unthinkable in peace. The  ad bellum determination means that 
such acts can be engaged with on behalf of one’s community. The fact that plans 
to do this can be premeditated and formulated in advance shows the difference 
between this and the peace-time actions of a police officer responding to a call out 
and forced to draw their weapon when the bank robber turns out to be armed. One 
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out with the intention of killing them before one even leaves the police station. 
Not so in war. 
At least the police officer knows the context she is operating in. In the same 
way, military staff officers planning a military operation are generally clear 
whether their planning assumptions are based in the context of an international 
armed conflict, non-international armed conflict or some kind of peace support 
mission in which the use of lethal force is still generally considered as an avail-
able option. But where do state-sponsored hostile information operations that can 
result in indirect harm, or even death, sit in this understanding? Robert Gates, 
US Secretary of Defense, describes ( 2009 ) this ambiguity very unambiguously: 
“the categories of warfare are blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes” 
( Gates 2009 ). 
So what are our options? As much as we would like to see “the West” as ethi-
cally principled, this is naturally an area in which our own state wishes to act 
as well. Of course, it must do, and not only in a purely defensive role. The fact 
that such measures are technically “non-violent” and less immediately risky than 
“boots on the ground” must count towards their attractiveness. 
The first option is that we can choose to apply the exceptional permissions 
afforded by a state of war by acting as if we are in a state of constant conflict, 
with everything that goes along with this. The second is that we can limit our 
responses to the peacetime model of permissible action and address the threats as 
criminal activities rather than as acts of war. 2 This latter response has some cred-
ibility, at least in terms of providing a clear framework to the problem. One should 
expect the police to deal with such threats, gather evidence and hand it over to the 
prosecutors to make the decision to charge in a court or not. In the case of actors 
not based in the same territory where harmful actions have taken place (where a 
domestic court is not suitable), issues are raised through diplomatic channels and 
demands made for the relevant jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible. In the 
case of disinformation, this could either be dealt with as an “incitement to xxx” 
type charge, or perhaps as a civil defamation case, dealt with through the civil 
courts (with the risk of damages being payable if the issue is found to be proved 
on the balance of probabilities).3 Of course, this sort of thing takes a great deal of 
time. The results may simply be ignored. Or foreign jurisdictions able to act might 
simply decide not to.4 It might then be up to the politicians to choose what to do 
through diplomatic channels, with powerful states being able to mobilize inter-
national public opinion in the form of collective political or economic sanctions. 
Or they may not. What is certain is that while it is possible that something on this 
range of actions might conceivably act as a deterrent to the behaviour occurring in 
the first place, being unable to respond in kind, or even threaten to do so because 
one would be breaking the same laws, makes deterrence lack a large element of 
its necessary credibility. 
Countering such behaviour within one’s own peacetime rules will possibly 
therefore be inadequate. Peacetime laws are supposed to protect people from 
harm, not give them permission to harm others. Special permissions are needed to 
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who is assaulting an old lady, for example. But extending the idea of self-defence 
to permit such activity in a third-party state is effectively moving the framework 
of understanding from the individual-based rights and permissions of peacetime, 
to the collective self-defence ideas inherent in wartime. 
To see such behaviours as causing harms commensurate with armed conflict, 
thus warranting a war-like response, certainly carries with it a better chance of 
deterrence. But is it really war? Thomas  Rid (2012 ) prefers to see this kind of 
“sub-war” activity as “neither crime nor war, but rather in the same category as 
subversion, spying or sabotage, existing somewhere on the spectrum between 
apolitical crime at one end and genuine war at the other” ( Rid 2012 , 7). This 
seems to echo the understanding (or at least practice) of the Russian state. If the 
traditional binary – war versus peace – conception is no longer appropriate, and 
one chooses to try and understand contemporary conflict as more like a spectrum 
of activity, how does this help us answer the question regarding what we are actu-
ally morally permitted to do on this spectrum? 
Jus ad vim 
There is a view that the “consensus behind just war theory is slowly beginning 
to wane and the relevance of the theory gradually eroding”. Jai Galliot (2019 ) 
comments that due in part to the changing means of political control, many “have 
begun to find that there is a limit to the extent to which the traditional principles 
and usual rules of war found in just war theory . . . . can be stretched to cover 
modern conflict”. Such a range of conflicts includes the very different environ-
ments of Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria. Galliot focuses on a discus-
sion of “kinetic” (violent) force in periods of ill-defined, fluid armed conflict, yet 
the idea is the same for political, information-based action. Such cases, Galliot 
observes “tend to focus on individual rather than categories of people and involve 
the employment of emerging military technologies”, they are “somewhat resistant 
to moral evaluation within the state-centric framework of the traditional just war 
theory” ( Galliot 2019 , 3–4). When the subject of power becomes so individu-
alized, the traditional context-based justification of wartime behaviour becomes 
very difficult to sustain. 
Still, the reasons why such ideas of jus ad vim have taken hold are not difficult to 
understand. According to Brunstetter and Braun in their highly influential paper in 
2013 responding to the outlining of the idea by Michael Walzer,  jus ad vim activity 
is just “nominally easier to justify”. Ad vim measures require less of a commit-
ment from politicians and statesmen than measures that clearly fall above the war 
threshold, but still permit you to do more than in the domestic peacetime context 
(Brunstetter and Braun 2013, 88). It has been popular because there is a gap in the 
ethical market for clear and consistent scaffolding to provide structure to decision-
making below the threshold of traditionally understood armed conflict, whether 
this is a raid, surgical strike, drone attack or subversive information campaign. 
Rather than accepting that all legitimate warlike actions can be justified because 
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satisfied (i.e. one’s state is now at war),  ad vim requires that each specific non-
peaceful act is assessed against the ad bellum criteria on its own merits. Does the 
specific act have a just cause related to an injury or harm received or threatened; 
does the individual or institution carrying out the act have sufficient authority and 
have they declared why they are responding in such a way; is it the real reason 
why one is seeking to act, that is does the actor have the appropriate intention; 
is the response proportionate to the injury suffered or threatened; will the action 
have a reasonable prospect of being successful and finally, has everything else 
that might work within the normal range of actions (domestic law, diplomatic 
sanctions etc.) already been attempted? 
If these criteria can be met, the act itself may be permitted, but how is one to 
carry it out? If one were to accept this new category, the next natural step would 
be just applying the ethical framework for activity in bello to such sub-threshold 
behaviour.  In bello rules already specify who and what may be made the object of 
attack and to what extent. While the spectrum of activity is potentially broad and 
can cover everything from kinetic attacks through to non-physical information 
operations aimed at shaping actions or perceptions, in theory at least, the same in 
bello rules could apply, supplementing the  ad bellum principles so they are taken 
all together for each act. In that respect, “changing weapon systems does not 
change the moral demands on those operating the systems” ( Skerker 2021 ). The 
rights of those being targeted, and those who will be affected even if not directly 
targeted, still need to be taken into account. 
However, simply transferring the existing rules from a state of declared war is 
not as viable as it at first might sound. For example, Brunstetter and Braun (2013 ) 
argue that the principle of “last resort” simply does not make sense transferred 
from an ad bellum to an ad vim context because it is war itself that is the last 
resort rather than the type of behaviours that fit here – these are the steps that are 
being tried before the last resort of war itself (Brunstetter and Braun 2013, 97). 
They are also concerned that the principle of proportionality may inadvertently 
permit escalation – something that goes against the very reason why politicians 
may choose to act in this area in the first place. One of the attractions for operat-
ing in this area is precisely because the actions do not cross the war threshold or 
pitch one’s country into a state of armed conflict. If this consideration is ignored, 
then action taken may very quickly escalate resulting in open hostilities (Brunstet-
ter and Braun 2013, 98). The point for policy makers is to be able to act and 
respond in this area within an ethical framework that can guide appropriate behav-
iour, without resulting in the kind of large-scale harms that war almost inevitably 
involves. 
Brunstetter and Braun ask, “what would a theory of jus ad vim that counters 
the shortcomings of the jus ad bellum framework in this context look like?” 
(Brunstetter and Braun 2013, 88). These revised principles for  jus ad vim and 
in bello can also then be used for other “non-kinetic” means as well ( Lupton 
2019 ). Their solution is to “recalibrate”  jus ad bellum criteria by adding a new 
principle, the probability of escalation. Their argument is that a similar set of 
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risk of escalation ought to be minimized. This is a completely understandable 
step to take. Given sub-threshold conflict remains outside the boundaries of all-
out war, the potential for a crisis to develop is a key consideration, whereas this 
might cease to be relevant if and when a situation of all-out war has already been 
accepted. However, for the reasons that we set out in the following, we think this 
recalibration does not solve things in the way intended. 
Jus ad vim, categories and shifting contexts 
Our first concern is that such an articulation is incomplete. Avoiding escalation 
alone surely does not imply moral equity. For example, if I am a vastly superior 
state, I could probably guarantee that the other weaker state I am bullying will be 
too fearful to retaliate, at least directly. Therefore, while there may be proxy actors 
or tools that can provide an element of deterrence, there may in fact be very little 
chance of escalation from their side. This surely does not mean that I am more 
justified in this behaviour. 
More generally, the issue with Brunstetter and Braun’s argument is that it 
implies that everything is ok so long as the situation does not escalate. They 
accept that escalation is not always a worse course of action, and increased coer-
cion is not always immoral, but argue that ensuring that any  ad vim action does 
not lead to the outbreak of war is “essential” (Brunstetter and Braun 2013, 99). 
We believe this represents fundamentally a frustrating aversion to confrontation 
for its own sake, and an unwillingness to accept that confrontation in one form 
or another might actually be more ethically viable than its alternatives. War is, 
after all, permitted as a last resort in the just war tradition only when the evil it 
is seeking to avert or turn back is genuinely considered to be worse than that of 
war itself. Without this acceptance that war may sometimes be (although admit-
tedly rarely) the least-worse option, we see the “pacificism by other means” argu-
ment often levelled against modern revisionism apply in a similar way. If there 
is a starting prejudice against confrontation in any circumstances, then the inertia 
of any variation of Just War theory built on its foundations will always drag it 
towards pacificist inactivity. While attempting to prevent escalation may indeed 
be entirely appropriate, prudent and ethical in many or even most situations, when 
considering the importance of deterring harmful behaviours, to have a principle 
that prohibits acts that might lead to escalation seems the equivalent of publicly 
ruling out ground troops from a planned military intervention.5 An act that dem-
onstrates a lack of resolve and signals a lack of willingness to back up one’s 
actions with the necessary commitment to be able to see it through is likely to be 
shrugged off by any opponent who is willing to bear the stated limited costs one 
is willing to impose. 
We believe that this problem comes from seeing  jus ad vim as an attempt to pro-
vide a new category of moral decision-making in the ambiguous murky world that 
sits below the threshold of all-out war, but above peace. We use the terms “below”, 
“above”, “threshold”, “phase” to talk about these forms of war. But we might just 
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the agreed upon context of being in a state of war. The concept of jus ad vim sug-
gests that measures such as surgical strikes, limited force, information campaigns 
and other forms of limited coercion fall into a third category. As such, they are 
subject to rules that are different to those that pertain in either peace or war. 
Our issue with this is that it is trying to solve the difficulty of switching between 
categories by creating another category. For “category” we might also read “con-
text”. The problem is not that the contexts or categories we use to judge certain 
behaviours have ceased to be “fit for purpose” (to use a military expression). The 
problem is our insistence on judging behaviour based on contexts and categories. 
Any such moral theory will be doomed to failure as real world circumstances 
inevitably develop. Indeed, our reluctance to accept a new threshold as a solution 
to tired and irrelevant old thresholds is in large part due to why such measures are 
so frequently employed. It is precisely because they fall outside the recognized 
social conditions of “war” that surgical strikes, or COVID-related misinforma-
tion for that matter, have become so popular. A whole set of expectations and 
legal parameters exist on either side of this line. Valerie Morkevicius and Danielle 
Lupton (2019 ) comment that: “one reason just war principles may be subject to 
political abuse is that the concept of war itself is treated as a binary concept by 
contemporary just war thinkers” ( Lupton 2019 , 36). As Jonsson argues earlier, the 
challenge that we are faced with today is that our competitors do not recognize 
that line, or have deliberately circumvented where we have chosen to draw our 
own lines. New categories will simply inspire a new wave of the same kind of 
creative categorization that got us to this discussion in the first place. 
Rephrasing the challenge 
The alternative to drawing category distinctions is to accept that contemporary 
conflict can be better understood as a spectrum. Along with Rid (above), and 
apparently, conforming with “the Russian way of war”, Morkevicius and Lutpon 
find that “the insights from the field of international relations make it clear that 
war, as it is traditionally understood, is actually a location on a broader continuum 
of political violence” ( Lupton 2019 , 52). This would suggest that a sliding scale 
of what you are permitted to do along a spectrum would be more useful for deter-
mining the appropriate ethical guidance ( Garraway 2008 ). 
The Just War framework “is about exceptions”, providing a structure for figur-
ing out when you can do things you are not otherwise allowed to do.6 The “excep-
tions” of wartime behaviour are justified by reference to a change in context: 
between war and peace. When one’s political community determines that this sta-
tus has changed, it means that previously prohibited acts can now be entertained. 
The declaration of war is a community’s articulation and recognition of a new and 
exceptional context. As such it is a social construct rather than an objective point 
that can be definitely observed.7 
But as we have already seen, its principles are useful beyond this very specific 
context as well. When applied to situations where the political community has 
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determining when exceptions can be made, and if they can, the in bello rules can 
still guide us into what we may do, or how far it is permissible to go. Do they need 
any help? We have already rejected the anti-escalation consideration earlier. Is 
that because we believe the combination of the two sets of criteria are genuinely 
sufficient on their own? We think that this may indeed be the case. Given the 
extremely long pedigree of the testing of those criteria, and the way they embrace 
a combination of absolute deontological requirements, while demanding consid-
erations of both consequential and prudential factors, we believe it may simply be 
a matter of emphasis rather than the creation of new criteria. 
Rather than being a “state-centric framework”, no longer appropriate for an 
age of non-state and sub-state actors ( Galliot 2019 , 3–4), we would argue that the 
just war tradition predates the modern, state-based system by some two thousand 
years.8 Its criteria have evolved over that time and have been applied to the wars 
of nation-states just as they were applied to the conflicts of city states, princedoms 
and empires in the middle ages.9 While the way we need to apply them must adapt 
to the changing character of war, we hold that the overlapping criteria remain 
remarkably robust for determining when an exception may be made in many dif-
ferent situations, not just war. 
The greatest challenge is not the criteria themselves, but that they have evolved 
over several millennia to give us a framework for determining these exceptions 
and in the process been given the collective title of “the just war tradition”. But 
that does not mean that the criteria are only useful in that context – the same 
types of reasoning can be applied to any situation in which one is seeking to do 
something normally prohibited. It could therefore be usefully thought of as a “Just 
Exception Tradition”. 
Take for example a “citizen’s arrest”. Normally, one cannot hold another per-
son against their will, but there are certain exceptional instances where one can 
reasonably curtail someone’s liberty. In the United Kingdom, detaining someone 
against their will is itself a criminal offence, but the right to do this has been 
in common law for centuries under certain circumstances.10 While we are less 
interested in the legal articulation, the key thing here is the ethical principles that 
underpin this long understanding of when it is permissible (but never required) 
to break one rule in order to uphold another. There is a seriousness threshold that 
must be considered (just cause leading to delegated authority to act). You must 
also believe at the time (right intention) that it is not reasonably practicable for 
a police officer to perform this task (last resort), and that the action is genuinely 
necessary to prevent (reasonable prospect of success) a specific person (discrimi-
nation): causing physical injury to themselves or any other person; suffering phys-
ical injury; causing loss of or damage to property or making off before a constable 
can assume responsibility for them (macro proportionality).11 Anyone attempting 
such an arrest must inform the subject why they are being held (declaration) and 
what they are suspected of (the just cause again). Obviously, one can’t use more 
force to do this than is considered reasonable in the circumstances (proportion-
ality): “So, one can physically restrain a thief, but one cannot rape him; read 








194 Nicholas Melgaard and David Whetham 
serious trouble if the exceptional criteria are not met – for example, you could be 
found guilty of false imprisonment, and/or assault. 
What are the contextual factors that need to be taken into account when seeking 
to defend the state and its citizens against hostile intervention? All of the Just War 
criteria overlap and must be considered as a whole rather than as an individual 
checklist, and while this is a subject that needs much further attention, here we 
look at two criteria in particular as they have already been discussed earlier – last 
resort and proportionality – as well as the role of discrimination and intention. 
We think that, just as the other criteria need to be understood in context, the 
last resort criterion does still make sense even if one is not determining if the 
threshold to declare war has been crossed. War itself is the last resort when one is 
thinking about the former, but in this case, we are actually asking if there are any 
measures that don’t require exceptions to be made that might work but haven’t 
yet been tried. For example, Walzer prudently suggests that nonlethal policing 
actions, akin to what must be undertaken in zones of peace, should be prioritized 
first ( Walzer 2007 , 482). Only if these have not worked should the exception 
be made to permit the type of actions normally prohibited in peacetime. This is 
necessary precisely because the blanket permissions granted by a state of war do 
not exist. 
While Brunstetter and Braun (and many others) are uncomfortable with the 
traditional criteria of proportionality, which can be seen as a “nebulous and inde-
terminate constraint” (Brunstetter and Braun 2013, 98), we think that it can still 
be extremely valuable. In war we know that what is at stake is a significant factor 
in determining what is justifiable. While some things remain forbidden regardless 
of context, there are some things that will change as the stakes get higher. For 
example, in a war of national survival, it may be permissible to cause more harm 
to those who have not made themselves liable to harm – that is non-combatants – 
as a foreseeable but undesired side effect of one’s actions directed towards your 
state’s survival, than if one were engaged in a very limited peace enforcement 
mission in which the aim is to get humanitarian assistance to those in desperate 
need. In such a situation, it would seem 
inappropriate and even perverse to move the burden of risk on to that same 
population, accepting a high degree of collateral damage, for example, in an 
effort to minimize one’s own casualties when the very purpose of being there 
is to protect those people who are now being put at additional risk. 
 ( Whetham 2010 , 83) 
We agree with Brunstetter and Braun that, on the whole, discrimination must 
be applied in an even stricter sense than at the ad bellum level. But, this is to do 
with where on the conflict spectrum this activity is likely to be placed – what 
is at stake – rather than because it is happening in a different category of activ-
ity. Returning to the sliding scale/spectrum understanding of conflict mentioned 
earlier, this may require the sacrificing of individual rights to protect even more 
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terrorist threat against a whole city might require some civilians to be put at risk 
of harm or even death. This may be true regardless of whether it takes place dur-
ing declared hostilities or not. To prohibit the exception because the category is 
wrong is to fail the test of protecting one’s people. As such, the spectrum is what is 
important, not the artificial category. This also has implications for the application 
of proportionality at the in bello level. 
Finally, we agree with Brunstetter and Braun about the essential importance of 
intention. We think the emphasis here is of particular importance for the way that 
the in bello criteria of discrimination and proportionality are to be understood in 
this different context. We accept (as did the medieval scholars who debated these 
ideas 1000 years before us) that intention shapes the moral and physical quality of 
action, so there is a direct link between intention and the normal in bello criteria 
limiting who may be intentionally harmed and to what extent.12 Right intention 
must be directed towards upholding the rights of the Other ( Skerker 2021 ). 
Directing an information attack against an agent of a hostile state causes no 
problems in wartime, and an exception can easily be justified if the stakes are 
sufficiently high outside of wartime. Creating a martyr by manipulating the social 
media of a regular civilian with no direct connection to the hostile acts being 
perpetrated by their state, in order to get that person arrested or killed (so their 
cause can be highlighted and used as a way to manipulate public opinion and 
ultimately change their government’s policy) would be to go far beyond what was 
permitted. While one could perhaps justify the  in bello considerations in terms of 
“it’s not us doing the bad things to them – it’s their state”, this would be using the 
targeted person as simply a means to an end. One cannot escape moral responsi-
bility by claiming that the result was foreseeable but unintended if the suffering is 
a required and intended part of the effect one is seeking. 
In a broader sense though, right intention shapes more than the relationship 
with a specific target. Intentions do matter, and the idea of returning to the status 
quo ante bellum is very different from aspiring to return to something more posi-
tive. War must not be characterized as a return to anything. It seems almost impos-
sible to make moral arguments if this is the case. 
Our point in essence is that war and conflict must be justified as an activity 
towards an eventual improvement if it is to be justified at all. Simply restoring 
the ante-bellum conditions that led to the outbreak of war is a rather depressing 
justification for all the suffering and bloodshed it would involve. The belief that 
things cannot gradually get better is at once a belief in the inevitability of war, and 
at once a belief that we have no power to prevent it. The premise that war arises 
as an aggregate of human decision-making seems indisputable, however complex 
a social phenomenon the origins of a given war might be. The idea that we exer-
cise choice to go to war, and can choose how we behave whilst fighting is surely 
the most basic premise of the just war tradition. Any form of moral discussion 
requires this. To claim that war is inevitable, but also concede that war is fun-
damentally a result of choices (and thus subject to moral discussion), is a totally 
incompatible pair of beliefs to hold. One must admit that a given conflict rests on 
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therefore things can indeed improve. Any moral decision-making in the context of 
conflict must at least acknowledge the possibility of things improving over time. 
As such, just as acts of perfidy are prohibited because they undermine the essen-
tial faith in the rules themselves ( Whetham 2009 , 6), actions that destroy the foun-
dations of knowledge or damage the long-term social cohesion even of a currently 
hostile state cannot be justified. It is impossible to see how this type of action, even 
if successful in undermining the will of an adversary, can actually lead to a better 
situation in the long run when the situation is viewed as a whole. In the same way, 
the just war tradition has long accepted that while it is acceptable to take the food 
or crops necessary for the subsistence of troops, it is never justified to destroy the 
means of making any more. For example, Deuteronomy (20:10, 19) forbids the 
destruction of fruit-bearing trees. “Condemning the civil population to starvation 
was hardly a way of promoting long-term reconciliation” ( Whetham 2010 , 69). 
Conclusion 
Let us return to the case of “sub-threshold behaviour”. We might ask whether act 
of political subversion, such as undermining another country’s COVID response, 
was indeed an act of war. The transmission of information was being deliberately 
obscured and undermined by an external actor. However, the question of whether 
this counted as an “act of war” merely serves to buy into an episodic, context-
based set of justifications that are clearly not relevant anymore. It is not that there 
is a different and more satisfying answer to the question of when the balance tips 
over into a state of war, from a state of peace; the entire convention of justifying 
behaviour according to contexts and states is unviable. 
Those who say this unacceptably blurs the distinction between war and peace 
are, unfortunately, disconnected from the current reality on the ground. One can-
not simply lament that the reality doesn’t fit the socially constructed theory so, 
therefore, reality must change. It is up to a state or representative political com-
munity to determine if it is in a declared state of war or not, but the fact that harms 
can be deliberately committed against it without that state wishing to make such 
a declaration does not mean that it is only able to act using the tools of peacetime. 
Creating a new category between peace and war is one way of doing this, but for 
the reasons that we have set out earlier, we do not think this new category really 
solves the problem without creating new ones. Instead, we suggest that actions 
that go beyond the normally permitted may be justified as exceptions if they can 
satisfy the ad bellum and in bello reasoning we are already familiar with, with 
a special emphasis placed upon the intention criteria when considering the full 
ramifications of the proposed act. 
In practice, our Just War position would focus less on consequentialist-based 
arguments aimed at working within one context or shifting to another. The value 
of declarations of war and victory parades in such cases serves to demarcate these 
shifts in context. Without them we are left with the  ad vim problems mentioned 
earlier. Instead, the moral foundations of our position rest on a faith in the pos-
sibility of gradual progress towards peace. If this is not accepted as a possibility, 
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it becomes hard to have any moral discussion relating to armed conflict. Once this 
is taken as a foundational premise, individual actions are justified deontologically 
if they represent activity in the service of this progress. 
When faced with political or information-based subversion, the discussion of 
whether this fits into the neat categories of war, peace or a third category is a 
moot point. Not even traditionally understood wartime behaviour fits into the 
neat categories of war and peace anymore. Nothing is solved or rescued simply 
by adding an intervening level. We might ask instead whether information-based 
attacks represent a credible source of harm, and whether they can be met with 
similar measures in response according to a framework within which deontologi-
cal concerns based on an appreciation of human rights are respected. The answer 
to the first is “yes, absolutely”. To the second, “yes maybe”. Much more thinking 
is required in this area. While the reasoning inherent in the just war tradition may 
be a useful guide in a much wider range of situations than initially presumed, and 
can assist us with that necessary thinking, the discussion of jus ad vim must not 
be a discussion of how we continue to prop obsolete ideas up, but rather to assess 
the foundations upon which they are grounded. 
Notes 
1 For example, Rankin (2020 ) and The Soufan Centre (2020 ). 
2 Of course this works both ways, and we would either have to limit our own responses 
to the area of legally permissible activity, ignore the rules ourselves or create some kind 
of legal fiction behind which we can hide – a move that makes taking the moral high 
ground rather awkward. 
3 The balance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable doubt is the bar in civil 
cases, at least in the UK. 
4 We can’t help thinking about the South African diplomats in  Lethal Weapon , invoking 
“diplomatic immunity” each time they are about to be apprehended. 
5 We are thinking of Kosovo in 1999 here, but there are other supposedly straightforward 
conflicts that were hampered by early declarations of red lines for domestic audiences 
that signalled limited commitment to adversaries at the same time. 
6 A similar argument is made by  Lucas (2015 ). 
7 We accept that there may be situations in which a political community or state is objec-
tively being attacked, such as when it has been subject to a surprise nuclear strike, even 
when it does not know from where the attack has come. This raises an interesting situa-
tion in which a state might be at war, but not sure whom it is at war with. See Whetham 
(2016 ). 
8 If one takes that starting position to be the familiar 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. 
9 See  Whetham (2009 ). 
10 The current laws are set out in Section 24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) 
Act 1984. 
11 In the UK, such an offence needs to be of a seriousness that carries a potential prison 
sentence of over 6 months imprisonment. 
12 See Chapter 2 of  Whetham (2009 ). 
 References 
Brunstetter, Daniel, and Megan Braun. 2013. “From Jus ad Bellum to Jus ad Vim: Recalibrat-






























198 Nicholas Melgaard and David Whetham 
Corera, Gordon. 2020. “Coronavirus: Hackers Targeted Covid Vaccine Supply ‘Cold Chain’”.
BBC, December 3. Accessed February 1, 2021.  www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
55165552. 
Corn, Gary. 2020. “Coronavirus Disinformation and the Need for States to Shore Up Inter-
national Law”. Lawfare, February 4. Accessed February 2, 2021.  www.lawfareblog. 
com/coronavirus-disinformation-and-need-states-shore-international-law . 
Galliot, Jai. 2019. Force Short of War in Modern Conflict. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univer-
sity Press. 
Garraway, Charles. 2008. “The Relevance of Jus Post Bellum: A Practitioner’s Perspec-
tive”. In Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace, edited 
by Carsten Stahn and Jaan K. Kelffner. The Hague: Asser Press. 
Gates, Robert M. 2009. “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New 
Age”. Foreign Affairs, January/February. Accessed February 1, 2021. www.foreign 
affairs.com/articles/united-states/2009-01-01/balanced-strategy . 
Johnson, James T. 1981. The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War. Princeton:
Princeton University Press. 
Jonsson, Oscar. 2019.  The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines between War 
and Peace. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Lucas, George R., and David Whetham. 2015. “The Relevance of the Just War Tradition 
to Cyber Warfare”. In  Cyber Warfare: A Multidisciplinary Analysis, edited by James 
Green. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Lupton, Danielle, and Valerie Morkevicius. 2019. “The Fog of War: Violence, Coercion 
and Jus ad Vim”. In  Jus Ad Vim, edited by Jai Galliott. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 
Rankin, Jennifer. 2020. “Russian Media Spreading COVID Disinformation”.  The Guard-
ian, March 18. Accessed February 1, 2021.  www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/18/ 
russian-media-spreading-covid-19-disinformation. 
Rid, Thomas. 2012. “Cyber War Will Not Take Place”.  Journal of Strategic Studies 35 (1). 
Skerker, Michael. 2021. “The Rights of Foreign Targets in Cyber Operations”. In  Cyber 
Warfare Ethics: A Handbook for Military Professionals, edited by Michael Skerker and 
David Whetham. Havant: Howgate. 
The Soufan Centre. 2020. “Russia Exploits Coronavirus as New Opportunity to Spread
Disinformation”. Accessed February 2, 2021.  https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-
russia-exploits-coronavirus-as-new-opportunity-to-spread-disinformation/. 
Walzer, Michael. 2007. “On Fighting Terrorism Justly”.  International Relations 21. 
Whetham, David. 2009. Just Wars and Moral Victories: Surprise, Deception and the Nor-
mative Framework of European War in the Later Middle Ages. Leiden: Brill. 
———. 2010. “The Just War Tradition: A Pragmatic Compromise”. In  Ethics, Law and 
Military Operations, edited by David Whetham. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
———. 2016. “‘Are We Fighting Yet?’ Can Traditional Just War Concepts Cope with Con-












 12 Reaching the inflection point 
 The Hughes-Ryan Amendment 
and intelligence oversight 
Genevieve Lester and Frank Leith Jones
 Introduction 
Public acceptance of intelligence operations in a democracy requires trust in the 
government, including an acknowledgement of the government’s right to with-
hold information from the public. Such trust requires at least some mechanism 
for oversight of such operations to ensure democratic accountability. The devel-
opment of intelligence oversight in the United States has been driven by the 
executive-legislative relationship. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1974 marked a distinct change in the conduct of intelligence 
oversight in the United States. The amendment affected foreign policy, covert 
action and presidential plausible deniability. It was the first sign the relationship 
between the executive and legislative branches was about to undergo a significant 
change regarding intelligence. 
Public acceptance of intelligence operations in a democracy requires trust in 
the government, including an acknowledgement of the government’s right to 
withhold information from the public. The constitution explicitly laid the ground-
work for executive-legislative cooperation and competition in the area of foreign 
policy, but the relationship between the two branches regarding intelligence has 
developed largely in response to a changing threat environment and lawmakers’
decisions regarding their oversight responsibilities. These two factors have cre-
ated a state of tension, as the executive has ultimate control over the intelligence 
function, but Congress asserts oversight authority authorized through its consti-
tutional prerogatives, and by the will of the public in bestowing its trust in their 
elected officials. 
While scholars argue that there was some intelligence oversight in the early 
Cold War, it is generally held that prior to the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, over-
sight was a grudging responsibility ( Barrett 2005 ;  Marshall 2003 ). In the words of 
Senator Leverett Saltonstall, “The difficulty in connection with asking questions 
and obtaining information is that we might obtain information which I personally 
would rather not have, unless it was essential for me as a Member of Congress to 
The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
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have it” ( Stuart 2008 , 271). Or in the self-exculpatory words of Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence (DCI) William Colby in 1976: 
The old tradition was that you don’t ask. It was a consensus that intelligence 
was apart from the rules . . . that was the reason we did step over the line in 
a few cases, largely because no one was watching. No one was there to say, 
‘Don’t do that’. 
 ( Johnson 2018 , 104) 
Some literature on intelligence oversight implies that the public, acting in 
response to the abuses described on the front page of the New York Times, cata-
lysed the passage of Hughes-Ryan. This chapter, however, points to a series of 
congressional inflection points to explain why this amendment – the first serious 
intrusion on executive authority over covert action – took place when it did. It 
describes the political context of the amendment, how and why it was introduced 
and passed when it was, and then what the outcome was of this legislation, which 
challenged the concept of plausible deniability. It also explains why the shift 
that occurred, while definitive, was limited in scope, and introduces an analyti-
cal framework to help clarify how congressional activity can impact intelligence 
operations, an almost purely executive branch function. 
 Analytical framework 
This chapter integrates three strands to offer a more robust way of understanding 
the passage of Hughes-Ryan. The first strand is the oppositional relationship of 
institutional development, whereby friction between the executive and legisla-
tive branches of government leads to institutional development ( Lester 2015 ). 1 
As Whittington and Carpenter argue: “[S]ustained conflict between legislative 
and executive actors lies at the center of institutional change in American political 
development” ( Whittington and Carpenter 2003 , 509). This conflict had already 
begun well before the Hughes-Ryan Amendment as Congress began to reassert its 
role in US foreign policy in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.
A second strand considers congressional behaviour regarding foreign policy,
particularly after direct US involvement in the Vietnam War ended in 1973 and
the foreign policy consensus that had existed since the beginning of the Cold
War began to erode ( Scott and Carter 2002 , 153, 156). In 1974, that erosion
was not yet evident because the full revelation of CIA abuses had not come to
light. At that point, a less assertive Congress was still in play on foreign policy
issues. Congress was “cooperating with the president to achieve foreign policy
goals over which there is substantial consensus”, namely, countering the threat
of communist expansionism ( Scott and Carter 2002 , 164, 165). The communist
threat in the Western hemisphere was particularly worrisome to Congress and
the executive branch since the Castro regime had seized control of Cuba. The
election of Salvador Allende, a socialist backed by a coalition of left-wing polit-
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his government through a successful coup in September 1973, led by General
Augusto Pinochet.
A third strand investigates what slows the process of institutional change. In 
the case of change in Congress, process and rules, as well as powerful individuals 
whose interests align with the status quo can and are incentivized to act to obstruct 
change. “The institutional drag hypothesis” posits that “institutions through their 
inertia and rigidity retard” change or structural innovation, but there are other 
related factors, such as the seniority system, where “loyalty to the congressional 
institution is the [emphasis in the original] necessary leadership trait” ( Meeus and 
Oerlemans 2005 , 64). As one commentator noted regarding Congress, 
For generations, the House was a secretive, hierarchical, tradition-bound 
institution that gave little regard or influence to newcomers. Power was con-
centrated so assiduously in the handful of committee chairs that even the 
elected leadership hesitated to challenge the old men with the gavel. 
 ( Lawrence 2018 ) 
In this chapter’s discussion of the passage of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, 
the three strands of the framework explain how, when and why the amendment 
passed. Individual action occurred within the context of inter-branch friction, 
which both supports and inhibits development. We see policy entrepreneurs act-
ing within this context with the intention of advancing their agendas, while both 
institutional drag and the behavioural norms tied to maintenance of the status quo 
slow change. Ultimately, against the odds, progressive activity was successful. 
While the Hughes-Ryan Amendment was rather small in scope, it had an outsized 
impact on oversight, laying the foundation for the later development and institu-
tionalization of intelligence oversight. 
US policy and Chile 
In March 1972, columnist Jack Anderson uncovered information about commu-
nications between the Nixon administration and the International Telephone and 
Telegraph Corporation (IT&T) regarding the company’s interest in financially 
supporting potential attempts to prevent the inauguration of the democratically 
elected Chilean president, Salvador Allende. Anderson claimed he had documents 
that showed the CIA planned to disrupt the Chilean economy to the point where a 
military coup would occur ( New York Times 1972 ). 
In response, the Senate formed a subcommittee in May 1972 to determine 
whether there had been an attempt to plot Allende’s downfall, questioning whether 
CIA had been involved and focusing on the broader issue of how multinational 
corporations may have sought to influence US foreign policy generally. The CIA
attempted to have the issue of IT&T’s involvement transferred to the Senate’s 
Armed Services Committee, where it believed the issue would be protected from 
scrutiny ( Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations 1973 , 193). In September 
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Edward Kennedy (D-MA), joined by Senator James Abourezk (D-SD), pushed 
for constraints on US support to the government of General Augusto Pinochet. 
They asked for a resolution denying Chile foreign aid, and requested that hear-
ings be held regarding the junta’s known human rights abuses ( Johnson 2005 , 
197). Rumours began to circulate in the US and international press that the CIA
had been involved in the coup ( Time 1973 , 38, 45, 46;  Paterson 1987 ). With the 
Nixon administration under fire over the Watergate scandal, the balance of power 
between the two branches was shifting in favour of Congress, particularly to the 
liberal members who launched what was referred to as an “oversight revolution” 
( Paterson 1987 , 161). 
On April 22, 1974, Congressman Lucien Nedzi (D-MI), chairman of the House 
Armed Services Committee’s Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, held a 
closed session on US covert operations in Chile with DCI Colby, testifying. Colby 
informed Nedzi and the Armed Services Committee’s chief counsel, the only 
other person present, about the political actions that the CIA had taken against the 
socialist government of late President Allende. Off the record, Colby informed 
Nedzi that CIA involvement comprised other activities, including plans to help 
foment a coup. Colby, however, assured Nedzi that the CIA had nothing to do with 
the September 1973 military coup that brought down the Allende government and 
led to the leader’s death. The CIA’s plans for a coup had ended when the Chilean 
military opposed it. Further, Colby informed Nedzi that his testimony was avail-
able to all subcommittee members if they were interested in reviewing it. Nedzi 
made it known confidentially that the transcript would be made available to any 
member of the House who wanted to examine it as was allowable under House 
rules ( Miller 1974 ;  Prados 2003 , 291;  Snider 2008 , 273). 
Representative Michael Harrington, a Massachusetts Democrat and member 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was the only congressman to request 
permission to review the classified transcript. In June, Nedzi granted him access, 
after discussing the request with the Armed Services Committee chairman and 
obtaining Colby’s consent. Surprisingly, Colby stated that Nedzi could act as he 
saw fit, as he viewed the matter as an internal congressional affair. Harrington was 
appalled at what he read in the transcript. Subsequently, in a lengthy July 18 letter 
to Thomas Morgan (D-PA), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
and J William Fulbright (D-AR), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation Com-
mittee, Harrington outlined Colby’s testimony and requested a comprehensive 
investigation into the US role in the overthrow of the Allende government. His 
appeal to Morgan proved futile, although Senator Fulbright responded that he 
appreciated Harrington’s exasperation. The Senate, Fulbright admitted, “at least 
has been unwilling to exercise control over the CIA” (one estimate is that more 
150 such proposals had been rejected by Congress in the past) ( Miller 1974 ). He 
believed a potential solution was the establishment of a joint congressional com-
mittee with authority to “exercise control” of the agency. He also offered to work 
with Harrington on proposed legislation ( Miller 1974 ;  O’ Leary 1974b ). 
Undaunted, Harrington persisted in his efforts to bring attention to the Nixon 
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oversight of CIA covert operations. The same month, he introduced two bills 
aimed at strengthening congressional oversight of the CIA. One of the bills Har-
rington introduced called for the establishment of a “15-member House Commit-
tee on Intelligence Operations”. The committee would meet monthly to review 
intelligence operations and require members of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
to participate. Harrington contended that the House Armed Services Committee’s 
five-member panel was not conducting adequate oversight of the CIA’s activities 
( New York Times 1974a ). 
One month later President Nixon resigned over the Watergate scandal, and Vice 
President Ford was confronted with an ugly fact when on the same day he par-
doned Nixon – September 8 – New York Times journalist Seymour Hersh claimed 
that US officials may have misled Congress when they claimed that the CIA was 
not involved in the overthrow of Allende ( Hersh 1974a ;  New York Times 1974b ; 
 Wicker 1974 ). 
Hersh based his reporting on the letters Harrington sent to Morgan and Ful-
bright, in which the Massachusetts’ legislator described Colby’s testimony in an
“account from memory” ( Wicker 1974 ). Harrington had informed Morgan that
Colby testified that the Nixon administration had spent $8 million in covert activi-
ties directed against Allende. In particular, $500,000 was approved in 1969 and
1970 to help Allende’s political opponents, and $350,000 went to bribing members
of the Chilean Congress to vote against certifying Allende’s election. Later, another
$5 million was approved for “destabilization” activities in Chile, and in 1973,
$1.5 million was furnished to assist anti-Allende candidates for municipal offices
( Wicker 1974 ). Hersh also quoted Colby testifying that the Nixon administration,
to include Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, spent these funds for covert activi-
ties in Chile between 1970 and 1973. Colby stressed that the agency had no role
in the military coup that deposed Allende ( New York Times 1974b ; Wicker 1974 ).
Hersh’s reporting ignited a firestorm. The next day, Harrington called for a pub-
lic hearing into the CIA’s covert operations. He stated he would formally request 
the Foreign Affairs Committee to call for Kissinger and Colby to testify on the 
matter. Harrington complained that senior members of Congress were unwill-
ing to investigate, fearing Kissinger ( Hersh 1974b ). Fulbright turned down Har-
rington’s call for an investigation, telling him that there was “no useful purpose” 
in his committee re-examining US policy towards Chile ( Hersh 1974b ). Morgan, 
on the other hand, vowed to take up the issue ( Miller 1974 ). Some House mem-
bers blamed Harrington for leaking the information to the newspapers, which he 
denied. 
Harrington did admit that with the authorization of Nedzi, he had read Col-
by’s classified testimony transcript in June and characterized it as “the most
direct, unambiguous and to the point I’ve ever seen”. His reaction to the infor-
mation was one of “profound shock” ( Hersh 1974b ). Representative Donald M
Fraser (D-MN), chairman of a House Foreign Affairs Committee subcommittee,
felt similarly, “The executive branch had deceived the Congress as well as the
public with respect to its involvement in the overthrow of the Allende regime”
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Shortly thereafter, an undisclosed source stated that the CIA had censored a 
book by two former intelligence officials that included detailed information about 
the agency’s activities to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency in 1970. 
The rationale for the censorship was “national security concerns”. According to 
the source, the authors quoted Kissinger as saying, “I don’t see why we need to 
stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own 
people”, at a June 1970 meeting of the interagency “40 Committee”, which was 
responsible for reviewing and authorizing CIA covert activities overseas, prior 
to presidential approval. Kissinger, the committee chair, refused to comment on 
these reports, but he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the CIA
had nothing to do with the coup “to the best of his knowledge and belief”. Other 
government witnesses, such as the former US ambassador to Chile, denied any 
attempts to subvert members of the Chilean Congress ( Hersh 1974d ; Wicker 
1974 ;  O’ Leary 1974a ;  Prados 2003 , 290–1). 
While Fulbright was disinclined to hold hearings, his Idaho colleague, Dem-
ocratic Senator Frank Church, chairman of a Foreign Relations subcommittee, 
had no aversion to deeper scrutiny. Church believed executive branch officials 
had deceived Congress, as they had done with the Vietnam War, and promised to 
refer disingenuous testimony to the Department of Justice for investigation into 
potential perjury, claiming that he was “incensed” by the recent allegations. Sub-
committee staff members were poring over the hearing transcripts to determine 
which officials may have lied under oath about CIA covert activities. Church 
believed there had been a serious attempt to at least mislead Congress, stating he 
would request Colby’s April 1974 testimony before the House Armed Services 
Committee’s subcommittee on intelligence as anonymous officials confirmed that 
this classified testimony included specific information about the cash payments 
the CIA made and their purpose. He intended to request Fulbright conduct a full 
committee hearing and review the “propriety” of clandestine activities against 
constitutionally elected leaders ( Hersh 1974e ;  Mills 1974 ). 
The State Department was now in the crosshairs, but also committed to sup-
porting the senior officials who had testified before both chambers in previous 
hearings. However, Senator Kennedy, chair of a Judiciary Committee subcom-
mittee, supported a complete investigation of the inconsistencies that existed in 
Nixon administration officials’ testimony concerning US intervention into Chil-
ean politics. He claimed that State Department officials had lied on at least three 
occasions in statements before Congress regarding US endeavours in Chile ( Stern 
1974a ;  Hersh 1974c ;  Mills 1974 ). He followed with a letter to Kissinger asking 
him on what basis were the CIA activities implemented without notifying Con-
gress since the executive branch shared with it the conduct of US foreign policy 
( Stern 1974b ;  Mills 1974 ). 
This line of discussion broadened to questions regarding what constituted the 
appropriate role of government’s covert incursions in the activities of foreign, 
sovereign nations. Further, there were rumblings about reopening Kissinger’s
confirmation hearings as secretary of state. Once again, he was being accused of 
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members of the administration. However, as one unnamed official pointed out to 
Hersh, if covert activities directed against a foreign government are approved, 
then high-ranking officials have to “lie about them. Lies are part of the business” 
( Wicker 1974 ). Tom Wicker, a  New York Times columnist, disparaged that argu-
ment as misguided. He questioned whether the United States had “any legal or 
moral right to conduct covert operations abroad”, and whether any administration 
had “the constitutional authority to order . . . money spent for clandestine warfare 
against the legitimate government of a sovereign country”. These issues neces-
sitated “full and open debate” because “gangster schemes of bribery, violence 
and even assassination are being carried out, in the name of the great American 
people” ( Wicker 1974 ). 
On September 13, Colby appeared on a panel at a conference in Washington, 
DC, where he told the attendees that the National Security Council had authorized 
the operations and the CIA had kept the chairmen or members of the appropri-
ate committees in Congress informed. Harrington, a fellow panellist, challenged 
Colby on this point as did Abourezk. Abourezk was unconvinced that the CIA was 
providing Congress sufficient and current information about its covert operations. 
Both lawmakers called for the agency to undergo more intensive oversight, to 
which Colby expressed concern as to whether Congress could be relied upon to 
keep classified information safe, given recent leaks ( Hersh 1974f ). 
Kissinger did not escape the furore unscathed. Hersh, citing anonymous former 
administration and current congressional officials, wrote that Kissinger had been 
the impetus for the economic sanctions that the United Stated imposed on Chile 
after Allende’s election, thereby preventing the Chilean government from obtain-
ing loans from the World Bank, the Export-Import Bank and private banks. The 
Nixon administration had denied that it took such retaliatory steps, but Hersh 
reported that Kissinger controlled this step as well as the covert activities ( Hersh 
1974g ;  Goodsell 1974 ). 
Hersh kept up the pressure. His next article informed readers that the CIA spent 
the last 18 months of Allende’s presidency sowing strife by secretly funding strik-
ing labour union members and trade groups to undermine the Chilean economy. 
Meanwhile, Kissinger had been called to testify before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee in closed session the same day. Kissinger emphasized that the 
covert activities were not intended to subvert the Allende government. The funds 
had been used to strengthen opposition parties and news media from threats by the 
Allende government, a position Ford similarly proclaimed at a news conference. 
Hersh also reported that Colby’s claims that the agency had briefed Congress 
had been confirmed. Colby had briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee’s subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs and the House Armed Ser-
vices Committee’s Subcommittee on Intelligence ( Hersh 1974i ;  Miller 1974 ). 
The same day, Church’s subcommittee staff members provided Church with a 
memorandum recommending perjury charges against Richard Helms, the former 
DCI who apparently had not been truthful in prior testimony about CIA involve-
ment in Chile. The report accused Kissinger of deceit in his testimony about the 
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government officials involved in Latin American affairs were cited for misleading 
testimony ( Miller 1974 ;  Hersh 1974c ). 
In early October, Abourezk introduced an amendment to the foreign aid bill that 
would have stopped all CIA covert operations, which he likened to an “arm of the 
government conducting a secret war without either the approval of Congress or 
the knowledge of the American people” ( Washington Post 1974a ). Abourezk was 
allegedly “under no illusion” that his amendment would pass. However, he had 
forced the issue to be debated when many lawmakers had “traditionally averted 
their eyes” ( Washington Post 1974b ). His amendment was defeated 68 to 17. 2 
At this point, Senator Harold E Hughes (D-IA) introduced an amendment 
(amendment 1948 to S. 3394) to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (sec. 662) 
on the Senate floor with the following language: “No funds may be expended by 
the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than 
those intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless the President 
makes specified findings and reports to specified Congressional committees”( US 
Department of State 2014 , XLII). 3 The amendment required the president to give 
explicit approval through a presidential finding for each action and state that this 
action was important to national security ( US Department of State 2014 , XLII). 4 
The amendment carried on a voice vote the same day. Hughes was particu-
larly satisfied with the outcome, arguing it was a step towards a degree of con-
trol over intelligence operations overseas. The CIA did not respond officially to 
this amendment’s passage, but one anonymous official viewed the legislation 
as “unprecedented” and said that if it was enacted, “it would put a ‘condition’
not on the C.I.A. but on the President’s right to order clandestine activities” 
( Hersh 1974j ). 
Given the new attitude on the Hill, the administration agreed to have the CIA
brief the House Foreign Affairs Committee on all the agency’s operations that 
could affect US foreign relations. This development resulted from a meeting a 
week earlier between Ford, Colby, Kissinger and House and Senate leaders. In 
the future, according to Nedzi, “any matters involving the CIA which affects 
foreign policy – including 40 Committee decisions – will be related to the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee”. He intimated that these briefings would occur 
before a covert operation began. Nedzi said that these briefings were similar to 
the ones that his subcommittee had been receiving since he had been chairman. 
Harrington, however, viewed the announcement as insufficient. The step, he 
groused, “only contributes to the illusion of oversight; it doesn’t solve the prob-
lems as they are”. Further, the change would not lead to comprehensive inves-
tigatory hearings on US policy towards the Allende government and potential 
administration lying, which he had been pressing Morgan to undertake ( Hersh 
1974h ; 1974j ;  Miller 1974 ). 
The Senate’s actions on the foreign aid bill (S. 3394) included more than just
concerns about the CIA’s activities and it was recommitted to the Foreign Relations
Committee for further consideration ( Raiford 1976 ). Nonetheless, the Senate action
forced the House to confront the issue as part of the conference committee’s action on
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in a House Foreign Affairs Committee meeting on October 9, 1974. Similar in lan-
guage to Hughes’ amendment, Ryan’s amendment specifically included the House
Foreign Affairs Committee as an oversight body. Ryan’s amendment, which he
viewed as a step towards improved oversight within the committee’s jurisdiction,
was modified slightly by a floor amendment. Subsequently, it became part of the
House version of the foreign aid bill (H.R. 17234), and was reported in the House at
the end of October ( Raiford 1976 ;  Johnson 2005 , 219). 5 
By December, the Senate had reported its foreign aid bill and its version passed 
in the Senate on December 4. The House followed a week later when it considered 
S. 3394 and passed the bill in place of its version. The conference committee com-
pleted its work on December 17, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 included 
a modification of Ryan’s amendment language. The Senate voted in favour of the 
Conference Report that day and the House followed a day later. President Ford 
signed the bill into law as Public Law 93–559 on December 30 ( Raiford 1976 ; 
 Kaiser 1978 ). 6 The final language placed the following limitation on intelligence 
activities indicating that no appropriated funds could be spent by the CIA for 
operations overseas other than for activities needed for obtaining intelligence, 
and could only be done so when the president found that US national security 
necessitated such an operation. The president was also obligated to report that 
operation in a timely fashion to designated committees, which now included the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
( Select Committee on Intelligence 1994 ). 7
 Analysis 
In the police patrol/fire alarm model that has customarily been used to analyze 
congressional oversight, the Hughes-Ryan amendment could be understood to 
be an example of the fire alarm ( McCubbins and Schwartz 1984 ). 8 The model 
defines police patrol as driven by congressional interest in agency activities; 
this model assumes that Congress will discover and remedy any infractions. The 
police patrol is also – as the name reflects – intended to play a deterrent role. In 
contrast, fire alarm oversight involves Congress responding to the call to investi-
gate an issue that has been brought forward, generally, by interest groups or other 
external observers ( McCubbins and Schwartz 1984 ). Extending that metaphor, 
what happens when the patrols are largely perfunctory and the alarm sounds but 
no one responds? 
This model does not accurately explain the events that led to the passage of 
the Hughes-Ryan amendment. Instead, this chapter offers an alternative explana-
tion using the three strands mentioned previously. In this case, Harrington does 
pull the fire alarm, but the method he uses, his letters to the chairmen of the 
foreign affairs committees, are silent alarms. He does not make the letters’ con-
tents known for several months and only when they are leaked to the New York 
Times and the Washington Post. Until this disclosure occurs, his communications 
have no impact on the two chairmen: neither holds hearings in response. In fact, 
Morgan does not react to Harrington’s letter and Fulbright underscores that the 
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likelihood of hearings or a change in jurisdiction regarding CIA oversight is point-
less based on his past experience. Thus, there is no rush on Morgan or Fulbright’s 
part to sound further alarms until the public revelation occurs. 
 The fire alarm or police patrol metaphor also does not fit as this model 
assumes that Congress, both chambers, is moved to act. That is not valid in this 
instance. The hearings held in the aftermath of the newspaper stories were token 
and more concerned about the leaks than the CIA covert operations ( Miller 
1974 ). To understand this reluctance requires more than counting the number 
of hearings or other quantitative methods; it demands attention be paid to the 
internal politics of the two chambers and the important members with a stake 
in the outcome. 9 Institutional drag – our third strand – the unwillingness of an 
institution to change or innovate, can be understood as a means by which indi-
viduals or groups, such as committees, “lose their original vision of service to 
people, and become instead of self-serving mechanisms first of all” ( Maxwell 
1978 , 120). Moreover, institutional drag is abetted by long and deeply held tra-
ditions and constituencies. 
V alues and norms (loyalty to an institution as an example) are involved as well, 
and in view of the powerful, no “upstart” is going to tamper with institutional 
practices. These factors are not dismissed quickly, but take intensive and con-
tinual initiative and attention to overcome ( Mount Jr. 1990 , 32). As one ethicist 
has pointed out, 
An example of the dangers of institutional drag is the temptation for us to  
devote total loyalty to an institution, especially when the institution stands 
for noble ideals and becomes the chief or only definer of a person’s identity. 
In such cases, loyalty to the institution becomes idolatrous. The institution is 
vested with the god-like prerogative of what is good and right. 
 ( Mount Jr. 1990 , 32) 
Some of the most powerful members of the House and Senate, committee chair -
men, were in danger of losing power by ceding control to other committees. 
 By June 1974, Fulbright is in his final few months as a senator. He has lost 
the Democratic primary to a challenger, former Arkansas government Dale Bum-
pers, who will ultimately win the general election. Fulbright is a lame duck with 
waning power ( Binder 1974 ;  Gwertzman 1974 ). Fulbright was equally demoral-
ized about any attempt to rein in CIA covert activities by Congress. Senator John 
Stennis (D-MS) was another obstacle as chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee and more importantly, chairman of the CIA subcommittee. The disclo-
sures in the newspapers surprised and embarrassed him publicly and were solid 
evidence that he had not been conducting rigorous oversight of the agency ( Stern 
1974c ;  Paterson 1987 , 162;  Congressional Quarterly 1975 , 538). Additionally, he 
preferred the arrangement in place whereby only his committee and the Appro-
priations Committee were cognizant of CIA activities and budgets. Adding the 
Foreign Relations Committee, with its liberal members, was outrageous to him 
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When Stennis assumed chairmanship of the Armed Services Committee in 
1972, he conducted the subcommittee’s activities differently from his predeces-
sor, Richard Russell. Russell had occasionally invited senior Foreign Relations 
Committee members to attend CIA oversight sessions. When Stennis became the 
chairman, he stopped inviting his Foreign Relations Committee colleagues and 
oversight sessions became rare. The floor debate regarding Hughes’ amendment 
shows clearly his attempts to thwart the passage of the amendment ( Washing-
ton Post 1974a ;  Snider 2008 , 32–3). 10 The CIA knew it had allies in Stennis and 
Henry “Scoop” Jackson, another senior Armed Services Committee member, 
whom the agency preferred lead the Senate investigation into the CIA’s relation-
ship with IT&T in order to produce a result advantageous to the agency ( Johnson 
2005 , 196). 
Senator Church could have played a more prominent role in this issue, but he 
did not. Likely his run for re-election to the Senate monopolized his time. His 
seniority on the Foreign Relations Committee was such that he would have been 
stymied in using the committee to further a reform agenda. In fact, his relationship 
with Fulbright was now strained and publicly evident because of their disagree-
ment over how to handle the Chile inquiry ( Miller 1974 ). There were sufficient 
senators with clout that could push reforms, such as Edward Kennedy, Walter 
Mondale (D-MN), Howard Baker (R-TN) and the so-called new international-
ists, such as Abourezk, but they were not members of the committees involved in 
the jurisdictional wrestling match ( Johnson 2004 , 10;  Paterson 1987 , 162;  Miller 
1974 ).11 Mike Mansfield, the Senate majority leader, did allow amendments to 
the foreign aid bill, which provided Abourezk and Hughes a means of promoting 
increased oversight that would not require the expenditure of political capital. The 
timing of disclosures proved beneficial as reformers could offer amendments to 
the foreign aid bill, already under fire because of other issues. Thus, in the Senate, 
Hughes used a floor amendment with compromise language, not a committee bill, 
to advance enhanced CIA oversight. 
The situation in the House is similar to that of the Senate. The chairman of the 
House Armed Services Committee, F Edward Hébert (D-LA), did not conduct 
hearings into the CIA covert operations, but instead held hearings regarding the 
leak of classified material and Harrington’s involvement. Nedzi, like Stennis, was 
embarrassed by the newspaper articles, but did not conduct hearings. The For-
eign Affairs Committee, of which Harrington was a member, took little action. 
In fact, when Harrington raised concerns about CIA involvement in Chile in light 
of the IT&T incident, the chairman of the Western Hemisphere subcommittee, 
Dante Fascell (D-FL), stated he did not intend to hold hearings ( Miller 1974 ). In 
response, Congressman Leo Ryan fashioned language acceptable to them as an 
amendment to the foreign aid bill, essentially mirroring the Hughes amendment, 
ensuring its passage in the House. The Hughes-Ryan amendment was not only a 
compromise but it was also a warning sign that the “Senate barons” were losing 
control of their power ( Snider 2008 , 32–3). 
With respect to the first strand, influential congressmen believed the president 
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was minimal challenge to executive authority when it came to the issue of covert 
action. Senator Carl Hayden, the Appropriations Committee chairman, held that 
congressional intrusion into intelligence activities “would tend to impinge upon 
the constitutional authority and responsibility of the President in the conduct of 
foreign affairs” ( Whittington and Carpenter 2003 , 505). Russell had told his col-
leagues that “we must take some matters on faith”, in beseeching his colleagues 
not to strengthen oversight requirements ( Whittington and Carpenter 2003 , 505). 
Consequently, the second strand occurred: “Congress did not develop the insti-
tutional capacity to set its own policy interests or to ensure that the intelligence 
agencies adhered to those concerns”. In essence, Congress acquiesced to presi-
dential leadership in this issue area. The oversight subcommittees faded “into near 
inactivity during most of the postwar period”. Members who may have objected 
to executive decision-making without consulting the relevant committees “were 
simply kept in the dark” ( Whittington and Carpenter 2003 , 505). Harrington’s 
complaint is indicative of this concern about “autonomous executive power” and 
“presidential hegemony” ( Whittington and Carpenter 2003 , 505). 
Conclusion 
While major change in terms of covert action and accountability was stymied by 
the forces described earlier, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment contributed a change 
that had a serious impact on the relationship between covert action and account-
ability. By requiring the president to notify Congress in the form of a presiden-
tial finding when a covert action was being planned, presidents were forced to 
acknowledge their role in covert activity and thus plausible deniability – the abil-
ity of the president to deny awareness of these types of activities – was at an end. 
In the words of intelligence scholar, Loch Johnson: “The objective of plausible 
deniability was to brush away footprints in a covert operation to prevent anyone 
from following the tracks back to the United States and particularly to the Oval 
Office” ( Johnson 1985 , 58). Those “tracks” would now be visible. 
Other events would also spur the major reforms that Harrington envisioned. 
As noted earlier, Watergate was a catalyst, followed by Ford’s pardon of Nixon 
and the December 1974 revelations in the newspapers about the CIA’s domestic 
spying activities and attempted assassinations of foreign leaders. The November 
1974 mid-term elections, another result of the Ford pardon, brought in a new class 
of members in both chambers, reformers that sought to wrest power from the 
committee leaders and begin a period where subcommittee chairs were in control. 
Even more importantly, Senate and House leaders could no longer avoid a full 
investigation into CIA activities, especially covert action. 
While the Hughes-Ryan Amendment itself was rather limited, it not only 
ensured presidential responsibility for covert action, but it also broadened congres-
sional activity in this executive-dominated arena. The notification requirement 
provided the basis for a framework of legislative oversight that would develop 
over subsequent decades. Lastly, the legislation empowered Congress, ultimately 
through the establishment of permanent committees a few years later, to share the 
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control – and responsibility for intelligence operations – a significant shift in the 
oppositional relationship between the two branches of government. While factors 
distinctive to the United States shaped the form of the legislation, Hughes-Ryan 
has broader significance as a milestone that marked a greater demand for transpar-
ency from the intelligence community that has only intensified in the succeeding 
years. 
Notes 
1 For an early discussion of this dynamic, see Whittington and Carpenter (2003 ). 
2 120 Cong. Rec. 33482. 
3 Foreign Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93–559 (1974). 
4 120 Cong. Rec. 33487–33491. 
5 See also 120 Cong. Rec. 39165–39165–39166. 
6 120 Cong. Rec. 39165–39165–39166. See also Kaiser (1978 ). 
7 Foreign Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93–559, 88 Stat., 22 USC 4222. See also  Select 
Committee on Intelligence (1994 , 4). 
8 See also  Deering (2003 ) and  Johnson (2005 ). 
9 This has been a common approach to gauging the efficacy of oversight. See Aberbach 
(1989 ) for a seminal text using this methodology. 
10 120 Cong. Rec. 33489–33490. 
11 120 Cong. Rec. 33491. See also Johnson (2005 , 190–241)  and Snider (2008 , 33). 
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 13 Congressional oversight of US 
intelligence activities 
Mary B. DeRosa 
 Introduction 
The United States Constitution assigns to Congress the responsibility to oversee 
activities of the executive branch, both to enhance the quality of decision-making 
and to ensure democratic accountability of the executive. The work of US intel-
ligence agencies is essential for national security and necessarily shrouded in 
secrecy. These characteristics make skilled external oversight crucial to prevent 
abuse and enhance the quality and credibility of intelligence activities, but they 
also make that oversight unusually difficult. US history is riddled with intelligence 
scandals and oversight failures. Congress has learned from these experiences and 
has crafted a credible oversight structure and process. But challenges remain for 
congressional overseers. This chapter examines these challenges, how they affect 
congressional oversight of intelligence, and Congress’s efforts to ensure account-
ability for US intelligence activities. 
History of congressional oversight and reforms 
Early oversight and the Church Committee 
The United States Government has engaged in intelligence collection and covert 
action since its earliest days. Congressional oversight of intelligence activities, 
however, has a relatively short history. It was not until the late 1940s, with the 
creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that the US House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate created entities – subcommittees of their Armed Services 
committees – with responsibility for intelligence oversight.1 
Congressional overseers in this early period exhibited a tendency common to
oversight through the years: a cyclical interest that ramps up in response to public
attention or perceived agency failure, but rarely persists past the crisis. Loch Johnson
describes this pattern, which he calls his “shock theory” of intelligence oversight:
[After some pivotal event that leads to reform] At first, members of Congress 
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Before long, though, the interest and attention span of lawmakers begin to 
wane and the intelligence agencies are treated with a sense of benign neglect 
on Capitol Hill. 
Inevitably the unwatched agencies go astray and shocked overseers “shake them-
selves out of their lassitude, rally to investigate what went wrong, and attempt to 
set the spy agencies back on a proper track . . . but only for a while before drop-
ping off again” ( Johnson 2018 , 18). 
A watershed in congressional oversight came in late 1974 after journalist Sey-
mour Hersh published a lengthy article in the New York Times revealing signifi-
cant illegal domestic activities by the CIA, including wiretaps, break-ins, mail 
openings, infiltration of domestic political organizations and the existence of files 
on 10,000 Americans involved in the anti-war movement ( Snider 2008 , 33). In the 
wake of these revelations, the Senate voted overwhelmingly to establish a select 
committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church, to investigate Intelligence Commu-
nity activities ( Snider 2008 , 37–9). 2 
The Church Committee’s investigation lasted 15 months and was the “most 
exhaustive look at our government’s (or any government’s) secret intelligence 
agencies” ( Schwartz Jr. 2007 , 19). The Committee investigated domestic and 
foreign intelligence activities and its revelations were earthshaking. Its final 
report described massive efforts by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
CIA, National Security Agency (NSA) and other intelligence organizations to 
spy on, harass, disrupt and undermine US organizations and citizens because of 
their political views and lawful speech and activities. In its reporting on foreign 
activities, the Committee revealed assassination plots, election meddling and 
coup attempts, among other morally questionable and often flawed and coun-
terproductive covert action ( Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1975 ;  1976a ;  1976b ;  Snider 
2008 , 275–8). 
In his transmittal letter for Book II of the Committee’s report, Committee 
Chairman Senator Church gave this description of the greatest lesson from the 
investigation: 
The root cause of the excesses which our record amply demonstrates has 
been failure to apply the wisdom of the constitutional system of checks and 
balances to intelligence activities . . . . The founding fathers foresaw excess as 
the inevitable consequence of granting any part of the government unchecked 
power. This has been demonstrated in the intelligence field where, too often, 
constitutional principles are subordinated to a pragmatic course of permitting 
desired ends to dictate and justify improper means. 
Our recommendations are designed to place intelligence activities within 
the constitutional scheme for controlling government power ( Senate Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
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Post-Church Committee reforms 
The Church Committee revelations and other concerns that surfaced during that 
period led to a number of significant reforms to intelligence oversight. In the years 
since, there have been additional changes to structure and process. 
In response to one of the Church Committee’s key recommendations, within 
a year after the report’s release the Senate and the House established “select” 
committees3 – the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) – with responsibility for 
oversight of intelligence and authorization of appropriations for intelligence 
activities. 
Beyond structure, Congress also focused on ensuring a greater flow of infor-
mation to the Congress from the Intelligence Community. In October 1980, Con-
gress passed what is known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, which 
imposed consequential reporting requirements that continue to this day. The Act 
required that the intelligence agency leaders keep the intelligence committees 
“fully and currently informed” of intelligence activities, including “any signifi-
cant anticipated intelligence activity”, and “report in a timely fashion” any illegal 
activities or significant intelligence failures.4 In 1991, Congress shifted these noti-
fication responsibilities to the president.5 It imposed similar requirements on the 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), when that position was created in 2004. 
Congress also passed significant additional reforms to processes for covert 
action and electronic surveillance. In 1974 Congress passed what is known as 
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment in response to concerns about the covert activi-
ties that the CIA conducted in Chile, intended to thwart the election of Salvador 
Allende. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, for the first time, formalized the process 
for approval and oversight of one important, and often perilous, type of intelli-
gence activity: covert action, which is operational activity intended to “influence 
political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the 
role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged pub-
licly”. Hughes-Ryan required that the CIA must obtain the president’s approval 
to conduct covert action and that the president must “find” that the activities are 
“important to the national security of the United States”. The president must report
this “Finding” to Congress ( Ford 2006 , 24–5). Congress amended these reporting
requirements further in 1981 and again in 1991 to require covert action reports 
to the intelligence committees “as soon as possible” and “before the initiation of the 
covert action”. If the president “determines it is essential to limit prior notice to 
meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States”, 
he may inform a smaller group of eight members of Congress. This has become 
known as “Gang of Eight” reporting ( Ford 2006 ). 6 
The Church Committee subject that generated perhaps the greatest outrage 
was its extensive chronicling of domestic electronic surveillance by intelligence 
agencies. The Committee found that wiretapping of US citizens with no judi-
cial warrant had been rampant ( Senate Select Committee to Study Governmen-
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1978 Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 
which sets out a process for seeking a warrant from a specially constituted court 
to conduct surveillance within the US for the purposes of foreign intelligence. 
FISA’s procedures guide the conduct of all electronic surveillance for foreign 
intelligence purposes in the United States. The FISA Amendments Act, passed 
in 2008, amended FISA to establish a process for some broader “programmatic 
surveillance” of foreign targets outside of the United States without individual-
ized suspicion. 
Congressional oversight tools 
Hearings, briefings and legislation 
The Intelligence Committees conduct virtually all of their work in classified set-
tings. Their standard information gathering tools are hearings (open and closed), 
formal briefings, statutorily required reports, ad hoc information requests, and 
informal interactions. Legislation also plays a key, if indirect, role in oversight. 
The executive branch fears the impact of what it believes is ill-considered legisla-
tion. Often it will increase its interaction with the committees hoping to head off 
or change proposed legislation, or it will take corrective action itself in an attempt 
to persuade members that legislation is unnecessary. 
The most important legislation for the intelligence committees is the annual 
Intelligence Authorization Act. Heather Molino, a former HPSCI staff director, 
described this bill as the committee’s key tool for oversight of the Intelligence 
Community ( Bahar et al. 2018 ). Although the congressional appropriations com-
mittees decide on funding for the agencies, Senate and House rules require that 
all intelligence appropriations be authorized separately and the intelligence com-
mittees have that responsibility. In producing authorization legislation, committee 
members and staff delve in minute detail into intelligence agency programmes, 
offices, activities and personnel to determine what may be funded, what is prohib-
ited and other important details of how agencies will conduct their activities and 
interact with the committees. Thus, the legislation is a source of great influence 
and leverage for the committees. At least this is the case in theory. In fact, the intel-
ligence committees have struggled over the last two decades to produce autho-
rization legislation that can pass the Congress. When there is no authorization 
legislation, Congress inserts language into the National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) that provides a blanket authorization for all amounts appropriated 
for national intelligence. The uncertainty about passage of this annual legislation 
reduces the effectiveness of intelligence committee oversight. 
Investigations 
Congressional investigations are a longstanding and critical tool of oversight. 
They usually arise from incidents of perceived failure or abuse or some other 
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this tool regularly over the years. Recent examples include the SSCI’s lengthy 
investigation of the Bush Administration’s detention and interrogation practices, 
HPSCI’s investigation of the 2012 attacks on US diplomatic facilities in Beng-
hazi, Libya and both committees’ investigations of Russia’s interference in the 
2016 election. For some significant investigations of intelligence issues, how-
ever, Congress has created special committees in each chamber – such as with the 
investigation of the Iran-Contra affair in 1986–87 – or joint committees involv-
ing both chambers – such as the congressional investigation following the 9/11 
attacks. Investigations tend to be more public and more adversarial than other 
tools of oversight. They are a key mechanism for developing an understanding of 
complex facts to uncover abuse, monitor the implementation of policy and inform 
the public. They also can serve as the basis for development of legislation and 
reforms. 
 Committee staff 
Staff on the intelligence committees plays an outsized role in oversight. Both 
intelligence committees now have majority and minority staffs. The tradition in 
both the House and Senate has been to avoid partisanship and the staffs have usu-
ally worked together, although this tradition breaks down on occasion. 7 
Committee members delegate to their staff much of the day-to-day oversight 
of the Intelligence Community. Staff conduct the initial fact-finding and anal-
ysis that result in hearings, reports and legislation. Although members provide 
the vision and broad goals for this work, and they become intensely involved on 
certain issues, it is the staff that develops the information and expertise. Many 
professional staff members on both committees have worked previously in the 
Intelligence Community and are familiar with the offices and personnel. The staff 
engage with personnel in intelligence agencies more frequently and in more depth 
than staff of most other congressional committees. 
Dynamics 
Types of oversight 
Much of the academic literature on congressional oversight identifies two dichoto-
mous approaches. In the most influential article on the subject, political scientists 
Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz describe two categories of oversight: 
“police patrol” and “fire alarm”. With police patrol oversight Congress takes the 
initiative to review the activities of the overseen entity with the goal of finding 
and fixing potential problems. Police patrol oversight is active and centralized, in 
that the overseers themselves are responsible for uncovering concerns. Fire alarm 
oversight is initially more passive on the part of the overseers; it relies primarily 
on outside observers to identify existing problems or abuses and raise concerns 
to which Congress will respond. Police patrol is the more time- and resource-
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Other experts have identified “active” and “reactive”, “anticipatory” and “post-
hoc”, and “institutional” and “investigative” as the most important distinctions 
between forms of congressional oversight ( Nolan 2007 , 116–17;  Schwartz Jr. 
2007 , 23). The categories tend to line up. The first of the two terms – police patrol, 
active, anticipatory and institutional – describe oversight that uses hearings, brief-
ings, formal and informal information requests, and legislation to stay on top of 
the agencies, understand their business and identify problems before they arise. 
The second terms – fire alarm, reactive, post-hoc and investigative – describe a 
form of oversight that reacts to discovery, usually from an outside source, of a 
failure or abuse and then investigates what happened and draws conclusions about 
fault and possible reforms. 
McCubbins and Schwartz identified fire alarm as the most common form of 
oversight in Congress. Members of Congress prefer it, they argue, because it is 
cost-effective and its more decentralized approach is a better fit with the incen-
tives for legislators than the more hands-on police patrol model. Other experts, 
however, have found that that police patrol oversight is more prevalent in Con-
gress than McCubbins and Schwartz suggest. They attribute this to a change in the 
incentives for legislators since the mid-1970s because of a greater public interest, 
post-Watergate and Church Committee, in assuring that government programmes 
operate competently and consistent with law ( Johnson 2018 , 37–8). 
Congress uses both forms of oversight with the Intelligence Community but 
is less effective at each than in other areas because of the unique challenges of 
intelligence oversight. Police patrol, as McCubbins and Schwartz noted, is a time 
and resource-intensive form of oversight. It becomes even more costly with intel-
ligence because, as discussed in the following, relevant information is far more 
difficult to acquire, there are cumbersome restrictions on where it can be reviewed 
and with whom it can be discussed, and legislators, for a variety of reasons, lack 
the incentive to devote time and energy to these activities. As a result, although the 
intelligence committees do engage regularly in this proactive type of oversight, 
it is largely the responsibility of the professional committee staffs, with limited 
focus from members unless the issues are high profile ( Johnson 2018 , 209–48). 
Fire alarm oversight is less effective with intelligence because there are fewer 
sources for alarms. McCubbins and Schwartz anticipated outside observers and 
interest groups who would act as watchdogs, keeping an eye on agency activities 
and alerting lawmakers to problems. In the intelligence world, because of the 
secrecy of the programmes involved, there are far fewer outside observers capable 
of raising alarms. Journalists play this role at times, usually based on leaked clas-
sified information. 
Secrecy, expertise and capture 
The most significant difference between oversight of intelligence and almost 
any other field is the difficulty congressional overseers experience acquiring and 
using information. Obtaining information is a challenge for all congressional 
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about the matters being overseen and legislators have to work hard to know the 
right questions to ask. But no other discipline involves the information constraints 
that exist for intelligence. Although the intelligence agencies share a significant 
amount of information with Congress, most relevant information is extremely 
sensitive and the agencies appropriately take measures to protect it from release. 
Moreover, unlike in other areas there are very few sources to which the overseers 
can look for information on intelligence other than the agencies they are review-
ing. The resulting dynamic affects the legislators’ ability to develop expertise and 
undermines effective oversight. 
The executive branch has an expansive view of the president’s legal author-
ity to control classified national security information. The US Justice Depart-
ment’s Office of Legal Counsel has explained that the President has “ultimate
and unimpeded authority over the collection, retention and dissemination of
intelligence and other national security information in the executive branch”,
including for dissemination to Congress (Christopher H Schroeder, Memoran-
dum opinion for the General Counsel Central Intelligence Agency, November
26, 1996).8 Congress and some experts dispute this legal analysis and the US
courts have never resolved these differences ( Cumming 2010 , 3;  Fisher 2008 ,
221). In practice, Congress has largely acquiesced in the view that the presi-
dent is the “owner” of intelligence and is able to control access to information
and operational details under some circumstances. Legislators consider the
statutory reporting requirements, discussed earlier, to be a critical counterbal-
ance; in particular the requirement that the president keep Congress, through
its intelligence committees, “fully and currently informed of all intelligence
activity” ( Cumming 2010 , 1–2). That requirement is vague, however. The
executive branch has never interpreted this obligation to require provision of
all intelligence to Congress. Congress asserts that right but has never sought
to enforce it.
The branches have never developed a written set of rules for what the Intel-
ligence Community must share ( Kibbe 2010 , 33). As a result, they rely on norms 
and historical understandings about what Congress may demand and conflicts are 
common. If Congress is not satisfied with what it receives, its realistic recourse 
is to criticize the administration publicly and use its leverage over appropriations, 
legislation and nominations to force the executive’s hands. The effectiveness of 
these tools depends on whether the president feels Congress’s actions can hurt 
him politically. 
Even when Intelligence Community personnel agree to provide information 
in hearings or briefings, they often are selective in what they share. As James 
Baker explains, “[m]embers see only part of the picture, and then only that part 
of the picture contained in executive talking points that have survived layers of 
editing and that are designed to fend off policy or partisan attack” ( Baker 2007 , 
132). Loch Johnson provides many examples from his own experience and that of 
others when the Intelligence Community provided obscure or incomplete infor-
mation to intelligence committee questioners. He quotes former Senator William 
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asset in Guatemala who was implicated in various human rights violations: “if 
you asked the wrong question of the Agency you never got the right answer”, 
he complained and “If you asked the right question, you got only half the right 
answer” ( Johnson 2018 , 157). 
Sometimes the process breaks down entirely. This was the case with the Iran-
Contra scandal during the Reagan Administration in the mid-1980s. Members 
of the Reagan National Security Council and CIA secretly sold arms to Iran in 
exchange for Iran’s assistance in obtaining the release of US hostages in Lebanon. 
This sale violated the Arms Export Control Act. The NSC staff then created a 
private organization, outside of government, and funnelled some of the proceeds 
from the arms sale to that organization for its use in supporting the Contras, a 
Nicaraguan rebel organization. This too violated the law. Congress had enacted a 
series of measures, known as the Boland Amendments, that restricted US assis-
tance to the Contras. One of these amendments specifically prohibited the use of 
funds to support the Contras. 
The Reagan Administration reported neither of these operations to Congress. 
Indeed, when members of Congress specifically asked the National Security Advi-
sor and his deputy about rumours of operations involving Nicaragua, the officials 
did not reveal the work of the private organization they had created ( Johnson 
2018 , 147–8). This is despite notification requirements for intelligence activities 
and specifically for covert action. Iran-Contra is perhaps the most egregious vio-
lation by the executive branch of its post-Church obligations to notify Congress 
(the affair included many other serious violations of law as well). It is an example 
of the dangers of a notification system that must rely, to some degree, on the good 
faith of the president and those who work for him. 
Secrecy poses other problems for members of Congress in their efforts to over-
see the Intelligence Community. For example, members face difficulty in access-
ing intelligence that the Intelligence Community has provided. To read classified 
intelligence, they must go to a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
(SCIF), a windowless vaulted space usually located in the intelligence commit-
tee’s office space. They may only read the materials there and, if notes are permit-
ted, they must also be stored in the SCIF. 
The use of limited briefings to inform some members about particularly sensi-
tive covert actions or other sensitive intelligence programmes is another concern. 
The National Security Act permits the president to limit congressional notification 
of a covert action where he “determines it is essential to limit prior notice to meet 
extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States”. In that 
case, the president is only obligated to inform the House and Senate majority and 
minority leaders and the chairs and ranking minority member of the House and 
Senate intelligence committees. In addition to these statutory “Gang of Eight” 
notifications for covert actions, there is a longstanding practice of “Gang of Four” 
notifications – to the chairs and ranking minority members of the intelligence 
committees – for some particularly sensitive intelligence activities that are not 
covert actions. When these limited notifications occur, members may not dis-
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sometimes does not include even senior staff. This poses a hardship because these 
members rely on their staff for expertise and guidance. 
Without being able to discuss the matter with staff, lawyers or any colleagues 
other than the few who had also been briefed, members of Congress have few ave-
nues to raise concerns or take corrective action. Nonetheless, the executive branch 
may use the briefings to suggest approval. In response to public and congressional 
anger after a controversial programme leaked to the press, George W Bush Admin-
istration officials repeatedly cited severely limited congressional briefings – and 
the lack of subsequent congressional action – as proof that Congress had approved 
of their actions. Thus, as Kathleen Clark has argued, the briefings serve little or no 
oversight purpose and allow the executive branch to inoculate itself against later 
criticism for controversial programs ( Clark 2012 ;  Decker 2006 , 300–1). Since the 
Bush Administration, the intelligence committees have pushed back much harder 
against limited briefings. 
These constraints on the flow of information affect the quality and effective-
ness of oversight in a number of ways. First, the inability to share or discuss the 
information they have robs lawmakers of traditional avenues for effective over-
sight. In the case of limited briefings, members can only raise objections with the 
executive branch and other briefed members. They cannot use the information 
to persuade colleagues to use leverage to address the concern – for example to 
pass legislation or cut funding ( Kibbe 2010 , 37). It is difficult to convince other 
lawmakers to take action when you are not able to explain why. Even if the brief-
ing is not limited, the classified nature of the information prevents discussing it 
publicly, which often is the only effective way that individual legislators can bring 
attention to an issue. 
Moreover, a number of factors make it difficult for lawmakers to develop 
expertise on complex intelligence matters. It is rare for any member of Congress 
to come into the job with experience in the intelligence community, so they must 
develop expertise on the job, which can take many years. Term limits for com-
mittee members have contributed to this problem. In this complex area, members 
often will just be getting up to speed when it is their time to leave the committee. 
The Senate no longer imposes term limits on SSCI members for this reason, but 
HPSCI members are limited to six years on the committee. The difficulty for 
members of obtaining and accessing information, and their inability at times to 
rely on staff expertise, makes learning the issues particularly time-consuming. 
Thus, lawmakers often are unable to develop expertise on complex intelligence 
matters. Or, more accurately, they are unwilling to take the time that developing 
that expertise would require. 
Finally, when lawmakers do endeavour to develop expertise, they have few if 
any sources of relevant information other than the agencies they oversee and are 
unable to reach out to colleagues or others to debate or discuss the tough issues 
involved. As a result, they tend to give the views of the Intelligence Commu-
nity significant, perhaps undue, weight. “Capture” – the loss of objectivity and 
distance – of overseers by the entities they oversee is always a concern in Con-
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are when national security is involved. Capture is a significant risk with intelli-
gence oversight. As Oregon Senator Ron Wyden described the problem, the Intel-
ligence Community “sweeps in” and explains “[w]ell, these are tough issues”, 
and “only one point of view gets conveyed”. He says the committee members can 
“get caught up in the culture that makes you, in effect, something more like an 
ambassador [for the Intelligence Community] than a vigorous overseer” ( Johnson 
2018 , 185). 
To be sure, legislators come in many varieties and not all are subject to capture 
by the Intelligence Community. Loch Johnson describes the varying roles of intel-
ligence committee members over the years. There are “ostriches”, who trust the 
intelligence community and pay little attention to committee matters; “cheerlead-
ers”, who are outspoken defenders of the intelligence community; at the other 
extreme there are the consistently negative and mistrustful “lemon suckers”, and 
finally there are the “guardians” – the type most suited to effective oversight – 
who combine respect for the intelligence agencies with distance and the ability to 
criticize when necessary ( Johnson 2018 , 278–88). The dynamics of intelligence 
oversight tends to encourage ostriches and cheerleaders. 
Incentives 
The nature of intelligence oversight also affects the incentives for lawmakers to 
serve on the intelligence committees and to devote time to these issues if they do. 
A study in the 1970s of individual members of Congress found the three primary 
goals for legislators that guide the activities they choose to pursue: (1) reelection, 
(2) power and influence within the chamber and (3) good public policy. Legisla-
tors prioritize these in different ways ( Nolan 2007 , 124–5). Membership on one of 
the intelligence committees only reliably helps with the third goal. 
Service on the intelligence committees produces little tangible benefit to a 
lawmaker’s constituents. It does not benefit local businesses, assist with infra-
structure, improve the economy or address any day-to-day local concerns. It is 
possible, depending on what is happening in the world and the interests of con-
stituents in a particular district, that an intelligence role will enhance a legislator’s
reputation for seriousness among constituents. It is difficult for a committee mem-
ber to capitalize on that role, however, because they cannot discuss their work 
publicly. Power within the Congress comes from many things, but a significant 
public profile and the ability to deliver something of use for fellow members, 
either politically or legislatively, are useful in pursuing influence among col-
leagues. Intelligence committee work typically produces neither of these things. 
As a result, this is the situation intelligence committee members face: they 
have to work harder to obtain the information they need to do their job, they 
have difficulty developing expertise because of access restrictions and a lack of 
non-Intelligence Community sources of expertise, they lack sufficient leverage to 
produce positive oversight results, they get little or no press attention for the work 
they do, which rarely helps them get reelected, and they stand a good chance of 
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that legislators either to avoid work on the intelligence committees or, if they can-
not do that, do not prioritize their intelligence work. 
Partisanship 
A relatively recent phenomenon – the rise of partisanship on the intelligence 
committees – has had a significant impact on congressional oversight of intel-
ligence. Avoiding partisanship was a key goal when Congress created the 
intelligence committee structure. This was, for example, the reason they were 
established as select committees, whose members would be chosen by leaders, 
rather than through the more political process used for standing committees. 
For most of their history, the committee leaders have respected this intent and 
avoided partisanship in their conduct of committee business. There were some 
breakdowns over the years, over the Reagan Administration policy towards the 
Contras, for example, and nominations for Director of Central Intelligence in the 
administrations of George HW Bush and Bill Clinton ( Kibbe 2010 , 39–40). But 
the committees largely returned to their bipartisan nature afterwards. 
During the George W Bush Administration partisan relationships on the com-
mittees began to fray again, largely over committee Democrats’ desire to inves-
tigate intelligence failures in the run-up to the Iraq War ( Kibbe 2010 , 40). The 
partisan breakdown of the committees continued through the Obama and Trump 
Administrations. During the Trump Administration, partisan rancour over investi-
gation of the Russian interference with the 2016 election and, later, the impeach-
ment of President Trump, caused the HPSCI to become largely dysfunctional. 
Partisanship undermines effective oversight in many ways. It has interfered 
with the ability to pass intelligence authorization legislation, which is perhaps the 
single most important committee function. It also makes responsible investigation 
of intelligence failures and abuses less likely. More subtly, partisanship alters the 
focus of overseers. They become more interested in pursuing issues that can harm 
the other party or avoiding those that will harm their own. These interests crowd 
out focus on the crucial, complex, long-term problems of intelligence oversight. 
 Jurisdictional issues 
When the House and Senate created the intelligence committees, the idea was 
that they would be the primary sources of oversight for the Intelligence Com-
munity. Their ability to control the authorization of appropriations would be their 
strongest oversight weapon. Some quirks of congressional structure, however, 
undermine the intelligence committees’ authority considerably. One committee in 
each house of Congress is responsible for the appropriation of the entire executive 
branch budget. This means the committees with the power to authorize appropria-
tions cannot assure that their carefully considered budget judgements will find 
their way into the final appropriation legislation. This is the same for all authoriz-
ing committees, but it has proven to be a particular problem for the intelligence 
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The intelligence budget has always been classified and housed in a classified 
section of the much larger defence appropriation. The purpose is to prevent adver-
saries from discovering intelligence capabilities by analyzing the intelligence 
budget. This means that the intelligence budget, unlike most key appropriations, 
does not have its own subcommittee. Instead, the Defense Subcommittees of the 
appropriations committees also handle the intelligence budget. Since 2009, at the 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, the Director of National Intelligence 
has declassified and released the “top line” budget number for the National Intel-
ligence Program (NIP). This means it is no longer necessary to bury the top line 
number in the defence budget, which addresses one of the key reasons for com-
bining the appropriations. Nonetheless, the structure remains and the subcommit-
tee that considers the much larger defence appropriation has intelligence as a side 
duty ( Kibbe 2010 , 30). 
That does not mean that the appropriators have no views on intelligence mat-
ters. It is not unusual for the appropriations committee to fund less than the autho-
rizers have recommended or – potentially more problematic – fund programmes 
that the intelligence committees have specifically declined to authorize ( Kibbe 
2010 , 31–2). Appropriators sit much higher in the congressional power hierar-
chy than the intelligence committees. Thus, despite the intelligence authorizers’
greater expertise and attention to intelligence issues, the appropriators usually win 
these battles, when they occur. 
Additional observations on effectiveness of oversight 
 Structural weaknesses 
The dynamics discussed earlier combine to pose hardships for congressional 
intelligence oversight that are greater than in other areas. Some of these prob-
lems are fixable, or at least could be alleviated. There have been proposals for 
decades to improve the strength of intelligence oversight by restructuring com-
mittee responsibilities in the House and Senate, whether by creating a joint 
House-Senate intelligence committee – the most ambitious and least realistic 
proposal – combining authorization and appropriation responsibilities in each 
chamber or, most modestly, creating stand-alone intelligence subcommittees on 
the appropriations committees ( National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the 
United States 2004 ). 9 
The purpose of each of these proposals is to boost the power and leverage of 
intelligence overseers. But Congress so far has proven incapable of structural 
reform. As the 9/11 Commission noted, “Few things are more difficult to change 
in Washington than congressional committee jurisdiction and prerogatives. To
a member, these assignments are almost as important as the map of his or her 
congressional district” ( National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United 
States 2004 , 419). Powerful committee chairs, particularly on the appropriations 
committees, are unwilling to give up turf and there is no real constituency among 
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said its structural recommendations for Congress, including the merging of intel-
ligence authorization and appropriation responsibilities, were among its most 
important, but also the least likely to be implemented ( National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks on the United States 2004 , 419). 
The value of statutory requirements 
Some of Congress’s greatest successes have come when it weathered executive 
branch opposition and imposed process and notification requirements by statute. 
The executive branch resists statutory obligations out of a concern that they will 
reduce the President’s flexibility on national security issues. Nonetheless, Con-
gress has at times managed to capitalize on the right political environment – usu-
ally after a major intelligence scandal or failure – to get it done. 
An example of such a success is the regulation of covert action. The Hughes-
Ryan Amendment and subsequent reforms transformed covert action from chaotic 
and virtually ungoverned to a careful, deliberative process that is taken seriously 
within the executive branch and reliably communicated to intelligence committee 
overseers. One of the most important aspects of the reforms was the requirement 
for presidential sign-off on any covert action programme. This requirement recog-
nizes that no matter how effective external oversight is, it can never succeed with-
out strong oversight within the entities carrying out the activities. By requiring 
the president to be involved, Congress created an incentive for the bureaucracy 
to professionalize itself, both to protect the president from embarrassment and 
to protect the agencies from presidential wrath. One of the Church Committee’s 
observations about the covert operations they reviewed was that they often had 
few “fingerprints” on them. There was no record of who approved or designed 
them, so nobody could be held accountable. Particularly in an area like covert 
action that is prone to abuse, it is critical to have awareness – and accountability – 
at the top. By imposing statutory process requirements, Congress assured this 
accountability exists with covert action. 
Another example of effective obligations imposed by statute are the notification 
requirements imposed with the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 and subsequent 
legislation. These acts require the Intelligence Community to keep the committees 
“fully and currently informed” of intelligence activities, including “any signifi-
cant anticipated intelligence activity” and any illegal activities or significant intel-
ligence failures. Despite their vagueness and the difficulties that remain for the 
intelligence committees in getting information from the executive branch, these 
requirements have had a major, positive impact on the information flow. 
The executive branch prefers to be guided in its interactions with Congress by 
norms and informal understandings. These norms are often effective, but they can 
also fall away if a president does not respect norms and does not fear political 
repercussions for violating them. With statutory obligations, agencies may look 
for ways to skirt them or interpret them narrowly, but they are unlikely simply to 
ignore them. Thus, it is in Congress’s institutional interests to capitalize on the 
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Investigation successes and failures 
Investigations are one of the most powerful tools for congressional oversight. 
The history of their use for in intelligence oversight is spotty, however, with some 
shining successes and many disappointments. The Church Committee, one of the 
most thorough and influential congressional investigations on any subject, is the 
gold standard. 
Another recent success – messier and more modest – was the SSCI investiga-
tion of the CIA’s detention and interrogation programme. This investigation began 
in 2009 as a bipartisan effort, with the minority Republicans supporting the Dem-
ocratic majority. The investigation process was not smooth. There were many 
disagreements between the agency and the committee staff, some extremely bitter 
and public. The Republicans eventually withdrew their support for the inquiry, 
which was approved on a partisan vote – only one Republican senator voted with 
all of the Democrats. But in 2012 the committee completed a 7000-page report 
and in 2014, after a sometimes painful process, obtained the Obama Adminis-
tration’s final approval to release a redacted version of the 500-page executive 
summary. The published official report of the SSCI investigation provides a clear 
and disturbing picture of the CIA’s activities and treatment of detainees in the 
post-9/11 period (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2015). Although the 
CIA disputes the accuracy of parts of the report, the investigation has provided a 
public historical record that otherwise might not have existed of a dark episode in 
the history of US intelligence. 
Other recent intelligence investigations have had more mixed results. The SSCI 
investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 election, for example, produced 
five bipartisan volumes of reports that, although they did not receive as much 
attention as they deserved, were well-regarded. A HPSCI Investigation of the 
same subject, on the other hand, resulted in a partisan melt-down that left the 
committee largely dysfunctional. 
It is impossible to account for all of the circumstances that make some inves-
tigations succeed while others fail or never get off the ground. One similarity 
between the Church Committee and SSCI Torture investigations that might be rel-
evant is that they both were charged with reviewing past actions that posed little 
political threat to the administration in power. In both cases the CIA opposed the 
efforts vigorously, but the executive branch political leadership was more forth-
coming, if reluctantly. 
Conclusion 
An effective, responsible intelligence community guided by law with internal 
checks and a sense of accountability to the public is an important and realistic 
goal in the United States. Key to achieving that goal is strong external oversight 
from Congress. The intelligence community will always be “chiefly concerned 
with achieving the objectives of the president, whatever they might be. Because 
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intelligence activities ( Snider 2008 , 307). Congress’s relative distance from the 
role of planning and carrying out the activities allows it to be a needed dispassion-
ate voice that corrects for this inherent bias. 
Congressional oversight of intelligence has come a long way since its early 
days and Congress can point to many successes along the way. Nonetheless, inher-
ent challenges of overseeing intelligence and the idiosyncrasies of congressional 
structure and incentives assure that this oversight will be inconsistent and flawed. 
Congressional oversight in the United States will remain, to paraphrase Winston 
Churchill, the worst form of oversight other than all the others we have tried. 
Notes 
1 Prior to formation of these subcommittees, what minimal oversight there was came from 
congressional defence committees ( Snider 2008 , 3). 
2 The House followed suit in February and established a select committee, chaired first by 
Rep. Lucien Nedzi and later by Rep. Otis Pike. The House Committee proved to be less 
effective than its Senate counterpart and never officially published a final report ( Snider 
2008 , 275–8). 
3 In an effort to discourage partisanship in this sensitive area, the committees were estab-
lished as “select” committees, for which party leaders would appoint the members, rather 
than going through the party caucuses, as happens with typical standing committees. 
4 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981 (Intelligence Oversight Act 1980), 
§501(a) (1980). 
5 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–88 (1991). 
6 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981 (Intelligence Oversight Act 1980) 
Pub. L. No. 96–450 (1980); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102–88 (1991); National Security Act of 1947, USC 50, §§3001 et. seq. (1947). 
7 During its investigation of Russian election interference, relations between the majority 
and minority deteriorated to the point that the Republican committee majority reportedly 
planned to erect a physical barrier to separate the majority and minority staffs. The plan 
was abandoned ( Grazis 2018 ). 
8 See  https://fas.org/sgp/othergov/olc_nuccio.html 
9 Indeed, Senate leadership took the step to order the creation of such a subcommittee but 
has never implemented the change. 
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 14 Accountability for covert action in 
the United States and the United 
Kingdom 
Mitt Regan and Michele Poole1 
States sometimes decide to conduct activities against adversaries without
acknowledging their involvement in them. The decision to engage in such 
covert action creates a fundamental tension between the need for a state to fulfil 
its national security responsibilities and the principle that citizens in a liberal 
democracy should be informed about actions taken in their name so they can 
hold government accountable them ( Lester 2015 ). Both the United States (US) 
and the United Kingdom (UK) have engaged in covert action for quite some 
time ( Daugherty 2004 ;  Cormac 2018 ). This chapter examines how each manages 
this tension. It reveals that, even as they accept the importance of accountability, 
liberal democracies may define the concept differently and use different mecha-
nisms to provide it. 
Definition of covert action 
 United States 
The National Security Act of 1947 2 established the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and charged it with collection of foreign intelligence and the performance 
of “such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national 
security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct”.3 The 
latter function was the basis for the agency’s involvement in covert action until 
such operations were explicitly authorized by statute in 1991 ( Snider 2008 , 140). 
Congress codified the definition of covert action in the 1991 Intelligence 
Authorization Act. That defines covert action as “an activity or activities of the 
United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions 
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not 
be apparent or acknowledged publicly”.4 The statute provides that covert action 
does not include intelligence collection, and traditional diplomatic, military and 
law enforcement activities. 
This definition distinguishes covert action from clandestine activities, which 
often are carried out by military units, especially Special Operations Forces. The 
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former involves passive information gathering, while the latter involves opera-
tions designed to affect the environment. The line is not a sharp one, however. 
Covert action can generate considerable intelligence even if that is not its primary 
goal and such operations obviously rely on accurate intelligence in order to be 
effective. 
 United Kingdom 
Unlike the US, the UK has no statutory definition of covert action. Military doc-
trine describes covert action as operations “planned and executed as to conceal 
the identity of, or permit plausible denial by, the sponsor” ( Cormac 2018 , 5). A
recent report by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, a body 
discussed in more detail in the following, distinguishes between intelligence 
“coverage” and “effects”, with covert action falling within the latter category. As 
the report describes, 
Intelligence coverage is the collection of information (or acquisition of infor-
mation from allied intelligence services) by the Agencies and Defence Intelli-
gence. Intelligence effects describe the Agencies’ and Defence Intelligence’s 
engagement in activities that have real-life outcomes. 
( Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 2020 , 26) 
The Secret Intelligence Services or MI6 has described its work as including 
“using covert contacts overseas to shape developments and exploit opportunities 
in the UK’s interest” ( Cormac 2018 , 5) and leaked documents indicate that the 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which has primary respon-
sibility for signals intelligence, has its own “‘online covert action’ programme” 
( Cormac 2014 ). 
Unlike the US, the UK does not formally or publicly distinguish between 
covert and clandestine action, nor between covert action and intelligence gather-
ing. In contrast to the CIA, MI6 does not have its own paramilitary assets and so 
must work closely with UK Special Forces (UKSF). Indeed, UKSF are regarded 
as an asset that may be utilized by any agency when necessary. UK covert action 
thus consists of activities the US would consider clandestine military operations 
not subject to its covert action statute. Similarly, UK agencies do not have the 
resources that would enable them to clearly distinguish intelligence collection and 
covert action. This contrasts with the CIA, which has separate offices responsible 
for intelligence and operations. 
The absence of sharp distinctions also is consistent with the UK’s emphasis on 
secrecy as essential to operational effectiveness. Both law and custom reflect a 
UK tradition in which government is provided considerable deference and flex-
ibility in matters of national security ( Cormac 2018 , 5). As the discussion below 
describes, a broad conception of covert action creates challenges for any effort by 
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Responsibility for covert action 
 United States 
Executive Order 12,333 provides that “[n]o agency except the Central Intelli-
gence Agency . . . may conduct any covert action activity unless the President 
determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective”. 
The Directorate of Operations in the CIA oversees the Special Activities Center 
(SAC), which is responsible for conducting covert action. Within the SAC are the 
Special Operations Group (SAC/SOG), responsible for covert paramilitary opera-
tions, and the Political Action Group (SAC/PAG), responsible for covert political 
action, and psychological, economic and cyber operations ( Harper 2015 ). SAC/ 
SOG is largely comprised of former and current US Special Operations Forces. 
When active duty service members conduct covert action, they typically do so 
under the legal authority of the CIA Director, such as occurred in the operation 
that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden. 
The National Security Agency (NSA) was established by President Truman 
in 1952 to provide unified control over communications intelligence activities 
( Homeland Security Digital Library 1952 ). The mission of the NSA has expanded 
beyond the collection of communications intelligence to include offensive cyber 
operations, which almost certainly include covert action. In 2010 US Cyber Com-
mand (CYBERCOM) was created under the command of the then director of the 
National Security Agency. Its mission is to “direct, synchronize, and coordinate 
cyberspace planning and operations to defend and advance national interests in 
collaboration with domestic and international partners”. 
A component of the military available to assist in covert action is US Special 
Operations Forces (SOF). US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) oversees 
SOF from the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines, as well as a Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC), which is itself comprised of units from each of the 
services. SOCOM reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President. 
JSOC’s primary mission is to train and conduct special operations missions in 
support of traditional military operations, but elements of the force are sometimes 
placed under the legal authority of the CIA for the conduct of covert operations. 
The National Security Council (NSC) serves as an important mechanism to 
coordinate covert action, based on its responsibility to “advise the President with 
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the 
national security”. The National Security Act of 1947 placed the CIA under the 
National Security Council and the NSC works to coordinate covert action across 
relevant government agencies. 
Finally, the exception for traditional military activities under the covert action 
statute means that the military may conduct some covert operations that are not 
subject to the requirements of the statute. Recent legislation established that, in 
addition to kinetic activity, this exception includes cyber and information opera-
tions. As the discussion below describes, such activities are subject to separate 
requirements that resemble those in the covert action statute. 
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Figure 14.1  depicts the elements of the US government with responsibility for 
covert action operations. 
 United Kingdom 
As far as is possible to discern, UK covert action is not solely , or even mainly, 
the preserve of one agency. The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and/or the 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which is responsible for 
signals intelligence, are the most likely agencies to undertake it. The Security Ser-
vice (MI5) theoretically could do so but this is much less likely given its domes-
tic remit. Covert action also has allegedly been conducted by other entities such 
as the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), the UK’s spe-
cialist strategic communications unit that conducts counter-jihadist propaganda. 
Covert action by the UK thus is decentralized, dependent on the resources and 
needs of various agencies with respect to particular operations. Equally or even 
more important are the needs of various offices such as the Foreign and Common-
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signing off on covert action, but it is unclear how much it has been involved in 
initiating it. 
The lack of a single agency with primary responsibility for covert action not 
only reflects practical considerations, but is also consistent with the UK tradition 
of providing minimal information about the responsibilities of its intelligence and 
security agencies. For example, in 1924, 15 years after MI5 was created, the Brit-
ish Foreign Secretary declared during Parliamentary debate, 
It is the essence of a Secret Service that it must be secret, and if you once 
begin disclosure it is perfectly obvious to me as to Hon. Members opposite 
that there is no longer any Secret Service and that you must do without it. 
 ( Andrew 2009 , 753) 
This philosophy persisted until late in the twentieth century and did not change 
until judicial decisions and scandal prompted reforms. In 1987, in a case involv-
ing Sweden, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that privacy provisions 
of the European Convention on Human Rights required that infringement on 
human rights “must have some basis in domestic law . . . [and] the law in ques-
tion must be accessible to the individual concerned and its consequences for him 
must also be foreseeable” ( Andrew 2009 , 758). The Security Service Act of 1989 
then explicitly incorporated MI5 into British law as a statutory domestic security 
service. Its most significant responsibility is 
the protection of national security, and, in particular, its protection against 
threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of foreign 
powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary 
democracy by political, industrial or violent means. 
The impetus for comparable legislation regarding MI6 and GCHQ was the 
1992 trial of three businessmen prosecuted in the Matrix Churchill scandal for 
illegal arms sales to Iraq. The trial revealed that MI6 had been aware of and 
advised the defendants on the sales and had been using the intelligence provided 
by one of them. The trial collapsed as a result and the Intelligence Services Act 
(ISA) of 1994 was passed in the midst of the three-year judiciary inquiry of the 
scandal ( Gill 2007 , 20). ISA formally established the Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS), or MI6, as the UK foreign intelligence service and the GCHQ as its signals 
intelligence agency. 
Two elements of the UK’s uniformed military services conduct or support 
covert action – Defence Intelligence (DI) and UK Special Forces (UKSF). DI is 
a component of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and conducts all-source intelli-
gence analysis “providing intelligence products and advice to policy, deployment 
and research decisions”. It provides support to planning and execution of covert 
action operations and benefits from intelligence collected during them. 
Since 1987 UK Special Forces have existed as a separate directorate in the 
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Navy, later expanded to include the Royal Air Force. UK Special Forces conducts 
“short notice high risk operations in support of UK interests” under Joint Forces 
Command ( Joint Forces Command n.d. ). They are funded through the Ministry 
of Defence, but are considered a national asset for covert action, with a subset 
of UKSF serving the Secret Intelligence Service ( Cormac 2018 , 9). UK Special 
Forces is the last remaining government organization on which the government 
refuses to comment. There is an absolute exemption for UKSF under the Freedom 
of Information Act 2000 and it is government policy “not to comment, and to 
dissuade others from commenting or speculating, about the operational activities 
of Special Forces because of the security implications” ( Directorate of Special 
Forces n.d. ). 
Finally, in 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron created the National Security 
Council (NSC) as a Cabinet committee to coordinate the government’s work on 
national security, including the management of covert action ( Cormac, Goodman, 
and Holman 2016 , 15). The NSC is chaired by the Prime Minister, includes ten 
other Ministerial members, and can draw upon other senior government officials 
like the Chief of the SIS or Director of GCHQ, if their presence is relevant to the 
issues before the council ( Devanny and Harris 2014 , 24). It is supported by a sec-
retariat of approximately 200 officials led by a National Security Adviser (NSA) 
( Devanny and Harris 2014 , 25, 27). Operations that require inter-department 
cooperation are likely to be reviewed by the NSC. Certain MI6 operations involv-
ing the FCO, however, are more likely to be reviewed by the Foreign Secretary, 
who will be the dominant cabinet figure overseeing such operations. 
Regulation and oversight of covert action 
 United States 
US conduct of covert action is subject to a detailed set of regulatory requirements 
that are designed to further both rigorous internal Executive branch review and 
informed oversight by Congress. From the creation of the CIA in 1947 through 
the mid-1970s, covert action was relatively unregulated and not explicitly subject 
to Congressional oversight. This changed as a result of hearings in the House and 
Senate in 1975. These produced evidence suggesting some CIA connection to 
events that resulted in the attempted or successful assassination of foreign lead-
ers ( Weiner 2008 ). They also revealed extensive surveillance of persons within 
the United States based on political beliefs and perceived national security risks 
( Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities 1976 ;  1975 ). The result was a series of reforms beginning 
in the mid-1970s that culminated in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, 
which set forth the current statutory regime of regulation. 
The main requirements of the US covert action statute are that the president 
must make a written finding in support of a covert action and must notify the 
Congressional intelligence committees before the action begins. The finding must 
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identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the 
national security of the United States”. The President “may not authorize any 
action that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States”.5 
While notification may occur after a programme has been initiated, informal prac-
tice generally has been that it will occur within 48 hours. The statute provides: 
If the President determines that it is essential to limit access to the finding 
to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United 
States, the finding may be reported to the chairmen and ranking minority 
members of the congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and 
minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority 
leaders of the Senate, and such other member or members of the congres-
sional leadership as may be included by the President [this is known as the 
“Gang of Eight”]. 
If the president elects to notify only the Gang of Eight, the intelligence commit-
tees of the House and Senate must be informed of this decision. 
The provision that prohibits authorization of covert action in violation of the 
US Constitution or any US statute has been construed by the Executive Branch to 
permit the president to authorize covert action in violation of any US international 
law obligations that have not been incorporated into US law. Most notably, this 
would include the customary international law prohibition on intervention into the 
sovereign functions of another state. 
The notification obligation of the president applies to covert action pro-
grammes, which may consist of several individual operations. The president must 
inform Congress of each programme, but is not required to provide notification 
prior to each separate operation. In addition, the president must notify Congress of 
any significant change in a previously approved covert action programme.6 Noti-
fication for these purposes generally takes the form of a Memorandum of Noti-
fication (MON). One expert on covert action suggests the MON requirement is 
important because a presidential finding may be in broad language. Thus, “where 
and how the president, his policymakers, and his lawyers define these threshold 
terms can be critical in determining what measure of internal and then external 
review [that] specific initiatives or operational proposals receive, if any” ( Baker 
2010 ). The statute imposes additional requirements on relevant agencies to keep 
congressional intelligence committees fully informed of covert action activities, 
“including significant failures” ( Baker 2010 ). 
The requirement of a written Presidential finding has resulted in the creation of
procedures within the Executive branch for review and approval of covert action.
Typically, the president sends the CIA a request for a covert action finding. That
agency engages in an extensive analysis, which includes consultation with its sta-
tion chiefs in all countries that may be affected by a programme. Review occurs at
several levels of the agency, eventually resulting in a proposed finding that is sent
to the CIA Director. One report suggests that there is some contact between the CIA
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According to a CIA officer with paramilitary experience, once the CIA begins 
to plan a covert action and define the terms of the finding, they begin to 
“socialize” the idea with the [House and Senate Intelligence Committee] 
chairmen. This opens up a dialogue with Congress, albeit limited in its scope, 
which affords an opportunity to address any initial questions that arise. 
 ( Rudd 2015 , 10) 
When the director transmits the finding to the White House, it goes to an inter-
agency working group for covert action that involves representatives from the 
State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of 
Management and Budget and the Justice Department. After review by this group, 
it goes to the National Security Council, which submits to the president a recom-
mendation, including all dissents, on each proposed covert action. Once the NSC 
presents a proposed finding to the president for his or her approval, the presi-
dent notifies the Congressional intelligence committees. A separate document 
describes policy objectives, the plan of action, an assessment of the risks involved 
and a description of the resources that will be required. 
The exclusion of traditional military operations from the statutory definition 
of covert action means that any covert military activities are not subject to the 
procedures set forth in the statute. There are, however, regulatory provisions that 
resemble those in the statute for specific types of military operations. The Sec-
retary of Defense is required to notify the Congressional Armed Services com-
mittees no less than 48 hours before initiation of a “sensitive military operation”, 
which is defined as a lethal or capture operation against a specific person or per-
sons outside certain conflict theatres. This requirement serves to furnish Congress 
with timely information about unacknowledged SOF operations. In addition, the 
Secretary of Defense must notify the Armed Services Committees no less than 15 
days before using funds authorized for payment to foreign and local groups and 
must file an annual report summarizing SOF counter-terrorism operations assisted 
by groups receiving these funds. 
Any “clandestine” military cyber operation that is covert must be authorized by
the president or the Secretary of Defense.7 This requirement is similar to the require-
ment of a presidential finding under the covert action statute, although it is unclear
the extent to which it involves consultation with multiple agencies as occurs with
a covert action finding. The Secretary of Defense must notify the Armed Services
Committees within 48 hours of any cyber operations outside theatres of hostilities.
Legislation also exempts from the covert action statute military information opera-
tions “short of hostilities and in areas outside of areas of active hostilities”. The Sec-
retary of Defense must report to the Armed Services Committees any “significant”
such operations conducted by the Department in the preceding quarter. 8
 United Kingdom 
Rory Cormac suggests that there may be at least two mechanisms in the UK for 
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must approve any such operation ( Cormac 2018 , 13). The other is the National 
Security Council (NSC) described earlier. Cormac notes that: 
[t]here is some suggestion that the NSC is now the primary forum for covert 
action tasking and scrutiny. This may be because it brings together the heads 
of the agencies and the military with the PM and key cabinet members like 
the Foreign and Defence Secretaries on a weekly basis. The NSC and For-
eign Office processes may work together or could be used interchangeably 
depending on operational needs. 
With respect to oversight by Parliament, the 1994 Intelligence Services Act cre-
ated the first parliamentary oversight mechanism, the Intelligence and Security 
Committee (ISC). The Act described the Committee’s mandate as “to examine 
the expenditure, administration, and policy” of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. The Com-
mittee was granted access to classified material. There were concerns, however, 
that it was insufficiently independent because, although comprised of members 
of Parliament, it was not a parliamentary committee but a statutory committee 
appointed by and reporting to the Prime Minister. 
The Justice and Security Act of 2013 and the resulting Memorandum of Under-
standing Agreed Between the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security 
Committee of Parliament substantially changed the structure, authority and man-
date of the ISC ( Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 2014 , 11). 
Members are now nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by a vote of 
their relevant House of Parliament ( Intelligence and Security Committee of Par-
liament 2014 , 11). The ISC now has its own staff – the ISC Secretariat – although 
members are seconded from the Cabinet Office. The ISC reports its findings to 
the Prime Minister, who then reports them to Parliament with redactions of sensi-
tive information. Only the Secretary of State may withhold information from the 
ISC, on the ground that “it is sensitive and should not be disclosed to the ISC in 
the interests of national security”. Information can be withheld from other parlia-
mentary committees if the Secretary of State thinks “it proper not to do so” and 
is “not limited to national security” grounds ( Dawson 2020 , 8). Notwithstanding 
this, the Prime Minister retains significant control over the process, as reflected, 
for instance, in delays in releasing ISC reports and in reconstituting the committee 
after an election. 
The ISC’s oversight authority was extended beyond the three major intelli-
gence agencies to include the intelligence and security work of a number of other 
offices, including the Chief of Defence Intelligence (DI) and offensive cyber 
activities in the Ministry of Defence; the Joint Intelligence Organisation, National 
Security Secretariat and Assessments Staff in the Cabinet Office; and the Office 
for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office ( Intelligence and 
Security Committee of Parliament 2014 , 12). 
The Committee’s role with respect to covert action is entirely retrospective – 
that is, it has no role in oversight of operations before or while they were taking 
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that the committee was created. “There is no benefit, and a lot of risk”, Rifkind 
said, “in having been briefed in advance of a secret operation unless you can influ-
ence whether it goes ahead. Otherwise, you have responsibility without power, 
which is even worse than power without responsibility” ( Rifkind 2016 , 428). 
In contrast to the US, one organization integral to covert action that remains 
free of parliamentary oversight is UK Special Forces (UKSF). The ISC is the 
only committee that has members cleared to review classified material, but it 
has no mandate to provide oversight of UKSF. The Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Committees that oversee the organizations to which UKSF are assigned have no 
security clearance. A member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee raised this 
issue in November 2017, asking if the MoD would “undertake a review of access 
to information on Special Forces by Parliament to enable effective scrutiny”, and 
he was told, “Given the sensitivity of their activities, oversight of Special Forces 
is exercised through the Prime Minister and Defence Ministers. We have no plans 
to change the current arrangements”. The year before, the Defence Ministry rep-
resentative refused to answer any of an MPs questions related to the UK Special 
Forces, repeating seven times to seven separate questions, “I cannot comment on 
specific questions about personnel, equipment, discussions or activities in relation 
to these units” ( Walpole and Karlshoej-Pedersen 2018 , 4–6). 
 Comparative analysis 
As the preceding discussion makes clear, there are not only some similarities but 
also some important differences in how the US and UK seek to ensure account-
ability for covert action. This section focuses on the main differences and their 
potential significance. 
Definition of covert action and designation of lead agency 
The US defines covert action in a statute that establishes requirements for engag-
ing in such operations. That definition excludes some activities that may be con-
ducted covertly, such as military activities. This results in different procedures 
and oversight mechanisms for activities formally defined as covert action and 
military covert operations that are not. Both require some form of notification of 
Congress, although military information operations need only be reported quar-
terly. Statutory covert action requires a presidential finding, while military covert 
action does not, although the Secretary of Defense presumably has a prominent 
role in the latter. 
The designation of the CIA as primarily responsible for statutory covert action 
means that Congressional Intelligence committees exercise oversight over the 
CIA, while Armed Services committees do so over military covert operations. 
The US thus effectively has a parallel system of covert action accountability for 
CIA and military operations. Other agencies have interests in such operations and 
have opportunities to weigh in, most notably for CIA operations. It is clear, how-
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By contrast, various UK agencies have definitions of covert action, but there 
is no statutory definition. Nor is any entity designated as the lead agency for 
such operations. The philosophy, perhaps shaped also by resource constraints, 
is that any given agency may have an interest in a particular operation and may 
have assets that are especially suitable for it. Covert action thus involves “[m] 
ultiple actors, often with diverging visions and goals”, which “require greater co-
ordination” ( Cormac, Goodman, and Holman 2016 , 17). This creates the poten-
tial for counterproductive competition among agencies, although in practice MI6 
generally takes the lead, with GCHQ also sometimes doing so. The NSC has the 
potential to coordinate operations, but it has broad responsibilities and less experi-
ence with covert action than its US counterpart. 
This decentralized approach also may produce gaps in Parliamentary oversight. 
Unlike the US, there is no committee charged with covert action oversight. The ISC 
oversees the intelligence agencies, but since covert action is a means of executing 
foreign policy, the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) arguably has an interest in 
overseeing it. Oversight of covert action formally comes within the ISC remit, 
but until recently the committee had no authority to review operations in advance. 
With limited exceptions, it tends to focus on broad policy and strategic issues. In 
addition, since covert action may involve the military, the House of Commons 
Defence Committee (HCDC) could be involved. Because the line between covert 
action and intelligence can be indistinct, however, neither FAC nor HCDC are 
entirely natural oversight forums for covert action. Furthermore, the ISC is the sole 
committee whose members may view classified information, which as a practical 
matter prevents FAC and HCDC from conducting effective oversight. 
Notification of the legislature 
A significant difference between the US and UK covert action process is that the 
former requires advance notification of Congress while the latter does not. Parlia-
ment therefore is limited to retrospective review of operations. This reflects the 
historical preference of ISC leadership, which believes that advance notice would 
result in the committee sharing responsibility for operations without any authority 
to influence them. 
Based on the US experience, it is not clear whether this concern is necessar-
ily warranted. Congress has no statutory authority to approve or disapprove of 
any covert action, but it does have the potential to exercise influence ( Cumming 
2010 , 5). The preparation of a finding by the CIA involves informal consultation 
with Congress, and formal notification historically has provided an opportunity 
for Congress to express its views on the practical, legal and political risks of 
proposed operations. Senator John Warner, who served on the Senate Intelligence 
committee, has written, 
Congressional oversight has uncovered instances when covert actions were 
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contributed to the reconsideration of activities or the particular details of their 
execution. On occasion, it has blocked some and terminated others. 
 ( Warner 1989 , 107) 
The ISC thus may be forgoing an informal opportunity to shape covert action by 
declining to seek advance notification. 
Oversight of special operations forces 
Another major difference between the US and UK is that the former provides
for Congressional oversight of SOF while the latter does not. US military covert
action generally will be carried out by SOF. Military covert action is not sub-
ject to the requirements of the covert action statute, but the requirement that
the Department of Defense notify the Armed Services committees of various
kinetic, cyber and information operations provides a mechanism for oversight
of military covert action in general and SOF in particular. By contrast, the UK
has no statute authorizing SOF and declines to comment on their operations
or existence. ISC members have security clearances, but that committee over-
sees the intelligence agencies. The HCDC may informally oversee SOF, but its
members do not have access to classified information. The Ministry of Defence
presumably engages in oversight, but of course is formally a member of the
executive branch.
Washington and Westminster systems 
Oversight of covert action by the legislature in the US and UK is of course affected 
by the differences in those countries’ systems of government. The US sharply 
differentiates between the executive and Congress, with members of Congress 
prohibited from serving simultaneously in the executive branch. By contrast, the 
executive is a component of Parliament in the UK. The authority of the executive 
to govern in the UK is based on its dominance of Parliament, with the Cabinet 
composed mainly of leading members of the House of Commons. Thus, the chair 
of the UK ISC has been from the same party as the Prime Minister in all but four 
of the 25 years that committee has been in existence. By contrast, over that same 
period the chair of the House and Senate intelligence committees has been from 
the same party as the president only 32% and 50% of the time. More generally, 
since 1945 the House has been controlled by the opposing party 68% of the time 
and the Senate 50% of the time. 
The timing of elections in the two systems also differs. The US has elections 
every two years for every House member and one-third of Senate members. Par-
liament may not exceed five years between elections, and the timing of those 
elections is usually determined by the Government, with 30 days’ notice between 
announcement and the day of election ( Peterson 2005 ). The work of the ISC may 
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be re-established after elections. After general elections, the ISC has been one of 
the last committees reconstituted. 
[I]n the three years from 2015 to the end of 2017, Britain was without a leg-
islative intelligence oversight body for almost 12 months. There were four 
terrorist attacks in the UK in the period in which the committee was in desue-
tude in 2017. 
The situation has been described as “deeply unsatisfactory” ( Defty 2019 , 9). 
Because US congressional elections occur at a regular interval, the outgoing 
Congress continues to sit during most of the period between election day and the 
swearing in of the new Congress. Committee assignments for the new Congress 
are decided during this time, which provides for continuity of oversight. 
The lesser role of legislative oversight in providing accountability for covert
action in the UK is reflected in the fact that although recent reforms to the ISC
increased its authority to request information from the executive, the executive can
refuse to provide such information with few repercussions. An example was a recent
ISC inquiry into the decision-making behind drone strikes in Syria that resulted in
the deaths of three UK citizens. The ISC announced that it planned to investigate the
intelligence basis for the strikes. The Prime Minister responded that the strike was
part of ongoing operations and therefore was beyond the scope of the Committee’s
remit. He noted, however, the significant public interest in assessing the threat that
one of the victims posed and asked the Committee to conduct an investigation con-
fined to this question ( Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 2017 , 2).
The ISC conducted oral interviews and received the written intelligence assess-
ments and reports that formed the basis for the threat determination. It requested 
information on targeting procedures, collateral damage estimates and other mat-
ters that were used in the decision-making. The executive refused on the ground 
that these were outside the scope of the investigation. ISC disagreed with that 
assessment and noted in its report that the unavailability of this information hin-
dered its ability to provide a full review of the operation. 
Finally, oversight of covert action by the US and UK also reflects cultural differ-
ences. The UK is more comfortable with secrecy by the executive and with unwrit-
ten policy and procedures, perhaps reflecting more trust in the government than 
exists in the US. The extensive formal regulatory provisions that govern covert 
action in the US reflected a tradition of greater distrust and emerged because of 
congressional hearings that revealed considerable questionable covert operations 
undertaken by the CIA from the end of World War II until the early 1970s. 
Executive branch process 
To the extent that there are limits on the ability of Congress or Parliament to oversee
covert action, robust internal executive branch deliberation can further accountabil-
ity by ensuring that decisions are informed by multiple perspectives that take into
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requirement that individuals be able to justify their positions to others. This require-
ment is especially important in settings in which many reasons cannot be publicly
articulated, such as in the national security setting. In these situations, what Ashley
Deeks calls secret reason-giving “improves the overall quality and effectiveness
of government decision-making and operations, constrains the decision-maker, and
strengthens the decision-maker’s legitimacy” ( Deeks 2020 , 616).
The requirement of a Presidential finding under the US covert action statute 
appears to foster this process within the executive branch. Extensive review of 
a proposed finding occurs within the CIA, sometimes involving informal con-
sultation with Congress. The proposal is then sent to a working group comprised 
of members of several agencies, after which it is reviewed by the NSC before 
submission to the President. By the time a finding reaches the President, it has 
been reviewed by multiple individuals and organizations with varying expertise, 
perspectives and interests. 
In the UK, “there needs to be particular emphasis on robust internal delibera-
tion within the executive, since the onus of ensuring meaningful covert action 
oversight rests almost entirely” on this mechanism ( Djabatey 2018 ). It is possible 
that the process is as comparably as wide-ranging as in the US, but there is no 
public information about it. The Foreign Office historically has been required to 
authorize covert action and may serve to coordinate consideration of proposed 
operations. Its influence at least in theory has meant that British covert action 
is tied to foreign policy and has given British covert action a generally cautious 
character ( Djabatey 2018 ). On the other hand, the NSC now may have assumed 
the primary coordinating role, since it brings together the heads of the agencies 
and the military with the PM and key cabinet members on a weekly basis. Inter-
agency consultation in the UK does not appear to be as formalized as it is in the 
US, but the NSC has the potential to foster this practice. In addition, interagency 
bodies that allegedly engage in forms of covert action exist, such as the RICU. 
The NSC and Foreign Office processes may work together, or could be used inter-
changeably depending on operational needs. 
In any event, more transparency about the UK process could serve to enhance 
a sense of accountability for covert action. With respect to the US targeted killing 
programme, for instance, disclosure of the process for selecting targets, albeit as 
a result of litigation, provided the public with a greater understanding of the par-
ties involved in the process, the criteria they apply and the evidence required at 
each step of the deliberations. Such disclosure also can provide at least general 
standards by which the public can assess the programme. Something comparable 
for UK covert action could both provide reassurance of rigorous deliberation and 
encourage officials to engage in it. 
Conclusion 
US covert action is explicitly authorized and regulated by publicly available stan-
dards, in contrast with the UK’s reluctance to formalize or disclose the process 
for conducting such activity. This likely reflects much greater reliance by the US 
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on covert action than the UK, the sharper separation of powers in the US system, 
and greater resources that allow the US to differentiate among intelligence, covert 
action and unacknowledged military operations. While the US system does not 
automatically ensure full accountability for covert action, it does at least provide 
some public standards against which it can be evaluated. 
Other factors that contribute to the dif ferences between the two systems may 
be the UK’s history of greater reliance on and confidence in elites and a prefer-
ence to avoid clear lines of demarcation in order to preserve freedom of action. 
Nonetheless, there is growing public demand for government transparency and 
for accountability even for secret operations. With a weaker system of legislative 
oversight than in the US, the UK may need to disclose more information about 
executive branch decision-making on covert action to meet this demand. 
 Notes 
 1 We are grateful for comments on a draft of this chapter by Rory Cormac. 
 2 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80–253, 80th Cong. 1st sess (1947). 
 3 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80–253, 80th Cong. 1st sess,  § 102(d)(5) (1947). 
 4 50 USC § 3093(e) .
 5 50 USC § 3093(a) .
 6 50 USC § 3093(d) .
 7 Legislation uses the term “clandestine” to emphasize that such operations are not subject 
to the covert action statute, but the definition of clandestine includes unacknowledged 
operations. 
 8 As with military cyber operations, clandestine information operations include those that 
are unacknowledged. 
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 15 GEOINT and the post-secret 
world 
Who guards the guards? 
 Robert Cardillo 
We are fast approaching the time in which technology will enable a continuous 
sensing of all of the world’s activity – 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days 
a year. Such holistic collection will facilitate a detailed model of the planet and all 
that is happening on it. There are many benefits of such a model, including natural 
disaster preparedness and response, enhanced measurements of the environment 
and real-time detection of nefarious actors. However, such a world will demand 
a rethinking of privacy itself, requiring us to find the optimum balance between 
the benefits of this technology, their implications for our privacy and the potential 
for misuse. Exploring that balance is the overriding purpose of this chapter. While 
a definitive answer will not be delineated, I will present the key questions which 
will guide our thinking. 
“Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” literally means “Who will guard the guards
themselves?” For our purposes, a variant of that translation will be more
constructive: “Who watches the watchers?” In the past, the watchers were
governments – for good and for bad – and the original driver for remote sensing 
technologies was national security. When the Iron Curtain was drawn across
Europe, the US Government and its allies needed to access the denied territory
of the Soviet Union in order to identify the magnitude of the military threat.
Wrapped in layers and layers of secrecy, such access was first provided by the
U-2 aircraft’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance mission ( Lockheed
Martin n.d .).
Over the next five years, the U2’s innovation provided President Eisenhower 
with unprecedented insight into denied territory and enhanced understanding of 
a critical threat and over 100 flights collecting thousands of images. However on 
May 1, 1960, a Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile shot down a U2 aircraft, not 
only removing our ability to surveil our adversaries but also revealing our tactics, 
techniques and procedures ( History 2018 ). We were blind and that blindness cre-
ated doubt, uncertainty and risk. 
That blindness lasted a little more than 100 days; on August 18, 1960, the then-
top secret CORONA satellite programme took its first image from space, a grainy 
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territory, providing insight and an ultimate advantage over our adversaries. In 
1995, Vice President Gore stated the CORONA satellites, 
recorded much more than the landscape of the Cold War. In the process of 
acquiring this priceless data, we recorded for future generations the environ-
mental history of the Earth at least a decade before any country on this Earth 
launched any Earth resource satellites. 
 ( CIA 2015 ) 
In order to collect such critical imagery intelligence, the creators of the CORONA
satellite had to overcome many obstacles: 
• determine a way to expose film via a shutter and lens system travelling at 
23,500 mph 
• solve for the necessary speed of the film feed system 
• contain the exposed film 
• eject the capsule of film 
• send the capsule of film back through the atmosphere 
• deploy a parachute at altitude 
• modify an Air Force transport with a trapeze to catch the capsule as it floated 
down over the Pacific 
All to say, it took innovative science and enormous investment amidst extraordi-
nary secrecy to create the ability to document activity on earth from space. 
Over the course of the next 50 years, there was a halting and gradual shift of that
capability from the government to the commercial sector. This shift has recently
accelerated, resulting in a sharp increase in commercial capabilities in space. Beyond
the visible images captured in the electro-optical spectrum, there are now commer-
cial radar satellites as well as those that capture radio frequencies and infrared.
With this rapid and steep commercial growth, some argue that we are entering 
into an era of geospatial “singularity”. This scenario 
coined the GEOINT Singularity, is a future where real-time Earth observa-
tions with analytics are available globally to the average citizen on the ground 
providing a tremendous wealth of information, insight, and intelligence. 
 ( Koller 2019 ) 
Dr Josef Koller, a global security and space science programme expert, believes, 
“technology trends are accelerating and there are indications that a sixth wave of 
innovation is coming”. Dr Koller reminds us of the five initial economic cycles 
defined as the industrial revolution; the age of steam and railways; the age of steel 
and electricity; the age of oil, cars and mass production and the age of information 
and communication ( Koller 2019 ). 
Each wave lasted from 40 to 60 years and consisted of alternating periods 
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postulated by some as an increase in resource efficiency. A new wave would 
be heralded by massive changes in the market, societal institutions and tech-
nology that all reinforce each other, centered around connected intelligence 
with new devices, new applications, new business models and new services. 
Space-based commercial remote sensing that create massive datasets, joined 
by [AI] for analysis and product development will be just one aspect of the 
innovation wave. 
 ( Koller 2019 ) 
With this increase in innovation and technological advances, the potential for 
transparency escalates exponentially, an attribute I find pertinent to our success as 
a liberal democracy in this technological age. 
One of the many benefits of embracing satellite imagery and artificial intelli-
gence (AI) into our daily life is the ability to predict natural disasters. Since 2000, 
spaceborne satellites and sensors have helped experts “quantify geophysical phe-
nomena associated with the movements of the earth’s surface (earthquakes, mass 
movements), water (floods, tsunamis, storms), and fire (wildfires)” ( Gillespie et 
al. 2007 ). This technology plays an important role in assessing disasters before 
and after they occur ( Gillespie et al. 2007 ). Specialists are turning to “geodetic 
methods – the math-based study of changes in the Earth’s shape – that use satel-
lites and other instruments to complement data gathered by seismometers” to bet-
ter predict the earth’s “movements and landslides” ( Joshi 2019 ;  Lewis 2019 ). A
University of Iowa student demonstrated this by processing: 
radar imagery, or interferograms, from a 6.9 magnitude quake that struck 
Indonesia in August 2018. She then used this imagery to produce a model of 
the earthquake and where it was located. The [United States Geological Sur-
vey] used this model directly to update its predictions of ground shaking and 
earthquake impact that were incorporated into its disaster-response systems. 
 ( Lewis 2019 ) 
These efforts directly improved earthquake estimates and solidified the impor-
tance of satellite imagery in predicting future natural disasters ( Lewis 2019 ). 
Furthermore, during Hurricane Harvey, The National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) collaborated with the mapping and data visualization 
team at Development Seed to track Harvey’s rainfall, cloud heights and cloud 
top temperatures ( Joshi 2019 ;  Dempsey 2017 ). This technology allowed experts 
to track the hurricane’s progress every hour, as opposed to every six hours, which 
was the standard tracking capability ( Joshi 2019 ). 
AI is also being used to protect and improve the environment in the form of 
monitoring endangered species, tracking diseases and optimizing crops. For 
example, WildTrack uses a “computer vision solution called Footprint Identifica-
tion Technology to monitor endangered species non-invasively. The tool analyses 
images of footprints of cheetahs, rhinos, and other endangered species to identify 
them, track them, and determine what threatens them” ( DeNisco Rayome 2019 ). 
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disease, as well as weather changes, to warn populations about upcoming storms” 
( DeNisco Rayome 2019 ). 
Epidemiology, the study of disease propagation, has long relied on maps, 
starting with John Snow’s iconic maps of the London cholera outbreak in 
1854. These maps may have been the beginning of geographic analysis as we 
know it – overlaying seemingly disparate elements on a map to reveal previ-
ously unseen patterns. 
 ( OECD 2020 ) 
Thanks to Geospatial technologies like AI, the spread of COVID-19 is being 
mapped in real time. 
Before the world was even aware of the threat posed by the coronavirus
(COVID-19), artificial intelligence (AI) systems had detected the outbreak of
an unknown type of pneumonia in the People’s Republic of China (hereafter
“China”). As the outbreak has now become a global pandemic, AI tools and
technologies can be employed to support efforts of policy makers, the medi-
cal community, and society at large to manage every stage of the crisis and its
aftermath: detection, prevention, response, recovery and to accelerate research.
 ( OECD 2020 ) 
AI is a contributing factor as governments attempt to limit contagion. Countries 
are using AI methods to surveil their population and conduct contact tracing, 
among other things. 
A number of countries are using population surveillance to monitor COVID-
19 cases (for example, in Korea algorithms use geolocation data, surveil-
lance-camera footage and credit card records to trace coronavirus patients). 
China assigns a risk level (colour code – red, yellow or green) to each person 
indicating contagion risk using cell phone software. While machine learning 
models use travel, payment, and communications data to predict the location 
of the next outbreak and inform border checks, search engines and social 
media are also helping to track the disease in real-time. 
 ( OECD 2020 ) 
Even before the COVID-19 outbreak, governments were adopting closed-circuit 
television cameras combined with AI in cities across the globe. Some cities may 
even utilize private companies to gather publicly available photographs and data 
from the internet ( Goldenfein 2020 ). One service in particular, Clearview AI, is 
“like a reverse image search for faces” ( Goldenfein 2020 ). As the global social 
networks expand, the raw material for such an application grows every day: 
You take a picture of a person, upload it and get to see public photos of 
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whose backbone is a database of more than three billion images that Clear-
view claims to have scraped from Facebook, YouTube, Venmo and millions 
of other websites – goes far beyond anything ever constructed by the United 
States government or Silicon Valley giants. 
 ( Hill 2020 ) 
With this increase in imagery and data collection, we will be able to holistically 
cross-connect data streams from human activity to physical reality; ultimately 
answering the questions, “Where are the people?” “Why are the people there?” 
and “Where are they going to be tomorrow?” Having the ability to answer these 
questions could contribute to the prevention of mass shootings, police brutality 
or maintaining peace during protests or daily life. For instance, law enforcement 
officers, including local police in Florida, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security, have used Clearview AI to assist 
with cases involving shoplifting, identity theft, credit card fraud, murder and child 
sexual exploitation cases ( Hill 2020 ). 
However, the collection of one’s daily actions, movements or publicly avail-
able information could be used with malice. If mishandled, employers, govern-
ment leaders or adversaries (personal or political/non state actors) could use this 
information as leverage against those with opposing viewpoints. In this instance, 
we risk being manipulated for another person’s gain. Due to this fear, it is likely 
most Americans would feel their freedoms were violated if Congress attempted to 
mandate that every adult carry a tracking device to reveal their location 24 hours 
a day ( Thompson and Warzel 2019a ). Yet, in the decade since Apple created its 
App Store and General Motors created OnStar, the majority of Americans have, 
application by application, consented to such a system run by private companies, 
even though the corporations that control their data are far less accountable than 
the government would be ( Thompson and Warzel 2019a ). In an exposé on the 
topic, The New York Times states: 
Americans have grown eerily accustomed to being tracked throughout their 
digital lives. But it’s far from their fault. It’s a result of a system in which data 
surveillance practices are hidden from consumers and in which much of the 
collection of information is done without the full knowledge of the device 
holders. 
 ( Thompson and Warzel 2019b ) 
Many Americans simply risk embarrassment or inconvenience should their loca-
tion data be exposed, but for victims of abuse, the risks are substantial as this 
information could be used by their abuser for further attacks ( Thompson and War-
zel 2019a ). The  New York Times also reminded their readers that not all people 
want their locational data shared: 
Who can say what practices or relationships any given individual might 
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government? We found hundreds of pings in mosques and churches, abortion 
clinics, queer spaces and other sensitive areas. 
 ( Thompson and Warzel 2019a ) 
With the innovations surrounding AI and geospatial technologies, the concept 
of privacy has evolved. Should our liberal democracy maintain transparency in 
regards to this technology, the concept of privacy will continue to morph, for good 
or for bad. For example, in May 2019, the city of San Francisco became the first 
city in the United States to ban the use of facial recognition software by police and 
other city agencies ( Fowler and Breedlove 2019 ). While this technology could 
provide assistance in fighting crime, it could also be used for evil or unjust rea-
sons. For example, if a child was kidnapped from a city park prior to this ban, San 
Francisco would be able to use a combination of CCTVs and facial recognition 
software to identify the kidnapper, track his or her location, retrieve the missing 
child and return them to his or her parents. A city employee, however, could mis-
use the technology at his or her disposal to track a former spouse during a divorce 
settlement. Perhaps this employee’s former spouse is claiming to be unable to 
afford child support or alimony, claims to be eating at food shelters and strug-
gling to make ends meet. However, with CCTVs and facial recognition, the city 
employee is able to prove that the former spouse is frequenting lavish stores and 
five star restaurants. In this instance, the technology that could be used for good 
becomes an abuse of power and a tool to invade someone’s privacy. Furthermore, 
“facial recognition algorithms have long been criticized for poor performance 
in identifying non-white faces” ( Hatmaker 2020 ). This issue contributes to San 
Francisco’s decision to ban such technology: “[t]he propensity for facial recogni-
tion technology to endanger civil rights and civil liberties substantially outweighs 
its purported benefits” ( Fowler and Breedlove 2019 ). 
If not properly regulated with transparency, this technology could also be used 
to threaten our national security. For example, in the same exposé referenced previ-
ously, the  New York Times used locational data to track one of president Trump’s 
secret service agents, and by association, likely president Trump himself ( Thomp-
son and Warzel 2019b ). The potential this information could have against our 
national security is obviously immense and there’s little stopping an adversary 
from utilizing this information to our detriment. For instance, according to former 
National Security Agency director General Michael Hayden, “the U.S. government 
‘kill[s] people based on metadata’”. If this is a practice we take part in, it could also 
be adapted by adversaries through readily available, public information. 
As the expansion and growth of such surveillance is inevitable and incessant, 
we must calculate a means to deal with such a reality. If approached with caution, 
this will benefit our society exponentially. In his 1998 book,  The Transparent 
Society, David Brin shares similar sentiments: 
This is a tale of two cities. Cities of the near future, say ten or twenty years 
from now. Barring something unforeseen, you are apt to be living in one these 
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Consider city number one. In this place, all the myriad cameras report their 
urban scenes straight to Police Central, where security officers use sophisti-
cated image processors to scan for infractions against public order – or per-
haps an established way of thought. Citizens walk the streets aware that any 
word or deed may be noted by agents of some mysterious bureau. 
At first sight, things seem quite similar in city number two. Again, ubiqui-
tous cameras perch on every vantage point. Only here we soon find a crucial 
difference. These devices do not report to the secret police. Rather, each and 
every citizen of this metropolis can use his or her wristwatch television to call 
up images from any camera in town. 
In city number two, such micro-cameras are banned from some indoor 
places . . . but not from police headquarters! There any citizen may tune in on 
bookings, arraignments, and especially the camera control room itself, sure 
that the agents on duty look out for violent crime, and only crime. 
Both futures may seem undesirable. But can there be any doubt which city 
we’d rather live in, if these two make up our only choice? 
 ( Brin 1999 ) 
Brin’s challenging question to choose from extremes is useful in the grey area 
that is real life. But given the relentless nature of commercial surveillance, Brin 
gives us a reference point from which to anchor the necessary details of our 
policy debate. The abundance of publicly available information is changing the 
definition of “private”. In an article for the Brookings Institute, Cameron Kerry 
states: 
To most people, ‘personal information’ means information like social
security numbers, account numbers, and other information that is unique
to them. U.S. privacy laws reflect this conception by aiming at ‘personally
identifiable information,’ but data scientists have repeatedly demonstrated
that this focus can be too narrow. The aggregation and correlation of data
from various sources make it increasingly possible to link supposedly
anonymous information to specific individuals and to infer characteristics
and information about them. The result is that today, a widening range
of data has the potential to be personal information, i.e. to identify us
uniquely.
 ( Kerry 2018 ) 
The European Union agrees with this sentiment: Brought to fruition in May 2018, 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) significantly altered the privacy 
laws throughout the European Union. The GDPR is focused largely on protect-
ing personal data, to include “racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious 
beliefs, membership of trade unions, genetic and biometric data, health informa-
tion and data around a person’s sex life or orientation” ( Burgess 2020 ). At the core 
of the GDPR legislation, there are seven principles that “don’t act as hard rules, but 
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of GDPR” ( Burgess 2020 ). The seven principles are: “lawfulness, fairness and 
transparency; purpose limitation; data minimisation; accuracy; storage limitation; 
integrity and confidentiality (security); and accountability” ( Burgess 2020 ). How-
ever, certain provisions could override the GDPR legislation, including national 
security, defence and public security ( European Parliament and Council of Euro-
pean Union 2016 ). 
Currently, US privacy laws focus on threats against individual’s rights, but 
those protections are anachronistic in the face of AI, geospatial technologies and 
mobile technologies, which not only use group data but also are dependent on 
it. We must determine who controls our data, who can access it, why it can be 
accessed and with what oversight. Finally, we need to firmly establish what role – 
if any – the derived data would play in our legal framework. We ultimately need 
to answer the question, “How might our society adapt, innovate and evolve to 
harness the power of geospatial data and technology while mitigating its ethical 
challenges”? 
As we seek to address that question, we must remember these are unchar-
tered waters and uninformed, impetuous actions could have deleterious effects. 
It is essential this unprecedented situation be addressed with deliberate and well 
thought out actions, as well as the flexibility and ability to modify rules and regu-
lations as we better understand the ramifications and consequences of our initial 
decisions. Currently, the most applicable legal notion along these lines may be the 
Fourth Amendment Equilibrium Adjustment, which: 
posits that the Supreme Court adjusts the scope of protection in response to 
new facts in order to restore the status quo level of protection. When chang-
ing technology or social practice expands government power, the Supreme 
Court tightens Fourth Amendment protection; when it threatens government 
power, the Supreme Court loosens constitutional protection. 
 ( Kerr 2011 ) 
While this is a far cry from what liberal democracies must create in order to 
adequately protect individuals’ privacy outside the court of law, the premise may 
serve as an appropriate baseline and reminder for a fluid, constantly changing, 
law. I would observe that until we can agree on data privacy norms, it will be hard 
to create lasting rules around transparency. Suffice it to say, the stakes are enor-
mous. In fact, one could see this discussion and debate as existential – at least as 
it pertains to human freedoms. 
Just as search engines like Google led the way for indexing and categorizing 
the knowledge deposited by humans into the online world for mankind’s benefit, a 
globally persistent sensing architecture could lead the way to finding information, 
intelligence and understanding of the physical world in real time to benefit all life 
on earth. Like others, I have used the analogy of the rising tide of data that can 
overwhelm us by bringing us more data and less information, ultimately reducing 
our shared awareness. That tide is cresting in a way that puts us now on the curling 
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us to propel into a world of radical transparency. Each advancement in technol-
ogy will build upon and interface with their predecessors. This accumulation is 
essential from a commercial utility perspective. And it will redound to the public 
sphere if and when such transparency is misused – especially by the government. 
Our transparent society is here to stay, no matter how hard one tries to elimi-
nate their digital presence. There is no putting this technological genie back in 
the bottle. I submit that transparency favours justice – and that evil lurks in the 
dark. If you think of this transparency as light – as I do – it shines both ways. I 
believe transparency is good for liberal, democratic societies. As Supreme Court 
Justice Louis Brandeis observed, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants” 
( Brandeis 1914 , chap. 5). 
I further believe the bedrock of civil discourse is trust; not so we agree on every 
issue, rather so we appreciate the other perspective and empathize with differing 
views. Properly thought through, an era of radical transparency can lead to a more 
humane world. However, achieving such a world means striking a balance between 
access and control, between openness and privacy, between good and evil. 
Thus, we should be considering our country’s core strengths – entrepreneurial 
spirit, risk capital, market competition and respect for the individual and their 
rights – as we rethink what the notion of privacy should mean today. If we antici-
pate many of the ways that the abundance of data might be misused, we can estab-
lish rules, regulations and governing authorities to encourage the best uses while 
thwarting bad actors. After all, as we’ve learned during the ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic, modifying prior constructs of privacy has enabled countries to conduct 
holistic contact tracing, limiting the spread of a deadly disease. If approached 
with thought and caution, this technology has the potential to make transparency 
a force for good and change the world for the better. 
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 Introduction 
This chapter has three objectives. First it assesses briefly contemporary and 
emerging chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats from 
non-state actors. Secondly, it identifies capability challenges across “Five Eyes” 
intelligence communities (ICs) in managing CBRN non-state actor threats and 
how these can be addressed. Thirdly, noting the threat posed by CBRN terrorism 
and “Five Eyes” ICs capabilities to prevent, disrupt or mitigate them, the chapter 
outlines key ethical challenges for ICs in managing such threats. The chapter is 
divided into three sections: contemporary and emerging non-state actor CBRN 
threats, intelligence capability gaps and challenges, and ethical challenges. 
Contemporary and emerging non-state actor CBRN threats 
 Defining CBRN 
The term “CBRN” includes a range of threats from the weaponization of chemi-
cal, biological, radiological and nuclear agents by state and non-state actors. 
“CBRN” is a departure from the traditional nomenclature – “Weapons of Mass 
Destruction” (WMDs), “with all its Cold War connotations of massive effect 
and mutual deterrence” ( Cornish 2007 , 2). As discussed shortly, not all CBRN 
threats present an existential threat to humanity or even massive causalities – 
of the kind depicted during the Cold War; where the former Soviet Union or 
the United States might have deployed tactical or strategic WMDs (particularly 
nuclear weapons). 
A critical point of difference between “WMD” and “CBRN” weapons is the 
former’s principal objective of significant and predictable devastation. In order to 
achieve this objective, WMD weapons have to be reliable, safely deployable and 
able to result in major destruction of localities and in the deaths of hundreds of 
thousands in order to deter an adversary. Throughout the Cold War to the present, 
only a few threat actors have developed large-scale WMD programmes that could 
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In contrast, while some non-state actors have demonstrated an interest and even 
an intent to use WMD-related technologies, up to this point none has demon-
strated the capability to weaponize chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 
agents akin to a truly devastating military standard that state actors have achieved 
with their WMD programs. Additionally, non-state actors such as terrorists, who 
show an interest in WMD technologies, are likely to use a different strategic cal-
culus for their deployment than military grade state actor programmes. For ter-
rorists, widespread destruction and accurate delivery may be less important than 
reaping a propaganda dividend from damage of property or causing the deaths of 
several hundred (rather than thousands) of deaths. A rudimentary CBRN agent 
therefore offers another suite of weapons that some non-state actors may choose 
to use. Their deployment may not kill thousands of victims, but nonetheless could 
conceivably result in a large number of casualties as well as having profound psy-
chological, social and economic effect on the target countries. In short, terminol-
ogy (WMD vs. CBRN) matters to how ICs understand threats and plan capability 
responses against them. 
Non-state actor CBRN threat assessment 
Chemical weapons and terrorism 
While the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has provided normative 
constraint on most state signatories in abandoning their use, production and stor-
age of military grade CWs, it has been less helpful in containing terrorist’s use of 
such weapons. The CWC was not crafted with counter-terrorism in mind. 1 It has 
focused on the large-scale military production of chemical agents – not smaller 
amounts that terrorist groups would likely use. Within the current CWC verifica-
tion regime it is also impossible to guarantee whether a few kilograms of toxic 
chemicals would be detected before they were used by a terrorist group. Addition-
ally, a failure by all CWC signatory states to implement strictly all of its articles 
means it is easier potentially for terrorists to acquire a chemical weapon capability. 
While the design and manufacture of advanced CWs will likely remain 
a technological challenge to many non-state actors, the intent by some to use 
them remains. Reliable data remains sketchy, though the Monterey WMD terror-
ism database reports for the period 1988–2004, 207 of the 316 CBRN incidents 
recorded involved CW ( Ivanova and Sandler 2006 , 423–48). These incidents, 
however, mostly involved the use of conventional explosives mixed with openly 
available chemicals to make them more deadly – or are failed attempts to weapon-
ize chemical agents ( Ivanova and Sandler 2006 , 423–48). 
It’s clear that Al-Qaeda and its franchises have shown interest in the deploy-
ment of CWs and other WMDs. In 1998, bin Laden said that to acquire and use 
WMDs was his Islamic duty ( Mowatt-Larssen 2010 ). Abu Musab al Zarqawi, 
the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, planned to utilize his network to carry out mul-
tiple ricin and cyanide attacks in the London Underground from 2002 to 2003, 
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Additionally, other Al-Qaeda franchises in Iraq (e.g. Ansar al-Islam) had begun 
to experiment with chemical and toxic weapons and declare their intent to obtain 
CW ( Ackerman and Jacome 2018 , 29;  Pita 2007 , 480–511). 
The only attack, however, that involved a standard CW agent – the Tokyo Sarin 
gas attacks by Aum Shrinikyo in 1995 – showed how difficult it is to mount an 
effective CW attack – even for an organization with high levels of expertise and 
sufficient funding ( Danzig et al. 2012 ;  Kaplan and Marshall 1996 ;  Cornish 2007 ; 
Tucker, Miller, and Lynn-Jones 2000 ). Shinrikyo’s attempts to synthesize Sarin 
cost as much as $30 million, involved 80 scientists and took a year or more to 
achieve ( Cornish 2007 , 6). 
While there remain technical barriers for most terrorist groups in building a 
conventional military grade CW, access to ready-made weapons could occur 
through theft or via state sponsorship. Likely sources are stockpiles in fragile and 
unstable states such as Syria, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. International retribu-
tions, however, including threats of regime change or economic sanctions may 
discourage states providing CWs to terrorists. Nonetheless, the instability of such 
regimes, including corrupt officials who have access to weapons, may facilitate 
access within these states. For example, recent reports from Iraqi officials (cit-
ing intelligence reports) suggested that the Islamic State (IS) during 2014 gained 
access to weapons stockpiles of the Syrian and former Iraqi regimes ( Berger 2015 , 
423–48). 
What of Islamic State (IS) use of CW? As IS grew in power (2014 to July 2017) 
the terrorist group reportedly used chlorine and sulphur mustard gas in Iraq and 
Syria several times. The number of actual attacks is still debateable, but research-
ers put them in the range of 37 to 76 times ( Binder, Quigley, and Tinsley 2018 , 
27; Rathore 2016 , 7;  Strack 2017 , 19–24). In 2014, IS was able to seize, purchase 
or craft military hardware that could be used in a chemical weapon programme 
in parts of Syria and Iraq. During the Caliphate’s physical expansion in Syria, IS 
forces deployed chlorine, sulphur mustard, phosphine and other toxic industrial 
chemicals such as vinyl-trichlorosilane, for tactical purposes – the first chemical 
warfare agents introduced onto the battlefield since the Iran–Iraq War. However, 
the mode of delivery of IS CW attacks seems to have been not in the same vein as 
classical WMD weaponry, instead involving the insertion of chemical substances 
into shells and firing them rather than the deployment of any sophisticated weap-
onry system ( Elvey 2015 ). 
With the final destruction of the Caliphate in 2019, the threat from IS including 
its capability to deploy CWs or other “WMD like weapons” has declined. None-
theless, IS recruiters and sympathizers continue to message an interest in develop-
ing a CBRN capability. Given IS did occupy areas of Iraq where CWs were stored 
and actually deployed (however crudely) one cannot discount fully a scenario 
where an IS lone actor could smuggle some CW material into the West and/or 
launch a rudimentary attack by accessing one or more poorly secured precursor 
chemicals or facilities where agents are stored ( Ackerman and Jacome 2018 , 30). 
Recent developments in dual-use chemistry and related technology mentioned 
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weapons) might also be attractive to some terrorist groups to weaponize in the 
future. The relatively weak international regulation and safety mechanisms around 
their manufacture, storage and transport in some nations remain a vulnerability. 
Biological weapons and terrorism 
In recent years, the debate around biological weapons (BWs) and non-prolifera-
tion has increasingly focused on non-state actors and terrorist groups in particular. 
CBRN researcher Seth Carus assessed that there were “at least 25 ‘distinct sub-
national actors’ who were known to have ‘shown concerted interest’ in acquiring 
BW, with at least eight of them known to have been successful” (Carus cited 
in NDU 2003 , 5). The experiments of Aum Shrinikyo with Anthrax and Ebola, 
the religious cult the Rajneeshees that poisoned salad bars with Salmonella 
typhimurium in 1984, as well as the 2001 Anthrax attacks allegedly by United 
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) 
microbiologist Bruce Ivins are well documented examples ( Carus 2000 , 115–37; 
 Rosenau 2001 ;  Walsh 2018 ). 2 
After 9/11, Al-Qaeda had demonstrated an interest in developing BW agents. 
Following the 2001 coalition forces’ invasion of Afghanistan, US soldiers found 
technical documents and equipment in a biological weapons laboratory under 
construction near Kandahar ( Walsh 2018 , 29–31; Tenet 2007 , 278–9). The cap-
ture, interrogation or death of most key Al-Qaeda operatives associated with its 
fledgling bio-weapons programme constrained further efforts by the group to con-
tinue down this pathway. 
Since the ouster of Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan the evidence has remained mixed 
on whether other Al-Qaeda affiliated groups have developed technical expertise in 
BWs – though the interest to do so seems to be clearer ( Walsh 2018 , 30;  Koblentz 
2009 , 223–4). More recently there is also some evidence that IS has had ambi-
tions to develop BWs when a laptop was seized in 2014 from one of the group’s 
hideouts in Syria. The laptop, owned by a Tunisian, who had studied chemistry and 
physics at universities in Tunisia, revealed thousands of files pertaining to produc-
ing biological weaponry ( Doornbos and Moussa 2014 ). Other reporting, though of 
questionable credibility, suggests IS had plans to recruit scientists in Iraq and the 
West to develop BWs ( Elvey 2015 ;  Doornbos and Moussa 2014 ). 
The “Five Eyes” countries’ understanding of state and non-state actor BW pro-
liferation has not been robust over the last 50 year period ( SSCI 2004 ;  Flood 
2004 ;  Butler 2004 ). The reasons why assessment of bio-threats and risks was not 
optimal relates to a number of complex capability issues. Some of these issues 
are discussed in the following section, but space is limited and the reader seek-
ing detailed understanding of capability issues can go to Walsh (2018 ). Suffice it 
to say, a lack of understanding by “Five Eyes” ICs has had real policy implica-
tions since 9/11 about scoping bio-threats and risks and how to manage them. 
The faulty intelligence assessment on WMD provided prior to US-led coalition 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 is the most well-known example. While debates con-
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emerging bio-threats and risks – they have coalesced around two broad threat/risk 
typologies: stolen biological agents and dual use research and synthetic biology. 
I will focus on the latter as this area is currently of greatest concern by ICs and the 
scientific community. 3 
Dual use research and synthetic biology 
Dual use research relates to research of dangerous biological agents that might 
be weaponized, and the publication of same, which potentially could be dissemi-
nated to threat actors for use ( Walsh 2018 , 41). It remains an open debate on 
whether criminals and terrorists will exploit biotechnology and synthetic biology 
research developed for legitimate purposes (e.g. health care, energy and food sup-
ply) for harm or profit. Assessments of threat and risk diverge mainly around two 
analytical frameworks: technological (determinism) and socio-technological. The 
technological determinists argue that the upsurge in biotechnological advance-
ments will make the access, use and exploitation of relevant knowledge and skills 
easier and cheaper for those with malevolent intentions ( Chyba 2006 ;  Carlson 
2003 ;  Petro and Carus 2005 ). Some of the consequences of the industrialization of 
biology add weight to their arguments about easier access and use of biotechnol-
ogy. For example, the entire human genome sequenced by 2013 took a team of 
scientists 13 years and $500 million to identify 20,500 genes. Today, the human 
genome can be sequenced in a day using bench top equipment costing around 
$1000 ( Walsh 2018 , 44). 
In contrast, the socio-technologists do not discount that criminals, and terror-
ists may exploit advances in synthetic biology and technology – yet argue access 
to knowledge and skills do not necessarily translate into threat actors adeptly 
exploiting these in order to produce a bio-weapon. They argue that other socio-
technical variables will impact on choices made to exploit and weaponize biology 
( Vogel 2008 ;  2013 ). Both intellectual perspectives have something to offer “Five 
Eyes” ICs in improving their assessments of emerging bio-threats and risks. 
What types of specific bio-threats are evolving? Assessing intention and capa-
bility to misuse dual use biological research remains difficult because the science 
is moving rapidly – making it difficult to get a “fix” on where vulnerabilities 
for malevolent exploitation are located. Such difficulties are amplified given the 
challenges all ICs confront when adapting to technologically enabled threats more 
broadly (e.g. cyber). 
Leaving aside the assessment difficulties, I have argued elsewhere that there 
are at least three areas where “Five Eyes” countries can start developing better 
knowledge of bio-threats and risks. These are:  bio-unabombers, identity theft and 
biopiracy. In regard to bio-unabombers, biotechnology is big business particu-
larly in the United States ( Walsh 2016 , 341–67;  2018 , 41–51). 4 Given the accel-
eration in biotechnology and synthetic biological sciences – probability alone 
suggests that there will be more individuals (some mentally unstable) with a range 
of grievances (e.g. personal, psychological, political and religious) working in the 
biological sciences and some may escalate these to acts of violence. Disgruntled 
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insiders (scientists), who can make a synthetic organism and obtain natural 
organisms under lock and key in highly regulated high containment labs, are 
uniquely placed under the disguise of a bigger legitimate scientific project to 
become bio-unabombers ( Walsh 2018 , 41–51). 
 Secondly, “identity” – long a facilitator of crime and terrorism in other 
contexts – is also likely to be a developing concern. The increase in DNA holdings 
in various government departments and the private sector provide greater opportu-
nities to steal or manipulate DNA ( Walsh 2018 , 41–51). Thirdly, bio-piracy could 
become a greater bio-threat and risk in “Five Eyes” countries. Recent develop-
ments in drugs, vaccines and medicines can be manipulated via newer gene edit-
ing techniques like CRISPR, Finger Nuclease and Talen (see in the following). 
 Radiological weapons and terrorism 
 In contrast to BWs, where terrorist’s production of them could be constrained 
by insufficient skills and knowledge, the wider global availability of radioactive 
material has long formed the basis for arguments that such groups would more 
likely weaponize them instead. Different isotopes are used in large quantities 
in various civilian applications (e.g. radium or caesium isotopes used in cancer 
treatments). The dual use nature, common use globally, and in some locations 
insufficient security and monitoring arrangements related to storage, provide ter-
rorist groups with easy access to dangerous radioactive substances that can be 
weaponized with little technical expertise or value added from them prior to use. 
Radioactive material may also be obtained from the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, for 
example by harvesting it from widely used mixed oxide fuel (MOX), which is a 
relatively simple technical procedure ( Balatsky and Severe 2019 , 357–87). While 
detection of radiation is not uncommon in ports, it is likely that terrorist groups 
would procure the material locally from sources mentioned earlier. Accessing 
radioactive materials could be easier than developing CWs or BWs – but they are 
nonetheless hazardous to handle and transport. 
Assessments diver ge on the lethality and damage caused by a radiological 
attack. The impact would depend on a number of variables, including the force 
of the explosion, the type of radioactive material used, the particle size of the 
dispersed material, weather conditions and countermeasures ( Rosoff and Winter-
feldt 2007 ;  Cirincione and Wilson 2015 ). However, many analysts assess that the 
number of casualties would be relatively low and probably not reach three figures 
( Rosoff and Winterfeldt 2007 ;  Cirincione and Wilson 2015 ). Nonetheless, dam-
age to property and the disruption of people’s lives and economic activity could 
be significant if the bomb was released in a crowded downtown financial area or 
a critical infrastructure zone such as a port. 
 While it isn’t trivial to produce a dirty bomb with optimal particle size and 
dispersion pattern to maximize casualties, it is considerably simpler than con-
structing a nuclear device, as no fission or fusion reactions have to be triggered. 5 
Nonetheless, terrorist groups would still need to have some knowledge about the 
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explosives would be required to ensure a wide dispersal of radiation ( Ackerman 
and Jacome 2018 , 26). 
In spite of the potential viability of attack scenarios just mentioned, radiologi-
cal attacks are not common. This might be because they don’t have the same 
kind of immediate kinetic lethality caused by simpler conventional explosives. 
Similarly, like other CBRN tactics they also carry significant operational risks of 
substantial retaliation by the country that falls victim to such an attack. 
In 2015, media reporting by the Associated Press suggested that IS was inter-
ested in using a dirty bomb and may have tried to acquire radiological material 
from gangs with Russian connections ( Butler 2015 ). It is unclear however, if IS 
successfully purchased it or if it was weaponized or used in any attacks. 
Nuclear weapons and terrorism 
Reports vary on whether non-state actors have either attempted or intend to 
acquire nuclear weapons ( Mueller 2019 , 5;  McIntosh and Storey 2018 , 289–300; 
Allison 2018 ). Further assessment of the validity of terrorist’s intent and capabil-
ity to develop nuclear weapons is therefore critical. From the intent perspective, 
Al-Qaeda leadership showed interest in developing nuclear capability – with Bin 
Laden quoted in an interview that the acquisition of a nuclear weapon (and other 
WMDs) is a “religious duty” of Muslims ( van de Velde 2010 , 682–99). However, 
despite Al-Qaeda’s desire to use CBRN against enemies, the threat never mate-
rialized ( Rathore 2016 , 5), particularly after sustained counter-terrorism action 
either destroyed or degraded its bases in Afghanistan after 2001. According to 
experts at NATO’s WMD Non-Proliferation Centre, IS has already acquired the 
knowledge and in some cases human expertise to use CBRN material ( Boyle 2015 ). 
But it’s unclear the extent to which any IS members developed a viable nuclear 
bomb during or after the Caliphate years. 
Several terrorist groups have “metastasized” from Al-Qaeda and IS, and 
the pressing question is what intent and capability will even more radicalized 
and potentially catastrophic terrorists have to develop nuclear weapons? Such 
groups may calculate that acquiring and using them is worth the effort. Unlike 
the development or acquisition of chemical, biological and even radiological 
weapons, building a nuclear bomb remains extremely difficult for non-state 
actors. Producing fissile material from raw products would require a focused and 
extended process in either the enrichment of uranium or the chemical separation 
of plutonium – that will likely be too complex, costly and detectable for most 
currently known terrorist organizations to realistically undertake. Instead of con-
ventional nuclear weapons, it is possible that some terrorist groups could build 
an improvised nuclear device, if they were able to obtain enough weapons-grade 
uranium or plutonium ( Cornish 2007 , vii). 
Another commonly cited scenario is terrorist groups could either steal or be 
given nuclear weapons by vulnerable state actors such as Pakistan or countries of 
the former Soviet Union. The theft of nuclear weapons is feasible from countries 
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weapons by their governments. But it is a risky gamble for these states and their 
officials as it would invite instant retaliation from “Five Eyes” states ( Weiss 2015 , 
75–87; Clarke 2013 , 98–114). 
In terms of emerging threat trajectories, as discussed shortly, there are other 
security concerns around the emergence of an “internet of nuclear things” and 
the digital nature of additive manufacturing, which might provide some non-state 
actors with new means to subvert nodes in nuclear supply chains at which pro-
liferation activities have traditionally been detected ( Hoffman and Volpe 2018 , 
102–13; Kroenig and Volpe 2015 ;  Fey 2017 ;  Bajema and DiEuliis 2017 ;  Shaw 
2017 ;  Hvistendahl 2016 ;  Kelly 2017 ). 
Intelligence capability gaps and challenges 
Detection of emerging threats 
The IC’s ability to assess emerging CBRN  state-based threats can be difficult 
enough given states can engage in well-organized deceptive strategies and claim 
suspicious activities are part of legitimate research, development and commercial 
activity. It is even more difficult for ICs to assess the emerging CBRN threat posed 
by terrorists. Terrorist “CBRN programmes” are not scaled up like their state-
based counterparts. They typically do not consist of large research and industrial 
enterprises nor involve many people or the regular movement of CBRN-related 
goods and services. Being in most cases the opposite of state-based CBRN pro-
grammes reduces even further the likelihood of detection and disruption. Com-
pounding the detection challenge of non-state actor CBRN threats is that analysis 
of them has often relied on sub-optimal empirical theorizing. Analytical extrapo-
lations have tended to rely only on a handful of prominent cases to understand 
how threats will evolve ( Binder and Ackerman 2019 , 1). 
Several authors have discussed how to improve CBRN terror threat detection 
( Tucker, Miller, and Lynn-Jones 2000 ;  Caves and Carus 2014 ;  Maurer 2009 ; 
Koblentz 2009 ), but such efforts remain difficult due to very few CBRN attacks 
by terrorists. A key barrier to better threat detection has also been the different 
classifiers scholars have used to record CBRN terrorism. In recent years, the Uni-
versity of Maryland’s Profiles of Incidents Involving CBRN and Non-state Actors 
(POICN) Database has recorded more than 517 CBRN terrorism-related events 
from 1990 to the present and offer potentially a more accurate way to classify 
such attacks ( Binder and Ackerman 2019 , 1). 
In addition to classification issues, there remains a lack of certainty and con-
sensus from within ICs and scholars about future CBRN attack vectors. As noted 
earlier, with the collapse of the Caliphate in March 2019, for example, it is even 
less clear what number of IS and affiliated groups have retained/acquired skills/ 
knowledge convertible to potential CBRN attacks in the Middle East or by foreign 
fighters returning to home countries. 
Improving threat detection on the intent, skills and knowledge of CBRN by 
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who provide financial and logistical support to terrorist groups for such attacks. 
Such individuals/groups are points of vulnerabilities for any planned attack that 
ICs may be able to detect and disrupt early; though increasingly encrypted com-
munications and the use of dark web sites by terrorists can make tracking their 
finances and logistics difficult. More focused collection efforts, including those of 
vulnerabilities in dual use technologies – will hopefully result in the accumulation 
of empirical evidence useful to informing better CBRN terrorist threat and risk 
assessment models used by ICs ( Ackerman and Jacome 2018 , 16; Zhang and
Gronvall 2020 ;  Walsh 2018 , 79–83, 121–43; Habegger 2010 , 49–58; Gentry and 
Gordon 2019 , 215–34). 
It is likely also that a deeper understanding of psychological factors to acquire, 
produce and use CBRN weapons through earlier psychological profiles of indi-
viduals and group members would be useful. In particular, ICs need to understand 
the behaviour of “insiders” working in economic sectors that produce CBRN-
related material vulnerable to their exploitation ( Bunn and Sagan 2016 ). Threat 
actors could also be “outsiders” who can access material from insiders by pur-
chasing it or by using blackmail or other threatening forceful behaviour. 
Another dimension to improving threat detection relates to organizational and 
governance issues in “Five Eyes” ICs. These issues concern how ICs are struc-
tured, coordinated and led to manage the evolving non-state actor CBRN threat 
environment. Are organizational and internal leadership fit for purpose in manag-
ing CBRN terrorist threats into the future? And what agencies across “Five Eyes” 
countries are best suited to own the CBRN threat problem into the future? In the 
United States with a total of 17 intelligence agencies, there is an ongoing need for 
IC leaders, particularly the DNI, to review IC wide counter CBRN arrangement 
to ensure de-conflicted intelligence collection and analysis ( Mauroni 2019 , 2). 
The key governance issue for ICs in the foreseeable future will be how to fuse 
increasing volumes of CBRN-related information to develop better situational 
awareness. Another enduring governance dimension is how the IC leadership can 
more effectively bring in external technical expertise as well as ensuring that the 
analytical workforce also sustains an optimal level of expertise in CRBN issues. 
ICs also need to develop greater outreach to relevant dual use CBRN-related 
industries (Walsh 2021). 
Threat detection and technology 
Across the entire CBRN spectrum there is an increasing suite of dual-use tech-
nology available – making it easier and more affordable for terrorist groups to 
access and potentially weaponize. As noted earlier, assessing the significance of 
technology to future CBRN uptake by terrorists is fraught with inaccuracies. Care 
is warranted in avoiding overly technologically deterministic assessments given 
most terrorists are not operating at the cutting edge of science. Nonetheless, ICs 
need to investigate how quickly such technology can morph into commercial-
off-the-shelf applications that could boost terrorist capabilities ( Ackerman and 











270 Patrick F. Walsh 
can be purchased and quickly delivered around the globe – effectively resulting 
in what Ackerman and Jacome refer to as “the ‘democratization’ of the means of 
mass destruction” ( Ackerman and Jacome 2018 , 32). Additionally, any assess-
ments of technological developments need to consider that the rate of change and 
length of time between major breakthroughs is continually decreasing ( Ackerman 
and Jacome 2018 , 32). 
Space does not allow an exhaustive assessment of all CBRN related dual use 
technology. Instead in the next section I briefly list three dual use technology 
areas: 3D printing/additive manufacturing, CRISPR and drones, which may be 
exploited by terrorist groups. 
3D printing/additive manufacturing 
The rapid growth in 3D printing/additive manufacturing for legitimate science 
and technology sectors (e.g. medicine) also opens up opportunities for their illicit 
use by terrorists for CBRN weapons. The ability of a terrorist network to procure 
for example 3D printed nuclear components or their files is one example. Addi-
tive manufacturing provides avenues for cheaper, faster and stealthier methods 
for acquiring dual use sensitive information and technology where deception is 
more difficult to detect by ICs ( Rid 2011 ; Anderson 2016 ; Albright, Brannan, and 
Stricker 2010 ). 
There are a number of potential scenarios where terrorist groups could exploit 
current difficulties in the detection and movement of additive manufactured 
products and files. For example, 3D printing files of nuclear equipment could be 
shared with a terrorist group via a third party – thereby avoiding any export con-
trol detection ( Fey 2017 , 1–44). 
CRISPR 
Gene editing tools like CRISPR, which allow accurate genetic modifications 
achieved by the use of small strands of RNA to guide proteins (e.g. CAS protein) 
to a specific site in an organism’s DNA, holds much promise for a range of medi-
cal treatments and other legitimate uses in bio-sciences. As noted earlier, the US 
IC has already expressed concerns that this technology could be weaponized by 
terrorists ( Clapper 2016 ). But further work is required by ICs on what ways ter-
rorist groups could exploit CRISPR. 
 Drone swarms 
Conventional drones are already being exploited by some terrorist groups
( Gibbons-Neff 2017 ; Warrick 2017 ;  Sims 2018 ). Rapid development of smaller 
drone swarms, however, could also be used in a coordinated delivery of CBRN 
attacks in the battlespace or a metropolitan environment ( Kallenborn and Bleek 
2018 ). Again, further collection and analysis is required on how this technology 
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 Threat disruption 
Despite the potential for some terrorist groups to exploit CBRN-related dual use 
technology for attacks, ICs are progressing their understanding of technology, 
knowledge and skills, which can enhance their capabilities for CBRN detection 
and disruption. For example, developments in two multi-disciplinary fields (cyber 
and forensics) will likely continue to play an important role in CBRN terrorism 
threat disruption. We have seen how, for example, in the 2010 stuxnet attack on 
an Iranian uranium enrichment plant and other facilities, which introduced IC 
malware, can disrupt progression of CBRN terrorist capabilities ( Mugavero et al. 
2018 , 52). In addition to investment by “Five Eyes” partners in offensive cyber 
intelligence capabilities ( Vavra 2019 ), developments in forensic science are also 
useful in detecting and disrupting CBRN attacks. Limited space does not allow an 
exploration of the various forensic applications currently being developed. Some 
are sceptical of the role of forensics thus far in, for example, the unreliable detec-
tion rates of bio-agents in programmes such as the US Biowatch program ( Walsh 
2018 , 182). But research efforts suggest that forensics will remain critical in the 
development of early sensor systems for countering CBRN terrorism ( Zöller and 
Genzel 2018 ;  Shea and Lister 2003 ; Walsh 2018 ;  Kouzes et al. 2008 , 383–400). 
 Ethical challenges 
The key ethical challenge arising from CBRN terrorism relates to the moral duty 
“Five Eye”’ ICs have to protect both the lives of citizens and non-citizens from 
attacks. The ICs bear only some of the moral and institutional responsibility to 
protect society. Other state instruments (military, health, foreign ministries and 
dual use industries) also have a collective moral responsibility to protect society 
from CBRN terrorism ( Miller 2006 , 176–93). But in this chapter, the focus is on 
the IC’s role. 
In this last section, I outline how IC collection against potential CBRN terror 
attacks presents additional hitherto not well-understood ethical and policy dilem-
mas that require further assessment. Fulfilling a moral duty by the state to pre-
serve life is contingent on ICs having situational awareness about the intent and 
capability of terrorists to launch CBRN attacks. This in turn, as noted earlier, 
relies on “Five Eyes” ICs improving the accuracy of CBRN threat detection capa-
bilities that can more reliably direct where intelligence collection, analytic and 
operational resources are best allocated to prevent and disrupt attacks. Improv-
ing threat and risk assessment capabilities will require as noted earlier continued 
institutional improvements across ICs. In particular, improvements are required 
in governance arrangements within ICs and a greater focus on analytical expertise 
and performance. Additionally and perhaps even more importantly, ICs need to 
develop strategies for sustained and systematic engagement with experts outside 
the community, who will be better placed to advise how various CBRN tech-
nologies could be exploited by terrorists. ICs are engaging more with outside 
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knowledge and skills about CBRN terrorist threat actors’ intentions and capabili-
ties through covert collection and rigorous analysis. 
Given the grave psychological and physical consequences of even a small 
CBRN-enabled terrorist attack in Sydney, Washington DC or London, ICs need 
to conceptualize and operationalize a more expanded pro-active intelligence col-
lection approach to this threat type. We have already witnessed in the period after 
9/11 the growth in counter-terrorism policy and legislative powers that have low-
ered the threshold and expanded the kinds of collection that ICs are able to do 
on those suspected of being involved in terrorism offences ( Cogan 2004 ; Walsh 
2016 , 51–74; Walsh and Miller 2016 ). For all ICs, these creeping powers — 
while undoubtedly in many cases helping in the earlier identification of a group/ 
individual planning conventional terrorist attacks – have also sharpened debates 
in liberal democracies about the impact of collection on individuals’ privacy and 
broader human rights. This includes the liberty for individuals, who might in some 
circumstances be subjected to preventative detention or control orders if sus-
pected but not yet charged of being involved in terrorism as seen in the Australian 
context. While collection against known terrorists should align with principles 
of necessity, proportionality and discrimination, many of the enhanced proactive 
collection powers ICs now have at their disposal may be targeted (accidentally 
or by intent) at innocent citizens and thus potentially result in a violation of pri-
vacy and other human rights. Determining the extent of surveillance required in 
a counter-terrorism case will be decided by a range of contextual factors that will 
be different depending on the individuals involved (e.g. citizens, non-citizens, 
reasonable suspicion, foreign vs. domestic actors and immediacy of threat). 
The ongoing debates about the impact of growing aggressive and permissive 
approaches to intelligence collection are also relevant to collection efforts against 
CBRN terrorism. However, given the discussion earlier of terrorists’ potential 
exploitation of dual use technology, it is possible that ethical dilemmas posed by 
collecting against CBRN terrorism may grow beyond those seen in conventional 
terrorism. As noted earlier, a growing suite of knowledge, skills and technologies 
in the chemistry, biology, radiology and nuclear fields is providing significant 
advancements to fulfil legitimate human needs such as medicine and energy. 
However, as seen acutely in the biological sciences and biotechnology sector, 
dual use technology can be exploited by bad actors for malevolent ends. The abil-
ity by ICs to gain more accurate evidence-based threat assessments is therefore 
dependent on collecting a great deal more information about the skills and knowl-
edge of people working in a range of public and private organizations across the 
diverse chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear sectors. Space limitations 
do not allow a comprehensive analysis of all the ethical dilemmas arising from an 
expanded collection across all CBRN-related industries. But considering briefly 
the biological and biotechnology sector, it’s clear that ICs would potentially 
be interested in information from a range of different experts working across a 
diverse number of contexts such as private biotech companies, universities, public 
research institutes, hospitals, graduate students, military personnel, lab biosafety 
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of CBRN-enabled terrorist threats will remain difficult for all the reasons dis-
cussed earlier, particularly if plans and activities are hidden in legitimate dual use 
research. Hence the prevention and disruption of such threats will likely rely on 
more invasive collection from the experts and contexts just mentioned – at least 
for the case of biologically enabled attacks. What could more invasive collection 
in the biological sciences environment mean? 
Firstly, it would go beyond the standard security clearance testing that all sci-
entists must undergo if they wish to work with biological select agents. These 
are mandated legislatively, and people working with dangerous pathogens accept 
these checks as a condition of employment despite them being intrusive. None-
theless, other more invasive collection strategies could be targeted against either 
suspects personally; the environment where they work; or a setting in which 
there may be some security concerns. Invasive collection might include enhanced 
CCTV surveillance in a facility under investigation, IC or police questioning of 
persons and other co-workers, more regular security checks, examination of hard 
copy and digital files and equipment, security vetting of research results and pub-
lications and accessing medical/mental health records. 
While some IC agencies across “the Five Eyes” have developed trusting and 
productive relationships with important stakeholders in the biology and biotech-
nology sector such as the FBI’s research community outreach initiatives, these 
efforts are by no means uniform across either the US IC or other “Five Eyes” coun-
tries. Therefore, in addition to developing better collection and analytical capabili-
ties to assess and disrupt CBRN terrorist threats, ICs need to consider the ethical 
consequences that may arise from additional invasive intelligence collection in 
dual use technology and research contexts. The actual ethical risks arising from 
collection across CBRN dual use research and technology sectors cannot be gener-
alized and will rely on a range of variables including but not limited to collection 
methods (e.g. meta data, social media, mental health history records), threat evolu-
tion (reports of “suspicious activity” vs. direct evidence of conspiracy to commit 
terrorism), contexts (e.g. military, espionage, criminal, terrorism) and the nature of 
the target (physical location, history and provenance of all relevant information). 
While more work is now being done to examine the ethical dimensions of dual 
use research and technology in the broader sense, particularly in synthetic biology 
( National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine et al. 2017 ; Miller 
and Selgelid 2007 ; Miller 2018 ), it’s clear that an important next step must be a 
deeper ethical and policy analysis of how intelligence collection across the CBRN
dual use spectrum impacts on the privacy and human rights of those working in 
these sectors. Such an endeavour would not only help to address the public’s con-
cerns over the powers and legitimacy of ICs, but also help to improve the efficacy 
of actual collection approaches under taken. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed the emerging CBRN terrorist threat space. There 
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constraints that any CBRN programmes will be smaller scale than conventional 
state-based WMD programmes. Likewise the impact of such attacks, though dis-
ruptive and psychologically profound, will not result in mass casualty levels asso-
ciated with WMD programmes. 
“Five Eyes” ICs are nonetheless gaining a greater understanding of threat and 
risk trajectories for CBRN terrorism. However, ICs need to develop sustained 
collection and analysis against potential attack vectors and more nuanced under-
standing of the psychological, social and technical drivers influencing terrorist’s 
interest and capability in CBRN dual use technologies. The IC’s ability to assess 
threat, risk and then prevent/disrupt CBRN terrorist attacks will increasingly rely 
on effective external and internal governance that can better integrate relevant 
and limited collection and analytical assets. Finally, given the diversity of the 
dual use technology and research sector, and in order to more effectively prevent 
and disrupt CBRN terrorism, it is likely that IC surveillance will need to expand 
further into these sectors. This will raise additional policy and ethical dilemmas 
for ICs and citizens of liberal democratic states which at this point are not well 
understood. 
Notes 
1 Though now the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has 
recently developed additional security and legal support initiatives to help CWC mem-
ber-states manage chemical terrorism. 
2 Since the FBI officially closed the investigation in 2010 several biologists and chemists 
disagree on whether the Bureau got the right perpetrator based on the presence of silicon 
and tin coating on the anthrax spores. In the opinion of some experts this suggests a 
greater complexity of manufacturing beyond the scope of what Ivins could do in his lab. 
Additionally, earlier in the investigation another army research scientist Steven Hatfield 
was targeted, but later exonerated, with the DOJ paying a $4.6 million legal settlement 
to the scientist. 
3 For a more detailed discussion of non-state actors and stolen biological agents, see 
 Walsh (2018 , 37–41). 
4 In the US, easily over 2 million people are employed with over 73,000 businesses work-
ing across range of biosciences (medicine, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, research ( Bio-
technology Innovation Organization, 2014 ). 
5 A dirty bomb, otherwise known as a radiological dispersal device (RDD), combines con-
ventional explosives, like dynamite, with radiological material. The regular explosive 
helps in dispersing the radioactive material. 
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 17 Reflections on the future 
of intelligence 
Gregory F. Treverton 
 Introduction 
This chapter reflects on my experiences in government, in both policy and intel-
ligence positions, drawing especially on my recent tenure as Chair of the US 
National Intelligence Council (NIC).1 It assesses challenges for the future of 
intelligence, many of which have long been with us but are newly reconfigured: 
balancing tactical and strategic intelligence; building and adjusting stories in a 
shapeless world; dealing with transparency and big data; finding new ways to add 
value; intelligence as an argument for policy; breaking the tired intelligence cycle 
and dealing with new competitors who are also potential colleagues. 
That would have been my list of challenges had Donald Trump not been elected 
president. Yet here, too, as in almost every aspect of US policy, the Trump admin-
istration scrambled the deck, injecting enormous uncertainty. Its malfeasance 
raised three additional challenges: reinvigorating a demoralized workforce; reori-
enting domestic intelligence, and last, and most worrisome, dealing with a world 
in which truth is personal or subjective, and, indeed, the very idea of truth is under 
attack. Thus, this chapter begins with the challenges as I might have portrayed 
them in more normal times, then concludes with reflections on my puzzlement 
about how lasting and how momentous the distinctly non-normal times of the 
Trump administration will prove to be. 
Balancing strategic and tactical 
An enduring challenge for the Intelligence Community is balancing the urgent 
need for actionable tactical intelligence with the need for too often-neglected 
strategic intelligence. The hand wringing about the primacy of urgent tactical 
intelligence over strategic has characterized all my years as a student, consumer 
and sometimes practitioner of intelligence. This issue is made all the worse by 
the shapelessness of the current world, which means that every crisis must be 
approached afresh on its own terms. This is especially heightened by the nation’s 
hypersensitivity to the threat of terrorism, which poses a minimal threat to the 
United States homeland but is hardly perceived that way by the public – or so 
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From my perch at the NIC, this acute sensitivity to terrorism was doubly 
deforming of our work. When we looked at Nigeria, there was not much Nige-
ria: it was Boko Haram. Instead of focusing on the complexities facing Nigeria, 
Africa’s largest economy and highest population, we solely focused on a terrorist 
group in Nigeria’s north. And even when we looked at Boko Haram, there was not 
much Boko Haram: it was all deciphering networks and targeting bad guys. We
all wondered and worried, where do these people come from, and why are they 
doing what they’re doing? Although we did what we could at the NIC trying to 
understand root causes and motivations, we were only scratching the surface of 
Boko Haram, let alone Nigeria. 
In 2016, the NIC produced about 700 pieces of paper. More than half of those 
were memoranda that were set in motion by the deliberations of the two main 
policymaking bodies in the administration – the Principals Committee, comprised 
of the relevant cabinet secretaries, or, more often, the Deputies Committee, com-
prised of their deputies or number threes. These memoranda were produced in 
response to “taskings” by the National Security Advisor, one of her deputies, or 
another senior National Security Council official, and were used as the focal point 
for assessing options and teeing up decisions. Not all those papers were purely 
tactical. Some were the “what ifs?” of the sort that should be the warp and woof 
of intelligence-policy relations: “if we do x, how will Putin respond?” Because 
we were at all the policy meetings, we knew what was going on. Yet as Chair of 
the NIC, my task, every day, was to find the time and capacity not only to answer 
the questions policy officials asked but also to answer the more strategic ones they 
weren’t asking. 2 
The perils of focusing on the tactical at the expense 
of the strategic run through many episodes of American 
foreign policymaking 
A prominent example is the decision to arm Islamic mujahideen resistance dur-
ing the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Although America’s decision ultimately 
led to the Soviet Union’s eventual retreat from Afghanistan, it also empowered 
radical Islamic elements, some of which later became the Taliban, which in the 
end overthrew the government of Afghanistan, and perhaps most importantly har-
boured Osama bin Laden. To be sure, it would have been hard at the time to raise 
cautions about putting pressure on Moscow based on analysis of second-order, 
and thus iffy, effects. 
Likewise, the decision to remove Saddam Hussein was a tactical success but 
a strategic disaster. It did remove from power a brutal dictator, but the second-
order effects created a power vacuum filled by Iran, opened space for the rise 
of ISIL and intensified the Cold War between Saudi Arabia and an empowered 
Iran. Nowhere is this failure clearer than five years after the invasion. While visit-
ing Iraq, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was greeted with an elaborate 
state visit, while a mere two weeks later, Vice President Cheney had to be flown 
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vacuum that enabled the Islamic State to rapidly expand. In short, although tacti-
cal intelligence is essential in planning an action, it needs to be viewed in light of 
more strategic intelligence, intelligence that seeks to parse longer term implica-
tions and second-order effects of an action. 
Building – and adjusting – “stories” in a shapeless world 
The shapelessness of the world both confounds and demands strategic analysis. 
In providing strategic analysis, I have come to think that intelligence is ultimately 
about telling stories and most intelligence – or warning – failures derive from 
holding onto stories that events have outmoded. This challenge is akin to the 
strategic/tactical challenge facing intelligence and one that bears more directly 
on warning. A story from another realm, medicine, drives the point home. The 
medical community had a “story” about the Ebola virus: because death was quick, 
contagion was unlikely and so the disease would flare up and die out in remote 
regions. The story was right until it wasn’t: the story had been overtaken by bet-
ter transit from rural to urban areas. This outdated story led to cases in the United 
States and to widespread, if not entirely founded, fear of an Ebola pandemic 
( World Health Organization 2015 ). 
If intelligence is storytelling, many of our current stories are suspiciously long 
in the tooth. In policy terms, for instance, we have been telling ourselves the same 
story about North Korea for a generation. With just the right combination of car-
rots and sticks – primarily the latter – and with China as a real partner, we can 
induce North Korea to foreswear nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, North Korea has 
gone from an incipient nuclear power to a real one. Intelligence cannot prove and 
thus cannot say the truth: North Korea is a nuclear power and almost certainly 
will remain one; that is all the regime has.3 But at the very least, challenging the 
prevailing story would be a start. 
For other critical issues, like the Middle East, we have no real story beyond 
demonizing terrorists and Iran. To be sure, the task is hard. Throughout my ten-
ure at the NIC, I looked for strategic insights and found precious few because 
the issues are complicated, and the causal arrows tangled. The best story I found 
came from our Australian intelligence colleagues. They divided the conflicts into 
three and a half factions – the ISIL-led Sunni extremists; the Saudi-led Sunni 
autocrats; the Iran-led Shias and the missing half, the Muslim Brotherhood-led 
Sunni moderates, recognizing that the term “moderate” is relative at best. But the 
difficulty of the task is no justification for not trying it. Without a story, we can 
all too easily blunder into major campaigns against minor threats or worse yet, 
create those threats. 
In the past, America has shown its ability to alter an existing story to great 
effect. Perhaps most famously, the US decision to recognize the communist China 
at the expense of Taiwan and treat the country as a counterweight to the Soviet 
Union was a great success. This partnership fractured the communist world and 
helped further isolate the Soviet Union. When Nixon and Kissinger decided to 
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US allies (notably Japan and Taiwan), fearing pushback. Yet once the new story 
was set, it paved the way for what seemed impossible a few years before – better 
Sino – American relations ( Hutchings and Treverton 2018 ). Likewise, America’s 
decision to partner with its old enemy, communist Vietnam, against an ascendant 
China, shows that reshaping stories can strengthen American policy ( Albert 2019 ). 
Transparency and “big data” 
These are two sides of the same coin. The same ubiquity of information that pro-
duces so much for intelligence agencies to assess also makes it impossible for 
intelligence operatives to remain secret for long. This, alas, guarantees that there 
will be more leaks of methods, if not more leakers, like Edward Snowden. Perhaps 
the vision of the future should be more akin to Silicon Valley, where secrets are 
kept but not for long and where the premium is on collaboration even if today’s 
partner may be tomorrow’s competitor. 
At the NIC, I was only an observer to intelligence operations, but I had the 
sense that, with respect to clandestine operations, the United States was like the 
roadrunners in the old cartoons: when they ran off the cliff they didn’t start to fall 
until they looked down. Given biometrics, facial recognition and ubiquitous cam-
eras, US spy tradecraft has run off the cliff; it just hadn’t looked down yet. Surely, 
operating under official cover without the knowledge of the host government will 
become all but impossible. Before I left the RAND Corporation, a retired former 
CIA station chief joined us. The CIA asked him to do a mission in the country 
where he had been chief. He said he was happy to do it but only under true name. 
He knew that any effort to operate under cover would be blown and – to say the 
least – complicate his future private visits to that country. 
But that data will be a godsend for intelligence. Indeed, the analytic challenge is 
greater for intelligence than for private businesses. Businesses care mostly about 
learning my preferences and predicting where I will be tomorrow so they can 
besiege me with personalized ads. By contrast, intelligence is trying to sort out a 
messy world full of noise and misinformation. Yet Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a 
natural fit for many intelligence tasks. The Open Source Enterprise, for instance, 
seeks to read every newspaper in the world, in every language, and monitor every 
television news broadcast, seeking nuggets of new information or insight ( Tucker 
2020 ). AI is a natural fit for it. So, too, it is a natural fit for the National Security 
Agency (NSA), which uses it not just to sort through the massive amount of sig-
nals intelligence its collects, looking for anomalies and potential threats, but also 
for compliance. NSA does lots of “queries” – that’s NSA-speak for getting access 
to signals intelligence data on an individual – which requires the paperwork of an 
audit to decide whether that data can be reported. AI won’t replace human over-
sight, but it can be used to predict the audit results with pretty high confidence. 
At the NIC, I started an experiment with the National Intelligence Officer 
(NIO) for Africa. Its premise was that while there isn’t a huge amount of intel-
ligence gathered on Africa, there is a lot of data out there. Thus, the goal was an 
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place in the Intelligence Community could. Not surprisingly, we found that social 
media and other available data were pretty good at predicting famine and disease. 
The next step was to cull “tips” from the data: where should analysts look and 
what connections should they probe that they hadn’t considered. 
The NIC also inherited a nifty bit of crowdsourcing that had been developed 
by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), intelligence’s 
counterpart to DARPA. There were two prediction markets: one classified and 
comprised of intelligence professionals, and the other unclassified and open. The 
unclassified one was the creation of Philip Tetlock and it had made two important 
discoveries. Just as some people are better athletes than others, so too, some peo-
ple are better predictors. His open market came to feature “super-forecasters”. 4 
Even better, a small amount of training improves prediction. Unsurprisingly, the 
burden of that training is helping people keep an open mind just a few seconds 
longer. 
I used the internal market as a kind of “red cell” – that is, a person or group 
charged with being contrarian. Here, I looked for places where the prediction 
market was contrarian: if the experts thought development x was y percent likely 
but the market was betting 2y, what was going on? I didn’t care about the num-
bers; it was the conversation that mattered.5 And I hoped to move the market from 
fairly short-run predictions, which could be settled soon, to longer, more strategic 
questions. For them, I hoped we might create way-stations on which to bet and, in 
the process, perhaps do better at constructing what intelligence calls “indicators”. 
Breaking the cycle 
It has been often said that the canonical intelligence cycle, from requirements 
through collection to analysis and dissemination, is often short-circuited. That 
is true enough – no matter how much intelligence agencies dislike it, policy 
officials will hanker for the next “raw” spy report or intercept. But as a paradigm 
the cycle is increasingly unhelpful. In this as in many other ways, what worked 
tolerably well in the Cold War is dysfunctional now. Then, with one overarching 
and secretive foe, it made a certain sense to ask, in a linear way, what we needed 
to know and how we might collect it. Even then analysis had a certain industrial 
quality about it: a friend who was an NSA Soviet analyst recalls starting the day 
with a large stack of “her take”, the overnight SIGINT collection relevant to her 
account. 
Moreover, the intelligence cycle simply does not operate as it is described. For 
instance, it is not guidance from policymakers that sets information requirements, 
but rather the need to fill gaps in intelligence. Furthermore, the information collec-
tors do not wait for clear requirements before beginning to collect intelligence. If 
they were to do so, they would not have the intelligence collected when it is needed 
by policymakers and risk being surprised by sudden events ( Hulnick 2006 ). 
Before I returned to the NIC, I had become a fan of “activity-based intelli-
gence”, or ABI. 6 It was developed in the war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq pri-
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Laden’s driver was one of its successes. ABI amassed information from many 
sources around particular locations and then used correlations to develop “pat-
terns of life” that would distinguish potential terrorists from ordinary pious Mus-
lims at prayer. For me, its side benefit was creatively disrupting the canonical 
cycle. It was “sequence neutral”: we might find the answer before we framed the 
question. Think how often in life that occurs; you don’t know you were puzzled 
about something until you find the answer. And in a world of ubiquitous informa-
tion, ABI doesn’t prize secret sources: if information is useful, it’s good; if not, it’s 
not. Finally, perhaps advancing age has made me sceptical of the causation that 
infuses the canonical cycle. I feel more comfortable with correlation: sure, many 
of the correlations will be spurious but some will be provocative. 
Finding new ways to add value 
The traditional model of relations between intelligence and policy, one that is 
not quite fair to blame entirely on Sherman Kent, is stand-offish lest intelligence 
be “politicized” by too close an association with policy ( Kent 2015 ). It can be 
characterized, in caricature, as intelligence throwing elegant analyses over the 
transom to policy – though no young person these days would have any idea what 
a “transom” is. Intelligence will be producing those elegant products for as far 
as the eye can see, but much of the Intelligence Community’s stock-in-trade is 
now available openly as technology continues to evolve. For instance, 30 years 
ago access to satellite imagery and GPS were only available to US government 
agencies. Yet today, anyone with a cell phone can access this data and often for 
free from Google. Although agencies like the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency (NGA) still have access to imagery with better resolution, the gap of 
capabilities is only closing. 
While these developments might be seen as making much of the Intelligence 
Community obsolete, they present a great opportunity. The widespread availabil-
ity of open-source intelligence can be used to complement intelligence, providing 
a clearer understanding of complex issues. In 2014, for instance, a junior Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst, browsing Russian social media, was able to 
determine who shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 ( Barnes 2014 ). As another 
DIA colleague put it: “Selfies are our best friend”. 
As in other contexts, the language we use is revealing. Traditionally, intelligence 
officers thought of their policy counterparts as “customers”, which connotes an 
arms-length, transactional relationship, one in which intelligence provides dis-
crete “products”. In my first stint at the NIC, I had one “aha” moment, realizing 
that while we thought we produced National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), in 
fact, our product was National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) – people, not paper. 
They were in a position to have those elevator conversations with policy coun-
terparts, to give advice informally and not have to be too careful about what was 
“intelligence” and what was “policy”. Similarly, in a study I did of the use of the 
President’s Daily Brief (PDB) by the three administrations before Obama, all of 
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better. The briefer offered a way to ask for more, or to take the conversation in a 
direction especially useful to the policy official ( Treverton 2013a ). 
All possible terms have their negatives, but I think of the recipients of intel-
ligence as “clients”, and liken the intelligence-policy connection to that between 
me and my financial advisor, a client-service relationship, not a business-cus-
tomer one: he or she knows things I don’t, but the reverse is also true and it is a 
relationship between equals. I expect the advisor to ask lots of questions and to get 
better and better at understanding my interests. He or she is bound by professional 
code neither to sugar coat the truth nor exaggerate confidence levels. And, in the 
end, if I don’t feel he or she is adding value, I will go elsewhere. 
Intelligence as an argument for policy 
This, too, is hardly new. In the past times of divided government, Congress was 
tempted to, in effect, turn intelligence issues into policy choices by mandating that 
if intelligence caught Iran exporting x, then y sanctions would be automatic. To be 
sure, the practice was more than uncomfortable for intelligence, for it meant ask-
ing intelligence to put a gun to the heads of its policy counterparts in an adminis-
tration! More recently, in days of intense partisanship, administrations have been 
tempted to use intelligence to argue for their policy choices. So it was in the run-
up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The intelligence assessment that Iraq had weapons 
of mass destruction made it difficult for Democrats in Congress to oppose the 
invasion and provided policy cover for supporting it. So, future administrations 
will be tempted to turn intelligence findings into policy choices: imagine if the 
Intelligence Community had found what it did not find before the Trump admin-
istration scuttled the deal – evidence that Iran was persistently cheating on its 
obligations under the nuclear deal. 
Ironically, when intelligence is used as an argument for policy, it can hamper 
policy decisions if framed incorrectly. Nowhere is this more evident than in deci-
sion to release the key judgements of the classified 2007 National Intelligence 
Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. This estimate stated with 
high confidence that Iran had its nuclear weapons programme. What it meant by 
“programme”, as a footnote explained, was weapons design and covert enrich-
ment of weapons-grade uranium. It had not stopped the enrichment of uranium – 
ostensibly for civil purposes – and the report also noted that Iran was keeping 
open the option to develop nuclear weapons. Yet when this report was released, 
the key, albeit false, takeaway was simply that Iran had halted its entire nuclear 
programme. After this report was released, international momentum for increased 
sanctions on Iran all but evaporated and the outcome was regarded as a great win 
in Iran ( Treverton 2013b ). 
Moreover, the obvious desire for policymakers to cherry-pick intelligence
that supports their policy is a grave issue. In the lead-up to the Iraq War, most
analysis concluded that an Iraq with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) did
not present a direct or immediate threat to the United States. Although there was
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proving so. Despite this, the prevailing mind-set, including of those like me who
opposed the war, was that Iraq  must possess WMD, though not nuclear weap-
ons. In that climate, it was difficult for any analysts to make the argument that
Iraq had no WMD of any kind, and too easy for policymakers to accept infor-
mation supporting their beliefs, including from discredited sources like Curve
Ball ( Heazle 2010 ).
New competitors, new colleagues 
Intelligence has always worried about the competition. A generation ago, the 
competition was CNN: was intelligence always to be scooped by CNN? (I always 
thought that concern was misplaced: better to get it right than get it wrong, first). 
Now, though, the list of sophisticated private organizations doing “intelligence” 
is a long one, from Eurasia Group through Bloomberg and Oxford Analytica to 
Stratford. 
The Russian intervention in the 2016 US elections came as a surprise, but it 
should not have. There was warning but from an unfamiliar quarter. A group of 
analysts outside government was tracking the online dimensions of the jihadists 
and the Syrian civil war when they came upon interesting anomalies as early as 
2014. When experts criticized the Assad regime online, they were immediately 
attacked by armies of trolls on Facebook and Twitter. Unrolling the network of 
the trolls revealed they were a new version of “honeypots”, presenting themselves 
as attractive young women eager to discuss issues with Americans, especially 
those involved in national security. The analysts made the connection to Russia 
but found it impossible, that early, to get anyone in the American government to 
pay attention, given the crises competing for both policy and intelligence attention 
( Weisburd, Watts, and Berger 2016 ). 
The cyber arena is also a striking example of the change. In the traditional 
process, if a major hack occurred, it would fall to the Intelligence Community 
to attribute it to the perpetrator. Afterwards, policy would decide on a response, 
name and shame, seek indictments or whatever. Now, however, that tidy process 
is disrupted, for while intelligence is doing attribution, so too are a host of private 
companies. And they will not be shy about identifying the perpetrator, never mind 
what the government might prefer. In the short run, this seems competition; in the 
long run, I hope it will become creative collaboration. 
One of the Intelligence Community’s greatest challenges is ensuring it remains 
useful to policy makers, when they show a marked interest in other sources. 
Dealing with the Trump train wreck, especially truth as malleable 
So much for the future of intelligence in normal times. Like many Americans, I 
thought the pressure of governing would compel Mr. Trump to behave like a more 
usual president, despite the deep distrust in the bureaucracy of the Intelligence 
Community he had expressed during the campaign. But he did not; he was more 










288 Gregory F. Treverton 
The most visible damage, one which the new Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI), Avril Haines, emphasized in her confirmation hearings, was to the morale 
of the workforce, especially that of the Office of the DNI. 7 It is one thing to suf-
fer the privations of money and lifestyle to serve as an intelligence officer if you 
feel your work is valuable and recognized as such. Who would do it, though, if 
your work was dissed and you were at risk of being thrown under the bus for any 
deviation from the party line in a blatantly politicized ODNI? The three-letter 
agencies, CIA and its kin, were mostly, though not entirely, shielded from the 
political manipulations, so the damage is less there. For the ODNI, the simple 
fact of working for a president who values intelligence and a director who doesn’t 
dismiss or twist it should restore morale fairly quickly. The longer term cost in the 
coin of those who left or shunned intelligence service is harder to reckon. 
The January 6, 2021 riots at the Capitol underscored the need to reshape 
domestic intelligence, a need reflected in the president’s charge to the director 
later in the month to produce a thorough assessment of domestic terrorism. White 
supremacist groups were responsible for 41 or 61 terrorist incidents in the first 
eight months of 2020.8 Yet the nation’s sprawling counterterrorism apparatus, 
while adapting, remains preoccupied with Islamic terrorism, not to mention the 
former president’s continual conjurings, virtually all baseless, of “antifa terror-
ism” on the left. 
More broadly, domestic intelligence continues to be something of a stepchild 
in the US Intelligence Community, which is dominated by agencies, like CIA and 
NSA, whose mandate and mindset are limited to “foreign” intelligence. The rag-
gedy connections among the “domestic” agencies, especially FBI and DHS, and 
between them and state and local law enforcement were, sadly, all too apparent 
on January 6. 
The last challenge is existential, for intelligence now faces a world not just 
of “false” facts and presidential tweets of bald disinformation, and the prospect 
that “truth” will be widely regarded as personal, or political, or partisan, but also 
one in which the very concept of truth – that empirical realities can validate or 
invalidate spoken statements – is under assault. One of the great paradoxes of our 
times is that all the wonderful technology created to connect people has ended up 
segmenting them into “echo chambers” in which they hear only what they want 
and learn only what they already thought. 
In passing, while I came to admire the marble entrance hall at the CIA, I’ve 
always found the Biblical quotation from John – “ye shall know the truth, and 
the truth shall set you free” – odd, and oddly placed there. Intelligence, still more 
than other endeavours, has always known how elusive the truth can be. And our 
language, like “true enough”, is mirrored in the distinction between intelligence 
and law enforcement: true enough for policy is a looser standard than true enough 
for a court of law. And in effect, and sometimes in intent, intelligence’s truth is 
more likely to constrain policy than to “set it free”. 
So far, I see no better response for intelligence than to double down on try-
ing to distinguish what is likely true from what is not. False facts, in principle, 
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it well: “The greatest challenge . . . is building the trust and confidence necessary 
to protect the American people. To be effective, the DNI must never shy away 
from speaking truth to power – even, especially, when doing so may be inconve-
nient or difficult. To safeguard the integrity of our Intelligence Community, the 
DNI must insist that, when it comes to intelligence, there is simply no place for 
politics – ever. 9 
The question is: will anyone listen? I fervently hope so. 
Notes 
1 I thank Stephen Chesterman for valuable research and comment in the final preparation 
of this article. 
2 For an assessment of what it would take for the United States to both think and act more 
strategically, and for examples of when the country has, see  Hutchings and Treverton 
(2018 ). 
3 The only country to develop its own nuclear arsenal, and later denuclearize is South 
Africa in 1989. At that time the apartheid was coming to an end and South Africa was 
working on ending its pariah status in the International Community. There are no clear 
parallels between the democratizing South Africa and ever authoritarian North Korea 
( Friedman 2017 ). 
4 For more on this topic see Tetlock and Gardner (2015 ). 
5 On red-teaming, see  Zenko (2015 ). 
6 For a thorough introduction to ABI, see  Biltgen and Ryan (2015 ). 
7 The hearings, including her statement, are available at www.intelligence.senate.gov/ 
hearings/open-hearing-nomination-avril-haines-be-director-national-intelligence . 
8 CSIS Issue Brief, The War Comes Home: The Evolution of Domestic Terrorism in the 
United States, October 22, 2020, available at www.csis.org/analysis/war-comes-home-
evolution-domestic-terrorism-united-states. 
9 Haines, cited earlier. 
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